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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent decades, a population of Gypsies, Ciganos, living in Bahia, who call themselves 
Calon, have been specializing in lending money on interest.  The thesis argues that the 
development of Cigano money-lending niche is a Calon assimilation of recent changes 
brought about by monetization of daily life transforming the Bahian tradition of seeing 
them as trickster-figures.  Several recent developments have increased demand for cash 
in the Bahian interior and small-town life is now characterized by a dense financial net of 
various credit/debt forms – formal and informal, novel and traditional.  In this context 
Ciganos-as-moneylenders are one of many existing credit institutions. Going beyond the 
“demand side”, the thesis explores Calon concepts and social organization of credit.  It 
argues that money in money-lending serves both as a medium of exchange, and as a way 
to create an environment for Calon social reproduction.  Through manipulating 
pragmatics of credit/debt Calon forge themselves as moral persons and create proper 
sociality. 
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brother, Renato, and four sisters, Rita, Carla, Sara and Genilsa, all of 
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Viviane A woman from respected, but poor, family, she married Eduardo at the 
age of 13. During my fieldwork she turns 30.  
Kiko Eduardo’s older son in his early 20s. After Viviane married his father, he 
was raised by his paternal grandparents. Kiko is married to Paula with 
whom he has a son during my stay. He also kills a non-Gypsy to protect 
his father and his family, which causes the dissolution of the Calon 
settlement in Santaluz. 
Paula Kiko’s wife in her early 20s. She becomes the best friend of my wife, 
Adriana. 
Romero Eduardo’s and Viviane’s son, in his late teens. During my fieldwork his 
parents are trying to arrange his marriage.  
Renato Renato, Eduardo’s older brother, infamous for losing all his property in 
gambling. Married three times he has four children with his current wife. 
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Maluco Maluco lives with a non-Gypsy woman. His mother died when he was a 
child and his father spent many years in prison. Maluco is one of my 
closest friends and my best informant. 
Djalma When we arrive, Djalma, in his early 50s is the strong-man of a camp in 
Santaluz. A keen trader, originally from the sertão, he is raising an 
adopted son along with his wife, Maria.  
Paulo and Rita Paulo, in his mid 50s, is blind. He is the author of many stories in 
this thesis and is often the most willing to explain things to me. His sister 
is married to Djalma and his wife, Rita, is Eduardo’s oldest sister. 
Pancho  and Genilsa Pancho is in his late 30s and is married to Eduardo’s youngest 
sister Genilsa with whom he has two daughters. Always on the look-out 
for another deal, he moves his household between settlements often. 
Zezinho and Sara From Eduardo’s family, Sara is Adriana’s and my favourite 
person. When we arrive, Zezinho is a strongman in São Gabriel, one of the 
settlements that I visit most frequently, but he passes away a year later, 
and the camp disintegrates.  
Beiju and Carla Beiju, in his mid 50s, is one of the most respected Calon in the 
area, with a history of violent confrontations. He is married to Eduardo’s 
sister, Carla.  
Sirley Beiju’s and Carla’s son, in his early 20s. He is married and has a baby son.  
 Faustão and Pinto During most of the fieldwork, brothers Fastão and Pinto live in the 
camp in Santaluz alongside their parents and fraternal uncles. For six years 
Faustão has been married to Daiane, but they have not had any success 
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with having children. Younger brother, Pinto, who is seen by many as a 
coward and not a very skilled trader, is married to Sandra and they have a 
baby during my fieldwork.  
Índio Índio is the poorest Calon in the camp in Santaluz. He is married to 
Iracema and has one son, Romão, in his mid teens.  
Adair The strongman in a Calon settlement in Alto de Bela Vista, in his mid 30s. 
He and the people in his settlements are my hosts on various occasions. 
With his wife he has two children. He is Paula’s maternal uncle. 
Nelson Nelson is Adair’s younger brother. Married to Sara’s younger daughter, 
they have two small daughters.  
Diego A non-Gypsy who works for Eduardo’s family as a middleman. He lives 
in Parnamirim with his wife and five children. 
Afonso and Malu Afonso is a retired oil worker, who together with his wife, Malu, 
runs a small bar nearby the “Gypsy street” where I spend a lot of time. 
They have four children. Afonso passes away while I write up the thesis 
and the bar is turned into a Pentecostal church.  
Joanna Joanna is a poor non-Gypsy woman in her mid 20s. She has three children 
with three different men and works as a cleaner. 
Gilson Gilson is a high-school teacher in his late 40s. 
Galeguinho  A non Gypsy. Probably the biggest moneylender in Santaluz. 
Seu Raimundo A non-Gypsy moneylender in Santaluz. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The Bankers of the Sertão” 
Santaluz is that little Bahian town familiar to admirers of Jorge Amado, and to readers of 
ethnographies or of travel writing: a place of women-headed households, of loud music, 
singing songs about passions gone wrong, and of Pentecostal churches springing up on 
every street corner. When you ask its inhabitants, they will tell you nothing ever changes 
here: Two families still alternate occupying the mayoral post, dividing the town into 
opposing blocks during every election campaign. Some complain that in contrast with 
Salvador or Cachoeira where the heritage is valorised, here old buildings are replaced by 
“cocós” (shit, rubbish), Candomblé remains a macumba (black magic), and Capoeira a 
pastime of moleques (mischievous street kids). Even the benefits of Lula’s two 
presidencies have yet to be felt in Santaluz. 
The town appears to illustrate a cliché about Brazil as an unfulfilled promise of 
progress. Many inhabitants have black and white pictures of a steam engine that used to 
run through the town and of the town’s centre as it looked sometime in the mid-twentieth 
century. They lament that today the only thing Santaluz is good for are its curiós, 
songbirds, that you can buy on the ugliest looking market place I visited in Bahia – a 
murky crowded place covered by pieces of tarpaulin besides a dirty river. But the new 
market place, feira nova, built by the mayor eight year ago, never took off as it was built 
far from the centre and nobody ever goes there. 
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Santaluz feels like that place in-between. It lies between two regions that 
dominate the image of the Brazilian North-East – between the sugar-producing region 
around the Bay of all Saints, Recôncavo, and the semi-arid hinterlands, the sertão. The 
soil around the town is still relatively rich, and the area was inhabited by independent 
peasants who used to supply the plantations with foodstuffs to feed slaves. The market 
that evolved in Santaluz, also served as a place where sertanejos could sell their animals. 
Its role in provisioning was so important that in the nineteenth century maroons 
(quilombolas) often attacked the town, especially in periods of heightened confrontation 
with authorities. Today it feels like a place in-between for a different reason; you can 
perceive it when you climb any small hill surrounding the town. The main BA road 
passes the town’s outskirts with traffic heading towards Santo António, Valença, Feira de 
Santana, Valença, and Salvador. Because most do not have any reason to stop here, 
Santaluz is that place marginalised by being besides the road.  
In fact, a great deal has changed. The pictures of the old town are circulated via 
the internet, and sometimes the curiós are confiscated by IBAMA, the federal 
environment agency. The monetary and welfare policies of the past 20 years have 
affected the social rubric of the town – cash and official credit play more important roles 
today than in the past. Some people tell you that before elections, especially the local 
ones, they try to sell their votes.  Old peasants receive retirement benefits for rural 
workers, their children apply for federal loans managed by the syndicate of rural workers 
and if their grandchildren go to school, the family also receives bolsa família, a 
conditional family benefit.   The government – federal, state and local – is now the 
biggest employer, and members of the burgeoning “middle class C” buy on instalments 
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or take up consumer loans. Inhabitants rent houses to the employees of large companies 
that operate in the area; many inhabitants are also employed there. Shops sell on credit as 
before, but besides more traditional caderninhos (notebooks), notas promissórias 
(promissory notes) and cobradores (debt collectors), many accept cheques, credit cards 
and have their crediários (credit databases) connected to Federal credit history agencies. 
As well as relying on patrons, friends or churches, families draw on the host of novel 
credit institutions – from a state micro credit scheme provided by the town hall to non-
bank financial institutions.  In fact, most of the new ugly “cocós” that replaced old 
buildings on the main square are banks. And if you know what to look for, on the same 
square you will also notice small groups of Ciganos, Gypsies, always willing to lend 
money without paperwork.  
Neither Amado’s novels nor the works of non-fiction talk much about Ciganos, 
but the inhabitants of Santaluz have a lot to say about them. They tell you that Ciganos 
are rich, that Cigano weddings last three days, that Ciganos steal children. Or somebody 
recalls a story about an unfortunate who made a deal in which he was tricked by Ciganos, 
a version of which you have heard many times already.  
Ciganos have been living around Santaluz for centuries. A few early nineteenth-
century judicial documents mention them as dealers and thieves of slaves or animals. 
Talking about the second half of the twentieth century, people describe how Gypsies 
known as Ciganos Turcos, or tacheiros, used to stop for a few days selling their copper 
pots and pans (tacho) throughout the town, or how the Ciganos tropeiros (traders with 
animals, caravaneers) used to settle for periods of few months on a property of some 
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fazendeiro (landowner) or another, trading in animals – and stealing chickens along the 
way. 
The people of Santaluz will tell you that Ciganos do not travel anymore, and that 
although a few of them still live in tents, they increasingly live in houses. That is because 
they stopped trading with animals and became moneylenders, agiotas, instead. Through 
loans, Ciganos acquired property while having “many people in their hands”. This 
recognition of Ciganos as a source of credit in the Bahian interior has been such, that the 
financial section of Folha de São Paulo called them ‘the bankers of the sertão’.1  
In this thesis, I try to describe this phenomenon. Centred on the money-lending 
practices of Ciganos, who call themselves Calon, whom I got to know in Santaluz, this 
thesis describes the functioning of the Cigano money-lending niche. In other words, how 
in the early twenty-first century Bahia “Cigano” became a recognised credit institution 
and even a synonym for a moneylender, and how this activity relates to the sociality of 
the Calon. The thesis can thus be understood at two levels. First, it builds on the literature 
on Gypsy economic activities. Secondly, it contributes more generally to an 
anthropological understanding of credit, especially in the era after structural adjustment. 
In the following section I introduce the central theoretical concerns pertaining to both 
areas.   
 
Financialisation and Credit/Debt 
Looking at the long-term cycle, Graeber (2011) describes how after Nixon suspended the 
dollar’s peg to gold an era of virtual money began. Placing it in a longue durée cyclical 
                                                 
1
 Billi, Marcelo. No sertão da Bahia, cigano é "banqueiro", Caderno Dinheiro, Folha de São Paulo, 
12.06.2005. 
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perspective where credit alternates with bullion, the era we are living in contrasts with the 
previous one that relied on powerful empires to keep the value standard of their money 
stable. Focusing on how monetary interactions between individuals are shaped by states 
and markets, Keith Hart (2000) argues that the great twentieth century experiment of 
impersonal markets is over. The money system reached such proportions that no state is 
able to control it anymore. The circulation of money is now detached from production 
and trade, while new technologies make access to information easier. The end result is 
the proliferation of credit money, or money as personalised credit tied to one’s social 
position.  
On one level, my dissertation elaborates on these themes of the rise of virtual 
money and life being increasingly dependent on forms of personalised credit. On another 
level, it focuses the picture by showing how these processes depend on state intervention, 
i.e. how access to personalised credit, from official as well as unofficial sources, 
increasingly depends “on impersonal governments and corporations, on impersonal 
abstraction of the sort associated with computing operations and on impersonal standards 
and social guarantees for contractual exchange” (Hart 2008) . Certainly, state regulation, 
starting with the structural adjustment programme, privatisation and monetarist policies, 
were influenced by the nature of the world economy in the era of “savage money” that 
was launched by Nixon’s decision (Gregory 1997). As a consequence, as I will argue, 
official measures engendered the proliferation of forms of credit which unsettled previous 
standards of value and bases of wealth.   
In the past ten years, life in the Bahian interior has been marked by economic 
growth accompanied by intensive “financialisation” (Gregory 2009). That is, today 
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official financial institutions play an increasingly prominent and even dominant role in 
the everyday flow of wealth and provision of money. Some authors use these terms 
differently. Graeber (2011: 376), for instance, equates financialisation with neo-
liberalism, while Ansell (2010: 283-294) calls it monetisation. I prefer to reserve the term 
financialisation to describe the formalisation of financial flows. At the same time I 
recognise that money does not refer only to state money and that life in a small market 
town in the former colony tied to the world market has been monetised since the earliest 
era.  
The picture that emerges is, therefore, known from other parts of the world. In 
Brazil, as in many parts of the world, the impact of the structural adjustment programmes 
of the 1980s which saw the collapse of local cottage industries, increased demand for 
cash and rising inequalities, had to be ameliorated by new forms of social programmes. 
Today, bolsa família is the largest programme of the so-called third generation welfare in 
the world. Every month beneficiaries need only to swipe their card in a federal financial 
institution. Writing about South Africa, James Ferguson (2007: 71-86) argued that this 
sort of welfare arrangement is one of a number of “neoliberal moves” that can be 
variously combined. He also questions the conventional oppositions and associations 
(e.g. between neoliberalism and social payments), while bringing the formal and informal 
into a redefined relation: the money comes directly from the state, requires documents 
and bank accounts, but unlike previous state welfare policies, it does not use full 
employment as a ““normal” frame of reference” (Ferguson 2007: 82).  In fact, as 
Ferguson points out, this sort of humanitarian social transfer accepts the informality. This 
is a tendency which is visible in other areas. For instance, in Brazil as with elsewhere in 
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the world, tapping into informal economies via micro-credit schemes expanded the social 
space of state while redisciplining people in a neoliberal fashion (Elyachar 2002: 493-
513;Ansell 2007). In a process of piece-meal formalisation (Guyer 2004: 157), the moves 
fix some arrangements while opening space for new arrangements, questioning and 
negotiations.  
The point I want to make is that the state intervened in directing and creating 
flows of money. Here economic and political liberalisation – neo-liberalism and re-
democratisation – have engendered a new “distributional regime” (James 2012: 22) with 
the state at its centre. For instance, “formalisalisation” brought about by CCTs required 
expansion of the network of state-run banks, ATMs, lottery houses and social services. 
Initiatives such as agricultural lending schemes providing productive credit required the 
creation of cooperatives and expansion of bank services. All this led to the formation and 
stimulation of new financial institutions – primarily of credit, but also of savings and 
insurance.  
In addition, unlike in other countries that underwent structural adjustment, Brazil 
relied on its state-owned banks rather than on private banks. Eventually, services were 
extended beyond providing a social safety net and productive credit. “Banking the people 
that were formerly unbanked”, became the primary target of the state project understood 
as a process of “financial democracy”. This meant the extension of consumer and 
productive credit, which, in combination with economic growth, resulted in shifts in 
social make-up of the country.  The following summary from the newspaper Bloomberg 
Business gives some idea of changes: 
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“During President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva's eight years in power, from 
2003-2011, 24.5 million people officially escaped poverty, and 35.5 million 
moved into the lowest rung of the middle class, the so-called Class C, earning 
$1,100 to $3,900 a month, according to researchers at the Getúlio Vargas 
Foundation university. For these strivers, credit abounds for the first time. Total 
consumer loans rose sixfold over the past eight years, to $495 billion, and jumped 
from 24 percent of gross domestic product in 2003 to 46 percent today, according 
to the central bank. About a fifth of these loans are paid by automatic deduction 
from paychecks. Since 2004, bank credit cards have tripled, to 159.5 million, and 
retailer cards have nearly quadrupled, to 233.5 million. The average interest rate 
on credit cards is 238 percent annually, while loans from retailers cost 85 percent, 
and personal loans from banks 47 percent.”2 
 
The new “middle class C”, which today means household earning between 
R$1,200 and R$5,174, became the show-case for the success of the policy – in the North 
East, which includes Bahia, it increased 80 percent in seven years. 3 These people enter 
the labour market with earnings slightly higher than the minimum wage and today are 
responsible for most credit in small towns like Santaluz. At the same time, in August 
2011 “consumer debt defaults […] are now up 29.2 percent from a year ago. Credit 
                                                 
2
 Harry Maurer and Alexander Ragir Brazil's New Middle Class Goes on a Spree, Bloomberg business, 
12.5.2011 <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_21/b4229010792956.htm>, last accessed 
30 April 2012. See also, Leahy, Joe Brazil’s tale of two middle classes, Financial Times, 20.7.2011 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6745ef9a-b1e9-11e0-a06c-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1qUd3orss>, last accessed 
30 April 2012.  
3
 Classe média no Nordeste aumentou 80% em sete anos, n.d., 
<http://www.sae.gov.br/novaclassemedia/?p=236>, last accessed 30 April 2012. 
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demand is slowing from last year.”4 Although there is some moral panic over 
conspicuous consumption,5 most money is spent on improving or constructing private 
houses. Experiencing upward mobility, members of the “middle class C” petition the 
state for investment in services such as health care and education. Their increasing 
indebtedness is due to their lack of savings and relatively low wages, which hinders their 
effort to keep up their newly acquired lifestyle. Because a large portion of their salaries is 
tied up with direct deduction from pay cheques (crédito consignado), they increasingly 
turn to illegal moneylenders.  
These observations are similar to those Deborah James made for South Africa 
(2012: 20-40). She shows that our understanding of the neo-liberal distributional regime 
should include middle-income groups and moneylenders. The redistribution could 
potentially extend even further, creating ever new flows (37). In South Africa, contrary to 
prevalent policy opinion, most people in debt are not the poor, but the so-called “black 
diamonds”, public service employees who emerged in the process of democratisation. 
The emergence of this class led to intensifying of registered and unregistered money-
lending practices. People often approach illegal moneylenders after their access to official 
sources was blocked or when they are pressured by these sources. Many moneylenders 
are also public service employees themselves, using their stable income to finance their 
loan making. James observes that both official sources of credit and unofficial 
moneylenders rely on official infrastructure: “The readiness with which both are able to 
                                                 
4
 Colitt, Raymond Brazil's middle-class economic miracle at risk, Reuters, 23.9.2011 
<http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/09/23/idINIndia-59511820110923>, last accessed 30 April 2012. 
5
 Brazilian anthropologist Roberto DaMatta argues that behind this moral panic lies Brazilian resistance to 
equality: "Our love for titles and hierarchy is part of our Portuguese heritage. People here want to be seen 
as different, as superior to the others, and don't like mixing" (Cabral, Paulo Brazil divided over an emerging 
middle class, BBC News Magazine, 10.11.2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15668275>, last 
accessed 1 May 2012).  
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reach into one’s bank account and take the money owed – whether with confiscated ATM 
cards or ‘garnishee’ orders – make them almost indistinguishable in the eyes of the 
overindebted” (36). 
Although in Brazil the state via its banks created its own lending schemes for 
public employees, and the punishment for default does not compare to the “garnishee 
orders” in South Africa, the picture is similar. Here too, the “middle class C” are the main 
category of borrowers. Although moneylenders existed in the past, they have proliferated 
in recent years alongside a broad variety of official credit institutions tapping into official 
sources and flows of money.  To explore these processes of diversion, which arose from 
the novel “distributional regime”, I focus on the point of view of ethnic credit-providers, 
on the functioning of the Cigano niche. 
 
Cigano Money-Lending Niche 
For those acquainted with literature on Gypsy economies, my use of the term niche might 
call for an explanation. As I will describe soon, my use is inspired by Guyer’s 
theorisation of “niche economy” (1997). Specifically, through use of this concept I try to 
draw a picture of an interstice within which Calon money-lending could flourish. 
Although this interstice belongs to the economic system, it is created through concrete 
processes through which Calon confer to it dimensions, stability and consistency (e.g. 
Pignarre and Stengers 2011: 110). In other words, only under specific milieu – economic 
conditions, flows of wealth and discourse about good and bad debt and so on – could 
Ciganos and agiotas become synonyms. At the same time, the image of Ciganos as 
moneylenders and interaction between them and their non-Gypsy neighbours is 
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historically determined and displays certain cultural logic. And from the point of view of 
the Calon, lending money on interest plays a role in creating sociality and forging moral 
persons. Through the term niche I try to describe the complexity involved in the 
emergence of the recognisable Cigano economic specialisation, while simultaneously 
accepting its temporal and geographical specificity, and without reducing the process any 
single underlying cause.  
Previously, other scholars also used the term “niche” in connection with the 
economic activities of the Gypsies, but their meaning differed from mine. Calon can be 
said to occupy “a peripatetic niche”, a term elaborated by Joseph Berland, Matt Salo and 
Aparna Rao (e.g. Berland and Salo 1986: 1-7; Rao 1987: 1-32). Here, “the peripatetic 
strategy consists basically of combining spatial mobility and non-subsistent 
commercialism at the economic level with endogamy at the social level” (Rao 1987: 3). 
The niche, then, refers to a “mutable demands for goods and/or services that other 
communities consider inaccessible or cannot, or will not, support on permanent basis” 
(Berland and Rao 2004: 4, italics removed). Similarly, although she does not use the 
word “peripatetic”, Judith Okely (1979: 17-34; 1983) understands the “niche” of the 
English Travellers as the employment of skills to exploit a broad range of opportunities 
and to strike an advantageous “chop”, in an environment where demand is irregular. In 
this view a niche is seen as a “specialised mode of subsistence”, “a resource 
exploitation”, where mobile communities provide for geographically dispersed customers 
(Rao 1987: 1-32). The Calon niche fits these characteristics: they are endogamous (at 
least in ideology), they do not consider their places of residence as permanent, and they 
provide usurious loans to a clientele dispersed across a broader area. 
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The use of a term “peripatetics” to describe Gypsies, and of “a peripatetic niche” 
to describe their economic specialisation, has not gone unchallenged. As Leonardo 
Piasere pointed out recently, in this case Gypsies have proved to behave as sociological 
tricksters and escape this category as soon as it was forged (Piasere 2011: 77). To be sure 
there was the potential for this to happen since the beginning: to fit the ethnographic data 
and to avoid reductionism, in the introduction to a volume on peripatetic communities, 
Rao (1987: 1-32) redefined the criteria – mobility, marginality, endogamy, self-
employment, and symbiosis – as continuums, leaving them, it turn, rather hollow.  
The main problem is that such uses focused on the “demand side” of the niche 
and referred essentially to consumers. In other words, they took the non-Gypsies as the 
starting point.6 As Piasere (e.g. 1986: 1-4) points out, such approaches reduce Gypsy 
adaptation to economic and ecologic determinants, without looking into meanings and 
social organisation that gave rise to things analysts perceived as the “peripatetic niche” in 
the first place. Thus Piasere (1992: 279-291) agrees with Rao (1987: 11) about the 
importance of ideology to analyse any specific case of peripatetics, but while Rao focuses 
on the majority “setting”, Piasere discusses varying conceptualisations and forms of 
sociality among Gypsies. He shows, for example, that three Gypsy populations living 
among the same non-Gypsies create three different modes of “resource exploitation” 
(Piasere 1992) and that the organisation of production and distribution can differ within 
one population of Gypsies in one country (Piasere 1987: 111-132;see also Grill 2011: 79-
102). 
                                                 
6
 This is true even of work of Judith Okely (1979: 17-34) that describes a complicated system of impression 
and ethnicity management, and shows that the Travellers are aware of how they are viewed by the non-
Gypsies and manipulate the non-Gypsy gaze. 
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It is therefore important to look at the “supply” side of the niche, i.e. what the 
conceptual apparatus and social relations behind any niche specialisation are. Piasere’s 
work, which focuses on different exchanges among the Slovensko Roma in Italy, and 
between the Roma and the gage is one example (Piasere 1985). However, the main 
inspiration comes from the work of Michael Stewart (1987; 1997) among the Vlach Rom 
in Hungary. Although these were not “peripatetic” Gypsies, and their main source of 
income was factory labour, their ideological preference was for deals in the market place. 
Stewart demonstrates how wheeling and dealing among the gadze is linked to the ways in 
which the Rom conceptualise the relationship between gender, fertility, money and work 
(see especially Stewart 1994: 45-62). Although the language of resistance he uses seems 
to me inapplicable to Bahian Calon, his work is particularly useful in order to understand 
the ways Gypsies appropriate some elements of their surrounding and give them different 
meanings, even if they seem to be doing the same things as their neighbours.   
My use of the term “niche” is based on my understanding of the concept as used 
by Jane Guyer in An African Niche Economy (1997). Dissatisfied with capitalist theories 
of the market, she uses the term to describe a process of competitive proliferation specific 
to Yoruba economic thought, where internal specialisation of interconnected niches 
accounts for a capability of the farming sector to provide for the expanding cities.   My 
work is much more limited in scope and ambition, and I can only start to sketch “what 
kind of an economic world” Bahians “think of themselves as living” (Guyer 2004: 175). 
But I take from her work the understanding of niche as “specialist production”, with its 
product definitions, standardisations, expertise and replication, and that which is created 
via the medium of money, that is, fully grounded in a commercial economy. For instance, 
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Calon are aware of being seen as Ciganos, while borrowing money from them follows 
specific logarithms of interests, potentiality of violence or use of collateral, which make 
this credit institution different from others available in a small town Bahia. In her 
reflections upon the term “niche”, Guyer recognises that although she was driven by 
keeping close to her ethnographic material, the concept turned out to resemble a 
Simmelian social form (Simmel 1972): “[social forms] are recognisable, and often 
named; they constrain and orient thought and action; they are specific, transposable, 
translatable; and they are small, dependent only very generally on larger social structures 
or economic conditions in an encompassing sense” (Guyer 2004: 177). 
There is a slight irony here. In their later work Berland and Rao tried to reinterpret 
the “peripatetics” using the concept of the Stranger, a Simmelian social type (Berland and 
Rao 2004: 1-29;Simmel 1950). They correctly argue that Simmel understood the Stranger 
as a positive relation, a specific form of interaction. But by focusing on things such as the 
“low social status” of the peripatetics or resourcefulness as a form of “adaptation”, they 
nevertheless side with those Simmelians they criticise. They focus on relationships of the 
Stranger ignoring that the Stranger, or any social form, is a relational term, a “form of 
sociation”, not a specific person, not a “content” (Berland and Rao 2004: 6). 
Fundamentally, they are not Simmelian enough and accept the Stranger as somebody 
coming from outside. The point should be, rather, to show how this “form of union based 
on interaction” (Simmel 1972: 143) is composed of a specific mix of closeness and 
remoteness involved in every human relationship. Put otherwise, any recognisable social 
form is a “positive manifestation of specific forms of interactions” (Ibid.), which gives a 
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fluid content of life its meaning. Social form is the way people locate themselves in 
continuity of life (e.g. Guyer 2004: 177).  
In this thesis, I understand Cigano in Bahia as one such recognisable social 
“form”, the “content” of which changed over time – today it is moneylending. Money, of 
course, is the Simmelian tool of sociation, of negotiating distance and closeness, par 
excellence. It allows for the transgression of one’s physical limits and the expansion of 
one’s capacities in time and space (see also Hart 2000). This thesis shows how in a 
process through which Calon and other Bahians impose determinate identities on 
monetary flows created by new distributional regime, the Cigano niche emerges, and 
which, co-ordinately, allows Calon to gain value – money and moral distinctiveness from 
the non-Gypsies – through niche threshold. 
 
Ciganos and Calon, Brasileiros and Juróns 
This thesis is premised on the idea that the positionality in exchange is crucial. 
Specifically, that there is a difference between a Calon man lending money to a non-
Gypsy client and the same man lending to another Calon. This is not simply a question of 
ethnic distinction, but the very process through which Calon remain Calon. When lending 
money to a non-Gypsy the man takes into account views the non-Gypsy has of Ciganos. 
On the other hand, loans and exchanges between two Calon force the non-Gypsies into 
the background and focus instead on creating proper sociality. Writing about the 
Slovensko Roma in Italy, Zatta and Piasere illustrate what is at stake:  
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“From a strictly semantic point of view, the distinction Roma/Gaĝe does not 
correspond exactly to that of Gypsies/non-Gypsies. The area denoted by the term 
Roma, as it is used by a Rom, and of the term Gypsies, as it is used by a non-
Gypsy, intersect for a large part, but they do not correspond totally. To this 
semantic discontinuity corresponds a far more important gap in perceptions: For a 
Rom the Roma/Gaĝo distinction is the fundamental distinction; the Gaĝe are the 
“outside” by definition. For a non-Gypsy, the Gypsy is an “other” among many, a 
“marginal man” among many, a bit of folklore among many; in our case, a thief 
among many. The perceptions are asymmetrical and they reflect the way of life of 
the Roma in respect to the Gaĝe” (1990: 165). 
 
The authors distinguish between an idea of an ethnic group (a non-Gypsy view), 
and between Gypsyness as the adherence to a way of life and forms of evaluating 
behaviour where the gaĝe serve as the “outside”.7 I do not think that their Bahian 
neighbours see Ciganos as a minority, or that Calon feel in confronted as a people against 
the majority or somehow “besieged” (Stewart 1997). Nevertheless, even in Bahia the 
difference between the two ways of marking difference – internal and external – is 
reflected in terminology: it is a difference between thinking of oneself as Cigano/Cigana 
and as Calon/Calin.  
                                                 
7
 This can have curious consequences. For instance, Elisabeth Tauber notes how impossible it is for Sinti in 
Italy to explain to authorities that their family cannot move to the same campi nomadi where there is a 
different Sinti family, who have different “own deceased” with different modalities of respect. This respect 
is the basis of Sinti sociality and survival of Sinti as Sinti, and could be accidentaly violated if put together 
in a place reserved for “the Gypsies”. Instead, they have to withstand being compared to behaving as 
children by authorities, in other words, for failing to behave as a (ethnic) group (Tauber 2006: 40 ft38).  
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Compare these two situations: “Ciganos are like this. If there is a pot of beans 
everybody eats together, until there is not a single grain left.” Here the speaker compares 
the behaviour of Ciganos to their non-Gypsy neighbours; in fact we were standing 
besides the non-Gypsies and the Calon soon switched to Romani. Their neighbours or the 
authorities recognise them only as Ciganos. On the other hand, when during a household 
conflict the same man calls his wife “Calin doida (mad Calin)” because she is criticising 
him for a bad deal; the focus is on a proper gender relationship. Although not a rigid rule 
and Cigano is used more explicitly, in the thesis I have tried to preserve the sense of them 
as relational categories. The distinction might seem scholastic, but it has theoretical 
implications. Additionally, through using these terms I hope to better convey the 
performative nature of Caloninity and make visible its relation to what Zatta and Piasere 
call the non-Gypsy “outside”. 
The point to remember is this: the non-Gypsies generally do not know the word 
“Calon” and only use “Cigano”. Therefore, in the thesis when I speak from the non-
Gypsy point of view (e.g. in popular representation or official documents) or describe an 
interaction with non-Gypsies (physical or symbolic), I use the term Cigano 
(masc.)/Cigana (fem.) and their derivatives. I use italics to make it clear that it is a 
Portuguese word and as with any local term it is context-specific. When I write about 
personhood and sociality among these Bahian Gypsies, I use the term Calon 
(masc.)/Calin (fem.) and its derivatives (e.g. Caloninity). I also use the term Calon as a 
name for a specific Gypsy population, alongside the Sinti, Roma, Travellers, etc. I 
reserve the term Gypsy to denote a sociological category, especially when drawing 
comparisons with other Gypsy populations. I use the distinction Gypsy/non-Gypsy only 
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in situations when I, as a gringo in a Bahian town, am the privileged observer describing 
an interaction between Ciganos and others. 
But concepts describing non-Gypsies also differ. Again, to retain the dynamic 
flavour of exchanges – in which performances, representations and switching frames of 
interactions matter – I relied on the terms of distinction used by the Calon. Most non-
Gypsies in Bahia know that Ciganos call them gajão (and its variations gajon, gajona, 
gajin, gajinha). It can be used as a form of address marking the separation, e.g. ‘do me a 
favour, gajão.’ But the Calon I knew hardly ever used this term. Instead, when talking to 
their clients, friends or strangers, they used proper names or forms of address common in 
Bahia (a senhora, o doutor, and so on). They never used gajão when talking about non-
Gypsies among themselves. Moreover, in a classically Bahian style, subversive of fixed 
categories and hierarchies, the non-Gypsies appropriated this expression and address 
Ciganos as gajons.8  
To talk about non-Gypsies, Calon use mostly brasileiros and jurón/s. They are 
generally interchangeable although there are slight differences. Firstly, terms jurón/jurin 
(sg.) and their equivalents hurón/hurin or burnón/burnin, are the most frequent. 
Alongside the word “Calon” itself, these are among the first words a Calon child learns; 
among the Bahian Calon it comes with a hand sign. Secondly, they never use it when 
addressing or in a presence of a non-Gypsy and most Bahians do not know that they are 
referred to as juróns. I was always struck by how strict the use of terms was: when 
talking to another Calon they could refer to a client as a “jurón” one moment, but when a 
non-Gypsy asked a question the client would become a “brasileiro”. Non-gypsies also 
                                                 
8
 For example, in Os Ciganos, a story which takes place in cocoa-producing Southern Bahia, the author 
refers to Cigano characters as “gajona”, “gajoninha”, “gajões” (Neto 2006: 65-78). 
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know that they are referred to as brasileiros, since Calon use it when, for instance, they 
try to contrast their lives to the non-Gypsies. Third, brasileiros is often used in the plural. 
It works as a kind of a background for comparison. When a group of Calon was 
commenting on the looseness of sexual mores of non-Gypsy women, one Calin 
exclaimed that “all brasileiras are galinhas (hens).” Fourth and related to this, jurón is 
used to denote a specific person or people. For instance, ‘a jurón on TV did this or that’, 
‘I bought this from a jurón on the street´ and ‘he was there in the middle of juróns’.  
I will therefore stick to these terms to convey atmosphere of interactions. To 
summarise then, it could be said that there are three pairs of terms that I use, which do not 
overlap completely: Cigano/brasileiro (or gajão), Calon/jurón and Gypsy/non-Gypsy. 
When the Calon were talking about Adriana (my wife) or me in our presence, they most 
often used the diminutive: ‘give huronzinho/huronzinha something to eat’. But we were 
not brasileiros. When I asked whether Adriana was also a galinha, the woman responded 
that of course she wasn’t, but she was ‘a gringa’, the term used in Bahia to denote 
foreigners in general. This apparently explained our weirdness.  
 
Fieldwork Setting 
Since I set out to understand the money-lending niche from both the “demand” and 
“supply” sides, I planned to do research both with Calon creditors and their non-Gypsy 
debtors. Many Bahians told me that Ciganos were cold and that I should not trust them. 
My teacher of Portuguese in Salvador, for instance, could not understand why I was 
interested in this topic and how I was planning to do it. She told me about her friend 
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whose household disintegrated after the family was threatened by Cigano moneylenders, 
but she refused to give me any more details. 
Not knowing what to expect, I planned to split my research into two parts: the 
major part was to consist of research among Calon; then I planned to move to another 
town to do research with clients of Ciganos. The move proved to be unnecessary and I 
stayed for eighteen months in Santaluz; I spent another five months in settlements 
elsewhere or in Salvador doing archival research. In fact, after a while, clients of Ciganos 
did not mind talking about their financial lives as much as I had thought. This was also 
made possible, at least partially, because thirteen months into my fieldwork, while I was 
back in London organising my visa, all the local Calon left the town. When I returned, 
neither of the two settlements which I knew best were where I had left them. It was not 
difficult to find out where the people went, but it allowed me to move to the centre of 
Santaluz, and focus on the research among the non-Gypsies.  
Santaluz is the geographical centre of my research. Only two hours from 
Salvador, it is a small town, with a total population of about 25.000, out of which about 
10.000 live in the rural area surrounding the town. It was one of the towns I visited 
during the pilot research and I imagined that I could somehow keep it all in my head. A 
Calon settlement was of average size and the very first non-Gypsy person I asked told me 
that Ciganos were “extremely rich”. I started my fieldwork in June 2008 and was 
prepared to leave Santaluz if the Calon did not accept me and gave myself three months 
to find a suitable fieldwork site.  
I am still grateful to Ana Lucia and Cleide from the tourist office. When I arrived 
in Santaluz, I rented a room in a hostel and on the second day I visited the office to learn 
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something about the town. When I told the two women, what I was planning to do, they 
were excited about the idea of a “gringo researcher” and agreed to take me to the house 
of Eduardo Cigano, who they told me was the “chefe of the Ciganos here”. Not knowing 
what being a chefe entailed, I agreed.  
When we came on the first evening, Eduardo was not home. Through the closed 
gate, I only talked to his wife who told me to come back the next day, around four. I 
came the next day and then the day after, but I never managed to catch Eduardo at home. 
It was rainy season; I was soaked and annoyed. On the fourth day I came again and 
Eduardo’s wife told me to wait that her husband would come back soon. I had been 
waiting for an hour or so, sitting in front of a shop nearby, when she yelled from her gate 
at me to go and talk to a guy who just walked, not to her house, but to a house nearby. He 
seemed to be expecting me. I asked him whether he had a few minutes and whether he 
was Eduardo. He confirmed this. When I explained to him that I planned to learn about 
Cigano life and learn the language, he was extremely helpful – he said he would teach me 
and I could come anytime to talk to them. We agreed that I could start after the weekend.  
When I arrived on Monday I had to wait in front of the shop again. Then two 
motorcycle taxis arrived – one with Eduardo and the second with another man. Once 
Eduardo got off, without paying any attention to me he left. The second man just called 
me into the house where “Eduardo’s wife” handed him a towel. I was confused. As it 
turned out, the man I had talked to last week was not Eduardo, but his brother Renato – 
Renato basically lied to me. So I introduced myself again and explained to the real 
Eduardo what I was planning to do. Unlike his brother, he was not supportive and 
dismissed all of my plans. It was impossible to learn the language; there was nothing 
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special about Ciganos. He was intimidating but not rude, then he was rude but not 
intimidating, then he was nice but vague, and afterwards bored and uninterested. I 
continued explaining my plan; it was pouring again anyway and I had no desire to walk 
to the hostel. Finally Eduardo told me that I could come any time to chat with them.  
In the following weeks, the situation repeated itself with most Calon – I was 
ignored or coaxed with friendliness, lied to and intimidated, often within one discussion. 
With a friendly air, for instance, people would start speaking at me in chibi, a form of 
Romani, seemingly explaining something to me or asking me a question, obviously aware 
that I did not have a clue. And I kept explaining to them, often with feigned excitement, 
that this was exactly the point, that I came there to learn. Or, we arranged to meet but 
nobody came. Just as I had envisioned, it took me three months and much frustration to 
settle somehow after all, although I never had to leave Santaluz.   
One of the things Eduardo told me that first day was that if I wanted to become a 
Cigano, I had to move to a house near them, to spend time with Ciganos and my wife 
should wear Cigana dresses. He was right in a sense. Although Adriana would not 
exchange her shorts for warm dresses, renting a house on the same street turned out to be 
crucial. Viviane, Eduardo’s wife, told me about the house which was exactly opposite 
theirs, on the street colloquially known as Rua dos Ciganos, the Street of the Gypsies. 
The Gypsies have lived there for decades; two Calon houses were on this street and a 
camp composed of about twelve tents was only about 50 metres down a muddy side road. 
As soon as we opened our door, we became part of the street’s activities. Early in the 
morning the Calon men would be sitting in front of their houses, drinking their morning 
coffee and discussing plans. During market days, the Calin in colourful dresses passed by 
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on their way to the town’s centre to read palms. They returned just before noon carrying 
grocery shopping on their heads. Non-Gypsy clients appeared. After lunch, cars blasting 
música sertaneja from speakers filling the entire trunks arrived packed with Calon from 
other settlements. Sometimes whole families came; at other times only men arrived to 
play cards. 
It is the lives of the Calon around Rua dos Ciganos, those living in tents in the 
camp as well as those living in the houses, which I describe in this thesis. These Calon 
were related through bilateral kinship, which also connected them to people living in 
other settlements within the region. I got to know the extended families of Eduardo and 
Viviane best. When I arrived, they lived in four settlements about 40 kilometres away on 
average. I spent much time accompanying somebody from Eduardo’s family going for a 
visit, to make a deal or to play a card game. When I left two years later, only one of those 
settlements was still in the same place. This is an important aspect to point out: at the 
beginning, and when I did research among the non-Gypsies, Santaluz was my 
geographical focus, my site. But as I got to know Calon better, individual towns receded 
and a different spatiality of the Calon emerged.  
Naturally, my understanding of the Calon in Bahia is influenced by what I know 
about Eduardo’s family, and sometimes I worry that the dilemmas and contradictions, 
aspirations and values that I identified as somehow inherent to Calon sociality, could be 
specific to this family alone. There was a rich Calon and his wife whom his siblings 
blamed for standing between him and his family. There was a gambler who lost his house 
with his rather invisible wife. There was an honourable man who never had much “luck” 
in deals and his shrewd wife who is the only one who still owes me money. There was a 
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valiant man who had killed five people and his tough wife who knew how to recognise a 
good weapon. There was a man who enjoyed deals more than anybody else I knew, and 
his wife who was known for her magical skills.  
But maybe that is precisely the point: in a sociality that is not based on 
transcendent rules and offices and that relies on individual performances, people 
themselves become indexes of archetypal behaviour (cf. Gay y Blasco 2011: 445-461). 
People’s behaviour is fraught with tensions, contradictions and possibilities of multiple 
interpretations. They are jealously watched and talked about, and most of the thesis 
revolves around varied assessments of thresholds when behaviour threatens to slip into 
something else: When does an unpaid loan become not only an abuse of trust, but also a 
sign of hierarchy? When does it become a “theft”? When does masculine performance on 
the market go against household interests? When is money-lending among kin a 
recognition of autonomy and equality, and when does it denote dependency and 
hierarchy?  
A network of Cigano settlements in the early twenty-first century Bahia that 
emerged during my fieldwork, “a gap” (décalage, Williams 2003) in the midst of 
brasileiros within which Calon tried to behave as Calon, became the factual setting for 
my fieldwork.  
 
On Methodology 
No-one in Bahia sits quite as much as the Calon. And during my fieldwork I too, became 
a professional sitter: in the morning I sat with men watching the cockerels that they 
brought out to warm up in the sun; an hour later I sat in somebody’s house or in a tent. 
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Before sitting down for lunch I often joined somebody on his visit to a client, or, more 
often, to another Calon settlement. There I spent a few hours sitting with others. There 
were periods when I spent endless weeks sitting (or standing) behind men sitting (or 
leaning against a table) playing cards.  
 
 
Picture 0.1         Sitting in the shade of a tent 
 
No-one in Bahia sits quite as socially as the Calon. Elena, a friend of mine living 
in Salvador, once quipped that seen from Bahia, plastic chairs were the world’s most 
important invention. In a properly Gypsy-like fashion, when non-Gypsy objects (things 
or ideas) are appropriated to create a Gypsy way of life, I sometimes imagine that without 
plastic chairs there would be no Calon. Whenever they were not going to town, visiting 
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somebody, cooking or cleaning – all of which took a couple of hours a day at most – 
people spent whole days sitting in front of their own or other people’s houses and tents. 
For a man living in a camp it worked roughly like this: you woke up and while your wife 
was making the morning coffee and sweeping the tent floor, you sat and talked to her 
about your plans. Or you dragged your plastic chair to sit beside another man, let’s call 
him B, who was doing the same. Somebody from a different settlement came to visit C. 
Without a word you dragged your chair there; a minute later B dragged his. Now all of 
you were sitting talking to the visitor. But talking was not necessary. If there were no 
visitors, or nothing to talk about, men were just as happy to sit together quietly. After a 
while you stood up, picked up your chair and without any word you dragged your chair to 
sit with D in front of his tent. 
So if my evidence in this thesis makes it sound as if I am always sitting 
somewhere, participating in the background, it is because it was true. Yet the curious 
thing is that everybody else participates in the background and things only “happen” 
thanks to this. After a while of sitting with others, two men would decide to swap their 
watches or to go and play cards; they might call men sitting in other settlements to join 
them. And suddenly, somebody would win of lose a lot of money. People drag their 
chairs not only to talk and listen to newcomers, but to hear better whenever those in the 
neighbouring tent are arguing. As a guest you drag your chair away from the group of 
men to the table, where the mistress of the house sets food out for you. Although you 
invite everybody else to join, the “locals” respond that they have already eaten and stay 
put. It feels as if you needed this multitude of Calon bodies to highlight what they 
treasured the most:  when through movement or action they behaved as Calon; for 
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instance, hosting one another or striking a deal with one another. Thus, we were sitting by 
the fire one evening when a man came to borrow a gun. A minute later, the whole 
settlement was in motion with my wife, four months pregnant, still sitting on a plastic 
chair in the middle of a group of agitated Calon. 
 Here I should also note that in this “happening world”, organised around events 
and radically open towards the everyday, there is constant potential for violence. In order 
to avoid voyeurism or confirming negative stereotypes and although I will come back to 
it in later, I should pause here and state a few words about Calon violence in Bahia. Over 
time I realised that it is an important organising principle. On the one hand, in Bahia in 
general there is a growing criminal violence linked to drug trafficking and easy access to 
guns. This feeds into established cultural practices which connect lower-class masculinity 
to gun-ownership, of personal relations seen as volatile and of one’s family name 
sometimes confirmed in feuding. On the other hand, violence among Calon serves a 
double purpose. Danger presented by brasileiros who should not be trusted, akin to “state 
of siege mentality” described by Stewart in case of the Hungarian Rom (Stewart 1997), 
serves to deny sociability and to mark moral distinctiveness between Calon and 
brasileiros; in other words, it marks off the outside. But it also is a tool of sociality and, 
along with gender, generation and kinship, it creates a heterogeneous inside. All male 
Ciganos are expected to show valour and to be ready to defend their honour with 
violence if necessary. For same reasons, contact with unknown Calon is avoided, lest 
misunderstandings and accidental violations of respect lead to violence. Younger men are 
more “hot-headed” (cabeça quente) than older ones, although the strength (força) of the 
latter depend on their capacity to amass support in case of conflicts and especially in 
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blood-feuds. Violent acts also turn kin into enemies and demarcate one’s home range. 
Violence, like moneylending, is thus an independent tool which serves to negotiate 
relationships with the outside and to create moments for forging of moral persons.   
To come back to sitting: It became my fieldwork technique. I learned to circulate 
among the houses and tents, talking to people or just observing. I carried a small 
notebook in my cargo shorts, in which I jotted down key words or phrases. Sometimes, 
especially during card games, I used my mobile phone to record – I had to be 
inconspicuous, not only because of the tense emotions, but also so as not to be accused of 
ruining somebody’s luck; most of the time, however, I became bored before anybody 
could accuse me of this. Just like with other Gypsies, more formal research techniques 
have proved unsuitable (see also Stewart 1987: 33).9 All attempts at arranging formal 
interviews failed. I never got beyond asking more than three consecutive questions while 
the answers to those questions that I was most interested in, were mostly monosyllabic, 
evasive or both. Without the possibility of surveys, things like collecting genealogies 
proved difficult and I essentially had to remember to return to the topic on several 
occasions. Keeping a systematic overview became particularly difficult whenever I tried 
to track down specific exchange histories and trajectory of objects.  
Whenever I felt that I had enough information or that I would not remember 
everything I left for my house; eventually without a word, just like everybody else when 
dragging their chair. But with the Calon in Santaluz it took me a while to reach their level 
of fluidity, when I did not feel obliged to use any greetings, forms of address, parting 
words or to explain and justify myself. Once at home, I wrote more extensive notes, 
                                                 
9
 This should not be seen as a rule. Elisabeth Tauber used her notebook openly throughout her research 
(pers. comm. 2012). 
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which I converted into proper field notes the following morning before I stepped out to 
Rua dos Ciganos. 
I used more formal research techniques only during the second part of my 
fieldwork when I interviewed representatives of credit institutions (banks, shops, 
syndicates and so on) and people linked to moneylending (debt collectors, moneylenders, 
middlemen). It helped that I was living in the town’s centre and spent less time with the 
Calon who lived elsewhere. I also interviewed several non-Gypsies – in a few cases 
several times – about their financial lives, focusing on their network of credit/debt. Prior 
to the fieldwork, and whenever I spend a longer period in Salvador, I conducted research 
in the Municipal Archive and the Geographical and Historical Institute in Salvador 
looking for historical source on Ciganos. For short periods I hired two assistants to do 
this, but they were not committed enough.  
Although I had already started studying Portuguese in London, I learned it only in 
Salvador when I took a three month course. With hindsight, the biggest shortcoming of 
my preparation was that I never took a course in standardised Romani. This would have 
allowed me to grasp the developments and the style of the form of Romani spoken by the 
Calon. They call it chibi, meaning a language in Romani, or língua, meaning a tongue in 
Portuguese.  
In a sense on that first day I met him Eduardo was right – I could never learn it, I 
could only pick out some words. Only slowly did I understand that it was not a language 
in the way I thought of one – the Calon did not think of it as I did, as one language among 
many with a limited (however large) number of words that could be learned from flash 
cards. In fact, chibi also includes Portuguese words with nuanced meanings and hand 
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signals. It should be seen as a part of the never-ending process of becoming a better 
Calon (Ferrari 2010;see also Matras, Gardner, Jones, and Schulman 2007: 142-184). The 
contradiction between Eduardo’s blunt refusal of my capability to learn and Renato’s 
excitement to teach me was a sign of this character of chibi. And during my fieldwork 
people were willing to teach me for money, taught me a few words for free, declined to 
teach me, told others not to teach me, inquired why I did not hire anybody teach me, and 
were pleased, surprised and amused whenever I understood what they were saying. But I 
am still not able to speak it properly. More broadly, these contrasting views on teaching 
me chibi point to Caloninity as being based on ethical practice, which opens a space for 
questioning and evaluating one’s behaviour and its meaning, rather than on a set of fixed 
rules.  
I have to stress that my thesis is essentially about Calon men; I followed the 
marriage negotiations of young men – still boys in my eyes; I observed deals and card 
games of middle-aged heads of households; I partied with young men; and sat in the 
shade listening to the stories of the oldest ones. In a way my thesis complements Ferrari’s 
work (2010) which is more about women. But the research turned out the way it did 
thanks to Adriana, my wife. Although she spent most of her time in Salvador, she came 
to Santaluz every week or so and stayed for a few days. She became a real friend to many 
people, and told me a lot about the world of the women, to which I had only indirect 
access (see also Stewart 1987: 33-34). Unlike men who seemed to be focused on the 
present unfolding of the future, women were much more willing to talk about their lives 
in narratives, to describe relationships and changes. It put Adriana in a difficult position 
occasionally as she tried to be a friend, a feminist, and a researcher’s wife at the same 
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time. She also used the term jurón/jurin happily in conversation with Calon, which often 
confused them. Sometimes she came home telling me that she knew a secret from this or 
that woman, but she was told not to tell me. But as things go in relationships, I knew that 
what she actually meant was that she really wanted to tell it to me. I promise I only used 
Adriana to triangulate what I had already discovered myself.   
 
Thesis outline 
The thesis is about how Calon create value across niche thresholds, through acting as 
Cigano moneylenders.  Although monetary gain is crucial, through constant 
transformations of money gained from brasileiros and through manipulating the 
pragmatics of credit/debt, they also create themselves as moral persons.  Ultimately, the 
thesis attempts to describe the resilience of the Gypsies and their capability to adapt to a 
changing environment while remaining Gypsies; rather than about making a living, it is 
about a way of life. 
The thesis is broadly divided into three parts. The first part (Chapter I) establishes 
something that might look obvious, but needs explanation: in order for Ciganos to be able 
to specialise as moneylenders, there have to be Ciganos in the first place – as a 
recognisable category with a certain history of interaction. The second part (Chapter II 
and III) explores the “demand side” of the niche. It describes the proliferation of credit 
institutions in the past decades, and the rich financial life created by credit/debt that 
people navigate. Seen from this angle, Ciganos are one among several credit institutions. 
The major part (Chapters IV through VIII) of the dissertation describes the “supply side” 
as it were – how moneylending is organised by the Calon and how it fits their sociality. It 
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argues that through moneylending, men forge themselves as proper Calon and through an 
ever-changing number of deals among themselves, which are always tied with future 
obligations, create Calon spaces. And the last Chapter VIII complements Chapters I 
through III by looking at how the Calon manage their economic exchanges with the non-
Gypsies.  
In Chapter I, I look into various inflections of “Cigano” in Brazil.  In the first part 
I describe the development of the Ciganologia Brasileira, Brazilian Gypsiology.  
Although the scholarly interest in Ciganos started in the nineteenth century and since the 
1980s there has been a proliferation of academic works, the studies remain 
ethnographically poor and theoretically underdeveloped. In the second part I look at the 
history of Ciganos as an object of state policies.  The eighteenth-century deportations of 
Ciganos from Portugal were part of a state-building project, but during most of Brazilian 
history only local authorities paid any attention to them.  In the third part I argue that 
Bahians, ever-suspicious of categorical engagement, see Ciganos as a trickster-figure and 
not a Simmelian Stranger, as Gypsies have been often described in the European 
scholarship. 
I start Chapter II with my walk from my house in the centre of the town to the 
main square, passing places where different forms of credit/debt can be arranged, 
individuals who make a living through arranging credit and different financial 
institutions.  I discuss a view dominant among Brazilian scholars that Brazilians have a 
cultural distrust of money.  I show that these authors understand money in a narrow sense 
as state money, but have failed to perceive alternative currencies and the richness of 
credit institutions that always underlined life in Brazil, i.e. money as credit.  The process 
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of financialisation has increased the local demand for cash which has led to the 
proliferation of financial institutions created by the state and the people, which function 
alongside more traditional ones. 
Chapter III describes how people manoeuvre and combine these various credit 
institutions. It revolves around on three case-studies of inhabitants who come from 
different social backgrounds but represent the majority of inhabitants of the town. I draw 
a picture of dense financial network, where at any moment people have various 
credit/debt relationships.  The last section looks at the institution of the moneylender, 
agiota, and how this form of diverting wealth depends on flows of the (neo-liberal) 
distributional regime. The last part describes the Cigano as a specific kind of 
moneylender.  
Chapter IV turns to the Calon.  I describe Calon spatiality and how the character 
of settlements relates to kinship, movement and constant potentiality of violence.  
Organised around strong-men, settlements – composed of varying combination of tents 
and houses – are unstable assemblages of bilaterally related kin.  Settlements do not 
possess identity beyond households that create them and cannot be understood without 
links to households in other settlements.  Although there is a slight preference for 
virilocality and patrilocality, people often move between settlements within the region 
where their relatives and known Calon live. I show that reasons for moving vary, ranging 
from boredom, through economic opportunities, to violence.  The constant potentiality of 
violence destabilises temporary arrangements of settlements and through feuding delimits 
the space any Calon can use.  
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Zooming into settlements, Chapter V has Calon households as its theme.  By 
telling the story of Eduardo’s family over two years, I describe the constant effort that 
goes into the establishment and stabilising of households, and argue that the ties that 
make Calon families strong are also the ones that cause their fragility.  I follow how this 
family tried to re-establish itself after fleeing the town and the imprisonment of their 
older son, all the while trying to arrange their younger son’s marriage.  My concern here 
is to reveal the role of money and monetary debts. I argue (pace Holbraad 2005: 231-
254), that the amount of money in loans to juróns, as Calon call the non-Gypsies, which 
is envisioned by people as a multiplicity, serves to register relationships with others.  I 
show how the creation of this environment relates to money’s role in the life cycle of 
Calon households: men use money given in dowry to establish themselves through 
individual exchanges with the juróns.  Their efficacy is most visible in helping to find 
and stabilise the households of their children.  
How one’s actions, such as deals on the street, are perceived by others is crucial 
and Chapter VI describes some means of evaluating men’s behaviour.  First, Calon use an 
expression “to make the future” to describe a capacity to behave as a ‘man of action’, 
attuned to his environment and ready to seize his opportunities.  This behaviour places 
each man between a besta (Port.), a beast of burden, associated with children and non-
Gypsies, and the dead, morto (Port.) or mulon (Rom.), who do not enter into exchange 
relationships anymore. Secondly, a Calon man has to be able to show his valour and back 
up his claims with physical force whenever appropriate.  Thirdly, there is a distinction 
between the poor and the rich and I argue that, rather than a class, they mark temporary 
states; Calon believe that these could be changed when a proper opportunity is seized. I 
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discuss strength, força, as the last, and composite, means of evaluation.  A strong-man 
lives in the centre of a settlement and inspires others to live around him, has money, can 
create opportunities and is willing to stand up himself or is capable to mobilize others.  
His opposite is a widow, who as an index of a dead man, is dependent on others and lives 
in the outskirts of a settlement.    
Chapters VII and VIII return to the question of moneylending from the point of 
view of the Calon. In Chapter VII, I argue that the Calon world is created through 
constant proliferations of deals among themselves.  Sales and loans always result in an 
agreement to pay a sum of money in the future, creating an ever-changing network of 
future obligations, or rather hopes for future behaviours. Building on their strong sense of 
autonomy, Calon focus on acts of payment or renegotiation, rather than on promises to 
repay; on “exchange” rather than “hierarchy” (Graeber 2010; 2011).  I trace various types 
of deferred exchanges among the Calon and show how they create “morally informed 
spaces of interaction” (McCallum 2003: 71): small subsistence loans define relations 
within the settlement, loans defined as “help” mark relationships of parents to their 
children and between affines, “deals” are done with people from one’s broader region and 
one never borrows from an enemy.   
By focusing on how Calon manage their loans to juróns, in the last chapter I 
connect Calon sociality to the themes discussed in the first three chapters.  I argue that 
although the clients of the Calon come from all social backgrounds, the majority come 
from new middle classes who are trying to preserve their newly acquired status.  Calon 
are aware of their cold and money-driven image, and manipulate it, in order to ensure that 
their loans remain “impersonal” (Hart 2005) and do not turn into other forms of 
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reciprocity.  Unlike in the deals between Calon men, women and other family members 
also become involved.  The ideal is one of a life without effort, when through an unequal 
relationship money flows one way to Cigano households from long-term non-Gypsy 
clients; the most successful men, who have the most secure position vis-à-vis brasileiros 
of any town, also usually become strong-men of settlements.  Due to contingencies of 
life, throughout their lives households build up a network of clients spread across the 
whole region.  Yet, I show their loans are often unsuccessful and especially those loans 
that were meant to bring large gain often threaten men with equally spectacular failures.  
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I. GYPSIES IN BRAZIL, THE BRAZILIAN GYPSIES: CIGANOS IN SOCIAL 
SCIENCE, HISTORICAL SOURCES AND POPULAR REPRESENTATIONS 
 
Introduction 
The date was 9th of December 2009. It was the first day of the State Meeting of 
Traditional People and Communities (Encontro Estadual de Povos e 
Comunidades Tradicionais). The lobby of the hotel in Salvador was full of 
colours: pais and mães de Santo – priests and priestesses of Afro-Brazilian 
religions – all in white with large bead collars around their necks; shepherds from 
the sertão with small round leather hats; Indians dressed sparingly in leather and 
adorned with feathers; Ciganas in colourful dresses, fingers heavy with golden 
rings; maroons in capoeira trousers. The aim of the meeting was to draft a plan for 
the sustainable development of communities identified as traditional by the state 
of Bahia – quilombolas (maroons), indígenas (indigenous people), extrativistas 
(women who gather from mangrove swamps), pescadores artesanais (traditional 
fishermen), comunidades de fundo e fecho de pasto (the herdsmen of the sertão 
who hold pastures in common ownership), povos de terreiro (the people of 
Candomblé terreiros) and Ciganos.          
After the opening, representatives of each community hailed the 
participants and offered rituals to bring about the meeting’s success. First, the 
indigenous representatives greeted their ancestors singing and dancing clockwise. 
Then, the people of Candomblé formed a semi-circle and sang to Orixás, 
especially the Orixá of communication. The Ciganos were called up next. They 
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lined up in the front facing the audience. Jucelho Dantas, their spokesman, 
explained that this was the first time, that Ciganos were present at a meeting like 
this and because of their lack of similar experience and the history of exclusion, 
Ciganos do not have any special ritual for such occasions. Calon have jaimpem, 
Jucelho continued, a lament for the deceased or relatives who do not live in the 
same camp sung in the “evening by the fire”, but nobody here knew how to sing 
it. Instead he prayed in “Romani”, the language that “has many dialects” and has 
been used by Ciganos for centuries “to protect themselves from persecution”. 
When they turned to leave, Neide de Oliveira whispered something to Jucelho and 
the Ciganos stopped. From a leaflet she then read out a prayer to Santa Sara Kali, 
“the patron-saint of Ciganos”.  
 
This event documents a process through which in the early twenty-first-century 
Brazil, Ciganos, defined as a traditional community, are becoming an object of state 
intervention. A proposal for the National Programme of Human Rights (2002), for 
instance, specifically identified “the situation of the Ciganos” among those areas of 
human rights that had previously not received adequate attention and in 2006 the 
Ministry of Culture included them in its list of Traditional Peoples and Communities. 
Such recognition is a state-led initiative, and Cigano representatives were identified and 
selected by the authorities themselves. Unlike the maroons, indigenous peoples, and 
Candomblé practitioners, the Calon do not have a tradition of grass-roots self-
organisation, or a history of struggle for land-rights and cultural recognition.  
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People like Jucelho are only learning the language of the contemporary version of 
Brazilian multiculturalism and often draw inspiration from scholarly works about 
Ciganos. Later during the event Jucelho read out a statement that started with the history 
of Cigano arrival to Brazil and the Holocaust and described the past of nomadism and 
fires, invisibility and persecution.  Here, such things a mention of chicken stealing, that 
one Calon representative jokingly proposed as a part of their history, had to be omitted. 
They were aware of this popular image. In fact, in the final document drafted at the 
meeting, the fight against the negative image became the only point pertaining 
specifically to Ciganos. Jucelho’s mention of the Holocaust and his description of 
Romani betray the influence of academia and of the pan-Romani political movement. 
During my two-year fieldwork, not once did the Calon I spent almost two years with 
made a reference to the Second World War or Europe, nor did they use the term 
“Romani” to talk about their language. 
But there is still a lot to learn. In the current mode of identity politics in Brazil, 
ritual and dress become central for defining cultural difference based on “representing” 
one’s culture for others. Although during the meeting, Ciganos could be clearly 
recognised by dresses of their women and their language, the opening salutation led to a 
small crisis. Jucelho succeeded in justifying their incapability, by pointing to Cigano 
social and political marginalisation, even suggesting that jaimpem could serve as a public 
condensation of the Cigano culture. I am curious about this development, since Jucelho 
and his brother had failed to record jaimpem10 in the past.   
                                                 
10
 The Calon in Bahia do not know the meaning of the word. Linguistically it is based on the verb "džal" 
meaning 'to go', and the nominal suffix 'ipe', thus it means a journey (Yaron Matras, pers. comm. July 8, 
2011). 
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The prayer read by Neide is different, because it builds on images easily 
recognisable by the audience. Neide, a non-Gypsy, was raised by a Rom family related to 
Miriam Stanescon, a Roma activist and a fortune-teller in Rio de Janeiro. Thanks to 
Miriam’s activities, the presidential decree of 2006 declared the day of St. Sara, March 
24, the National Day of Ciganos. Miriam also promotes a certain vision of Gypsyness, 
which is characteristic of large urban centres such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, but 
uses symbols foreign to Bahian Calon. Cigano culture is seen through so-called Cigano 
dances, fortune-telling, violin music and magic and it also fits with image of Cigano 
spirits in Umbanda, a Brazilian syncretic religion (e.g. Bomfim da Fonseca 2002;Vos 
2006). Miriam, who was also present at some workshops prior to the meeting, is also the 
author of the prayer to St. Sara read out by Neide.  
I describe this incident, because in a condensed manner it demonstrates how 
multifaceted and ambiguous the image of Ciganos in present-day Bahia is. Although this 
is a specific kind of event, in everyday life Calon also have to negotiate ways they have 
been viewed and characterised by Brazilians. In this chapter I describe three ways of 
framing Ciganos. First, I provide a brief overview of Ciganologia, as Romani Studies is 
known in Brazil. I then turn to outlining the history of Ciganos in Bahia complemented in 
some cases by sources from other parts of Brazil. The third section deals with the Cigano 
as a stock character of the Bahian social universe.  
 
1.1 Ciganologia Brasileira 
 
“Popular books and reviews ignore them,” wrote Richard Burton, a co-founder of the 
Anthropological Society of London, “but the peasantry regard them with disgust and 
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religious dread” (1898: 284). This observation about Ciganos has held true for over a 
century now. Although they live in most Bahian towns and everybody has something to 
say about them, it is difficult to find any academic studies about Ciganos. Bookshops 
carry esoteric books on Cigano spirits, magic or millennial culture, but the only scholarly 
books available are an anthology of essays (Mota 2004) , a reprint of two books from a 
nineteenth-century folklorist (Moraes Filho 1981) and a history of Ciganos in Minas 
Gerais (Teixeira 2007a).  
Yet, the “scholarly” interest in Ciganos started relatively early. On 4 May 1839 
members of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute, amateur scholars from 
among the elite listened to a presentation about Ciganos in Brazil (1839: 134). In 1885 
and 1886 Alexander José de Mello Moraes Filho, who prior to the abolition of slavery 
was the only person to study African cultures in Brazil (Skidmore 1993: 57), published 
the first books on Ciganos. A folklorist, he was the immediate predecessor of a growing 
group of intellectuals who aimed to stimulate national pride on the basis of Brazilian 
traditions. In his work on Ciganos, valuable mostly for its descriptions of life rituals, he 
tried to carve out a space for them, alongside the three constitutive races. The only 
attempt at any comprehensive study of Ciganos in Brazil up to today – Os Ciganos do 
Brasil by Oliveira China – was published in 1936. Although tedious and repetitive he 
connects ethnographic, historical data and linguistic material collected through network 
of his collaborators in diverse regions of Brazil.  
Despite the good reception of these works, after 1936 Ciganos appeared only in a 
few articles in regional journals, or as a side note in works on folklore and on street argot 
(see also Cairus 2012). Moreover, most folklorists denied the special role of Ciganos 
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arguing, that superstitions that Moraes Filho attributed to Ciganos, were in fact of a 
broader Iberian origin (Gouveira 1926, in Bettencourt 1957: 32) and that although 
Ciganos were a separate “race”, they had not influenced in any way “the spirit of our 
people” (Magalhães 1960: 17ft 6 [1939]).   
Published master’s dissertations by ethnographers Locatelli (1981) and Sant’Ana 
(1983), mark the beginning of the academic interest in Ciganos; it is related to the 
opening of discussion on minorities and ethnicity in Brazil and the process of re-
democratisation. In fact, in recent years, many anthropologists have also been personally 
involved: For instance, Frans Moonen, a founder of the Núcleo de Estudos Ciganos, 
accused Miriam Stanescon - with whom he was in the 2006 working group on Cigano 
cultures (Grupo de Trabalho Culturas Ciganas) of the Ministry of Culture – of  ‘self-
promoting’ ‘false’ leadership; and in 2009 Patricia Goldfarb and Erisvelton Sávio Melo 
were among the researchers of the Brazilian North-East, who denounced systematic 
violation of the human rights of traditional populations. 
About two dozen theses and dissertations in history, geography and anthropology 
have been written about Ciganos after the late 1990s. Generally, the best works are 
historical or done by historians (e.g. Teixeira 2000;Alves de Souza 2006;Borges 2007).11 
Most anthropological works lack ethnographic research, create an image of the ahistorical 
diasporic people and in most cases can be salvaged only for facts. Many also codify 
certain way of writing about Ciganos. For instance, they start with the discussion of the 
Indian origin of Gypsies and their wanderings through Europe; a few available authors 
are canonised; concepts are often taken from others without context or ethnographic 
evidence. The studies that decry exoticisation of Ciganos, build uncritically on the 
                                                 
11
 For an updated list of theses and dissertations see (Moonen 2011). 
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analysis of Anti-Gypsyism in Europe and end up treating Ciganos as automatically 
marginal. For instance, anthropologist Frans Moonen, who most systematically tried to 
define Ciganologia as an academic field, specifically aimed at mapping out anti-
Gypsyism in Brazilian society and at linked it to history of the Gypsies in Europe, 
including the Holocaust (1994;2007). This becomes a challenge especially for historical 
studies that are based on shallow reading of official sources, and which end up reducing 
the history of Ciganos in Brazil to a history of persecution.  
In 2004 Patricia Goldfarb received the first PhD (in sociology) on the basis of her 
research among the Calon. Largely a reworking of her master’s dissertation, it stands out 
among other works by its use of a wealth of ethnographic data. Unfortunately, as Ferrari 
(2010: 88) correctly points out, Goldfard does not sufficiently explore Calon concepts 
and instead in her analysis uses concepts taken from non-Gypsy thought, such as 
“tradition” and “culture loss”, “nomadism” and “sedentarism”. The only ethnography that 
tries to understand how the Calon see and construct their world using their own 
conceptual apparatus is a 2010 thesis by Florencia Ferrari. It deals with the Calon notion 
of personhood and ways the difference from non-Gypsies is created. Since in my thesis I 
explicitly engage with Ferrari’s work, I will leave any commentaries to places where 
specific issues arise.   
Overall, it could be said that although the field of Brazilian Gypsiology, 
Ciganologia Brasileira, started already in the first years of the 1980s – i.e. not much after 
modern anthropological interest in Gypsies started, and the first ethnographies were 
published, elsewhere (e.g. Gropper 1975;Rehfish 1975;Kaprow 1978) --,  it has 
developed only weakly. No published ethnographies compare to those produced during 
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this period within the French-Italian (e.g. Williams 1984;Piasere 1985;Tauber 2006) or 
the Anglo-American (e.g. Okely 1983;Stewart 1997;Gay y Blasco 1999;Lemon 2000) 
anthropological traditions. The picture of a Cigano that emerges from the existing 
academic output in Brazil is a mixture of the “ethnographic present” described as 
tradition, stress on marginalisation, and the split between the (nomadic) past and the 
(sedentary) present. As the event in Salvador and especially of the content of Jucelho’s 
speech showed, this portrayal corresponds and informs the identity discourse on Ciganos 
as one of the traditional communities; in fact, many anthropologists today discuss 
governmental documents, foregoing the fieldwork research. As Florencia Ferrrari 
correctly observed, within Brazilian anthropology there is not a Cigano ethnography that 
could be considered a “classic” (2010: 87) and I argue elsewhere, from the point of view 
of anthropology in general, writing about Ciganos in Brazil remains rather impoverished 
(see also Ferrari and Fotta 2012).  
 
1.2 History12 
Blasphemers 
The first names of Ciganos in Bahia show up in records of the First Visit of the Holy 
Office in 1591 – eight Ciganas figure in seven denunciations as both accused (six cases) 
and accusers (five cases) (Mendonça 1925); an additional Cigana confesses within the 
period “of grace” (Mendonça 1935). Four denunciations for various blasphemies were 
against Violante Fernandes; she also confessed to saying that it rained heavily because 
God pissed on her, wanting her to drown. Other Ciganas were accused of denying the 
                                                 
12
 For a general history of Gypsies in Brazil see Os Cigano do Brasil (China 1936) and História dos 
Ciganos no Brasil (Teixeira 2007b).  
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judgement day, of renunciation of God and of sorcery. These Inquisition documents also 
reveal a few things about lives of these Gypsy women: most were married to Ciganos; 
some worked as peddlers of second-hand goods (adellas); one Cigano couple served as 
jailers. Overall, there seems nothing unusual about the treatment of Ciganas or suggestive 
of special association with heretical or magical practices. Rather, the cases reflect popular 
religiosity in the colony more generally, which preoccupied the religious authorities in 
the first place (Souza 2003). But since out of seven accusations four were by one Cigana 
against another, one can speculate about the distance from non-Gypsies and the intensity 
of relations among the Ciganos in Salvador.13  
The Inquisition records also attest to the colonial politics of difference. People are 
classified as Old, New or Semi-new Christians; in fact, the control of proper religious 
practices of the Jewish converts (the New Christians) exiled to colonies was a prime 
motivation of the Inquisition’s visit. Their places of birth are noted. Lastly, in about ten 
percent of cases “race” is given (Quirino 1966: 34 ff) with Cigano as the only “race” 
specified for old Christians born in Portugal. Overall, these characterisations betray the 
peculiar Cigano character of being not quite white, not quite Portuguese and not quite 
Catholic.14 
                                                 
13
 Husbands of all but one ciganas were Ciganos; Angelina and Tareja claimed witnessing Violante 
blaspheming while peddling with her; and Joanna Ribeiro is accused of taking the placenta of Brianda’s 
newborn while visiting her after the delivery, then salting and hiding it in a wardrobe, which killed the 
baby.  
There is also collective effort against Maria, alias Violante, Fernandes. Of four cases when one Cigana 
accused another, three were against Violante; another was by an official of the ecclesiastical court who was 
told about Violante’s blasphemy from cigana Tareja (who heard it from cigana Angelina). Violante was a 
tough “a woman of the world”, also accused of stealing a share from a robbery from cigano Francisco.  
14
 “Race” categories of those “born” in Brazil were negro, índio, mistiço, and malemuco. 
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Although the proportion of Ciganos in the Inquisition records for Bahia is small – 
about 2 percent (Quirino 1966: 32)15, the stories of the Ciganas reveal how the Crown 
dealt with Gypsies. In Portugal of this period, the term Cigano started to denote a specific 
lifestyle and habits. As their relationship to the centres of power, the Crown and the 
Church, became increasingly problematic, Ciganos begin to be exiled overseas (Donovan 
1992: 33-53). For instance, Violante Fernandes and Apolonia de Bustamãte (both born in 
Spain) had been deported for theft of animals (Mendonça 1935: 57, 127) while the 
records note that Tareja Rois stressed that she came to Brazil on her own will (Mendonça 
1925: 400). 
 
Exiles 
The system of degredos, of royal edicts by which people were exiled to colonies or to 
galleys, reflected authorities’ preoccupations with Portugal’s underpopulation and the 
quality of its population. While the colonial empire required inhabitants and explorers, 
not everybody could be allowed to leave freely to the colonies. Those that stayed should 
be as productive as possible. Hence, “[T]he small demographic base and global 
requirements translated into a reality that each and every citizen was simply too valuable 
to waste” (Coates 2001: 188). By using degredados – prostitutes, orphans, major and 
minor criminals, New Christians and Ciganos – it was possible to populate the colonies 
in a relatively controlled manner. 
                                                 
15
 In 1618 during the second visit of the Holy Office in Bahia, only one out of 135 denounced is a Cigano 
(BNRJ 1927). 
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In connection with Ciganos, degredos developed as a part of the attempt to expel 
them from Portugal.16 In these laws Ciganos were defined broadly as those leading gypsy 
lives and sharing gypsy customs.17 In fact, only a century after Gypsies were first 
documented in the Iberian Peninsula (Saragosa, 1425) already the second law passed in 
Portugal dealing with Ciganos (1538), ordered them to leave the kingdom. Those who 
did not conform were to be deported for two years to African colonies (Costa 1999: 
56;Coelho 1892: 231). Over time, destinations for deportations changed and around 1686, 
with the opening of the Brazilian hinterland, Maranhão and Ceará replaced Africa as the 
main destination.  
As was the case with degredos in general, besides expulsion of undesirables, the 
legislation also aimed at disciplining the remaining population. For instance, the law of 
1538 already stipulated the same treatment for non-Gypsies “who live as Ciganos”. Such 
control of population became more urgent after the War of Restoration (1640-1668) when 
lack of public safety, criminality and economic recession made Ciganos into “obvious 
and non-controversial subjects of social control” (Donovan 1992: 37). In the long run, 
legislation also helped reify Ciganos as different and associated with socially undesirable 
characteristics and practices. In a law of 1708, for instance, Ciganos were accused of 
frequent theft and deceit (engano). Like the previous regulations, the law confirmed 
galleys for men and deportation for women – for Ciganos as well as those associating 
with them – unless they gave up wearing Cigano clothes, speaking Cigano language, 
                                                 
16
 For more details see: Adolpho Coelho(1892), Elisa Maria Lopes da Costa (1997;1999: 49-91;2001: 223-
232;2005: 153-181), Bill M. Donovan (1992: 33-53). 
17
 For instance, a 1686 royal letter to the judge of Elvas describes Ciganos as “sons and grandsons of the 
Portuguese but of Gypsy habits, type (género) and lifestyle” (Coelho 1892: 252).  
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practicing palmistry, living together, walking together, or trading with beasts of burden 
(Coelho 1892: 223). 
As these laws dealt differently with men and women, exile also impacted conjugal 
relations (Costa 2001: 225). In a law from 1592, for instance, Ciganos who did not leave 
the country were sent to galleys, while Ciganas were to give up Gypsy “habits” and 
language or be exiled to Brazil for life (Costa 2005: 158). The Ciganas mentioned in the 
Inquisition records already give a sense of consequences for individuals: one Cigano 
living in Salvador was rumoured to have another wife elsewhere; two Ciganas had been 
separated from the Ciganos they had lived with in Portugal; Violante claimed to be a 
widow, but apparently had a husband in galleys.  
The sheer variety of legislative measures passed in the seventeenth century aimed 
at expelling Ciganos from the kingdom shows their ineffectiveness, a fact explicitly 
recognised by the 1708 edict of a new king João V (Coelho 1892: 256). In February 1718 
he ordered that all Ciganos along the Portuguese borders be imprisoned and deported 
(Ibid. 1892: 257). Unlike before, whole families and communities were rounded up and 
no period to leave the country or a possibility of giving up a Cigano lifestyle was offered. 
On the March 10 Gazeta de Lisboa reported that 50 Ciganos, 51 Ciganas and 43 children 
were imprisoned in Limoeiro (Costa 1995: 167). Their deportation was heavily publicised 
and in combination with the usual spectacle offered by departures and arrivals of ships, it 
served as the demonstration of King’s will (Donovan 1992: 38).  
Such mass deportations continued throughout the century. The last known 
shipments from Portugal to Brazil – of 400 Ciganos – occurred in 1780 and 1786 (Ibid. 
1992: 52 ft50). The total number of Ciganos exiled as degredados is unknown as the ship 
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registers are often unavailable. There are only two registers of Ciganos arriving to 
Salvador in the Public Archive of Bahia – one of five Cigano couples and their children 
brought by a ship to Bahia in 1718,18 another of eleven Cigano couples – without 
children – on their way to Angola in 1756.19 The Archive also holds a letter dating 11 
April 1718 that accompanied the register. Addressed to the governor of Bahia, it stated 
that Cigano families would continue being shipped to Salvador, because of their 
“scandalous behaviour” in the kingdom.20 Once in Bahia, they were prohibited from 
using their language and the governor was to ensure that it was not taught to children.21 
 
Highwaymen 
In July 1719, only a year after the spectacle-deportation from Lisbon, the governor of 
Bahia ordered all captains to capture “without hesitation or any dodging” three Ciganos – 
deserters from Salvador – and a Cigana, a mother-in-law of one (BNRJ 1946: 148). As 
none of them appear on the 1718 name list, they must have arrived on different ships. In 
August of the same year, the governor sent another similar letter, and in November, he 
ordered the captains to imprison “discreetly” and “with diligence” all Ciganos and 
Ciganas, young and old (BNRJ 1946: 233). These orders betray an increasing 
preoccupation caused by the deportations of Ciganos to various Brazilian cities 
simultaneously. Larger numbers of Ciganos required employment (e.g. as soldiers), 
                                                 
18
 Arquivo Público da Bahia (APEB). Seção Colonial e Provincial, série Ordens Régias. Livro 12, doc. 46.  
19
 Arquivo Público da Bahia (APEB). Seção Colonial e Provincial, série Ordens Régias. Livro 54, doc. 65. 
20
 Accioli de (Cerqueira e Silva 1925: 155) mentions that Ciganos arrived also in January 1715, but I did 
not find any record of it. 
21
 The same letter was sent to governors of Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, Paraiba, Angola, Cabo Verde e 
São Tomé (Costa 1995:166).  
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policing and a place to live, especially since, officially, they were also prohibited from 
leaving Salvador.  
According to a letter by the Count of Arcos dated 1755, Ciganos exiled to 
Salvador settled in the Bairro da Palma, which became known as Mouraria, a place of the 
Moors, but as their population grew, they were allowed to settle in Santo Antonio Além 
do Carmo and other parts of Recôncavo (Neves 2005: 27).22 The letter was an opinion 
solicited by the Conselho Ultramarino in a case of a complaint by the municipal council 
of Salvador dating 5 July 1755; a similar complaint was sent by the council in Cachoeira 
(Cerqueira e Silva 1925: 155 ft59)). Both pleaded with King to “free them” of these 
“damned people”, who traded with horses and encouraged slaves to steal from their 
masters.  
But their main complaint was about the Ciganos’ theft of horses from caravans 
coming from Minas (Cerqueira e Silva 1925: 155). The petitions therefore have to seen in 
the context of both the preoccupation with public safety and the importance of mining. 
Gold was discovered in Minas in 1695 and although officially prohibited from entering 
Minas, there are documents showing that Ciganos from Bahia started arriving early in the 
1720s, often after being expelled by authorities there (Teixeira 2007a). The sertão, 
through which the above-mentioned caravans had to pass, remained an extremely violent 
place throughout the eighteenth century. In Minas itself, authorities blamed disorder on 
the “bad quality of the population” (Anastasia 2005: 14); regulations dealing with 
Ciganos are a part of this effort to control the “unruly” and “mobile” population, o povo 
(Schwartz 1999: 103-125), of which they were an easily identified segment. Common 
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 In a 1761 letter, the interim governors estimated the number of Gypsies at “several thousands” (Coelho 
1995, pp. 228-229). 
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complaints against Ciganos included their carrying weapons, stealing slaves and animals, 
and being salteadores dos caminhos, highwaymen, a crime that after 1766 applied to 
anybody caught wandering throughout the sertão. 
Prompted by the complaints from Salvador and other colonial authorities, on 20 
September 1760 King José I passed a charter in which he specified how “such useless 
and coarse people” should be made to take up “civilised lives”. The king ordered small 
Cigano boys to be handed over to craftsmen and men to become soldiers or to be 
employed on public works. Ciganos were not permitted to wander, to carry arms, to live 
together in one neighbourhood, to trade with slaves and beasts of burden. Those that 
broke this law were to be deported to São Tomé and Príncipe summarily (Coelho 1892: 
262). A year later, in October 1761, the interim governors of Bahia reported that 
“Ciganos want to take up ordered lives, because they are being imprisoned all over the 
country. […] totally give up their illicit trade and libertine lives”. They admitted, 
however, that boys were rarely handed to craftsmen, because they married very early 
(BNRJ 1909: 482). 
 
Itinerant Traders 
Up until now the sources that I have reviewed have dealt primarily with criminalisation 
and disciplining of Ciganos, representatives of an undesirable lifestyle. Starting in the 
nineteenth century, however, thanks to Brazilian memoirists and foreign travellers we can 
catch glimpses of the Cigano way of life. Travelling through Pernambuco in the late 
1830s, George Gardner made this observation:  
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“[Ciganos] seldom come near the large towns of the coast preferring more thinly 
inhabited, and consequently more lawless districts; they wander from farm to 
farm, and from village to village, buying, selling, and exchanging horses and 
various articles of jewellery; like those of Europe they are often accused of 
stealing horses, fowls, or whatever they can lay their hands upon; the old women 
tell fortunes, in which they are much encouraged by the young ladies of the places 
they visit. Although they speak Portuguese like the other inhabitants of the 
country, among themselves they always make use of their own language, always 
intermarry, are said to pay no attention to the religious observances of the 
country, nor to use any form of worship of their own” (Gardner 1849: 147). 
 
In the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, Ciganos lived in houses as well as 
in camps along roads: Richard Burton (1898: 284) spent a night in a Cigano tent, while 
Jaques Debret (1975: 191-194) depicted the interior of a house of a gypsy slave trader. 
The two modes of living were not separate. In a letter dated August 1761, the Bahian 
interim governor wrote that the Ciganos lived in “set-apart neighbourhoods” and were 
“used to leaving their houses often and going bartering and trading throughout the 
sertão”. Lady Callcot visiting Botafogo in Rio de Janeiro – in early 1820s still a village 
inhabited only by “fishermen and gipsies [sic.]” – writes that “part of their [gypsy] 
families is generally resident at their settlements but the men rove about the country and 
are the great horse jockies [sic.] of this part of Brazil” (Graham 1824: 253). Travelling 
through Minas Gerais in the late 1880s, James Wells (1886: 378) bought mules from a 
settled Cigano owning a fazenda, whose relatives used it to camp temporarily. 
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Ciganos travelled in groups composed of several families. When they came close 
to towns they were often chased away, accused of disturbing public order and stealing 
slaves and animals. In 1726 in São Paulo, Ciganos were given 24 hours to leave since 
they were “harmful to the population because they walked around organizing games and 
other disturbances” (Teixeira 2007a: 33). A year later, the bishop of Rio de Janeiro 
complained of Ciganos in Minas “performing immoral operas and comedies that insult 
the sacred teachings of the Holy Church” (Borges 2007: 28). Probably referring to Rom 
who began arriving from Eastern Europe by the end of the nineteenth century, Gilberto 
Freyre mentions Cigano circuses with bears, “real and fake”, monkeys, and boys who had 
been “sometimes kidnapped”, doing acrobatics on horses that were “generally also 
stolen” (1951: 155).  
As a source of goods and animals, Ciganos were tolerated by the wealthy, 
especially outside large cities, while Ciganos sought out their protection in order to be 
able to camp or to earn their living. When travelling through Ceará in 1828, Patroni was 
approached by a group of Ciganos. Thinking he was being assaulted, he told the Ciganos 
he was a judge and immediately “all of them at the same time saluted me with bows, and 
pleaded that I provide them with patronage in the town of Icó, where they were going to 
trade” (Patroni 1851: 44). Ten years later Gardner encountered Ciganos between Ceará 
and Pernambuco who, according to him, “are generally disliked by common people, but 
are encouraged by the more wealthy, as was the case on the present occasion for they 
were encamped beneath some large trees near the house of a major in the National 
Guards, who is the proprietor of a large cane plantation” (Gardner 1849: 146).  
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Picture 1.1      Ciganos in Brazil in the 19th century23 
                                                 
23
 From top left: An illustration of James W. Wells’ Three Thousand Miles Through Brazil, Vol. 1 (1886: 
378), “Tsiganes iles du Parana” by Edouard Riou published in a magazine Le Tour du Monde in 1874, and  
“Intérieur d'une maison gitane” by Jean Baptiste Debret, 1823.  
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As early as 1591 the Holy Office refers to Ciganas as ambulant vendors (adellas) 
of second-hand goods across Recôncavo Baiano and the above mentioned 1761 letter of 
the governors of Bahia refers to their ambulant trading. In the nineteenth century 
travellers describe Ciganos trading with trinkets, horses and slaves; they belonged among 
mascates, the itinerant traders. Travelling in groups of relatives made crossings of 
dangerous areas possible while dispersed communities and self-subsistent fazendas 
hampered development of fixed establishments (Goulart 1967: 70). According to some, 
they were the first “gringos”, a term that was used in the North-East for itinerant traders 
of non-Portuguese origin (Freyre 1951: 133 ft4 & 155). In addition, an investigation into 
a quilombo (a maroon community) near Recife, Pernambuco, uncovered, for instance, 
that weapons, of the same kind that the army used, were supplied by Cigano Genoíno 
Dantas (Carvalho 1991: 18).  
Itinerant traders in general and Ciganos in particular, were viewed with suspicion. 
Goods were considered overpriced or stolen. Freyre’s suggestion that Cigano horses were 
“generally stolen” reflects this sentiment; the Cigano implicated in selling weapons to the 
quilombo, was also charged with catching run-away slaves, who he resold instead of 
returning to their owners. Similarly, when a quilombo in Abrantes near Salvador was 
destroyed in 1827, one of accusations against it was that these run-away slaves were 
getting revenge by stealing the children of their former masters and selling them to 
Ciganos (Cerqueira e Silva 1933: 431).  
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Vagabonds 
Thanks to the richness of sources, Ciganos of Rio de Janeiro of the beginning of the 
nineteenth century are the best documented community.24 They specialised as 
comissários, i.e. small-scale traders and re-sellers of slaves (e.g. Alves de Souza 2006, 
especially Chapter IV).25 One French traveller describes Cigana ambulant vendors of 
slaves (Goulart 1967: 166); but they were mostly associated with Valongo, the main slave 
market. The market, which closed down in 1831, consisted of about 50 establishments 
containing about 300-400 slaves each and many ran by Ciganos (Soares 1988: 50). 
According to Robert Walsh, an Anglican chaplain,  
 
“[W]hen a cargo of slaves arrives, it is generally purchased by people who are 
called Ciganos, or gipsies, and who nearly resemble all the individuals of the race 
which I have seen in different parts of the world. They have dark olive 
complexions, black eyes and hair, in common with many Brazilians; but they 
have that obliquity of aspect, and sinister expression of countenance, that at once 
marks them as a peculiar race; and on all occasions they display callosity of 
feeling, and a ferocious and wild temper, that assimilates them with their kind, 
and unfortunately fits them for the traffic which they almost exclusively exercise 
in Rio” (Walsh 1831: 178). 
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 Alexander Caldcleugh (1825: 81) estimated the population of Rio de Janeiro in 1821 at 135,000, out of 
which 400 were Gypsies. 
25
 Slave trade in Rio de Janeiro involved many comissários – ship  captains , muleteers from São Paulo and 
Minas Gerais, Portuguese peddlers, African freedmen and Ciganos (Karasch 1987: 51)  
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This scene from one such establishment, depicted by Jean-Baptiste Debret, shows 
a poorer Cigano trader talking to a buyer from Minas Gerais: 
 
Picture 1.2        Valongo Slave Market 
 
Although in the interior of Brazil Ciganos were suspected of stealing animals, the 
only specific cases I encountered deal with thefts of slaves, primarily within Rio de 
Janeiro. For instance, in 1820 Joaquim José Roiz was imprisoned suspected of having 
stolen and sold more than one thousand slaves to Minas and in 1836 a group of Ciganos 
was caught with 60 stolen slaves (Karasch 1987: 54).26  An anonymous letter to the chief 
of police in 1834 states that one such Cigano gang “is protected by persons of high 
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 Rio de Janeiro was special because of a high number of slaves, a size of the slave market, amount of 
written sources as well as organisation of its police force.  
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esteem” (Soares 1988: 86). They were also suspected of buying stolen slaves from gangs 
of freemen, of kidnapping freemen and turning them into slaves (Soares 1988: 78 ff), and 
were generally deemed responsible for the transportation of stolen slaves outside the city 
(Soares 1988: 87).  
Some Ciganos in Rio de Janeiro served as meirinhos, lower court officials (Mello, 
Alves de Souza, and Couto 2004). They also performed during celebrations of the 
wedding of the Prince Regent to the Infanta of Spain in May 1810, and of the birthday of 
the Prince Regent in October 1810. To celebrate the elevation of Brasil into the Kingdom 
in 1815, João VI accompanied by the entire court and foreign delegates, spent an evening 
of merrymaking in the Campo dos Ciganos, the Rio’s bohemian neighbourhood 
(Donovan 1992: 47).  
This visibility, romantic valorisation and insertion into the slave economy did not 
imply general acceptance of Ciganos. Henry Koster, who lived in Pernambuco between 
1809 and 1815, never met any Ciganos there because “the late governor of the province 
was inimical to them, and some attempts having been made to apprehend some of them, 
their visits were discontinued” (1816: 400). Besides the continued accusations of the theft 
of animals27, Ciganos were targeted under the fight against vadiagem (vagabondage), a 
new crime under a new Royal Criminal Code of 1831. During this period, they came to 
be seen as a part of a class of poor non-working free people – malandros (rascals), vadios 
(vagabonds), moleques (street children living off petty theft), capoeiras (free negro 
highwaymen hiding in the capoeira forest) and so on – feared for their criminality, 
rebelliousness and involvement in kidnapping of slaves (Goulart 1967: 177-8). In Minas 
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 See, for instance, a 1858 governor’s report about the crime in Sergipe (Relatorio da Presidencia, p.5, 
<http://brazil.crl.edu/bsd/bsd/1053/index.html>). 
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Gerais, for instance, while the early municipal ordinances treated Ciganos as suspect of 
the theft of animals and slaves, the latter once turned repressive and aimed at expelling 
them from the cities (Teixeira 2000: 29).  
In Bahia, meanwhile, food crises, federalist revolts and slave rebellions led to 
similar concerns with safety. The above-mentioned case of the quilombo in Abrantes and 
the panic about runaway slaves selling the children of their former masters to Ciganos is 
one example of the effect on Ciganos. Another is provided by Castelluci Junior (2009: 
197), who described the impact of an 1831 gathering of judges. The judges, coming from 
several towns of southern Recôncavo, elaborated a new code, which was to help in 
catching runaway slaves and criminals, as well as in disciplining vagabonds. Passports 
were issued to control movement of people, and to prevent both the kidnapping and the 
fleeing of slaves. It also dealt with vadios and elaborated regulations against Ciganos. 
Ciganos without employment, and farmers, who let Ciganos to camp on their land, were 
to be punished. In 1833, Cigano José de Palma, resident of Santo António Além do 
Carmo, got caught in this system when he tried to deliver four slaves to a customer in 
Jaguaripe. Lacking passports for the slaves he was imprisoned and the investigation 
revealed that he had not paid tax on the slaves, and that one of them had been stolen and 
sold to him by kidnappers.  
 
Degenerates 
The First Republic (1889-1930) further elaborated the concept of vadiagem in connection 
with two modernisation projects: The hygienisation and public health arose from ideas of 
modern urban planning, while the disciplining of labour force and redefinition of work 
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was necessitated by the collapse of slavery and the twentieth century European migration. 
These projects were interlinked. For instance, already in the 1858 municipal regulation of 
Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais, which regulated begging, also prohibited Ciganos from 
staying for more than 24 hours in the city and city inhabitants from trading with them. 
The police as well as public hygiene authorities were responsible for the implementation 
of this regulation (Borges 2007: 43). Although Juiz de Fora was a special case of a town 
undergoing fast industrialisation, the strategies employed here were similar to those in 
Bahia (e.g. Fraga Filho 1996).  
In this view, the Cigano lifestyle was incompatible with progress. Their 
anachronism was seen predominantly in hereditary terms (e.g. Freyre 1951: 155 & 216), 
although ciganos were peripheral to discussions about the racial degeneracy of the 
Brazilian povo, sometimes deemed as the cause behind some specific ills, such as 
trachoma (e.g. Ribeiro da Silva 1916: 68-93). Bahian Newspapers, the self-appointed 
guardians of modernity, provide insight into these views. They reported “infestations” by 
Cigano “hordes”.28They enlightened people by reporting latest developments in science 
(including eugenics) and fought superstition by detailing Cigano tricks.29 They 
documented movements and activities of Ciganos and encouraged police to chase them 
out,30 closely reporting police actions against them31 and praising the police for their 
successes.32 Often the local population demanded and participated in police repression. 
Such was the case of Juiz de Fora, in Minas Gerais, in 1903 when police and the lynch 
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 Mais de 200 ciganos apavoram o município de Bom Conselho, A Tarde. Salvador, Bahia, 5.4.1925.  
29
 Ciganas embusteiras, Diario de Notícias, Salvador, Bahia, 28.6. 1912.  
30
 Ciganos perniciosos, Diario de Notícias, Salvador, Bahia, 9.5.1913. 
31
 Bando de ciganos, Diario de Noticias, Salvador, Bahia, 29.5.1907. 
32
 Horda de ciganos, Diario de Noticias, Salvador, Bahia, 3.3.1909. 
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mob attacked a camp of Serbian Ciganos, killing three men and two children (Borges 
2007: 71).  
The Serbian Ciganos belonged to the Eastern European Roma who started 
migrating to Brazil at the end of the nineteenth century. In the North-East they are also 
referred to as the Ciganos Turcos, or, because they often worked as coppersmiths, as 
tacheiros (from tacho, a copper pot). In large cities some women, known as madammes, 
opened future-telling parlours (Oliveira China 1935:107-108). A newspaper article from 
January 1935 provides some description of the lives of Russian ciganos in Salvador: 
They lived in tents and houses, men working as blacksmiths and women reading future 
from cards. Theodoro Michlos was born in Crato, Ceará, travelled across Minas Gerais, 
before arriving to Salvador in November 1934. Sometime after the Feast of Bomfim 
(January 6) they were planning on moving to Sergipe (China 1936: 121-123). Many 
Roma only passed through Brasil (Cotten 1951: 19) and some were true cosmopolitans: 
Brazilian Roma carrying American passports who were imprisoned in Serbia in 1930s 
had wandered for some time in South Africa; they spoke Romany of the Roma living in 
Vojvodina, Portuguese, English and some Afrikaans (Prince 1930: 139-143).  Further 
immigration of Ciganos, however, was officially prohibited in 1938, one year after the 
Estado Novo was established. The law banned entry to “beggars, vagabonds, ciganos and 
the like”, even if they held a valid visa. This law remained the only piece of national 
legislation pertaining to Ciganos until 2006.  
 
*** 
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To summarise, looking at the historical evidence, it seems that apart from a short period 
of the eighteenth century, Brazilian authorities were ambiguous about Ciganos. Most of 
the time they ignored their presence and there is little documentation about them. But 
they also saw Cigano lives as “irregular”33 and viewed their activities with suspicion and 
their customs as marks of difference. Ciganos belonged to the mass of free poor people 
but were also seen as distinct from others.  The tenuous members of the povo, the people, 
their position was amenable to transformations through politicisation of difference, and 
depending on specific circumstance authorities problematised Ciganos.  
Accounts of travellers are potentially more useful in revealing something about 
the Cigano way of life. Most, however, are silent about them despite the fact that as a 
Scottish naturalist George Gardner observed, Ciganos were present in almost every town 
in the North-East (1849: 146;see also Patroni 1851: 46). Burton, for instance, complained 
that “many English residents of long standing ignore the existence of gipsies [sic.] in the 
[sic.]  Brazil” (1869: 62). Only in the first decades of the nineteenth century, during a 
brief period when Ciganos in Rio de Janeiro became uncharacteristically visible, foreign 
travellers mentioned Ciganos more often.  
It is unclear what criteria travellers used to identify Ciganos, however. Felte 
Bezerra, the author of Etnias Sergipanas (1950), notes that “among us, a Gypsy, carries a 
cultural rather than ethnic meaning, and designates a nomadic lifestyle sustained through 
exchanges and wheeling and dealing” (cited in Freyre 1951: 133 ft4). Augusto Zaluar, 
who explicitly set up to “catalogue civilising elements” of the Brazilian nation, was, for 
                                                 
33
 In a letter to the Governor of Minas Gerais in 1737, a captain of dragoons argued that it was not worth 
following “ten or twelve Ciganos” and lose a horse in the pursuit, since “not one of them has any crime on 
him, other than a disgrace of being a Gypsy used to leading an irregular life (costumando a uma vida 
irregular)” (Costa 1999: 87).   
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instance, accused by his friend and editor Affonso Taunay of mistaking a camp of 
caboclos (or bohémios americanos) living in huts along the road  for Ciganos (1939: 
361).  
 
1.3 Popular Image 
 
Shortly after George Gardner had met some Ciganos, his horse was stolen and the 
inhabitants of the town accused Ciganos. Later the horse was found badly hurt and it 
turned out that a local stole it “to hunt down cattle on his estate” (1849: 147). For James 
Wells, who bought two mules from a Cigano in Minas Gerais, “lowness of the price was 
very suggestive of their being stolen property” (1886: 383). And Richard Burton 
confirms the existence of a “common rumour which charges them with being robbers of 
poultry and horses, and with doing at times a trifle in the way of assassination” (1898: 
284).  
According to Burton, Brazilian peasants viewed Ciganos “with disgust and 
religious dread”, but Ciganos were “hardly worse than the “Morpeticos” (lepers) who are 
allowed to haunt the country” (Ibid. 284). Filipe Patroni, later an important politician of 
Pará, admits that although he met many “hordes” of Ciganos, he never heard anybody 
complain about them. “Quite on the contrary, I observed that they entered all kinds of 
farms and settlements and maintained commercial relations with all castes of people rural 
and urban, poor and rich” (1851: 46).  
From these nineteenth-century accounts of travellers, Ciganos emerge as 
ambiguous characters, about which everybody has strong opinions. They were seen as 
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skilled traders, but suspected of theft or of selling stolen and worthless goods. They were 
also distrusted for carrying arms, although this was not unusual for the hinterland of the 
period. Today, Ciganos are likewise seen as interested only in gain and as opportunistic 
thieves; they are assumed to have plenty of money without any work. Some Bahians see 
them as “cowards”, who walk in groups to intimidate, quickly pulling out arms or 
running away from trouble; others become suspicious of Ciganos’ using unknown 
language, especially when negotiating. In this concluding section, I explore what these 
images have in common and try to interpret a figure of Cigano within the Bahian social 
universe.  
 
Cunning Traders 
A young Calon and I were sitting in a local bar in Santaluz and chatting with the bar 
owner and the only two other customers. Suddenly, one of the customers started telling 
me what happened to him several years ago, when he wanted to buy a mule from a 
Cigano. He asked the Cigano if there was anything wrong with it. The Cigano answered 
that “defeito tá na vista”, a defect is ‘in sight’. The man examined the mule carefully, but 
not seeing anything wrong with it, he bought it. Only the following day he found out that 
the mule was blind. The defect was indeed in the vista. I was amused. Not because I 
believed him, but because I had read the same story prior to my fieldwork in a book about 
folklore from the Brazilian Northeast (Pinto 1961: 98-100).  
In the eyes of other Bahians, Ciganos belong to the street and the market, and as 
in the past, they are seen as eager and skilled traders. Sometimes clients assume that 
Ciganos sell things cheaply because they are stolen. At other times, they seem to be able 
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to sell things for more than they are worth, through their skills of persuasion, intimidation 
and magic. Alternatively, as in the story above, they are suspected of concealing the real 
qualities of their goods. This meme is so ubiquitous that a contestant in the Big Brother 
Brazil 2009 exclaimed about a singer who came to the house to entertain them, that he 
was very handsome and “fancier (“mais enfeitado”, literally more fancified) than a 
Gypsies’ mule.”  
The writer Guimarães Rosa developed this theme in the story Corpo Fechado 
(1966). The main character, Manuel Fulô, lived with Ciganos who thought he was a 
simpleton and taught him their tricks with animals. With this knowledge Manuel became 
a successful animal trader until one day, in a deal with Ciganos, he exchanged two 
worthless horses – after he had covered up their faults – for two much better ones. After 
that, because he had deceived even Ciganos, nobody in the region wanted to negotiate 
with him anymore.  
An English naturalist Alexander Caldcleugh, who travelled in Brazil between 
1819 and 1821, tells the following story: “I was engaged early this morning in buying a 
horse. I liked the appearance of the animal, and offered 25 mil reis, but the owner 
demanded thirty: while I was in the midst of the barter, a man passed me rapidly and 
whispered "cigano" (gipsey) [sic.]. I immediately withdrew my offer. Within half an hour 
afterwards I learned that the horse had received a kick, and was occasionally lame” 
(1825: 219). Caldcleugh concludes that “this wandering people, whether gold washers in 
Hungary and Transylvania, tinkers in England, or horse-dealers in Brazil, preserve a 
character for duplicity and cunning which pre-eminently distinguishes them above their 
fellow men”(1825: 129).  
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Despite such translocal character of these attributes, they also reflect specific local 
circumstances. Debret (1975: 107) gives this advice when buying from Cigano slave-
traders in Valongo: “they do not lag behind their kinsmen who trade with horses; 
therefore, whenever one wants to buy a negro in one of these establishments, one has to 
take precautions and bring along a surgeon [to examine the slave]” . And the folklorist 
Luiz Pinto noted that the figure of a Cigano is still particularly strong in those folk songs 
and stories that relate to animal markets (1961: 98). Such markets, with animals and other 
goods, are still important in lives of many Brazilians.   
 
Child Thieves  
Most Bahians see Ciganos as opportunistic thieves, but Ciganos are also rumoured to 
snatch children. Just like their cunning in trade, this image also goes back to the Iberian 
Peninsula of the sixteenth century (Charnon-Deutsch 2004). The first documented – but 
unproven – accusations of baby-snatching and related anthropophagy in Brazil come 
from the nineteenth century (Teixeira 2007a: 121-122) and the trope is still widespread. 
In Bahia almost everybody told me that when they were little their mothers told them that 
Ciganos kidnapped children. Moreover, during my research at least two accusation of 
child theft – one from São Paulo34 and another from Minas Gerais35 -- appeared in the 
media. The trope is also exploited in contemporary cultural production: for instance, in a 
silent film from 1927, Dança, Amor e Ventura, the heroine is kidnapped by Ciganos as a 
                                                 
34
 Desaparecimento de menino, Matheus Dias, completa um ano, Jornal Cruzeiro do Sul  via  Jornal.us, 
13.2.2010 <http://www.jornal.us/article-4303.Desaparecimento-de-menino-Matheus-Dias-completa-um-
ano.html>, last accessed 1 July 1 2011. 
35
 Criança sequestrada é vista com ciganos no interior de MT, Notícias Capital, 25.2.2010 
<http://www.grupocapital.com.br/index.php?mega=noticia&cat=Pol%EDcia&cod=25336>, last accessed 1 
July 2011. 
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child from a wealthy family; in O Indigitado, a 2001 novel by Heitor Cony, a boy is 
raised by non-Gypsies after a deliberate switching of babies by two Ciganas.  
As with other translocal attributes of Gypsies, “in each culture where it surfaces, 
the stereotype of the Gypsy baby thief responded to particular configurations of power 
and stages of national development” (Charnon-Deutsch 2004: 38). For example, in 
Brazil, Indians have also been accused of baby-snatching. The trope also reflects popular 
misgivings, especially around the family life and the historical position of Ciganos. 
During slavery, for instance, Ciganos were slave-traders while their spells were sought 
out when looking for run-away slaves (Mott 1996: 128). But they were also accused of 
kidnapping freemen and selling them into slavery, and of buying children stolen from 
their former masters by their runaway slaves. As Robert Walsh observed, purchasers of 
slaves were greatly disturbed by more white-looking children sold (Koebel 1917: 367). 
The point is that, because Ciganos crossed the boundaries of this predatory system and in 
many ways served as its conduits, they threatened to subvert its hierarchies and expose its 
contradictions.36 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the recently-arrived Roma seem to have 
used the kidnapping accusation to draw law-enforcement authorities into their internal 
disputers, a strategy similar to that identified by Sheila Salo in the US of the same period 
(1988: 25-41). In 1913 Estephanwi Petrowichi accused João Petrowichi of kidnapping his 
daughter (12) to marry João’s son (9). It turned out that the daughter had been married for 
                                                 
36
 Gilberto Freyre is famous for arguing that the sexual relations between masters and slaves resulted 
specific intimate warmth of the Brazilian slavery; children were born of these interactions. But he also  
suggested that Ciganos were probable authors of “mysterious” thefts of (free) children, later sold as slaves  
(1951: 790). 
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two years, but João did not pay the agreed-upon bride-price.37In 1935 a man in love with 
a renowned madame Helena accused her father of having “sold” her to a Cigano; 
newspapers decried as scandalous both the “sale” of Helena and her capability to make 
money through fortune telling (China 1936: 109).38  
Salo suggests that in the US the majority of cases involving non-Gypsies that 
were closed by the police, related to “romantic kidnapping”. Such romances, where either 
a minor leaves with Gypsies against wishes of parents, or a woman marries a Gypsy but 
later decides to leave, also occur in Brazil. For instance, in a fascinating case-study 
Ferrari describes a demanding process through which a non-Gypsy woman, initially 
drawn by her often romantic projections about Ciganos, is transformed into a Calin 
(2010: 16 ff). In 2010, a 12 year old girl who fled with Ciganos insisted she went on her 
own accord and that she was in love. But when the case made the news, the Ciganos 
brought the girl back.39   
There is a possibility that the suspicion about kidnapping arises from others 
seeing non-Gypsies living among Gypsies and a few accusations in the U.S. were by 
former employees. In Brazil, the Roma families also include agregados, i.e. adult non-
Gypsies who either work with them living in their households, or children raised by 
them.40 The Calon households I know do not include adult agregados. In Santaluz, I 
know only of one non-Gypsy boy, who, still a toddler, was given by his parents through 
an informal adoption process to be raised by a childless Calon couple. But this is not one-
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 Negocio de ciganos, Diario de Notícias: Bahia, 17.7.1913.      
38
 Among some Roma, a young women’s potential to make money in reading fortunes is reflected in higher 
bride-price (Andersen 1981: 11-28).  
39
 Ciganos devolvem menina raptada, Jornal da Alterosa 2ª Edição, 11.8.2010 < 
www.dzai.com.br/jornaldaalterosa> , last accessed 4 July 2011. 
40
 Aline Miklos, March 4, 2009, personal communication.  
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directional. A couple of deaf-mute Calon, who were among the poorest in Santaluz, gave 
two children to brasileiros. Such dynamics have to be seen in the context of diverse 
forms of child circulation ranging from a temporary raising of a child to an adoption 
outside of the state purview (Fonseca 1986: 15-27). Nevertheless, it is possible that the 
continuation of the child-snatching suspicions feeds on the existence of flexible and often 
difficult children-raising arrangements among the poor. 
 
Fortune-tellers 
In Victor Hugo’s Hunchback of Notre Dame the heroine, Esmeralda, is stolen as a baby, 
only to grow up into one of the most seductive Gypsy women in European literature. 
Such enticing Ciganas, at least partially influenced by the European (French) 
Romanticism, also appeared in Brazilian theatre at the end of the eighteenth century 
(Donovan 1992: 46). If rumours are to be believed, the desirable Ciganas also influenced 
the history of their people in Brazil: behind the fervour of João V to rid Portugal of 
Ciganos was an unhappy love-affair with a beautiful Cigana (Ibid. 38); João VI – during 
whose rein Ciganos became exoticised by the carioca elites – was rumoured to be 
“fascinated by one particular cigana” (Ibid. 47); Pedro, the emperor of Brazil, as a young 
man liked partying with Ciganos, particularly the women (Teixeira 2007a: 42).  
But consider, what happened to the figure of Esmeralda herself after she arrived 
to the Brazilian North-East. A cordel41 O testamento da Cigana Esmeralda (Barros 
n.d.)42 provides advice on fortune-telling and interpretation of dreams. Apparently, it is a 
                                                 
41
 Popular and inexpensively printed booklets or pamphlets containing folk novels, poems and songs 
(source: Wikipedia). 
42
 By Leandro Gomes de Barros (1865 - 1918). 
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testimony left behind by Esmeralda and brought to Brasil by Ciganos coming from 
France. Thus, although desirable when young, Ciganas are seen primarily as fortune-
tellers and eventually sorceresses (feitiçeiras) especially when older.  
This connection has been fairly constant throughout the Cigano history. 
Quiromancia (palmistry) could lead to deportation from Portugal in the seventeenth 
century. The card-reading parlours of Romani madammes in the early twentieth are 
another variation of such belief in Ciganas’ capability. A 1912 newspaper article warns 
about a new technique that four Ciganas who live in Santo António in Salvador use to 
obtain money from their gullible customers; 43another article from the same year reports 
that a man filed a complaint at the police station at Conceição da Praia, Salvador, because 
he had paid two Ciganas R$30 for a treatment, but a few days later his disease had still 
not disappeared.44 
For many Bahians, then, Cigana’s access to the supernatural is a constant 
potentiality.  Among the Calin I knew, the most common practice was to read palms and 
to bless (rezar) for small change. Sometimes, especially among tourists this can result in 
more substantial cash. These acts rest on the understanding that Ciganas mediate with 
magic and prescience, where even the blessing of money notes can be efficacious. Ferrari 
(pace Bateson 1972: 177-193) analyses how such interaction relies on a Cigana 
redefining a frame against which the interaction involving her and a client is interpreted 
(2010: 188 ff). The change of frames results from a temporary alignment of any 
particular Cigana reading one’s hand with the worldview where some Ciganas, at least, 
have such capabilities. Here, not giving money to the Cigana, refusing to give more, or 
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 Ciganas embusteiras, Diario de Notícias, 28.6.1912.  
44
 Ciganas expertas, Diario de Notícias, 8.11.1912.  
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discontinuing the reading, places the responsibility for the future outcome solely with the 
client.  
   
Tricksters 
Such images – of deceitful traders, baby-snatchers and sorcerers – have something in 
common. Consider the expressions: enfeitar – to embellish a mule so it looks more 
tempting and it defects hidden; feitiço – an artifice and a spell; feitiçeira – a sorceress. 
These expressions have a long history and refer to a “true” reality hidden behind a 
seductive or made up appearance of any entity (Sansi 2011: 21). Besides charms, in 
Bahia such distrust of reality also gives rise to a variety of trickster or devil characters 
(Pina Cabral 2007: 477-525) – ambiguous, mischievous, capable of disturbing 
appearances, but associating with whom could also lead to true gain. Similarly, although 
Ciganos might seem greedy, sometimes to the point of stupidity or cruelty, people 
interact with them in hope that this will open up new opportunities. 45  
This position of Ciganos can be characterised as a specific manifestation of the 
Simmelian stranger (Simmel 1950). For Simmel, social forms are materializations of 
specific social interactions and some scholars have described Gypsies and other 
peripatetic communities as a specific example of the stranger (Berland and Rao 2004: 1-
29). The stranger stands apart from social relations seen as characteristic for any given 
society. For one of the most famous interpreters of the Brazilian civilisation, Gilberto 
Freyre (1951: 790), Ciganos did not adapt to the Brazilian “patriarchal system”, but fitted 
to it only marginally as traders, their specificity disappearing over time. The stranger is 
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 For the figure of a Gypsy as the European trickster see (Piasere 2011: 57-85). 
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also mobile, a “potential wanderer”; “inorganically appended” to a society, “yet an 
organic member”; a “special proportion” of nearness and distance and “tension” 
produced by it. Such relations are never solely dyadic. Authorities decried the itinerant 
traders for frightening and corrupting the povo , for instance, while others lauded them as 
“agents disseminating civilisation and progress” and a respite from patronage (Goulart 
1967: 71;see also McGrath 2005: 178-192).  
Simmel’s stranger enters societies of fixed social relations, closed economies, 
demarcated identity and shared common features; of “cognitive clarity” and “behavioural 
certainty” (Bauman 1990: 146). It was precisely when Brazilian authorities, the State, 
tried to bring about such fixity and “order” to disorderly povo, that Ciganos were 
scapegoated in the past (compare Bauman 1990: 155ff.). Life in Bahia and especially 
among the Brazilian poor, however, has defied such closure. Trust here is non-
generalised leading to localised patronage. Dyadic relations are potentially volatile 
bringing about violence. Unpredictable ways of making the living require special 
navigation, a jeito. Religious beliefs are syncretic and often contradictory. Such moments 
when uncertainty prevails give rise to a more specific social form, which anthropologists 
and folklorists call the trickster (see e.g. Radin 1988;Hyde 2008).  
In Brazil, the most famous trickster-figure is malandro.46This “paradigmatic 
figure of the Brazilian social world” (DaMatta 1997: 252) emerges from specific 
Brazilian conditions and social interactions. Almeida’s Memórias de um Sargento de 
Milícias por um Brasileiro (1854) depicts the adventures of “the first malandro of the 
Brazilian literature” and gives an impression of realism because it is “constructed 
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 “According to tradition, the Brazilian petty criminal […] mischievous but harmless rascal [ …] it 
describes an urban character who wants to have a good and easy life, surviving through unofficial forms of 
work” (Schwarcz 2010)  
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according to a general rhythm of the society, seen through one of its sectors” (Candido 
1993: 45). The characters in the novel, just like in the contemporary society that inspired 
it, constantly mediate between order and disorder. Such recurring liminality characterises 
the dialectics of malandragem where any closure and fixity is impossible; all people can 
hope for, is some provisional avoidance of a disaster or a momentary gain. In the 
Memórias, Ciganos appear beside the malandro: the main character grows up with them; 
they are of the same order. They often make transitions from order to disorder possible, 
for instance, when the priest is seduced by the Cigana.  
The point I want to make is that Ciganos are not “strangers”; they do not enter 
this world from outside.47 They have been part of it since the beginning, their character 
embedded in specific social interactions.  They are “the catalysts of the ambiguity 
between order and disorder in society, [the ambiguity] represented by malandro” (Ferrari 
2006: 86). But Ciganos can never be incorporated into “the order”.  Similarly to other 
tricksters, they are always wandering (“nomadism”), non-reproductive (“baby-
snatching”, “endogamy”), constantly hungry (“love of money”). It will therefore come as 
no surprise that the figures of Cigano and of Cigana, have been incorporated among 
other trickster and the street entities of the Afro-Brazilian religions (e.g. Vos 2006;Thiele 
2006;Thiele 2008: 135-154).  
Although the specific content of Cigano activities has changed over time, many 
Bahians view them in similarly as in the past. Through mediating on the thresholds, the 
figure of Cigano helps to define internal and external limits and show their arbitrariness. 
                                                 
47A characteristic, which Bauman (1990:149) call stranger’s “unforgettable and hence unforgivable original 
sin of the late entry” and which “makes of his presence an event in history, rather than a fact of nature”. It 
is clear that in Brazil, everybody arrived at a certain point, bar the indigenous, but who were presented 
through the idiom of lack (no king, no law etc.) as anachronistic. 
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Guimarães Rosa’s Manuel Fulô who tricked Ciganos showed such limits for the 
predatory trade, while child-theft reminds people that most valuable things might be of a 
dubious origin.  If grasped correctly, however, a Cigana’s blessing could bring success in 
love, a poor child could turn out to be an aristocrat, or one can sit on the pot of gold. This 
understanding of Ciganos as tricksters plays a role in the dynamic of the Calon money-
lending.  Poorer Bahian families borrow money against their welfare benefits. Emerging 
members of the lower-middle classes, often take up loans to preserve their newly 
acquired lifestyle and to meet their other loans. Here, the engagement with Ciganos 
opens space for manoeuvring, but also constantly raises suspicions of duplicity, of 
shifting frames, of doubts about who is gaining. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlined views the non-Gypsies in Brazil have of Ciganos. In popular 
representation they represent one of many trickster-figures capable of crossing various 
domains. In academia, they emerge as representatives of a sociological category of 
Gypsies, more or less explicitly linked to Brazilian political circumstances and compared 
to Gypsies in other countries and periods. Within the historical sources the link to actual 
Ciganos is uncertain and it is unclear what categories and criteria authorities used to 
identify Ciganos. The picture that emerges is therefore a history of how authorities 
constructed Ciganos for purposes of making the people (o povo) legible and disciplining 
them, a process that depended on historical and geographical circumstances.  
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These images are not discontinuous. Recently, for instance, the Ministério 
Público, Brazilian body of independent public prosecutors, motivated by a fight against 
prejudice against a traditional community, asked a judge to order Houaiss dictionaries to 
be taken out of circulation, because one definition of an entry “Cigano” given there is 
that of a miser, a moneylender and a person skilled with money. The publisher retorted 
that it is one among many definitions of Cigano in the dictionary and, besides, it is 
clearly marked as pejorative. It was included in the dictionary because it reflects the 
current use of the word in Brazil.  
How they are seen, influences the space for Calon activities. Although details 
have changed over time, ways of interacting with Ciganos and their position of people 
specially placed within Brazilian society remained relatively stable. Seen in this light, 
money lending, which replaces animal sale as the activity associated with Ciganos, is 
both novel – because it emerges from within changed economic situation – and an 
elaboration of an already existing cultural logic. This logic is generative: the Calon could 
become one of the available credit institutions and specialize as moneylenders, because 
other Bahians recognise them as Ciganos endowed with special character. Here Bahians 
use Cigano loans as an ambiguous tool to navigate monetary flows that changed as a 
result of financialisation. 
II. FINANCIALISATION AND THE PROLIFERATION OF LOCAL FORMS OF 
CREDIT 
 
Introduction 
In summer 2010 I rented a house in the centre of Santaluz. It was the ideal location from 
which to pursue my my plan to focus on clients of Ciganos. The only problem was that I 
could not stay in bed for long in the morning. Next to my window, a neighbour had a 
loudspeaker installed which, every day apart from Sundays, played the town’s radio 
station. It started at 8am with a song celebrating the town, paused for two hours at noon 
with another song about Bahia, and finished at 6pm with Ave Maria. My days soon 
adjusted to its programme – I was procrastinating if I caught a biblical “thought of the 
day”; it was time to get my evening bread rolls when the requests for love songs came on. 
But only while living in the centre I did realise the multiplicity of financial institutions, 
and the density of credit forms in a small town.  
To illustrate this, consider my effort on Monday, 9 August  2010 when I set out to 
note all credit institutions that I passed on my way to interview Marly, a shopkeeper. 
There is no need to pay attention to all the details, since I will return to the credit 
institutions at the end of this chapter. Some individuals will also appear in the next 
chapter. My point is that most people, if they stopped and decided to think about it, 
would see at least what I saw: a disorienting variety of credit forms and multiple 
connections between them.  
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The radio comes on as usual. One of the first announcements is about a public 
presentation, held at 9 o’clock in the town hall, about a retirement benefit for rural 
workers, aposentadoria rural. Apart from the commercials that I now know by 
heart, the radio also repeats one for Guaibim, a furniture store where most people 
buy goods on hire purchase. It has a special offer for Father’s Day: buy this week 
and start paying only in November.  
I open the shutters to my bedroom. In front of my house stands a red car 
with a huge loudspeaker on its roof. Every day our neighbour drives around the 
town at about 20 km/h playing commercials. The advert of the past weeks has 
been for a non-bank financial institution, financeira, ABC, which offers credit to 
public employees, those on the INSS48 retirement and military personnel.  
I set off towards Marly’s shop. It is located on the main shopping street 
about two minutes from my house. Behind the first corner I pass the house with a 
large garage that is hired out for events – for instance, for fundraising bingos. A 
month ago, I watched a comedy skit there performed by a group of locals about 
the lack of style of poor Bahians. At one point the play discussed vaquinha 
(literally a little cow), a money collection by a group for some (common) purpose, 
and how ridiculous it was for somebody to give a christening party and ask the 
guests to contribute.  Walking on, I pass Colônia dos Pescadores, the Fishermen’s 
Syndicate, which among other things provides loans to it members.  
After turning onto a side street, I face the house of Seu Raimundo, one of 
the biggest agiotas, moneylenders, in the town. I met him at a barbeque a couple 
of weeks ago and tried to arrange an interview, but I failed. He hates being called 
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 National social security. 
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an agiota and, instead, the whole afternoon he insisted on discussing the 
irresponsibility of most Bahians with their money. I will not get a chance to talk 
to him because he went to Salvador after being assaulted. I enter the main street. 
Most of about eleven financeiras are on this street and I pass two of them.  
Unfortunately, Marly is ill at home, so I chat with her sister, Gabriella. 
There aren’t any customers. A moment later a woman in her 30s walks in. She is 
here to pay her nota promissória, a promissory note, which expires today. 
Gabriella takes a stack of notas in a rubber band and without asking for the 
woman’s name starts looking through them. When she finds what she is looking 
for, she tears it along the perforated line, keeps one third, on which she notes that 
the debt was paid off, and hands the rest to the woman who gives her R$27. After 
the woman leaves, Gabriella opens the woman’s account in the shop’s crediário 
and notes the transaction. 
Crediário is a shop’s system of sale on instalments. By extension it also 
means one’s account in such a shop or a debt one acquires there. Marly’s 
crediário relies on the information from SPC, an official credit rating agency.49 
Smaller stores rely on their own systems (often also using computers) and employ 
debt-collectors (cobradores) to collect long-outstanding debts.  
Bars, restaurants, botequims and small shops (venda) also sell fiado, on 
credit: In the Bar do Barbudo on one of the side streets, customers sign receipts 
attesting to their consumption. Most bars also have messages pinned to their walls 
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 From the official mission: “SPC Brazil is an information system of the Chambers of Shop Directors, 
making it the biggest database of credit information about natural and juridical persons in the Latin 
America, helping corporations throughout the country to make a decision about credit extension” 
(www.spcbrasil.org.br/, last accessed 30 March 2012).  
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against fiado. In the luncheonette São Jorge, on the main square, they mark fiado 
sales in a small notebook, although above the cashier hangs pinned a message that 
reads “Fiado suspenso”, “Fiado discontinued”. 
Some larger storeowners are also known agiotas and some shopkeepers 
lend through a system of patronage whereby loans can be paid off in cash as well 
as in kind (including labour). In the past, some clients also stored their cash with 
these shopkeepers-patrons. 
 I leave Marly’s shop and walk towards the main square, praça, which is 
just around the corner. A few houses down the road, but in the direction opposite 
to mine, is the syndicate of rural workers. It provides loans for small farmers and 
rural workers, and is funded through PRONAF, a federal programme of micro-
credit for farmers. In the town hall on the praça is the office of the town’s micro-
credit program, Credibahia, financed by the Bahian state. The majority of its 
clients are women running “informal” enterprises, such as door-to-door vendors 
or hairdressers. 
I enter the praça passing luncheonette São Jorge. In front of it, just like 
most days before noon, sits Codó; jokingly, he calls this his office. When I enter, 
he is talking to a woman; a second later he is called to a car of Seu Barbosa, a 
shopkeeper, who gives him a few one hundred-real notes. Codó is a Jack of all 
trades of financial flows: he sells and rents houses for commission; he looks for 
clients for one financeira; he is a “ponte do agiota”, a middleman (literally “a 
bridge”), for several agiotas; he always has a rifa (a raffle) to sign; he buys votes 
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for political candidates; he collects drinks and food for events in his 
neighbourhood; he sells the Federal Lottery.  
Normally Codó is an expansive personality, but today he looks distressed. 
Galeguinho, a notorious agiota, was released after barely two months after being 
arrested and now is after his money. In his house, which lies on a street parallel to 
the main street, and almost in a mirror position from mine, the police found guns, 
drugs, and a huge quantity of bank cards. Rumours put the number of these cards 
withheld from his clients anywhere between 600 and 5000. 
  There are three banks in the centre, all of which I pass: Banco do Brasil is 
on the main street, Bradesco and Caixa Económica Federal are on the praça. Itaú 
is being built there now. Six months ago a director of Bradesco was fired because 
a client to whom he extended more credit than permitted defaulted. The client 
comes from an important family which often occupies the post of the mayor.  
I notice two Ciganos, Maurício and Eduardo, standing in front of 
Bradesco; later I also pass another three by a bridge leading to the marketplace. 
Ciganos arrive from surrounding towns, offer money to people they know and 
wait for their debtors to pay. But because Monday is not the market day, there are 
not many of them around. Maurício is waiting for his father who is in Bradesco 
and when he comes out they leave. Eduardo and I cross the street and stand 
exactly in the middle of the square; Eduardo wants to be visible. His wife comes 
and joins us. Eduardo talks to a few people; Codó and later Eduardo’s middleman 
stop by. About 20 minutes later, when the husband of Eduardo’s niece appears, 
they all leave. 
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Once they are gone, I observe a plastic table besides a newsstand. Behind 
it sit two women in blue T-shirts with Credit Cartão written on them. “Oi 
senhora, come and see if we couldn’t make a credit card for you,” they call trying 
to attract a woman passing by. “You will get a discount of 10 percent in a grocery 
store even if it’s a small shop.” Their SuperD cards, either Mastercard or Visa, are 
bright green with one rounded corner. The advantage, they tell me, is that I only 
need my ID and to fill in my personal details, CPF, employer, income, list other 
cards I own and where I have my bank account. Unlike banks, they inform me, I 
do not need a proof of income; I only fill in the form and they will call me on my 
mobile phone letting me know what credit I can get. To increase the credit limit, I 
would not need to go through a complicated process as in a bank, but simply call 
them. I thank them and leave.  
 
My walk shows a variety of financial institutions in Bahia today. Forms of 
available credit differ in their degree of formality, use of collateral, ease of access, 
interconnection to other institutions and so on. The praça is the real hub, where the 
financial services are most dense. In fact, people often talk about their name being “dirty 
on the square” (nome sujo na praça), when they do not have access to credit. Many credit 
institutions found around the praça existed in the past, but both local and official 
institutions proliferated in recent years.  
In this and the following chapter, I explore the effect of the financialisation on 
daily life in the Bahian interior. In this chapter I argue that the richness of credit forms is 
not novel, but reflects a way Brazil has been inserted in the global economy. In the past 
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decades, however, the state policies aimed at “financial inclusion”, to use the term of the 
Brazilian Central Bank, and monetary policies have led to the shift in the source of 
wealth and flow of money: today more people rely on direct transfer from the state or 
through institutions established by the state. This shift also influenced the functioning of 
local credit institutions, which often tap into official flows. At the end of this chapter I 
return to my walk, and list various credit institutions available.  
 
2.1 Anthropology of Money and Debt in Brazil 
Personalism vs. Impersonal Money 
It is impossible to discuss anthropology of debt or the role of money in the lives of 
Brazilians without mentioning the work of Roberto DaMatta, which in many respects it 
presented a theoretical turning point in the anthropology of Brazil (1982: 11-
44;1997a;1997b). In contrast with previous conceptualisations, DaMatta argues that there 
are not “two Brazils” – one modern/capitalist and another pre-modern/precapitalist.  
Rather, he suggested there are two codes – one hierarchical/personalistic and another 
egalitarian/individualistic, which operate in lives of people simultaneously. In their 
interactions people constantly oscillate between individualism and personalism, between 
warm harmonious authoritarianism and deceitful impersonal egalitarianism. This 
dynamic of “the house” and “the street” can by analogy be extended to other spheres. In 
the public domain, Brazilians often call for universalism and equal treatment equated 
with modern (state) institutions, but at the same time they refuse to be reduced to 
individuals. DaMatta’s is essentially a Dumontian framework – it posits a modern 
(Western) individual against a person of the non-Western hierarchy (Pina Cabral 2007: 
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95-111). In Brazil, despite constant striving the former, human interactions are always 
encompassed by the latter.   
Through these lenses, issues such as patronage, godparenthood or jeitinho appear 
as mediating resources used by people against impersonal forces. Jeitinho, denotes a 
capacity to navigate official rules, to find your way around them. Patronage, a keystone 
of Brazilian social organisation – essentially a debt couched in familiar terms – is 
portrayed as based on vertical warmth despite its oppressive sides. In other words, it is 
“part of the story that Brazilians tell about themselves, a story in which their human 
warmth opposes the cold anonymity of egalitarian citizenship” (Ansell 2007: 17). 
Brazilians also apparently prefer the personalism of social relations to the impersonalism 
of money of capitalist societies, which are based on the Protestant ethics (e.g. Oliven 
fortcoming). Analysts using this framework show how almost heroically and somewhat 
romantically, personalism always encompasses cold and calculating impersonalism: 
transactions, including market exchange, seem to be exempt from cold calculation, while 
difficult and even ruinous at the same time. 
It would be easy to place Ciganos into this arrangement: loans from these 
ethnically distant people, who fit only imperfectly into localised social relations, help 
people to achieve respite from relationships of patronage. Alternatively, Cigano services 
enhance people’s freedom to manoeuvre and personalise impersonal relationships, when, 
for instance, a loan is used to bribe an official or a way to pay alimony ordered by court. 
Such positing, however, does injustice to ethnographic and historical data. In the previous 
chapter I already argued that Ciganos are not Simmelian strangers coming from outside 
into a closed system of relations. They have always been part of this world where the 
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ambiguity of social relations is caused less by switching between two opposing codes, 
than by an openness and fluidity of the system itself. And as I argue in this thesis, Cigano 
moneylending niche emerges from within the system itself. 
 
Beyond Personalism 
Looking specifically at conceptions of money in Brazil, Sansi-Roca (forthcoming) 
provided a criticism of the personalism paradigm. He argues that at the heart of Brazilian 
(and Lusophone) distrust of money, lies a “merchant machine” and not the personalist 
culture. Echoing the dependency theorists and inspired by anthropology that in 
conceptualising money takes both the role of the state and of the market seriously (pace 
Hart 1986: 637-656),  Sansi-Roca argues that Brazil has since colonisation been ascribed 
a subaltern position in the capitalist world system. This made it difficult for the Brazilian 
state to control money as the standard of value and as a consequence people’s 
participation of the market, their linking with others, has always been fraught with 
contradictions and uncertainty.  
The point is this: the issues of indebtedness, dependency and money have been 
recognised as central to descriptions of social arrangements in Brazil, but have not been 
adequately explored. Part of the reason is that personalism, as a dominant paradigm, 
which took Western modernity as a measuring rod, has obviated the diverse and multiple 
monetary repertoires and a variety of credit institutions. As Keith Hart (2005) shows, it is 
impersonalism that needs explaining, however, since in practice personal and impersonal 
are hard to separate and the cultural effort to achieve such separation is huge. From this 
point of view, state capitalism – associated primarily with Europe in the first half of the 
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twentieth century, when centralised bureaucracy, financial interests and (social) science 
aligned to create a social world, including the market and money, according to 
impersonal processes – is a historical anomaly (see also Hart 2000).  
Several recent studies began to provide a more complex picture than the dominant 
personalist narrative would allow. I will mention just three. Collins (2008: 237-255) 
looks at how most of the inhabitants of central Salvador were removed from the historical 
centre while their practices were repackaged as patrimony. He shows how these people 
mobilised patron-client networks to deal with these dislocations and to make profit. 
Sansi-Roca (2007: 319-339) shows that the prominence of money in Pentecostalism is 
not an exceptional consequence of neoliberalism, since popular Catholicism and 
Candomblé have always included such practices. What is novel is that behind the 
Pentecostal use of money is a project of the hegemonic take-over of the state; in other 
words the state is accepted as a source of money’s value, but not the ultimate one.  Ansell 
(2007) describes the creation of cooperatives by the Brazilian state in a pilot programme 
of Zero Hunger, a project at least partially justified by a need to undermine patronage and 
to reorder its vertical intimacy into a horizontal association of free individuals.  The 
project aimed to replace traditional regimes of value and social hierarchies, with a 
neoliberal vision where the state is an initiator of value-generative welfare aimed at 
creating “market peasants”.   
These studies unravel different value registers people use and their complex 
relationship to money. They highlight the crucial role of the Brazilian state on the 
“distribution regime” and the impact of what they term “neoliberalism”, whether 
understood as monetarism, as a form of intimacy, or as an ideology. 
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2.2 The Financialisation of Life in Bahia 
Credit Money in the Past 
Since the earliest days of colonisation social relations in Bahia were constituted by debt. 
Debt served for powers-that-be as an instrument to create ““extroverted” political 
economy” (Roitman 2003: 212) and was a founding social relation at a local level. 
Probably the most famous example is the nineteenth century aviamento, a system for 
rubber-tapping in Amazonia organised through credit extended from international export 
companies, via a system of middlemen to individual tappers. The rubber flowed in the 
opposite direction and served as a payment for the debts. Diverse and fluid categories of 
intermediaries, who formed a part of the commercial system supplying goods to Minas 
Gerais after the discovery of gold, also relied on credit to function. Among other things, 
these intermediaries also sold on credit, lent money or accepted pawned things (Furtado 
2012: 245-263).50 In the Bahian Recôncavo, where the major export was sugar, the post-
mortem records of plantation owners show, that 41 percent of their wealth was tied in 
debts and only 6.9 percent was formed by credit to others (Mattoso 1986: 641).  
Until recently, daily life was characterised by the scarcity of money and its 
instability. To bridge their needs, people relied on various credit institutions and a variety 
of credit forms, perpetuating a generalised state of indebtedness. Analysing post-mortem 
inventories from the nineteenth century Bahia, Mattoso discovered that most people had 
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 The list of some names provided by Furtado gives a sense of the specialised proliferation of 
intermediaries: negociantes de grosso trato, mercadores a retalho de secos ou molhados, lojistas, 
taverneiros, tratantes, tendeiros, caixeiros, escriturários, mascates, viajantes nos caminhos, lavradores que 
comerciavam seus gêneros, comboieiros de escravos, condutores, volantes, condutores, vendas and 
tavernas. 
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higher debt than credit; most acquired shortly before death, pointing to people’s 
vulnerability in face of cash shortage (1986: 642). The chronic lack of capital led to 
proliferation of so-called “written money”. In the nineteenth century there were of 
various type – known as letras de câmbio, letra de crédito, letra da terra, notas de 
crédito, notas promisórias and so on (Mattoso 1986: 509). At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, merchants, municipalities and property owners in the North-East 
signed borós of various values, notes that circulated as a substitute for money (Figueiredo 
Filho 1962: 46).  
In mid-twentieth-century Ceará people purchased pigs and staple crops as form of 
saving or insurance (Johnson 1971: 96)51 while their survival depended on short-term 
purchase on credit from shopkeepers (ibid. 1971: 117).  There were communal forms of 
reciprocal help such as mutirão, first documented in 1808 (Cândido 1975: 67). During his 
research in mid-twentieth-century in the interior of São Paulo, Pierson noticed on a wall 
of the principal botequim “a piece of paper on which is printed, in pencil, in large letters, 
the following verse” (1948: 98):  
 
O fiado me da penas       Credit brings me worry  
As penas me da cuidado                                      My worries cause me pain 
 Para aliviar-me penas                                                           To relieve myself of worry 
 Não posso vender fiado.                                                         I cannot sell on credit 
                                                                                                                   (his translation) 
                                                 
51
 It is possible that the characteristic of the “ocular” wealth susceptible to evil eye and which unlike the 
cash from the government could not become part of an open discourse (Ansell 2009: 96-109) is linked to 
use of animals as the storage of value and a source of social reproduction.   
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It was a poster against selling fiado, on credit and similar notes were apparently 
common.52 Pierson interpreted them as “[recent half-hearted] efforts to limit the amount 
of credit extended” (ibid.). I question his conclusions. Sixty years after Pierson, shops in 
Santaluz still had posters against fiado. Some messages, just as the one in luncheonette 
São Jorge I mentioned above, were quite blunt. Others were more creative: “Fiado é 
coisa do cão, aqui não é o inferno”/ “Credit is a thing of a devil, and Hell is not here”. A 
concept of fiado also covers other exchanges on credit, besides those in these small 
establishments. And just like during Pierson’s time, also today shopkeepers complain 
about it. 
Although this overview is far from comprehensive, I hope to have given a sense 
of the broad variety of credit institutions that existed in the past. Here monetary debt 
formed a basis of social relations and wealth creation was based on debt relations. I 
should also note that the role and forms of credit and debt differed between regions. 
While peasants in the sertão, might have had little use for, and trust in, money and rely 
on reciprocal labour instead (Ansell 2010: 285;see also Pierson 1948), the places where I 
did fieldwork produced for the regional market since the earliest day of colonisation. This 
is the area of small independent farmers, whose crops – manioc and beans – fed sugar 
plantations of the Bahian Recôncavo that produced for export (Barickman 1998). A part 
of monetary economy, the instability and scarcity of money, demanded various forms of 
credit. Many of the same credit institutions still exist today, but the past two decades have 
also brought about significant changes.  
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 From the verb fiar – to trust, to have confidence. 
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Democratisation and Neoliberalism 
Today in Santaluz more products are bought in shops, task employment is paid in cash 
rather than in kind, local politics depends on money available and so on. These changes 
are related to two processes – neoliberalism and democratisation, which led to the 
expansion of the particular form of redistribution. Through stimulation and direct creation 
of official credit institutions, a process I call financialisation, the state redefined the 
“distribution regime”. It is the single most important source of wealth and it also 
redirected its flow. 
First, this resulted from the monetarist policies – a state project to build a strong 
currency through controlling its flux. President Fernando Collor, elected in 1990, adopted 
a series of authoritarian policies which stopped the inflation, but led to the increase in 
inequality as well as dismantling of state companies in order to pay off the foreign debt. 
This “shock therapy” also opened a way for other neoliberal reforms (Sansi-Roca 2007: 
320-322). Supported by the excess liquidity of the international finance, in 1994 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso created a new currency (Real), pegging it to the U.S. Dollar. 
But other structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) caused a falling of staple food prices 
and collapse of cottage industries, while increasing people’s reliance on supermarkets for 
food (Ansell 2010: 285). Although the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 
popularly known as ‘Lula’, elected in 2003, managed to pay off the IMF debt early, he 
did not to reverse these policies.  
Second, Cardoso’s government also introduced several measures that aimed at 
remedying the worst impacts of the SAPs, and which would be later expended under 
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Lula. In 1990 the aposentadoria rural, a non-contributory retirement benefit for rural 
workers, was created. Experimenting with “the second generation” of neoliberal policies, 
the Brazilian government created a system of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) aimed at 
increasing human capital (Hall 2006: 689-709).  Bolsa Família, a showpiece of Lula’s 
social policies, is a family benefit whose payout is conditional on vaccination, school 
attendance and so on. With 12 million families, by 2004 it was the biggest CCT 
programme in the world.  
Third, the stabilisation of currency and CCTs combined with the expansion of 
access to official credit. Four strategies used by Brazilian governments have been the 
“banking” (bancarização) of the lower classes, the expansion of both consumer credit 
and of productive microcredit, and support for targeted productive microcredit through 
secondary institutions (e.g. cooperatives) (Barone and Sader 2008: 1249-1267). For 
instance, in 1996 Cardoso’s government launched PRONAF, a federal micro-credit 
programme for family farmers. It was quickly successful: after two years 56 percent of its 
beneficiaries were those that had never taken out an official loan and in 2003 it had 1,1 
million contracts making it one of the biggest programme of its kind in the world 
(Abramovay 2004: 32). Building on his predecessors, Lula’s government supported 
bancarização and expansion of consumption credit using state banks. In 2003, for 
instance, Caixa Econômica Federal started opening bank accounts for those without a 
permanent address aiming to reach 500.000 accounts a year later, but already in two 
months more than 474.000 accounts were opened (Abramovay 2004: 29). Another mode 
to increase access to credit was Lula’s expansion of the crédito consignado, loans from 
financial institutions whereby a payment is directly deducted from one’s bank account. 
 109 
The advantage is that money is lent even to those, who have a “dirty” name with SPC or 
Serrasa. 
The stabilisation of currency, CCTs, higher minimum wage (to which unofficial 
wage is customarily pegged), and novel access to credit can be all seen as aspects of the 
expansion of the third generation welfare state. Due to them, in 2004 more than a half of 
the income of the poor came from federal cash transfers (Hall 2006: 707). As Perry 
Anderson (2011: 3-12) observes, “[R]einforcing these effects was the introduction early 
on of crédito consignado: bank loans for household purchases to those who had never 
before had bank accounts, with repayment automatically deducted from monthly wages 
or pensions.” Overall effect was that, in seven years between 2003 and 2011, 24.5 million 
people officially escaped poverty, and 35.5 million reached so-called “middle class C” 
status.53 Related to it, life in small towns like Santaluz became increasingly monetised. In 
politics, for instance, patronage based on long-term reciprocities is being replaced by 
short-term clientelism, which requires cash (Ansell 2010: 283-294;Villela 2005: 267-
296). This increased demand for cash, however, often cannot be met through official 
institutions alone. 
 
2.3 Credit institutions 
Proliferation of Local Financial Institutions 
In the process of financialisation, Santaluz saw several new credit institutions created. 
But by fixing some arrangements these changes also provided a framework for further 
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 Harry Maurer and Alexander Ragir Brazil's New Middle Class Goes on a Spree, Bloomberg bussiness, 
12.5.2011 <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_21/b4229010792956.htm>, last accessed 
12 March 2012. 
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development and multiplication of financial services beyond official control. In addition, 
traditional credit institutions, such as fiado or vaquinha, still sustain people’s lives, 
although often in a changed manner.  
Going back to the introduction of this chapter, a few examples will illustrate 
forms of credit that were not available two decades ago. Although agiotas, moneylenders, 
are a traditional institution in the hinterland their functioning changed due to 
formalisation of people’s income. Agiotas like Galeguinho and Seu Raimundo today 
accept checks and especially CCT or bank cards as collateral. They note transactions on 
same official nota promissória54 that shopkeepers use and which can be bought in shops 
with office supplies.  
 
 Picture 2.1          Nota Promissória  
 
Or consider the Fishermen’s Syndicate, just around the corner from my house. Its 
credit provision is financed through federal transfers and aims at improving the 
productivity of the fishermen and marisqueiras – collectors of sea or mangrove 
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 A promissory note. Also called a letra promissória (or letra), or a promissora. Officialised by the 1908 
law.  
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crustaceans and molluscs.  Pedro, its chairman, showed me a number of old loan 
contracts that were never paid. Some people even died without repaying, but he does not 
report on it and in order not to lose support from the Ministry, he has to carefully 
maintain the balance of defaults. He also knows that sometimes people become members 
although fishing is not their source of income, but their neighbours, who already are 
members, are willing to serve as guarantors.  
In Marly’s shop it is possible to purchase things in four different ways – with 
cash, a credit card, or against a nota promissória for cheques or cash. The latter is the 
most popular, but it is available only to those who are in the store’s crediário. Here their 
credit, their name, is guaranteed by SPC. When buying on a nota, the instalments are paid 
with cash or on pre-dated bank cheques. Each payment is noted into the crediário and at 
the back of the nota, which Marly keeps. The note is handed over to the customer only 
when the whole sum was paid off.   
For instance, a friend of mine, Gilson, prefers to buy with pre-dated checks 
because as a friend of Marly, he feels he could renegotiate payment if he ran into 
difficulties. But he would not give pre-dated checks to everyone. He trusts that Marly will 
not cash them before the date, since a bank cashes it whenever the check is brought in. 
Taking money from his account on a different date than he had planned, would interfere 
with Gilson’s plans. It could also cause problems, when there is not enough money in his 
account. Any transaction between Marly and Gilson is thus stabilised by the whole scope 
of actors: personal trust; notas promissórias that can be used as jural evidence; these are 
linked to the store’s crediário linked to credit history agencies, which have a license from 
the state; the state pays Gilson’s wage into the state bank and he transfers it to a private 
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bank; from this bank, where a director is his friend and gives Gilson advantageous deals, 
Gilson receives his cheques that he hands in pre-dated to Marly. Some parts of Gilson’s 
purchase in Marly’s shop are officially regulated, but as a whole it cannot easily be 
reduced to personal/impersonal, formal/informal and even new or old. 
New credit institutions, which were created with support of the state, sometimes 
run parallel to, and sometimes are elaborations of, older forms and institutions, which 
might be less directly dependent. The twin interaction of neoliberalism and welfare 
democratisation has led to the multiplication of forms of credit. With people’s continuing 
indebtedness, and just like in colonial times, credit remains the single most important 
source of money in Santaluz. But today, it is fuelled with novel demand for cash and 
made possible because of state policies. In this new distribution regime, people variously 
combine traditional and novel credit institutions.  
 
A Taxonomy of Credit Institutions 
It is not my intention to describe all financial institutions and forms of credit available in 
small town Bahia, only to draw attention to the role of novel formalisations and 
interconnections between various institutions. Nevertheless, before concluding I provide 
a taxonomical overview of institutions I encountered in Santaluz.55 Although I list only 
the (dominant) credit services, it should also be kept in mind that most institutions (e.g. 
banks or cooperatives) provide a range of financial services.  
 
 
                                                 
55
 I also draw on work of Magalhães (2005), who studied farmers’ cooperatives in Feira de Santana (150 
kilometers away). 
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Table 2.1                                        Credit Institutions in Santaluz, 2009  
Institution Description (main services) 
Family/Friend Loans without or with interest (often at inflation rate).  
Vaquinha Contribution of small amount food towards some goal, in which 
contributors participate. 
Mutirão/Boi 
Roubado/Batalhão 
Mutual exchange of (agricultural) labour usually within a 
neighbourhood. 
 
Shops/Bars (1) Sale on credit (fiado); (2) Small Loans; (3) Storage of money 
Bingo A fundraising event in which people pay to participate. Usually 
related is balaio – a collection of goods to serve as prices.  
Campanha/Offerta A collection of money within a community, often for an extended 
period of time.   
Caixinha/ Consórcio 
(unofficial) 
A rotating credit association sometimes with goods; a trustworthy 
person who organises it gets a commission.  
Rifa A raffle organised by a person who usually sells 100 numbers. Last 
two digits in the National Lottery on the agreed day win.  Prices are 
lower than money collected.   
Agiota Loans with varied (usurious) interest. Pawning. 
Cigano Loans with high monthly interest.  
Consórcio (official) Rotating credit towards a specific good (e.g. a car or a motorcycle).  
Stores (1) Sale on instalments using notas promissórias and crediáro; (2) 
Some offer credit cards. 
Banks Loans; Credit cards; Cheques. Limited to those with stable income or 
property.  
Financeiras Crédito consignado, credit cards and “buying off” individuals’ bank 
debts (i.e. refinancing their loans). 
Micro-credit The program of micro-credit organised by the state of Bahia 
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(Credibahia). 
Cooperatives/Syndicates Loans to members with funds allocated by the Federal Government.  
 
The list is roughly organised along the level of formalisation and the direct state 
involvement: cooperatives offer to their registered members money from the Federal 
Government, agiotas tap into CCT accounts while a person might ask a friend a loan, 
because the friend is a public employee. In the state of Santa Catarina one independent 
consultant (of microfinance) identified 21 forms of credit (Brusky 2004: 175-213); it 
depends on how one is counting.56 Institutions are created and disappear. A company 
shop that sold to the company’s employees on credit does not exist in Santaluz anymore, 
while in towns close by people experiment with alternative currencies.57 
 
Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I argued that credit/debt and credit money have been integral to the Bahian 
society since the earliest day of colonisation, reflecting Brazil’s integration into the 
global economy and the capacity of the state to define the regime of value. Despite its 
importance money as credit has been ignored by the Brazilian social science which 
                                                 
56
 It should also be kept in mind that names differ across regions and in time. For instance, mutirão (of Tupí 
origin) is, beside the other two names that I give, in Brazil also known as ademão, adjunto, ajuri, ajutório, 
arrelia, bandeira, boi de cova, junta, muquirão, muxirã, muxirão, muxirom, pixurum, ponxirão, punxirão, 
putirão, putirom, putirum, puxirão, puxirum. 
57
 Four municipalities within an hour drive from my fieldwork use such alternative currencies. 
Bonfati,Cristiane Moedas sociais alternativas ao real circulam em 65 localidades do Brasil, Correio 
Braziliense, 23.10.2011 
<http://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/economia/2011/10/23/internas_economia,275178/moed
as-sociais-alternativas-ao-real-circulam-em-65-localidades-do-brasil.shtml>, last accessed 23 November 
2011. 
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instead focused on a radical discontinuity between the modern and the pre-modern world 
(or Anglo-American/Protestant vs. Portuguese/Catholic). In this view, the fragility of 
state money and the continued existence of informal credit were seen as a cultural trait, 
rather than as one of many permutations that money always takes. At the same time, the 
state-induced financialisation of the past 20 years, which includes a range of processes 
from market liberalisation, through “financial inclusion” to third generation welfare, led 
to proliferation of credit institutions. Some credit forms that today exist in small town 
Bahia were directly created or stimulated by the state, while people created others by, for 
instance, diverting flows of money and processes opened up by state formalisation. 
Besides these, there are still traditional local institutions. But such development might not 
be completely novel in Bahia: in the nineteenth century, during the period when new 
bank institutions were being created, people also increasingly relied on moneylenders 
(Mattoso 1986: 508).  
In the following chapter I will show that the complexity increases because most 
credit forms are variously combined. Promissory notes can be passed to another person. 
A person can let another buy on her account in a store or a market stall, for which the 
former is responsible. There is a whole market with the SPC credit histories where people 
“sell” their credit, for instance, their capability to buy in a furniture chain store. Stable 
wages and CCTs are accepted as collateral by agiotas, while wage earners also become 
moneylenders or guarantors to other loan seekers at formal or informal institutions.  
III. “DENSE FINANCIAL LIVES”: MANOEUVRING THE MONEYLENDERS 
AND OTHER CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
 
Introduction 
State policies during the past two decades have brought about intense financialisation of 
small-town Bahia, in the process of which a great variety of new credit institutions were 
established and new credit forms proliferated. Some older institutions remained almost 
unchanged, while other altered ways they functioned. For instance, agiotas, 
moneylenders, either Gypsy or non-Gypsy, today tap into resources distributed directly 
by the state or through channels created by the state. Calon sometimes explained to me 
that this or that client could be trusted because he ‘was retired’ (aposentado), or that that 
another would pay because ‘the state owed him’ money. People with stable incomes 
could have their debt in a bank refinanced through a financeira, but once they reached a 
limit there, they turned to moneylenders. 
In other words, traditional, novel, local or official credit forms can be variously 
mobilised. Each individual’s access to the myriad credit institutions and credit forms is 
determined by her class and employment status, as well as her relationships with other 
people. Institutions vary in the amounts they provide, their use of collateral, their 
dependence on official regulation, or mode of enforcement. Some institutions satisfy 
long-term needs, whereas others are used to mobilise short-term capital. Looking at three 
case studies, in this chapter I first describe a financial network of credit institutions and 
ways people juggle them. In the second part I describe the functioning of informal 
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moneylenders, agiotas, and show how they partake in the current distribution regime in a 
way that is recognisably neo-liberal (James 2011;James 2012: 20-40). I conclude by 
outlining the character of a Cigano as a moneylender and argue that although the 
identification of Ciganos as agiotas arose in recent times, their economic activities in the 
past were also often related to credit and debt.  
 
3.1 “Dense Financial Lives”, Autumn 2009 
 
Viewed according to the official class division used by the Brazilian statistical office 
(IBGE), the following three households come from three out of five classes and represent 
most people in the town. Gilson belongs to the middle class A/B, which in 2009 means a 
household income above R$4.557.58 Afonso and Malu are a lower border case of the 
“middle class C”, set at monthly household income between R$1064 – 4571. Joana, with 
income far below R$768, belongs to the lowest income segment, class E.59 As snap-shots 
of individual debt/credit nets taken between October and December 2009, the three 
accounts illustrate “a densa vida financeira”, the “dense financial life”, in Bahia today 
(Abramovay 2004: 21-67).  
 
                                                 
58
 The exchange rate in October 2009 was 1EUR = R$1.57; the official minimal wage was R$465. 
59
 Unfortunately, full accounts that would do justice to the temporality and that would map the 
interconnections between institutions were beyond my capacities in the field. I would, for instance, need to 
arrange several people to keep financial diaries. 
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Afonso and Malu 
Afonso and Malu have been married for 28 years and have four children. They live in 
their own house, built in 2000, together with three of their children. They also raise the 
little daughter of their poorer neighbour. Their household spends about R$150 per week 
on food and another R$120 a month on water and electricity. Afonso receives a INSS 
retirement of R$960 per month and since 2007 the couple has also been running a bar 
near their house, which on a good month brings in about R$450. Malu does not work, but 
she is registered as a marisceira, a collector of molluscs and crustaceans in mangroves. 
Two sons who have several odd jobs contribute from time to time; for example, by 
buying a gas canister.  
A few days before I interviewed them, they had called Eduardo, a Cigano. Five 
months before, they had borrowed R$560 with a “20 percent” interest rate – i.e. a 
monthly interest of R$100 on R$500 – from Kiko, Eduardo’s son; Kiko had agreed to add 
R$60, because they were neighbours and he often played dominoes in Afonso’s bar. 
Because Kiko had been in prison for a while, and they had money at that moment, they 
were eager to pay their debt. Otherwise, the interest would accumulate during Kiko’s 
term.  
In the past they had borrowed also from non-Gypsy agiotas. While still working, 
Afonso used to gamble and borrowed money with predated cheques; for instance, he 
would exchange a cheque for R$240 to be cashed in one month for R$200 in cash. But he 
quit playing; out of all of the men who played with him, he says proudly, he is one of the 
few who still owns a house. Neither does he have unpaid cheques “on the street” any 
more. 
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Afonso prefers borrowing from agiotas, because he says they are closer and when 
everything adds up the interest in banks is much higher. There is also too much 
bureaucracy in a bank. In addition, he cannot currently take out a loan from an official 
institution.  Two years ago he borrowed money from a financeira, guaranteed by his 
retirement benefit. Payments were to be deducted directly from his bank account, but at 
some point, and without him realising it, they stopped. A few months later the bank 
manager called him to say that the financeira was demanding that he pay a large amount 
of interest. He refused to pay it, closed the bank account and now receives the retirement 
benefit into his savings account. As a consequence, SPC has him registered a defaulter.  
After having paid the Ciganos, the household’s remaining significant debt is one 
to Guaibim, a chain of furniture stores, where the couple bought supplies for their house 
(a door, a floor, a bathtub) for R$3060. They put down R$1000 and split the rest into ten 
monthly instalments worth R$273. Afonso had given the shop ten predated cheques and 
each month when another cheque is cashed, Malu picks up a nota promissória that goes 
with it. In the past Malu had also received a loan from the Fishermen’s Syndicate. 
About ten bar customers owe them money, which Afonso keeps noted in his small 
notebook (caderninho). Some debts are a year and a half old, dating from the time when 
the bar opened, and the highest is R$250. A few months before our interview, a hand-
written poster hung next to the bar’s entrance, announcing that if the debtors failed to pay 
their debts, he was going to sell it to Ciganos.60 It apparently helped – two people paid 
their debts.  
                                                 
60
 The poster read (a literal translation): “We would like to let our clients in debit (débito) know, that your 
debt is due 30/5/2009, otherwise, we will pass the debt onto Ciganos. Signature: the head office” 
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Sometimes, they make their bar available for fundraising bingos. I did not win 
anything when the Fisherman’s Syndicate organised a bingo game to fundraise for the 
feast of Iemanjá, the sea goddess. A year previously, neighbours held another to pay for 
an operation for a disabled man. In most community bingos, prizes are donated by people 
through an institution called balaio, literally a large basket made of bamboo or straw used 
primarily for transport, which figuratively designates a system of, and a place for, 
material donations.61  
 
Joana 
Joana, 27, and her children live in a small adobe house (taipa) on the outskirts of the 
town. The house was bought for R$5.000 by her ex-boyfriend, who had since moved out. 
Only intermittently employed, Joana mostly survives on biscate/bico – on one-off tasks 
for money, on street-vending or selling a rifa (raffle). She usually sells 100 numbers for 
R$1 and whoever gets the last two digits from in the Federal Lottery that week wins 
R$70. Mostly, though, she does not sell everything, falling short of the maximum profit 
of R$30. Two fathers of her three children, while acknowledging their paternity, do not 
pay child support; she had already filed legal complaints against them. 
Mid-October 2009, when I interviewed her, was particularly difficult. Joana had 
been employed as a cleaner in a Cigano house – three hours a day, for R$120 per month 
plus lunch. But in June the Ciganos fled. In July her bolsa família stopped, because her 
son had dropped out of the schooling provided by the PETI, a programme for the 
eradication of child labour. She started working as a cook in one restaurant for a small 
                                                 
61
 By extention it can also denote a canister, where offerings for Iemanjá are given in the sea. 
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sum, but quit after 20 days, because the restaurant was too far away. She had also 
arranged for her oldest daughter (13) to live with an old lady as her companion, but a few 
weeks later, her daughter had still not been paid and Joana made her quit. After a few 
futile attempts to get the amount owed to her, Joana gave up.  
Joana spends about R$50 per week on food. Electricity is about R$12 per month 
and gas about R$35. Water is illegally connected to the municipal distribution.  She 
doesn’t know how much money she spends monthly, because she buys things or pays off 
her debts whenever she can. For example, two weeks ago she asked the restaurant owner 
for an advance on her wages. She bought some new clothes to wear that night at a party 
where her new boyfriend was singing. Then she looked for her mother at the market-
place to ask for money for a hairdresser; she also met her ex-boyfriend who refused to 
lend money to her, claiming his card was blocked; and for one hour she waited around 
the praça, hoping to spot a colleague from the restaurant who had borrowed R$50 a few 
weeks earlier.  
Besides the ex-colleague, her neighbour owes her R$20 that he had borrowed to 
pay for the cooking gas. Another man who had owed her R$80 finally paid her after a 
year and a half. Joana had lent him money when he was threatened by an agiota, but he 
had avoided paying her back until she threatened to report him to the police. 
When she is in dire need a few friends lend her money. One of them has a line of 
credit (conta) at one market stall, and he sometimes allows her to buy clothes there. She 
puts things she buys on his account and pays him – without interest – whenever she has 
money. Her debts exceed what she normally earns in one month (when she worked for 
the Ciganos and received the bolsa família it was about R$250). She cannot buy 
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groceries fiado as no shop owner trusts her. Currently she owes R$40 for a perfume, 
R$100 for a pressure cooker and a small sum for a cake from her neighbour. She also 
owes R$140 for cesta básica (a basic food package) to a door-to-door trader who agreed 
to sell it to her on two instalments because he used to date her niece and Joana had 
bought from him in the past. When she made the purchase she was counting on money 
from the restaurant, but in the meantime she quit. 
Only once, by claiming to be a street vendor, she inquired about a micro-loan 
from Caixa Econômica Federal, in which she has had a bank account for five years. But 
the paperwork was costly and anyway it was unlikely she would get it.62 Two years ago, 
she also borrowed money from an agiota on advice of her “friend”.63 It was Christmas 
Eve. Joana and her children were living in a rented house for R$60 per month and they 
had nothing to eat. The agiota lent her R$90 in exchange for her bolsa família card. She 
had planned to retrieve it the following month, but falling short, she kept paying only the 
interest (juros). For one year, every month the agiota took out R$122 from an ATM, gave 
her R$90 and kept R$32, until her new boyfriend gave her money to buy the card back.  
In November, after four months, she started receiving bolsa família again. Since 
her son had dropped out of the PETI it was lowered from R$132 to R$102.  Nevertheless, 
she says it is “good little money” (dinheirinho bom). “You know already what you will 
do with it”. It allows her to plan things, to borrow or to pay off a debt. The family also 
moved into the house of her current boyfriend.  
 
                                                 
62
 She has another account empty of money in Banco do Brazil Popular. 
63
 The irony stressed by Joana. 
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Gilson  
As a teacher at two high-schools, one municipal and one state, Gilson (49) receives 
around R$4800 per month.  But he tells others that it is only R$2000; it is nobody’s 
business, he says, and people often ask to borrow money from him. Since 2005, he has 
been living with his sister (42), also a teacher at a state high school, in a rented house. 
They divide the costs: Gilson pays the rent of R$250 per month and the internet; his sister 
pays for the water, electricity and the phone bill. The salary of their ‘domestic’ is R$510 
per month and they each pay half. He calculates for me that monthly he spends about 
R$400 on food, R$460 on car payments, R$200 on gasoline, R$480 on private health 
insurance, less then R$100 on clothes and between R$300-500 on alcohol and going out. 
On top of that, there are ad hoc and irregular costs: last month he spent R$300 on a post-
surgery treatment and the following month he will have to pay the annual car insurance.  
For decades he has had a bank account in Bradesco, where he receives his 
municipal salary. To draw the state school’s salary, a few years ago he was obliged to 
open another account in the state-owned Banco do Brasil. When the money comes to the 
latter, he pays all of his bills, his credit cards and drinks he has bought on fiado in the Bar 
do Barbudo, although when the month is difficult, he negotiates to pay those later. 
Whatever is left from the salary, he moves to the savings account in Bradesco.   
He says he does not have many debts these days: first, there are the instalments on 
a new plasma TV in the furniture store Guaibim; he wanted to have the instalments 
deducted from a credit card, but to avoid interest he brings a cheque every month instead. 
Second, there are the above-mentioned car payments. Third, a few days ago, just as usual, 
he bought groceries in a supermarket in Palotina with a predated cheque that will be 
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cashed shortly after his salary comes.64 Fourth, six months ago he had given his dentist 
ten cheques predated for ten months – R$380 each. Fifth, he and his sister sued their 
health insurance company for some changes in rules but they lost. They were ordered to 
pay what had accumulated since 2007 when the court first pre-emptively stopped the 
payments – Gilson R$2700 and his sister R$1800. Luckily, the insurance company made 
them an offer: if they paid everything at once, they would get a 40 percent discount. 
Gilson borrowed the money from Bradesco for both. He will be repaying the loan for 
twenty-four months at 2.6 per cent annual interest without his sister contributing 
anything. 
He complains about his sister.  She has too many credit cards and much of her 
salary is tied up with crédito consignado, i.e. payments taken directly from her account. 
He paid for her extra training required by the state. He tells me how a few years back he 
had two additional credit cards made that were tied to his – one for his boyfriend and 
another for his sister. While the boyfriend used it only sporadically and in small amounts, 
his sister spent R$760. Although she kept paying, because of her limits, the debt kept 
increasing. Gilson only learned about it when the debt reached R$2000 and his own card 
was blocked. He negotiated a new payment plan and the bank even wrote off part of the 
debt. To this day Gilson is paying R$160 per month, while his sister has stopped paying 
this debt.  
Gilson also “helps” his cousin by occasionally giving her some money. For the 
past few weeks, a common friend of ours has been nagging him to finance a luncheonette 
                                                 
64
 Besides the interest, he sees another advantage in buying on notas promisórias, or predated cheques (but 
only to those you can trust not to cash before the date): “If [you are short of money and] you pay with a 
credit card on, let’s say the 20th, they deduct the payment already on the 1st.” With the cheques one decides 
on the date of payment (the usual upper limit being one month – “thirty days”, “trinta dias”. One can also 
re-negotiate a new promissory note. 
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she is planning to open. So far he has refused; she still owes him a considerable sum from 
three years ago when he financed her now closed restaurant. A few months ago he lent 
money to another friend, who paid it back, but the last week came to borrow again. He 
served as an avalista, a guarantor, in a bank loan of yet another friend. He only learned 
that this friend did not pay the loan, when he found out that the daily limits on his credit 
card and cheque especial65 were lowered.  
Gilson believes that he only managed to renegotiate the responsibility for his 
friend’s loan and the new payment plan of his sister’s debt because he is a loyal customer 
to Bradesco. Besides the savings account and now the loan for twenty-four months, he 
has a car insurance, life insurance, and cheque especial with this bank. As a public 
service employee he can borrow from any bank relatively easily, but he does not think 
banks are that much better than agiotas – although the interest is low, because it is 
extended for a long period, one ends up paying a lot.  
He has three credit cards with Bradesco: one with a limit of R$4500, the second 
with R$3500 and a special card for public service employees, with low interest. He also 
has two cards with Banco do Brasil, a debit card with a telephone operator, a credicartão 
with a financeira to buy in shops (with a very high interest), and a new one with Itaú 
bank.  
 
*** 
 
                                                 
65
 Cheques which allow him to go into R$3000 debit without any interest if he pays the debt within one 
week. 
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Of the three examples, Gilson’s monthly income is the highest and combined with his 
sister’s salary, the household income reaches around R$7000 per month. This contrasts 
sharply with Joana who even in her better days when she was working as a cleaner and 
receiving bolsa família earned only R$250 per month. Unlike Afonso and Malu, neither 
Gilson nor Joana own their own house, but while Joana has to rely on the goodwill of her 
partners and was constantly anxious about where to live, Gilson is planning to take a state 
guaranteed loan for an apartment in Salvador shortly before he retires. Although these are 
not the richest people in Santaluz they represent the majority of people in the town 
(excluding peasants). More specifically, they illustrate how people in Bahia today 
combine diverse credit forms and negotiate a variety of financial institutions – both 
informal-local and official.  
As the case studies show, people are involved in an intricate network of 
credit/debt facilitated through various credit institutions. Their debt is not just a result of 
conspicuous consumption, but often reflects long-term investments, obligations and ideas 
about “sanctioned” sources of wealth (Roitman 2003: 211-237). Joana fell into debt 
trying to provide for her children and Gilson constantly helped his friends and family and 
even invested in his sister’s education. Or take Afonso and Malu. For many Bahians, a 
house (a casa) serves as the point of continuity (Marcelin 1999: 31-60); in fact, a house 
or the lack of one, was one thing that came out most frequently during interviews. Afonso 
and Malu acquired debts in Guaibim to improve their house; taking a child of their 
neighbour to be raised by them is also a part of this ideology of relatedness centring on 
the house. In addition, they provided their bar for neighbourhood bingos for free and, 
despite the poster, Afonso was not really planning to sell his neighbour’s debts to 
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Ciganos. Rather, just like the posters about fiado hanging in shops, Afonso’s threat can 
be seen as a confirmation of a shared world through social relations constituted by debt, 
where “hope of an accomplishment is the confidence in the future” (Roitman 2003: 223).  
In all three cases, the stable monthly income comes from the state in a form of a 
salary, retirement benefit or a conditional cash transfer. The state also intervenes either 
indirectly by stimulating creation of official financial services or directly using its own 
institutions or as a source of income. It is critical that both, formal institutions (banks, 
shops and financeiras), as well as informal moneylenders, try to tap into a seemingly 
inexorable flow of money to one’s bank account (James 2012: 37). In small town Bahia, 
where only a minority of people have formal employment with a legally required 
“signed” work book (a carteira de trabalho), individual households’ stable income 
comes often directly from the state in a form of retirement benefit, public service 
employment (e.g. a hospital) or a CCT. Gilson’s negotiating position with Bradesco was 
strong, because of his relatively high stable income; in Afonso’s case, the financeira 
deducted money directly from his bank account where he received his contributory 
retirement; in Joana’s case, Galeguinho withheld her bolsa família card and took the 
money from an ATM every month.  
 
3.2 Agiotas  
 
All three households had experience with Gypsy and non-Gypsy agiotas. Joana borrowed 
to buy food for her children, Afonso to finance his gambling and to cover bar costs. 
Gilson, too, had an experience with non-Gypsy agiotas and Ciganos:  
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In 2001, Gilson needed money for a small enterprise he had established and which 
was going badly. He asked for a loan from an acquaintance about whom he knew 
was lending on interest. The acquaintance did not have enough money, but he 
offered to arrange a loan from Ciganos on 40 percent monthly interest. Gilson 
agreed. The next day they went to a Cigano settlement in a neighbouring town, 
where a Cigano told Gilson to come back alone the next day and he would not 
have to pay the middleman.  They agreed on 20 percent interest and the Cigano 
told him to return in five days. Meanwhile, however, Gilson managed to defer 
another payment, “gained time”, and did not need to borrow anymore. But in five 
days he went back nevertheless “to talk to” (conversar com) the Cigano and to 
thank him: “I did not know if I would ever need him again.”   
“But Ciganos are not the only agiotas”, he stressed. Besides them, there 
were those “of white collar” (de collarinho branco) and he told me how in 1998 
his father borrowed R$100 from Seu Raimundo – the same agiota I failed to 
interview– using Gilson’s cheque as the collateral (garantia). For the next few 
months the father kept paying only the interest, gave the agiota another cheque 
from Gilson after a year, but never fully repaid the loan. Then in 2001 his father 
had a stroke. A few months later, Seu Raimundo asked Gilson for a new cheque 
and told him that his father’s debt had risen to R$1800. Gilson managed to get 
away with paying only part of the debt by threatening him with the police and 
because it was not really his debt. 
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In a different way Gilson’s case illustrates the sentiment that Joana also expressed 
when she told me that one could never get a card from agiotas, because they only want 
the interest. “In reality it is not a loan, but a pawn (penhora),” a former right hand of Seu 
Raimundo told me when he was explaining how Galeguinho operates. “When somebody 
comes to borrow, he hands in his card. On a day when the loan is to be paid, Gil 
[Galeguinho’s right hand man] goes with him [a client] to a bank who takes money out of 
his account. Let’s say you should pay 500. He would go to a bank with you, you would 
take the money out, and he would take his interest plus your card and gave you the rest. 
Until you also paid your principal. He never lost/took on a bad debt (nunca tomou 
calote).”  
So why do people borrow money from agiotas? Gilson is convinced that his 
father would have got a loan in a bank. He had a bank account and was a friend of the 
director,66 but it would take too much paperwork and his father needed the money 
urgently. Most people told me that money from an agiota is “fast money”, “without any 
bureaucracy”, and does not require a proof of income. Afonso, who as a former gambler 
should know, stressed that he knew these people and could visit them any time, to either 
borrow or renegotiate. A director of one bank in the interior told me that he thought that 
the role of agiotas was decreasing, because more people borrowed from official sources. 
I do not have any way to disprove or corroborate this, but the high level of default on 
official loans among the middle class C in recent years suggests the opposite. Just as 
Afonso’s case illustrated, upon defaulting on their loans, people’s access to official 
sources is blocked for five years, a period during which they often turn to agiotas.  
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 Similarly to the manager fired during my stay, this bank manager had been also removed for too many 
defaulters; apparently from among the town’s politicians. 
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  There are at least ten big agiotas in Santaluz, most of them shopkeepers. Seu 
Alberto owns a shop with construction materials; Galeguinho started as a barber at the 
town’s market. Agiota is one of the most common local credit institutions (e.g. 
Abramovay 2004: 21-67). But although agiotas existed in the past, their functioning has 
slightly changed and their role intensified in the process of “financialisation”. While 
writing this chapter, I read about a mayor from southern Bahia, who had bought 
construction supplies worth R$100.000 with cheques. The cheques bounced, since the 
mayor used the Federal money allocated to the town (verba) to pay his debt with agiotas 
and Ciganos.67 I also witnessed how a loan from a financiera was used to pay a loan to 
agiota.   
This often is a complex operation: People “sell” their lines of credit (in 
financeiras and stores) which makes agiotas their only remaining option; in the furniture 
store Guaibim there were posters warning against the practice. Or, military personnel first 
borrow informally and then borrow maximum crédito consignado from a financeira for 
four years. Then they legally divorce and because their wives start receiving 40 percent 
of their salary, instalments to financeira are automatically lowered and the repayment 
period doubled. In both of these cases then, the state policies have had an impact on 
temporality of credit/debt, opening a space for negotiation meanwhile.  
And then there are the poor who can borrow from agiotas using CCT cards as 
collateral. In fact, predated cheques, CCT and bank cards with PIN numbers and 
sometimes also ID cards, “formalised” the relations and solved a major problem for an 
agiota – imperfect information about their clients. By often drawing money directly from 
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 Cristiano, Jackson, Aurelino Leal - Prefeito é acusado de passar cheques sem fundo e pagar agiotas e 
ciganos com dinheiro do povo, Ubaitaba Urgente, 23.10.2011 <http://ubaitabaurgente.com.br>, last 
accessed 3 December 2011. 
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bank accounts “forms of social collateral like trust are simply not required” (James 2012: 
37).   
  Most clients of agiotas are public employees, who leave their bank cards with 
them. Although his view is probably biased, Gilson was convinced that most borrowers 
are teachers: “I know one, from whose house a Cigano took even a kitchen blender … 
many people have problems with SPC and Cerrasa … only financeiras lend to them. And 
this is taken directly from their bank accounts [i.e. crédito consignado] – there is no way 
how one can avoid paying it. So it is much easier [to borrow from an agiota].”  
But often the line separating borrowers and moneylenders is blurred by middle 
class people using their stable income as a fund for their money-lending activities 
(compare James 2012: 25). “They tried to involve me in agiotagem”, Gilson told me. A 
few years ago a friend asked him for money to borrow. Because Gilson had just received 
a larger sum – an accumulation of several delayed salaries from the municipal school – 
he agreed. “10 percent, isn’t it, Gilson?” suggested the friend automatically when she 
came to pay back the loan. “I am not an agiota,” he said appalled, “You pay me only at 
the rate of inflation.” The grateful friend suggested that she could arrange people for him 
to lend money to, but “at least at 10 percent”. Gilson declined.  
Loans to friends and families are made with zero interest or at the inflation rate. 
Often, considerations of kinship and friendship complicate the issues. For instance, a 
former right hand man of Seu Raimundo, who used to be a small scale agiota himself, 
told me that he gave it up after he was disgusted with his friend who for four years 
avoided paying back the loan. As Gilson’s story makes clear, besides the large agiotas 
and Ciganos, in Santaluz there are people who could be classified as “small” 
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moneylenders, who often try to supplement their state guaranteed income through lending 
part of it on interest.  
Before concluding, I want to turn to the place of Ciganos in all this. For instance, 
unlike large-scale agiotas they do not like to lend withholding CCT cards. But unlike the 
small moneylenders, this reluctance is not caused by considerations of long-term 
relationships. Depending on circumstances, Ciganos can be seen as specific agiotas or 
distinguished from agiotas proper. Gilson stressed that Ciganos are not the only agiotas 
and the article about the mayor from southern Bahia also distinguished between agiotas 
and Ciganos. It is telling of social distance and their respective modes of functioning, that 
the agiotas were interviewed by the journalist directly and told him that the mayor owed 
them R$200.000 which he was paying with predated cheques. On the other hand, the 
journalist referred to the “people” (o povo) that said that “Ciganos are frequently seen 
looking for the mayor”, always the 10th, the 20th and the 30th of the month when the 
federal money arrives. 
  
3.3 Ciganos  
 
In the introduction, I mentioned the 2005 article in the financial supplement of Folha de 
São Paulo that announced that “in the Bahian backlands, a cigano is the banker”. The 
article described how for the agave peasants in Valente, Ciganos are the second most 
important source of credit after agave merchants who own storage places and organise 
transportation. Other sources of credit – banks and a cooperative – are less popular; the 
cooperative does not even spend the money given by the Federal Government. The 
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merchants, in a system of patronage pay against the future crop,68 financing the planting 
in turn. In a circle of dependency, the peasants receive less than what they could get on 
the market, stalling any possibilities of saving up for a next year.  Ciganos do not require 
bureaucracy and their interest is “high” – “10 on every 100” per month. The peasants 
know they can find them on the main street, although many prefer borrowing money in 
the evening when nobody can see them. And the stories circulate in Valente about people 
who “lost everything” to Ciganos.  
These Cigano characteristics are widespread. Once I knew where to look I could 
spot Ciganos in most small towns, alone or numbering up to twenty, more or less 
conspicuous, on a marketplace or in front of a bank. Their popular image portrays them 
as callous and sometimes obtuse tricksters always hungry for money.69 They are 
notorious for the ease with which they seem to obtain money, for their high interest rates, 
and for their potentially violent debt collection. In some regions, merchants and 
storeowners also hire Ciganos as cobradores – debt collectors. The point is, that Cigano 
and moneylender are increasingly synonymous. Elisabeth Thiele, for instance, reports 
that in some places in Bahia Ciganos are known as the “informal bank” (2008: 144). This 
despite the fact, that Ciganos are involved also in trade and even farming.70  
It is unclear when moneylending turned into the dominant mode of livelihood 
among the Calon, but there were other periods and places when Ciganos were known to 
lend money on interest. A 1957 dictionary of slang from Rio de Janeiro, for instance, 
under the entry “cigano” gives as a synonym-definitions two expressions that mean a 
moneylender (Viotti 1957): agiota and onzeneiro. Onzeneiro is derived from a word for 
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 The system known as comprar na folha. 
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 See chapter 1 
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 Those in Valente planted agave themselves. 
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eleven (onze), a percentual height of an interest rate and dates back to at least sixteenth-
century Portugal.71 Other synonyms of cigano that the dictionary offers – sovina (a miser) 
and espertalhão (a confidence man) – also point to a Cigano as a person involved with 
money in a way that violates appropriate sociability.  
It is likely that in Rio de Janeiro the link between moneylending and Ciganos is 
much older. A Cigano José Rabello was at the beginning of the nineteenth century one of 
its richest inhabitants, who even organised “Gypsy parties” for the Court. Vivaldo 
Coaracy writes, that “Rabello, who received a position in the military, dedicated himself 
to financial and bank operations. In other words, he was a prestamista. On interest, 
naturally” (1965: 74). Coaracy tells of a legend that circulated in Rio de Janeiro of the 
period, that Rabello had so many golden bricks hidden under the roof of his house, that 
they caused the ceiling to collapse. The legend “was probably invented by some of his 
clients,” he concludes. Such financial activities were possibly also connected with the 
role of Ciganos as lower court officials (meirinhos), a profession that they passed on 
hereditarily until the 1950s (Mello, Alves de Souza, and Couto 2004).  Writing at the end 
of the nineteenth century, Moraes Filho notes that “they were the gypsies of Cidade 
Nova, who showed off, the old justice officers, who set up home in the gallery 
underneath the terrace, waiting for notifications of court orders and writs of garnishment 
(á espera de citações e mandados de penhora)” (1904: 141). 
It should be kept in mind, however, that even for the early nineteenth century, Rio 
de Janeiro was unique for its level of inclusion of Ciganos into the urban life.72 Similarly, 
I did not come across any suggestions that Ciganos specialised or were recognised as 
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 A figure of onzeneiro appears in a 1517 moralistic play of Gil Vincente Auto da Barca do Inferno. 
72
 See chapter 2. 
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agiotas in other regions or at other periods. On the other hand, as I described in the 
previous chapter, trade in Brazil was mostly done on credit. In fact, the project of the 
Portuguese Empire was based on a dense net of debt relations into which Ciganos entered 
on various terms. For instance, just a paragraph above his description of Cigano slave 
merchants in the Valongo in Rio de Janeiro, Robert Walsh notes that slaves were sold on 
credit up to ten years (1831: 322). And in a commentary to the painting Boutique de la 
rue du Valongo that depicts a Cigano slave trader with a buyer from Minas73, Debret 
discusses the difference between buying on credit and in cash: “the temporary 
depreciation of paper money (papel moeda) doubles the price of a negro [bought on 
credit], but the inhabitants of São Paulo or Minas with cash ready (com dinheiro na mão), 
buy him for the exchange rate of a day” (Debret 1975: 190). On the other side of the 
Atlantic, bush traders in Angola, many of whom were exiled Ciganos and Jews, accepted 
goods on credit from Portuguese merchants in ports before going into the interior in 
search of slaves (Solow 1993: 141). Incidentally, the word prestamista, which Coaracy 
used to describe Jose Rabello, has been used in the North-Eastern Brazil to denote an 
ambulant trader who sells his goods on instalments (prestação).74  
All this suggests that the emergence of moneylending as the main Cigano activity 
for making money arose from a general economy of credit of which the Calon were a 
part. In the past, animals – which Ciganos mostly traded in – were used to store value. As 
recently as few decades ago, owing to a general cash shortage and the character of the 
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 See Picture 1.2, page 75, above. 
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 According to the Houaiss dictionary the word prestamista is first noted in 1873 and means: 1) an 
individuals that lends money on interest 2) a holder of state bonds (títulos de dívida pública) 3) one who 
buys on instalments/prestations 4) Regionalism: North-East Brazil. an ambulant trader that sells on 
instalments.  
“Prestamista” also means usurer in Spanish-speaking Latin America. 
The root verb prestar means to concede, give, but also for a person to have value and be of a good 
character. 
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agricultural cycle where cash from selling crops alternated with its lack, majority of 
animals in Bahia were bought and sold on credit (fiado). A man from an established 
farming family in Santaluz told me that he was so well acquainted with some Ciganos 
because some were born on his family’s fazenda where they often camped in the past. His 
family bought animals from them, with most transactions done on credit. The fazendeiro 
argued that this is how they became agiotas. Such practices were widespread and went in 
both directions. When Manuel, a Calon, whose story I describe in the following chapter, 
died in 1983, his older sons paid his debts to a farmer from whom Manuel had bought 
animals on fiado because they wanted to continue dealing with him.   
The story of a rise of the Cigano moneylending niche seems to go as follows: at 
the time when life in small Bahian towns was becoming more financialised, Calon 
opportunities for making a living from itinerant trade were becoming limited. Demand 
for animals decreased and the Calon could not compete with established stores although 
trade was still done on credit. Between 1980 and the mid 1990s, a period of 
transformation attested by several authors (e.g. Silva 1999; Goldfarb 2004), many Calon 
built houses and limited their daily trade rounds to adjacent municipalities easily 
reachable by cars; the Calon in Valente, above, claim to have settled in the town in 1993. 
Thanks to cars and roads Calon men do not need to travel with their whole families and 
in larger troupes, but can return the same evening after their daily round. But as I will 
show in the following chapter, they have not simply become sedentarised. Rather, there is 
an intensive movement between settlements and switching between tents and houses.  
During this period, moneylending became Calon’s primary (pre)occupation. 
Whether a transformation of their previous activities, such as sales on credit, or the 
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intensification of already existing moneylending practices, the fact is that in Bahia today, 
under the conditions brought about by financialisation, agiota has become a synonym for 
a Cigano; the term replaced mascate (an ambulant trade) or negociante (a trader) of past 
three centuries, and gringo (a foreign ambulant trader) of the seventeenth. Ciganos are 
one of many local credit institutions, and although they are not the only agiotas, they are 
the agiotas of a specific kind.  
 
Conclusion 
 
People in Santaluz are constantly being entangled in a dense network of credit/debt 
through which they meet their daily needs and invest in the future. This network is not 
purely local. Rather it emerged out of the state’s intervention which redefined the 
distribution regime (e.g. James 2012: 20-40). Even local forms of credit, such as the 
moneylenders, are tied to flows of money coming from the state or via official financial 
institutions. One’s personal credit, even in informal exchanges, is influenced by this 
“formalisation” (Guyer 2004). Poor people, who depend on CCTs, can obtain loans using 
their cards as collateral. Public employees are often sought out by their friends asking for 
loans and become small money-lenders themselves. But they are also the most common 
customers of agiotas to whom they hand in predated cheques or their bank cards. In other 
words, through involvement of the state, relationships with agiotas have become more 
formalised and less personalised in the traditional sense.  
Within this financialising framework Calon started to make a living through 
lending money on interest. This does not seem as a totally new development. On the one 
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hand, the ambiguity of the moneylender is strengthened by Ciganos being seen as 
trickster-figures, as I defined it in the first chapter. On the other, in the past Ciganos were 
one among many intermediaries in an economic system that ran on the basis of 
credit/debt. Today, Ciganos-as-moneylenders arise out of the distribution system which 
allows for novel diversions of wealth. Therefore, after having described the “demand” 
side of the Cigano moneylending niche in the last two chapters, I now turn to explore 
how this diversion is organised.  
 
 139 
IV. CALON SPACES: THE EMERGENCE OF SETTLEMENTS THROUGH 
MOBILITY AND VIOLENCE 
 
Introduction 
In the mid-nineteenth century, London’s Penny Magazine of the Society for the Diffusion 
of Useful Knowledge noted that the Muras, an indigenous people of mobile hunter-
gatherers who defied “pacification” by the state, were also known as the “gypsies of 
Brasil” (1842: 90). Recently a family who made a living through travelling across Brazil 
selling medicinal plants and were described by journalists as Indians-Gypsies (Índios 
ciganos), insisted that they were of indigenous origin and had nothing to do with 
Ciganos.75 Or consider this 2010 story from Santa Catarina: When the municipal council 
wanted to expel Ciganos who had built tents in the centre of one town, the Ministério 
Público intervened and forced the council to offer alternative camping grounds instead.  
These snippets give a sense of the extent to which in Brazil a nomadic lifestyle 
has been perceived as a symbol of Ciganos; which, under the current regime of 
multiculturalism, is even becoming the ethnic trait in a need of protection. But Cigano 
“nomadism” (nomadismo) is viewed ambiguously: erecting camps can cause tensions 
with authorities and behaving like Ciganos, i.e. being “nomads”, can serve as a label for 
an indigenous people in conflict with authorities. Today, as in the past, authorities often 
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 Índios ciganos pedem que justiça conceda liberdade provisória a familiares presos, Acesse Notícias. 
27.01.2012 <http://www.acessenoticias.com.br/noticia/ndios-ciganos-pedem-que-justica-conceda-
liberdade-provisoria-a-familiares-pr/5957>, last accessed 04.04.2012. 
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see mobility as problematic, while much academic writing and popular discourse sees 
“nomadism” as the Cigano characteristic.76  
What normally perplexes their neighbours the most is the fluidity and instability 
of any Calon settlement. When I started my fieldwork everybody in Santaluz knew where 
to find Ciganos. The identification of that place with Ciganos and the intensity of their 
presence were such that even our bills came addressed to Rua dos Ciganos (The Gypsy 
Street), rather than using the official street name. Yet, two years later all Calon 
disappeared from our town. Such disappearances are not unique.  There are many more 
places across Brazil with names such as Grota dos Ciganos, Descida dos Ciganos, or 
Baixada dos Ciganos, while many towns used to have such locales in the past. Only those 
interested in history know, for instance, that Ciganos in Rio de Janeiro, who in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were barred from settling within the city, 
concentrated around what is today Praça Tiradentes, which for this reason used to be 
known as Campo dos Ciganos (Green 2006: 181-204). And a memoirist recalls that 
somewhere in Salvador used to be Beco dos Ciganos but that his “generation forgot 
where it stood” (Leal 2000: 172).  
Starting with this chapter, I want to shift the focus from the non-Gypsy views of 
Ciganos which I have been describing until now, and explore how Calon construct and 
view their world. Concretely in this chapter, I address the ways in which Calon spatiality 
relates to Calon social organisation. I argue, using DeLanda’s operationalisation of a 
Deleuzian concept, that Calon settlements are unstable “assemblages” (DeLanda 2006).  
Assemblages are composed of elements brought together through relations of 
exteriority. Parts can be detached and form other assemblages with different interactions 
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between elements, while the characteristics of any assemblage cannot be reduced to 
properties of any of its parts. Focusing on interaction between parts, assemblages can be 
studied along three axes: roles of component parts on a material-expressive axis; stability 
of elements on a territorialisation-deterritorialisation axis; and according to expressive 
media consolidating identity of assemblages on a coding-decoding axis. Seen from this 
perspective, on the material-expressive axis there are no fixed social roles and no political 
authority in settlements. Settlements are weakly coded: they do not have specific names 
on their own; there does not exist a way to represent them as totalities; they are not parts 
of larges assemblages – such as state zoning or some Calon territorial structure – that 
would be able to fix their identity. Settlements are also constantly deterritorialised 
through violence and movement. Moreover, individual subjectivity, one’s knowledge and 
feeling of “the presence of absence” (Fowles 2010: 23-41) that relate primarily to places 
that have Calon left because of mourning and violence, become important, but these 
cannot be collectively represented.  
A settlement is therefore as much a temporal event as a spatial discontinuity – a 
Calon space, “a gap” (décalage) as Patrick Williams (2003) put it – created within a 
seamless non-Gypsy whole (cf Rivière 1995: 202). In this chapter I argue that the 
dynamics of Calon sociality stymies creation of any fixed order making settlements fluid 
and ephemeral. People decide to live somewhere, negotiating a series of dyadic 
relationships. Here principles of autonomy and of looking for better opportunities make 
people relatively free to leave and join other camps. Readiness to move elsewhere is part 
of a legitimate effort to improve one’s position among other Calon. Lastly, the permanent 
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potentiality of violence influences spatial distribution and gives meaning to the cleavages 
separating Calon. 
 
4.1 Organisation of Settlements  
The Settlement in Santaluz 
This chapter is about Calon settlements – visible geographical locations of Calon. I take 
the term “settlement” from a description of another “minimalistic society” (Viveiros de 
Castro 1986: 265-282) that lacks formal social groupings or corporate social structure. 
Writing about the Trio in the Amazonian Guiana, Peter Rivière (1984) described their 
settlements as constantly changing, small and impermanent, composed of individualistic 
people who prefer living with kin (Rival and Whitehead 2001: 3). Although the Calon are 
not Trio, “in the absence of any clearly defined social structure among these people” I 
also find settlements to be “an invaluable mode on which to hang their descriptions” 
(1995: 189).  
Let us return to the Calon settlement in Santaluz. Within the last three decades, 
due to town growth and land-ownership issues, the camp changed location five times. For 
some time it stood in a neighbourhood called São Lázaro, then it moved to Graça, the 
biggest neighbourhood (bairro) in town. Graça is one of the poorest neighbourhoods with 
many people occupying land illegally; most drug-related violence happens in this part of 
town. In Graça, a tent camp first stood by the river next to a metal foot-bridge, until the 
mayor started building a small football field there in the run-up to the election. The camp 
moved to Rua dos Ciganos, where Djalma owned a plot at the end of the street. At that 
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time, another rich Calon from a town about 95 kilometres away also bought a house on 
this street.  
About six years before my fieldwork Djalma sold the plot and the camp moved to 
a new location not far from the street, where I found it. When I arrived, the Calon lived in 
two double houses on Rua dos Ciganos and in a camp with a fluctuating number of tents, 
about fifty meters away down a dirt road. Djalma was a strongman in the camp and many 
people had lived there for the past six years. The place had previously been a flat grassy 
unoccupied piece of land owned by a man who lived abroad; by the time I arrived to do 
my fieldwork, new construction was limiting the options of the Calon again.  The two 
houses, about twenty meters from each other and each containing two flats, belonged to 
Eduardo. He started constructing his one around the same time when Djalma moved to 
the present camp; Eduardo’s older son and Eduardo’s brother divided the two apartments 
of the second house. Our house was also on this street.  
Brazilians call Calon settlements acampamentos Ciganos (Gypsy camps) when 
dominated by tents, or ruas dos Ciganos (Gypsy streets) when houses dominate (or 
“alleyways”, “squares”, “plazas” and other urban spaces). In terms of composition, what I 
call a Calon settlement can consist of tents or houses in various combinations. A 
settlement comprising only tents77, I refer to as camp, from Portuguese acampamento. 
But settlements can also be composed of a house (or few houses) surrounded by tents, or 
a few neighbouring houses (with or without tents). Even on Gypsy streets, Calon are 
seldom a numerical majority. Consider other settlements that I know well: in São Gabriel, 
besides several houses scattered across one neighbourhood among non-Gypsy houses, 
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 The tents are rectangular usually 10x8 meters and 2,5 meters high in the middle. Their structure is made 
out of wooden poles covered with two pieces of tarpaulin – one for roof and another for sides. The whole 
tent can be taken apart in an hour and transported to another destination by a lorry.  
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there were two settlements – a camp composed of twelve tents perched on a hill next to 
the entrance of the town (São Gabriel A), and a settlement composed of a house 
surrounded by six tents in the centre of the town (São Gabriel B). In Bomfim, a rural 
zone within the municipality of Santaluz occupied by small farmers, there were more 
than forty tents in three camps separated by dirt roads and peasant houses. Although 
settlements composed of houses tend to be more stable, as I show below, this a matter of 
degree. Calon families often move house, and move from houses to tents.  
Calon do not have a specific word which signifies ‘a settlement’ and nor do they 
have names for individual settlements. When referring to settlements from outside, they 
use the names of towns. They say they go to “Bomfim”, “São Gabriel” or “Santaluz” and 
one can assume they are going to visit other Calon there. Otherwise, they use 
geographical descriptions.  Calon in Santaluz who lived in the houses, talked about the 
camp as “lá em baixo”, “down there”, because it was closer to the river; I will use this 
term when talking about the camp in Santaluz. When a year into my fieldwork, Eduardo 
bought a plot and organised a new settlement in São Gabriel, it was called as the 
“terreno”, “a plot”. A camp in Alto de Bela Vista, where Kiko’s in-laws lived they called 
“roça”, “a field” because it was in the rural zone. Most of the time, though, Calon use a 
person who lives in the place as a referent: “come with me to the house of my mother”; 
“he is there at Paulo’s”. When somebody calls and a person is in his own settlement, the 
person answers: “I am here. In my rancho.” A rancho is the term used most commonly to 
refer to one’s own tent (barraca, a tent, is also used, albeit less commonly).78  
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 According to Houaiss dictionary, etymologically rancho means a temporary rural shelter for those who 
are not local inhabitants, such as soldiers. It can also mean a camp made out of such shelters. 
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In other words, settlements do not have a fixed identity. They are not known even 
according to a person who owns a plot or a strong-man around whom a camp is 
organised. In this way, Calon downplay any possible hierarchy in relation to settlements, 
which could result from ownership or wealth. A settlement is an assemblage of individual 
households composing it, where an outsider refers to the closest person there, somebody 
he or she is visiting or to a geographical characteristic.  
Most of the families living in Santaluz had lived in this area for the past 20 years, 
but during this period the same households did not always “ranch” together. Rather, they 
have been moving within the area settling variously in interlinked settlements within the 
broader region. Therefore, although settlements are not corporate or political bodies, they 
are sociological phenomena. At their core is bilateral kinship and they centre around the 
figure of a strong-man. 
 
Kinship and Settlement Organisation  
Every settlement is organised around a strong-man who inspires others to live around him 
through his prestige among brasileiros, his claim to the land under the settlement, kinship 
links, protection and help. Reflecting local and historical specificities, the figure has also 
been known as o chefe (Ferrari 2010), o líder (Goldfarb 2004) o barão (Silva 1999), or o 
capitão (Wells 1886;China 1936;Thiele 2006). Although Calon I knew sometimes also 
used the expression chefe or líder, as a sociological category I prefer to use the term 
strong-man. This also reflects an important Calon concept of strength, força.  
The position of a strong-man is not given, but varies over time and across 
settlements. As a rule, however, it is impossible for anybody to move into a settlement 
 146 
when this is opposed by the strong-man. At the same time, he cannot force anybody to 
live with him; he has to invite people, who in turn might invite others. A strong-man 
generally has more established claims to the locality of the settlement. After Calon 
moved to the neighbourhood of Graça in Santaluz, they first lived on Djalma’s plot on 
Rua dos Ciganos. When the camp moved “down there”, he was the only one who owned 
the lot under his tent; others were allowed to stay by a caretaker of the plot, who 
happened to owe several of them money. Zezinho, the strong-man in São Gabriel A, 
rented a plot where the whole camp stood and was responsible for paying the rent and 
water, provided through a hose from a neighbouring house. Turista, a strong-man in São 
Gabriel B, did not own the plot, but it belonged to his youngest son whose wife brought it 
as a part of her dowry.  In Volta Redonda, Barão owned a large walled plot where his 
large house stood surrounded by small houses of his sons and son-in-laws. Only in 
Bomfim, where there was little official control, did most Calon occupy land without any 
legal titles.  
Households that habitually form a settlement and change locations together refer 
to themselves as turma, a cohort. In the camp “down there” in Santaluz, the following 
four households formed the core of the turma (Map 4.1): Djalma (a strong-man) and 
Maria (tent I), Paulo and Rita (II), Valdeli and Jacira (VI), and Índio and Iracema (XIII) 
(see Map 4.1 below). By the time of my fieldwork, these households had lived together 
for five years continuously. Wanderlei and Sonia (III) also belonged to this core, 
although when I first arrived they were spending some time (passar um tempo) with their 
other daughter in Bonital. The sons of Valdeli and Jacira built their tents next to their 
parents after they got married and other people variously joined and left this core.   
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Map 4.1                                         Spatial layout of the camp “down there” in Santaluz, 20 October 2008  
            Numbers refer to the same households as in the text and Figure 4.1.   
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Figure 4.1           Kinship relations among households in the camp “down there” in Santaluz, 20 October 2008.  
                          Numbers refer to the same households as in the text and Map 4.1.   
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Although there is certain preference for the closest relatives to live together, 
camps are not reflections of kinship groups. However, there is a general preference for 
what Gay y Blasco termed endosociability, a preference to live and spend time with, 
those with whom one grew up with, or provided care when one was a child, and to whom 
a person feels strong affective ties (2004: 167). These people are usually glossed over by 
the Calon as família and include parents, siblings, paternal uncles and a few cousins. 
Other consanguinal and affinal relatives are referred to as relatives, parentes. Since Calon 
usually marry other known Calon, most of the people have some kind of bilateral kin in 
most settlements of the wider area of which theirs is a part.  
Settlements also show the preference for patrilocality and virilocality known from 
other Gypsy groups (e.g. San Román 1975: 169-199;Okely 1983;Gay y Blasco 1999), but 
it is not a rule. This preference was most visible in São Gabriel B and Volta Redonda. 
The camp in São Gabriel A was composed of sisters and their husbands and the kinship 
relations for the camp “down there” in Santaluz can be seen on the Figure 4.1 above. The 
core of the turma is composed of men related to Djalma through affinity. Here too, we 
find groups of brothers – households III, V and IX; sons of V (tents IV and VI) and of IX 
(tents VIII, X and XI). 
Any settlement can also be visualised as a set of concentric kinship circles: a 
person is surrounded by his closest relatives who happen to live there. These principles 
combine with the “strength” of people, força, i.e. a capability to influence flow of things 
into a camp, which I will discuss in Chapter 6. Here it suffices to say that in Santaluz 
only Djalma owned a plot under his tent. He also helped others through small subsistence 
loans, had most deals with juróns and with Calon outside Santaluz, and with his guns 
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could provide some protection. In Santaluz, most deals were concluded in front of 
Djalma’s tent, that I marked as the “central space”. In many settlements this space was 
covered with tarpaulin on wooden poles.  
Djalma was the main inspiration for people to live in the camp “down there”. 
Djalma’s tent (I), in which he lived with his wife Maria and their son adopted from non-
Gypsies, stood in the centre, not a geographical middle but a centre of social 
relationships. His tent lay furthest from the river and from uninhabited houses and from 
non-Gypsy houses built illegally. Because he did not have any brothers and he himself 
came from the sertão, he was surrounded by his wife’s relatives. In front of him was the 
tent of blind Paulo (II), his brother-in-law. To the right of Djalma lay the tent of Maria’s 
sister Sonia and her husband Wanderlei (III); to the left, that of his niece Sandra (IV). 
With Sandra’s tent another circle began: Sandra’s father-in-law who lived across a patch 
of grass was also her father’s brother (V). Next to it was her husband’s brother (VI) and 
her sister’s (VII). Such co-centricity can be described for the whole settlement “down 
there” in Santaluz and it is observable in other settlements too.  
The density of kinship relations, the concentration of “strength” and related 
temporal stability are the highest in such a centre of a settlement. On the other hand, 
furnishings, the amount of money in circulation and the capacity to mobilise others, 
worsen towards the outskirts while a propensity for moving out increases. Thus Renato 
and Sonia (XII) stayed in the camp only for two weeks, while Pancho and Genilsa (XI) 
moved into and out the camp the most (see below). Índio (XII), on the other hand, came 
from the sertão and had only one brother with whom he refused to communicate. He was 
the poorest man in the settlement, and lived with this turma, because he got along well 
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with Djalma; neither he nor his wife Iracema were related to either Djalma or Maria, but 
Iracema’s sister Jacira lived in the camp (V). The last tent belonged to Maluco (XIV) 
who only had cousins in the camp and was married to a jurin. Between Índio and Maluco 
were the tents of two widows – Neide (black left) and Raimunda (black right). The first 
usually followed her son Renato and the second, her grandson Pancho. Their tents were 
the smallest, made of single tarpaulins and without any furniture.  
So far I have argued that Calon settlements are not independent entities; they are 
composed of bilaterally related people. At the centre of settlements lie households of 
strong-men. Although there is a preference for patrilocality and virilocality, as I will 
show next, any decision to settle is a result of negotiation and depends on a range of 
factors – from getting along with people in any settlement and economic opportunities in 
the area, to the degree of support in cases of violence, especially with other Calon. 
 
4.2 Settling Down And Moving Elsewhere 
One Family During Twenty Years  
Where one lives is not prescribed by any special functions or by membership at corporate 
groups. Moreover, despite the preference for endosociability, contingencies of life and 
the character of the household lifecycle often cause dispersal of relatives throughout the 
region and even across state borders. Apart from small children, most Calon I knew were 
not born in the towns where I met them. Tellingly, the settlement in Santaluz 
disintegrated during my fieldwork.  
Seen from the long-term perspective, the stability of settlements has not changed 
much over last decades. To illustrate this, I turn to the family of Manuel Borges da Costa. 
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In the following account I describe this family’s coast-hinterland-coast trajectory between 
the 1970s and the 1990s.  
 
Manuel was born in the semi-arid sertão, but for the past few years he had lived 
along the coast, close to Salvador, selling mules and donkeys to cambiteiros.79 In 
1979 he and his wife had arranged the marriage of their oldest son Jorge. Because 
the wedding was to take place in the sertão where the bride lived, in October 
1979, twenty-three people on mules and horses started their journey of 675 
kilometres, which would last several months.  
Their plan was to come back within a few months after the wedding. But 
while camping in Salgueiro on the lot of the local coronel-mayor, whose family 
had been dealing with these Calon families for years, the mayor suggested that 
they settle in his town. Manuel accepted and they started building two houses – 
one for Manuel and one for Jorge. Manuel’s daughter Mariazinha was also due to 
get married to her cross-cousin Claudio, the son of Manuel’s youngest sister. 
Manuel’s wife was a fraternal cousin of Claudio’s father, Eraldo.  
The newly-weds moved to the neighbouring town where they lived with 
Claudio’s family. About two years later, Claudio and Mariazinha appeared at 
Manuel’s house visibly anxious: A few hours previously, Claudio had gotten into 
an argument with his father, Eraldo, and pulled a gun on him. In the midst of the 
following confusion, his mother had stepped between them and been hit by a 
bullet. Claudio had not meant to shoot her; he said he was not trying to shoot his 
father either. Manuel’s sons were against the couple staying at their camp. They 
                                                 
79Transporters of sugar canes to mills for refinement. 
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did not like Claudio and, anyway it was not clear yet what the repercussions of the 
shooting would be. In the end, Manuel arranged for the couple to stay at the farm 
of an acquaintance.  
His sister died the next day in hospital. There was no way Manuel’s sons 
would accept their brother-in-law living with them now. Manuel even suggested 
to Mariazinha that since they did not have children yet, she could leave Claudio. 
She followed him instead, afraid that she would be gossiped about for leaving her 
husband and unable to marry again. The couple moved to Uauá about 200 km 
away.  
A year later, news reached the Calon in Salgueiro that Mariazinha was 
being abused by Claudio. Manuel and his second-oldest, Giovanni, immediately 
drove from Salgueiro to Uauá. Before entering Mariazinha’s tent they talked to 
other Calon in the vicinity, who confirmed the rumours; Claudio had apparently 
even beaten Mariazinha during her pregnancy. When Manuel appeared at his 
daughter’s tent he offered to take her and her baby with them. Otherwise, not 
wanting to see her suffer, he would never set foot into her tent again. Mariazinha 
accepted. During the days and weeks that followed, Claudio began to drink even 
more, squandering his money and getting into fights. In June 1984, in one such 
row he was killed. 
Eraldo, Claudio’s father, blamed Manuel, his former brother-in-law, for 
his son’s death. The way he saw it, after Manuel had taken Mariazinha and the 
child away, Claudio had become uncontrollable and was subsequently killed. 
Therefore one day in March 1985, aided by a non-Gypsy friend, Eraldo killed 
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Manuel at the market-place in Salguerio. Within a few days, people who used to 
live around Manuel in Salgueiro moved to neighbouring Brejo Santo where they 
built new houses and tents. The oldest brothers were especially angered by their 
father’s murder, so when a few months later Eraldo was imprisoned for illegal 
possession of firearms, they arranged for him to be killed in prison.  
The brothers and their widowed mother lived in Brejo Santo for the next 
twelve years. In 1997, during the wedding of their youngest sister, a local 
councillor and a policeman appeared at the camp claiming that one of their 
cousins had bought a gun from the councillor, but had never paid for it. They 
demanded that the cousin accompany them. The Calon suggested that they pay for 
the gun and settle the issue, but in the midst of the following row, both the 
policeman and the councillor were shot dead. The family of late Manuel fled 
Brejo Santo, returning back to the humid coast. 
  
This account shows some reasons for movement and for settling down. The 
family moves to arrange a marriage, seizes an opportunity to stay in Salgueiro, leaves the 
camp because of the death of the strong-man, and flees because of violence. Such 
dislocations can be intra-regional and mean starting anew, often among unknown 
Ciganos. In thirty years some things have changed though: thanks to cars and roads, men 
who strike deals often hundreds of kilometres away from their camps do not have to 
move with their whole families anymore, but return the same day. In 1979 Manuel’s trip 
took several months because the family stopped along the way to make a living. At one 
wedding during my fieldwork, the groom’s family arrived to the town where the bride 
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only a few days before the wedding lived and rented a house there for two weeks. My 
point is that travelling patterns did not change much, although the speed and ease of 
travel did. But Manuel’s story as described above hides a variety of smaller movements 
that occur between such regional dislocations. 
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MAP 4.2          Settlements visited most frequently by the Calon from Santaluz 
Volta Redonda 
 Nazaré da Mata 
 
    Road 
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      Alto de Bela Vista 
Muritiba 
  Barra 
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          Bonital    
 São Gabriel 
 Bomfim  Santaluz  
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One Settlement in Five Months 
When I arrived, the camp in Santaluz was composed of ten tents occupied by 25 people. 
Within six months it grew to seventeen tents and 46 people. Within fourteen months, it 
was completely abandoned. The following is an account of movement from and into the 
camp between September 2008 and February 2009. The numbers in brackets refer to 
households in the Figure 4.1 and the Map 4.1; the towns can be found in the Map 4.2. It 
should also be remembered that in the following account every male name, unless 
specified otherwise, stands as shorthand for his whole household, i.e. his nuclear family: 
 
11 September. The camp has 24 people and ten tents. Wanderlei (III) 
arrives from Bonital, 85 kilometres away.  
14 September. Renato (XII) moves into the camp. His brother, Eduardo is 
planning to refurbish the house on Rua dos Ciganos where Renato lived until 
now.  
15 October. Pancho (XI) arrives from São Gabriel, 40 kilometres. 
Pancho’s business was not going well; Genilsa, his wife was also eager to leave 
the town. They were hoping that her rich brother, Eduardo, would help their 
business. Pancho’s grandmother, builds her little tent at the edge of the camp 
(black tent/circle right). 
  16 October. The caretaker of the plot gives Ciganos ten days to move out.  
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20 October. Gel (IX) moves in from São Gabriel. He has two brothers and 
two sons here already and his third son, José (X), arrives with him. Mudo (VII) 
moves his tent to accommodate for these new arrivals.  
30 October. Babaloo, Renato’s oldest son, has been drinking and 
gambling heavily and hurt himself in a motorcycle accident. Renato (XII) moves 
to São Gabriel, where his other two sisters live. Pancho (XI) moves his tent onto 
the spot covered by concrete that remained from a wedding a few years back and 
where Renato’s tent stood until today. 
27 November. Maluco (XIV) moves out. His jurin wife is going to give 
birth soon. They will live nearby in the house of his mother-in-law. 
30 November. Maluco’s father escaped from prison. Maluco goes to see 
him in São Gabriel and sells his tent to him. He stays there for a month missing 
the birth of his daughter.  
11 December. Widow Neide (black tent/circle left), follows her son 
Renato to São Gabriel.  
 14 December. The caretaker erects wooden poles around and across the 
camp.  
6 January 2009. Mudo (VII) leaves to Nazaré da Mata, 75 kilometres. 
People have not been supportive of this family composed of a deaf-mute couple 
and their daughter. Faustão (VI) moves his tent beside Wanderlei’s (III). 
9 January. Pancho (XI) moves his tent closer to the camp. He is afraid of 
living far from the camp, separated by a row of houses.  
 159 
10 January. Uelson (VIII) leaves the camp for Boa Vista, 58 kilometres 
away. He does not get along with his father Gel. 
28 January. Jenilson moves into the camp from Bomfim, 18 kilometres 
away, after getting into an argument with a man there. His widowed mother, who 
has two other children, builds a tent next to his. She is Djalma’s sister-in-law and 
has two sisters and a brother living in the camp already. Jenilson’s cousin Val and 
his widowed mother come too. 
4 February. Faustão (VI) moves his tent again. A jurón started building a 
house on a place where it stood until now. 
8 February. Widow Neide returns to Santaluz from São Gabriel after her 
son Renato hit her. The land-owner gives the Calon thirty days to vacate the plot.  
13 February. The camp has 46 people. José (X) moves his tent away from 
his father Gel (IX) and closer to his oldest brother Pancho (XI); although married 
with a child, José has a male lover in town, a fact which irritates his father.  
14 February. Maluco (XIV) comes back to Santaluz and moves to the 
house of his mother-in-law; in São Gabriel, he did not get along with his father’s 
wife.  
  22 February. Pancho’s grandmother leaves for São Gabriel. 
 23 February: Pancho (XI) leaves for São Gabriel. Kiko, his nephew, told 
me that Pancho managed to gain only one stable client. “You know how it is, 
Martin,” Kiko explained, “whenever a Cigano sees that there is no future (não 
tem futuro), he moves to a different place.” Heavy rains, which last week flooded 
several tents, are the immediate cause for Pancho’s departure.  
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I chose this period of five months because nothing dramatic happened in the camp 
“down there” in Santaluz. Nevertheless, the intensity of tent relocation in Santaluz was 
high, reasons for movement diverse and in this regard I find no reasons to suspect that 
this period was somehow unique. Every time I visited any settlement after one month or 
so, its composition differed. 
The first thing to note is that whenever people decide to move into to the camp 
“down there” in Santaluz, they already have some relatives living there. They also move 
from settlement within the area which I call “home range”. From the point of view of any 
Calon, it represents an area within which known Calon live and which is characterised by 
a dense network of exchange relations. Second, people are readily mobile; a house or a 
tent is not a fixed point of reference. People also move out of tents to houses and from 
houses to tents. Renato, for instance, moves out of a house to a tent; he also used to live 
both in houses and tents elsewhere in the past.  
Third, movement is literally a way to change one’s positioning. People move in 
order to be able to make better deals, to live closer to their kin or to deal with unforeseen 
events, such as fights and evictions. This change of positioning is what Kiko means, 
when he says that ‘when there is no future, a Cigano moves’. In Chapter 6, I will return 
to the concept of the future, futuro, and how movement associated with life relates to 
creating opportunities. Here it is sufficient to say that an increase in inhabition of houses 
in past decades presents a mixed blessing. There is a tension between the Calon 
understanding of active life understood as movement and the character of fixed domicile 
that threatens to stop life – to bring about “velocity zero” (Ferrari 2010: 268). Ferrari 
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notes that “flux seems to come to a halt when they start to inhabit [a house]. Although 
they stress the advantages of living in a house, such as water, electricity, and the ease of 
cleaning, this mode of life is thought of as “still life” (vida parada), that is, it calls 
attention to the lack of flux” (Ibid., 266).  
““Still” (parado) creates an image of a world of bad quality, moribund, sick” 
(Ibid., 267)(cf. Okely 1983: 86) and Calon associate healthy life with “travel” (viagem) of 
the “before” (antes/antigamente/atrás) (e.g. Goldfarb 2004). But as the description of 
five months in Santaluz showed, even today there is no shortage of movement. Despite 
various changes in mode of travel and threats of a fixed domicile, the ideal of movement, 
can still be achieved by changing one’s tent’s location. In addition, there are various ways 
to move or to halt, and related rich conceptual apparatus (Ferrari 2010: 268-273). For 
instance, men often drive around town, andar na rua, or visit different camps, passear. 
The following story illustrates this:  
In November 2009 Leo seemed to be settling. A few years back, after his uncle 
died, he had sold his house in Barra and moved to Bomfim, 32 kilometres away. 
Recently he bought a huge plot here and built the largest tent in the settlement 
complete with a concrete floor and brick bathroom beside it. That day at noon he 
had just come back from Santaluz, 18 kilometres, ate lunch and was immediately 
getting into his car with me and two other men. He was ready to drive to another 
town. “I cannot stand still (parado),” he told us while on the phone with a client, 
“I just eat and go again. It’s an agony remaining [still] here (ficar [parado]).”  
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Not all movement is prompted by new opportunities arising elsewhere. Jenilson 
moves to a camp in Santaluz, because a fight he got into in Bomfim. Pancho arrives from 
São Gabriel looking for better economic opportunities, but leaves, dissatisfied, within a 
few months; others talk of him as moving too much. Deaf-mute Mudo moves often 
within and without the camp itself and eventually leaves to go to Nazaré da Mata. In 
other words, if a strong man is the stable centre around which the camp emerges, those 
who move the most, are often weak, fracos. They lack money, have a small number of 
deals “on the street”, and are weakly related to others, especially to the strong-man.80 
Although movement is not always deemed positive, people decide according to their 
settlement’s composition and the hope for opportunities elsewhere (cf. Piasere 1992: 279-
291). But both are constantly changing. 
 
One Family in One Year 
A settlement-as-assemblage emerges when interests of several households and other 
characteristics (such as land-ownership) collude. I will illustrate how this process 
happens with the example of the extended family I know the best – that of Eduardo and 
his five siblings – Renato, Rita, Sara, Carla and Genilsa (Figure 4.2). 
                                                 
80
 The complexity of Calon “cosmology of nomadism” (Ferrari 2010) does not allow reducing mobility to 
poverty and the stories in this chapter show that rich Calon also move. Secondly, there is no fixed pattern 
comparatively speaking. Similarly to Calon, among the Californian Rom even within one extended family 
some households are more mobile and more powerful Rom tend to move less. But unlike Calon, Rom also 
explicitly divide and control territories between and within families (Nemeth 2002: 165-186). In contrast 
with both the American Rom and the Bahian Calon, among the English Travellers richer families travel 
more often and for longer distances than the poorer ones (Okely 1983: 149). 
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Figure 4.2                                                                                                     Eduardo (black triangle) and his family. July 2009 
 In March 2009, the family lived in two settlements – in Santaluz and São Gabriel. 
Eduardo and his sister Rita lived in Santaluz – Eduardo in the house on Rua dos Ciganos 
and Rita in the camp “down there”. Their sister Genilsa, who is married to Pancho, had 
just left Santaluz, and moved to São Gabriel A. There, the household joined Genilsa’s 
sisters Carla and Sara, and her brother Renato; Sara’s husband, Zezinho, was the strong-
man of this camp. The following account describes how six months later, following a 
series of events, both settlements were gone and the siblings living in different 
settlements in a changed combination.   
 
In early July 2009 Kiko, Eduardo’s older son, killed a non-Gypsy man from 
Santaluz. Fearing retaliation, all Calon fled the town. Most people from Djalma’s 
camp “down there” built their tents in Bomfim, planning to wait until emotions 
calmed down before returning to Santaluz. Bomfim was an obvious immediate 
option. Only 18 kilometres from Santaluz, it meant that even people without much 
cash could afford a lorry for their belongings. Many had relatives living there and 
as a large flat open space of scattered peasant abodes, it made it possible for them 
to easily find a place to construct their tents. A few used it only as a temporary 
stopping place and within the next month moved elsewhere. 
Eduardo first joined his three sisters and the brother in the camp in São 
Gabriel, but a month later he rented a house nearby the camp after selling one of 
the two houses he left behind in Santaluz. Rita could not go to São Gabriel to join 
all of her siblings. Her blind husband Paulo depended on help from Djalma, his 
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brother-in-law. In addition, a few years previously, her son separated from a 
woman whose family lives in São Gabriel. Because she remained unmarried, Rita 
and Paulo feared for their son’s safety. 
In August, Zezinho, Sara’s husband, died of heart attack. Within a few 
days, the settlement disintegrated with about twelve households abandoning the 
locale.81 In her grief, Sara burnt their common bed and tent, and either destroyed 
or sold the rest. Her son-in-law, Nelson, rented a house for his family and Sara on 
the other side of the town. Genilsa joined Rita in Bomfim, 45 kilometres away. 
Carla, Renato and a few other households from Zezinho’s settlement moved to a 
plot in São Gabriel that Beiju, Carla’s husband, rented from a non-Gypsy. But 
Renato did not like the muddy camp next to the highway and moved his tent twice 
within it. Meanwhile, his older daughter separated from her husband and moved 
into her parents’ tent. Since her ex-husband was in the camp every day visiting 
their son and Renato became worried that his daughter would be unable to find a 
new husband, in late September they left and came to Bomfim.  
In Bomfim, too, some were thinking over and discussing their 
possibilities. In October, describing how Santaluz was better and how she missed 
it, Genilsa found out that a few others from the original camp in Santaluz wanted 
to go back. A few days later, this was the general opinion. Unfortunately, Genilsa’ 
husband found out that the plot they used to live on had already been sold it and 
there was no other suitable place at that moment.  
                                                 
81
 I suggest viewing settlements as relational entities, not only a geographical concentration of relatives. 
Among the American Rom, who live scattered between gadze within a 5 mile perimeter, “a death at home 
in any Rom family in the Los Angeles settlement precipitated an immediate change of residence” (Nemeth 
2002: 178).  
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Meanwhile Eduardo and his wife Viviane were spending a lot on court-
expenses to free Kiko and had to borrow money. They were having intense 
discussions about what to do next: now, they planned to leave to the sertão as 
soon as Kiko was released; now, Eduardo was asking another Calon about a plot 
for sale in São Gabriel; next, he was telling everybody that he was selling his 
second house in Santaluz; and then, to the horror of his relatives, he was talking 
about returning soon to Santaluz.  In early November Eduardo bought a plot, 
“terreno”, in São Gabriel and soon he had a brick wall built around the new camp 
and started constructing two houses. He and Viviane planned to move there after 
Kiko’s release. He also invited people – his affinal relatives – who he trusted. 
Nelson, Sara’s son-in-law, who talked him into buying the “terreno”, did not want 
to live alone and pay rent anymore. Beiju, Carla’s husband, had a reputation for 
his courage and Eduardo hoped that his presence would provide some security to 
Kiko. For his part, Beiju did not get along with his brother-in-law living in the 
same camp as him. Their camp by the highway was “dead” – all the men were 
poor and there were no deals. Thinking especially about his son, Beiju saw 
advantages in moving in with rich Eduardo. 
 
To sum up, by December 2009 six siblings had passed through several living 
arrangements. Renato, Genilsa and Rita now lived in the camp in Bomfim, while Carla 
and Sara were in the new settlement (“terreno”) in São Gabriel, which was founded by 
Eduardo. Similarly to that Mauro’s family, this story illustrates that the intensity of 
movement is the highest following unpredictable events. In both cases, deaths and 
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killings made some places inaccessible and forced people to reconsider their positions. 
But finding a more durable arrangement requires effort and, as Eduardo’s story also 
showed, disturbing events are followed by a period of experiments with living 
arrangements. 
Although the events are clearly quite singular, the story is useful in helping us to 
realise that behind any alignment lies households’ readiness to move and the constant 
search for better immediate positioning. Their decisions take into account their 
surrounding environment. They judge their various options on the basis of people who 
live in specific settlements, interests of other members of households, economic 
circumstances, space, ownership issues, costs, safety, and so on. The process could be 
understood as social navigation in an unstable environment (Vigh 2009: 419-438), 
although social “wayfaring” (Ingold 2007) would be more appropriate; people do not 
evaluate each possible position on a continuum with a fixed future point in mind, but on 
the basis of feedback reference to changes in positions around them.  Calon men and 
women imagine themselves as active and capable of dealing with uncertainties – in 
gambling, in loans, in their living arrangements and so on – and adept at gaining 
advantage in the process. Therefore, it seems imprecise to conclude that in Calon 
“nomadic cosmology” “[it is] not a Calon that is in movement, but the world which is 
around him” (Ferrari 2010: 268). Rather, Calon talk about the world in motion, a 
happening world, exactly when they know they are moving.82 This is why Beiju thinks of 
his camp by the road as dead and responds by moving in with Eduardo.  
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 One woman interviewed by Ferrari (2010: 263) makes a similar point about nature of travelling and time. 
By travelling the world passes by, while during a “still life” there is a fixed reference - a clock: “…and 
today, the time passes and we can see even hours and minutes of moments. And when we used to travel 
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Such social wayfaring is not easy since the environment – the absolute and 
relative composition of all settlements – is unstable. It requires constant alertness to the 
present, which is achieved by means of conversations with others and visits, for instance. 
These visits also make relations visible and people decide to settle with others judging 
their behaviour. As a consequence, a person with whom one camps today might not be 
the same tomorrow.  
Households make choices with different people in various camps in mind who are 
simultaneously also evaluating positions of their own households. In the story above, 
individual interests and personal relations, lead Eduardo, Beiju, Nelson and their 
dependents to end up in one settlement, after their previous settlements fell apart. The 
settlement thus emerge as a collusion of such judgements, on the basis of a temporary 
harmony of these households, rather than of any fixed order (cf MacDonald 2008: 5-21). 
Such interaction of kinship obligations and financial deals, emotions and evaluations of 
others’ behaviour, constantly changes the quality of places. It represents a kind of 
complexity described for other “anarchic societies”, where based on personal ties, 
complicated psychological requirements, a great number of potential arrangements 
characterised by randomness of results are possible (MacDonald 2009: 15); this form of 
self-organising allows a variety of outcomes while the overall system persists (Strathern 
1995: 20). 
In this section I extended the description of Calon spatiality by looking at the 
question of mobility. I argued that although people have some preferences with whom 
and where to live, contingencies of life often disperse relatives within and without their 
                                                                                                                                                 
(viajar), we did not think of it. For us the world was passing by and we did not realise what time it was.” 
As if a passing clock-time could not change anything – it was only a handle moving. 
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region. At the same time, autonomy, personalised relating to other people and looking for 
better opportunities, mean that people are ready to change their location. Settlements 
arise around strong men, such as Manuel, Djalma or Eduardo, whenever other people 
think that living around them could improve their position. But their cases also 
demonstrate the impact of violence on settlement composition and mobility. Violence 
delimits people’s regions and closeness or distance from others. As one expression of 
autonomy and personalised relating to others, it causes fragmentation and dispersal, and 
limits the possibility of hierarchy developing.   
 
4. 3 Space and Violence 
Revenge and Segmentarity 
A relative preference for virilocality and patrilocality is influenced by seeing other Calon 
as valentes – valiant or courageous – and brasileiros as perigosos – dangerous.83 Eraldo 
killed Manuel to avenge his son, Manuel’s sons had Eraldo killed to avenge their father; 
Kiko killed a local outlaw to protect both his father and a brother; Beiju killed a man who 
had killed his father and so on. While the fragmentation of space which results from 
violent acts is similar to other Gypsy groups described by anthropologists, revenge is 
justified by emotions – sadness or anger – alone and not by an appeal to any “Gypsy 
law”. Revenge involves only small agnatic groups, what Gay y Blasco (1999) calls 
patrigroups,  and results in a blood feud, i.e. in the killing of a perpetrator by agnates. 
                                                 
83
 About Spanish Gitanos Gay y Blasco writes that: “Feuding and fear of feuding are premised upon and 
reinforce links to paternal kin, and are essential in constructing an emotional universe where Gitano 
persons face a hostile world in which not only the threatening Paoys, but also unrelated Gitanos are 
potential sources of danger. In other words, feuding and fear of feuding go a long way towards displacing 
ideals and feelings of unity, harmony and cohesiveness to the margins of the Gitano imagined community” 
(2004, 166). 
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Like emotions, it does not travel well across generations, although it might take time. For 
instance, many years back, a man had killed his wife, who was Beiju’s and Camarão’s 
sister. They in turn killed the man. A decade later, however, Beiju married his son to a 
woman from the man’s family while his brother Camarão still refuses to talk to the 
“enemies”.84 
This stands in contrast with the Iberian Gypsies where patrigroups often merge 
into larger segments “descended from a common ancestor through male links” (San 
Román 1975: 171).  These are called razas in Spanish and raças in Portuguese and there 
is a specific term associated with feuding among those – ruinas or quimeras (Sp.) or 
desordens (Port.) (San Román 1975: 171;Gay y Blasco 1999: 147-151;Seabra Lopes 
2008: 158).   In the case of a murder, “any member of the offending raza are liable of 
retaliation” (Gay y Blasco 1999: 149;see also Seabra Lopes 2008: 70). The Bahian Calon 
do not have terms for larger segments, nor for long-term feuds between them.  
Following Evans-Pritchard (1940: 160), I distinguish between blood feuds and 
feuds. The latter refers to a rare warfare between larger segments, while the former 
designates a much more common vengeance which is restricted to kin alone. Without 
overstressing the similarities between the Brazilian Calon and the Iberian Gypsies, 
Evans-Pritchard’s analysis of segmentarity among the Nuer allows us to hypothesise 
about the roots of absence of feud among the Bahian Calon. He suggests that the rise of 
feuding among the Nuer, between “primary” and “secondary” sections of a tribe, was 
related to pressure from Arab and European colonisers, the need for expansion and 
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 Similarly, Ferrari (2010) describes a case of a boy in the state of São Paulo who married a daughter of a 
man who had killed his father. Others said that the boy had nothing to do with the murder, since he was 
very small when it happened. Similarly, Vilar (2011: 39 ft4), writing about Calon in Rio Grande do Norte, 
mentions how younger people distance themselves from older blood feuds by talking about “enemies of the 
old ones”.  
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competition for economic opportunities. In the case of Spanish Gitanos, while in past 
patrigroups in conflict tried to avoid each other, since the 1960s “government policies 
have dictated the growing concentration of Gitanos in shanty towns, housing estates and 
even Roma-only, purpose-built ghettoes. This state incursion made it difficult for 
patrigroups to scatter themselves among the Payos, and led, in the 1960s and 1970s, to 
high levels of ruinas (feuding) and later to the development of novel political institutions 
such as caciques and mafia-like networks” (Gay y Blasco 2004: 165 citations removed). 
On the other hand, the Brazilian State had not paid much attention to Gypsies and there 
were no attempts at forced settlement into designated areas. People avoid the escalation 
of violence by leaving. Such was the case of Jenilson (above) who left Bomfim because 
of the argument. Other people I knew moved elsewhere, because there was “too much 
talk” in their settlements. In a case where conflict results in killing, kin overcome with 
emotion resort to blood feud (vingança, revenge) and avoidance.  
Within their home range, people move into settlements occupied by their 
relatives. Violent outbursts, however, can also drive families apart and turn kin into 
enemies. In fact, enemies (inimígos) are most often former kin (parentes), especially the 
affinal relatives; almost by definition they cannot be the unknown nameless Gypsies 
(Ciganos desconhecidos) with whom one has no previous relationship. Exogamous 
affinity, which involves creation of intensive relations with people with whom one might 
not share memories of co-living, seems especially prone to violent breakdown. When 
feuding involves several deaths or particularly high emotions, it can drive patrigroups 
apart: Djalma and Índio, both caatingueiros (of the hinterland), live on the coast. Beiju 
left Southern Bahia after he had killed an uncle; Eraldo’s sons avoided Manuel’s sons 
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after the killings of their fathers and at least some never returned to the town where their 
father was killed.  
 
Violent Relations 
Violence is a basic organisational principle (see also Kaprow 1978; Gay y Blasco 1999). 
It delimits use of space and fragments it into what Ferrari calls “political regions” (2010: 
273) and I, in order to highlight the ego-centric character of these spaces, call home 
ranges. The case of Manuel’s and Eduardo’s stories illustrated how violence influences 
family dynamics and composition. However, due to the character of settlements, violence 
impacts all their inhabitants, causing flight or at least a reconfiguration of alliances. 
Violence thus influences people who are not directly related, might not observe loyalty in 
the same way, or even refuse to participate, but who live in the same settlement or are 
related to the people who do.   
Unknown Gypsies are potentially dangerous.85Praianos, living on the coast, 
would not, for instance, voluntarily move to live among unrelated caatingeiros in the 
                                                 
85
 Ignorance is relative in both senses. Calon are aware that individual links vary and are often able to trace 
possible relationships if they try hard enough.  There is always somebody to refer to. Sometimes it is 
enough to ask “who is he a son of” or “what is his family name” as surnames tend to dominate specific 
regions. 
Alternatively, the process can be more elaborate. One day I was watching Tarabatara (2007), a 
documentary about a camp in Alagoas, with about six men in Candeias, Bahia. Although none of the men 
was in touch with the people in the film, collectively they established their connections. They did it through 
various sets of dyadic relationships that men had with the people in the film. Giovanni Borges Costa first 
thought that he had met the oldest Calon from the film 25 yeas ago. A young man, who married into 
Candeias, was discovered to be a son of a cousin of one man in the film. Through discussions and 
identification of various links, they established that “he [the young man] is their parente (relative). But he 
does not know them…” Suddenly new connections materialised. Knowing a possible connection, the men 
hypothesised that a brother of one man in the film was that man, who killed another Cigano in XY a few 
years back.  
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interior.86 Even when forced by events, one does not go alone. Calon from elsewhere are 
generally portrayed as more valente, valiant – for those in Bahia those in Pernambuco, for 
those in São Paulo those in Bahia. A region outside one’s home range is also often where 
one’s enemies (inimigos) live. After all, a conflict between relatives is often the main 
reason for flight or evasion. For these reasons weddings are the most explosive events 
and all weddings that I attended, had Polícia Militar or Polícia Civil watching; they were 
normally invited by the brides’ parents. People who are in conflict can meet at a wedding 
accidentally, or, because information about weddings spread, people can search out their 
enemies there. In addition, men, fortified by alcohol, display their masculinity much more 
overtly.  
While Ciganos are dangerous because they are expected to behave as Ciganos, 
i.e. to be valente and protect their autonomy, brasileiros are dangerous, perigosos, in an 
unpredictable and unspecified way. Pancho moved his tent closer to others; although 
others in the camp told him that in Santaluz a jurón had never attacked a Cigano. When 
the owner of the plot under the camp “down there” threatened to evict the Calon, some 
were worried that if Djalma stayed alone, he would be attacked by pistoleiros, armed 
bandits. One reason that Eduardo gave me for not wanting to go back to Santaluz was 
that the town was not worth it, because there were too many shootings. In larger towns, 
which usually had several settlements of sometimes unrelated Calon, people also felt that 
they were harassed by police. In addition, there is always a possibility of violence in a 
                                                 
86
 From caatinga, an ecoregion of the sertão, North-Eastern Brazil, characterised by the plant of the same 
name. From praia, the beach. 
Calon in Bahia often distinguish themselves as caatingueiros (the hinterland), mateiros (Southern Bahia), 
praianos (the island of Itaparica), recôncavanos (from around Santo Amaro), mineiros (Minas Gerais) and 
so on. It should be stressed that this is not a fixed divisions and does not denote nations, clans, tribes or 
even “groups”. Rather it refers to a place where one has significant relations, especially the dead. 
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debtor-creditor relationship and when Índio, who had left to collect debts for shopkeepers 
in Santaluz, did not return home on time, I met his wife and a crying son looking for him 
in panic. In fact, Índio was threatened by an armed debtor on another occasion, when he 
went to collect the payment. 
It is impossible to separate this fear from the reality of criminal violence. TV 
programmes showing murderers and their imprisonment were popular with Calon in 
Santaluz. I was also always warned to be careful when going to Salvador, which seemed 
particularly dangerous. But the impact of non-Gypsy violence and discourse about it are 
amplified by divisions that separate brasileiros from their moral universe. Stewart (1987: 
173) talks about the Hungarian Rom as sharing “a state of siege” mentality. On a more 
subtle level, however, there is also something tragic in being alone among brasileiros and 
Ferrari argues that is impossible for a Calon to live alone (sozinho) and stay a Gypsy, 
since as one of her informants said: “free is a person together with others, with her 
family. She is not free alone. Never is a Gypsy free alone” (2010: 202).  
But the distance goes both ways. Despite the reality of violence endemic to such 
marginal neighbourhoods such as Graça in Santaluz, Rua dos Ciganos was relatively 
safe. Thanks to Cigano presence and monitoring, the fear and respect that people had for 
them, theft or violence was not frequent on our street. I did not realize the weight of their 
presence until the Calon were gone. While during the first year we lived on this street 
together with them nobody was killed on our street, once they fled, within three months 
four people were shot dead on this and adjoining streets. Our neighbours, who in the 
evening used to chat in front of their houses under a street lamp, started locking up at six 
o’clock and some were even talking about to moving away.  One reason why their 
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presence was so effective was that Ciganos are considered violent by their neighbours. 
This can sometimes turn against them. After the killing in Candeias of a non-Gypsy by a 
Cigano, the camp there was burnt and police claimed that somebody misused hatred 
toward Cigano money-lenders to get even. In any case, leaving Santaluz after Kiko killed 
the man was not such a bad idea, given especially that the man was popular, but also a 
criminal. 
In Bahia, there is growing criminal violence related to drug-trafficking and easy 
access to guns. Although Calon in the region of Santaluz are not involved in trafficking, 
they are not immune to it and many also buy stolen goods and guns; guns are actually 
used by many people in a small town as a storage of value. Furthermore, there is a state 
violence, the legitimate or illegitimate use of force by police, which Calon avoid through 
escape and hiding. The impact of police and criminal violence, which often cannot be 
separated in practice, is further amplified by the media discourse. Then there is violence 
specific to the region. From the internet alerts that I receive it seems to me that most 
killings between Ciganos came from Sergipe, Pernambuco, the interior and southern 
Bahia. The first three compose so-called the hinterland – the sertão – notorious for wide-
spread long-term family feuding, vinganca sertaneja, as well as the use of weapons to 
solve daily conflicts (e.g. Marques 2002).  
I want to stress here, that the constant potentiality of violence in Calon lives is an 
important principle. It is the principle of coding the space – it divides it between one’s 
home range and the space of unknown Ciganos and enemies. It is also a form of sociality 
– it is a denial of commonality with brasileiros and places a limit to sociability among the 
Calon. Feuding becomes a way to show ones’ Gypsyness (Gay y Blasco 1999) and as an 
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“apparatus of counterpower” (Graeber 2004: 32), interpersonal violence limits the size of 
settlements and prevents the development of hierarchical order.  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I described the logic of Calon spatiality. I argued that a Calon household 
moves within the home range occupied by relatives and known Calon. Within this space 
they create settlements of related people around strong-men. Violence plays a central role 
as a source of fragmentation and dispersal and delimiting one’s area. Although there have 
been some changes in mode and ease of travel, and although many Calon now live in 
houses, there are still many reasons to travel; neither physical houses, nor tents serve as 
fixed points of reference. Trying to earn money, men leave camps almost daily often 
going to neighbouring or distant towns. There are also many reasons to change one’s 
location, such as the possibility of living close to other relatives, an economic 
opportunity, an argument or simply boredom. Because all households make such 
decisions, the overall environment is unstable and places the onus on every household to 
evaluate its options and opportunities.   
These spatial characteristics relate to the social organisation of money-lending. 
One of the characteristics of strong-men is that they have the most deals within and 
outside settlements. Every settlement is criss-crossed with small subsistence loans 
especially from them. Violence is a structuring principle guiding financial deals: one 
helps those that stand up for him and never lends money to unknown Ciganos. People 
move to improve their capacity to strike deals – here physical movement is 
conceptualised as a way to create opportunities for monetary flow. And thanks to 
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dislocations, over the course of their lives, men create long-term customers in many 
towns across the region. 
Before exploring money-lending in a systematic manner, I shall address the 
position of households and the character of Calon masculinity, which served as the 
background for the present discussion. I mentioned that Calon see themselves as “men of 
action” attuned to surrounding opportunities and on the move, which include physical 
movement. For their part, households are the basic components of settlements. 
Objectified in tents or houses, and occupied by a couple with unmarried children, the 
network between such households demarcates spaces as Calon and not gaje. But as I go 
on to show, constructing and preserving a household is far from easy.  
V. “TAKING CARE OF ONE’S LIFE”: HOUSEHOLDS, EMOTIONS AND 
MONEY  
 
Introduction 
Every afternoon Viviane washed her hair, put on a clean dress and jewellery and when 
Eduardo came “home” from “the street”, they sat down in front of their house on Rua dos 
Ciganos in Santaluz. With a cup of sweet coffee, accompanied by their sons and their 
daughter-in-law, they observed the street and talked to passer-bys. These Ciganos were 
visible, self-confident and such moments of contentment contrasted with the days’ busy-
ness and constant movement; it was a proof that everything – deals, card-games, cooking, 
cleaning – went well and problems were resolved. This is how I remember the period 
between four and six o’clock, before their older son and his wife retired to their own 
house. My house was just opposite theirs and often I sat on our veranda, shouting across 
the street at each other; most of the time, however, I sat with them.   
Eduardo, a short balding man, was always clean shaven. With a cigarette stuck in 
the corner of his mouth under a huge moustache and money in his wallet, he was always 
ready for another deal. Viviane, a pretty woman, had a new dress made each month and 
wore custom-made jewellery of real gold. She ran the household with a help of a cleaner 
and kept a close eye on her daughter-in-law. She also had a detailed overview of 
Eduardo’s deals and lent money in the name of their younger unmarried son Romero. 
Although Viviane did not know how to read, when a customer came and she went inside 
to get his promissory note, she always brought the correct one.  
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I never managed to interview Eduardo or to ask him more than two consecutive 
questions. He seemed to have few explicit theories and very little taste for explaining the 
obvious. Mostly he listened to others with a superior air. Not that he minded my 
presence: I spent good portions of most days at their house or travelling with them and 
whenever we were too lazy to cook, that is most days, Adriana and I ate at their house or 
their son’s. Through this family I got to know other Calon, who described me to others as 
the gringo who “lives with Eduardo”. Eduardo’s older son, Kiko, became my friend and 
informant; Eduardo’s daughter-in-law, Paula, Adriana’s best friend. We were with them 
for the birth of Eduardo’s first grandchild and the death of his mother. We followed the 
marriage negotiations of his younger son, Romero, and the unfolding of the marriages of 
his two other children, Kiko and Josiene.  
Those images of dusks in front of their house contrast with the low points I 
witnessed later: Kiko’s time in prison, failures to marry Romero, moving to new 
settlements, a life in provisional arrangement. Through Eduardo, I learned that even for a 
rich man, behaving properly as a Calon and stabilising one’s positions in the uncertain 
environment requires a constant effort.  
Focusing on the story of Eduardo, this chapter aims to convey two messages. 
Firstly, it shows the highly negotiated quality of Calon sociality, where visible individual 
action is crucial. Specifically, the story shows Eduardo’s difficulty in achieving what I 
see as the prime goal of a Calon man – to live in an “established” manner,87 meaning, in 
his own household surrounded by households of his sons whose marriages he had 
negotiated.  
                                                 
87
 From the verb estabelecer 
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An adult man, building on his connections, aspires to be a centre of households, 
preferably surrounded by his married sons; those without sons, like Djalma who was a 
strong man of the camp in Santaluz, live surrounded by their sons-in-law and affines. In 
any case, most settlements can be viewed as consisting of one or several father-sons 
clusters. If there is any predictability in Calon spatial arrangements it is this: a man and 
his married son live in the same settlement. This does not mean that none of his sons live 
elsewhere, only that at least one of them lives alongside him. This preference, at least 
partially, reflects questions of personal safety in the world perceived as dangerous; here, 
the father-son bond becomes most visible in blood feuds. A father and his sons will often 
cooperate in economic activities; the father “helps” (ajudar) his sons through drawing 
them into further deals or borrowing money from them; he prefers travelling 
accompanied by them. Successful marriages of his children, the wedding and the dowry 
he pays for his daughter and the dowry his daughter-in-law brings to the new household, 
are the signs of his efficacy and reputation. But establishing oneself is not easy in the 
uncertain environment the Bahian Calon live in, where relationships need to be 
constantly negotiated and confirmed, and where many activities that mark proper 
behaviour lead to further instability. 
Secondly, Eduardo’s story highlights the centrality of money. In this world, 
money objectifies relationships or, rather, it makes relationships between people visible. 
A dowry objectifies the marriage and relationships between parents and children; the 
money a father spends on getting his son out of jail shows his paternal love; the money a 
family spends on saving a dying man expresses the love his relatives hold for him.  
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The observation about the importance of money is not limited to the Bahian 
Calon. Michael Stewart showed that for the Hungarian Rom money is also a “food for 
sociality” (1994: 45-62;see also Stewart 1997). Like the Bahian Calon, Rom are 
passionate about their deals on the market and see the desire for money as a legitimate 
concern. Money’s ability to circulate allows the acquisition of distinction in market 
transactions. The money Rom earn in factories is often spent on mulatsago (a communal 
drinking) which expresses the ideal of brotherly behaviour and sharing. They also gamble 
frivolously, thus annihilating the arduous (gaźo) work that went into making the money. 
In all three modes – in deals, mulatsago and gambling – through a process of the 
ideological disengagement both from gaźo and from their households, men use money to 
create a world of abundance, where positive qualities attributed to them as Rom are fore 
grounded. Even deals on the marketplace are not evaluated solely according to a 
monetary gain.  
But the differences between the Rom and the Calon are revealing. The Calon do 
not earn money in gaje factories, but in moneylending to gaje, which, as Stewart 
observes, is an ideal way of making money since it flows in one direction without any 
intermediary object (1987: 284). Calon do not create a world of “brothers” through 
spending on shared drinks, for instance. Rather, violence is a constant potentiality, one’s 
trust and space need to be constantly created. Man’s activities “on the street” are not 
conceptually opposed to household interests, but even serve as a basis for the creation of 
his children’s households. Money is a tool for sociality among the Calon not thanks to the 
process of ideological disengagement, but through their manipulation of the 
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characteristics of money, its capacity to slip into alternative regimes of value (Keane 
2002: 65-90). 
Here I draw especially on Holbraad’s analysis of money as a “purely multiple” 
object.88 Holbraad (2005) argues that when money is used in Cuban Ifá cults, it is an 
object of expenditure and not of (abstract) calculation. In fact, its expenditure silences its 
qualities for commensuration; in other words, one cannot use it for anything else at that 
moment. It is not consumed as a determinate quantity (value), but “consummated” as a 
special qualitative entity.  Money’s quantitative quality makes it divisible and thus highly 
mobile. But it is also capable of “registering displacement”. When a specific whole (a 
sum) is exchanged for something else, that parted whole can be visualised as missing 
from the original whole. In Ifá cults money is therefore a medium in a double sense – it is 
“an object that gets exchanged, but also provides an ‘environment’ that allows exchange 
to get going” (247).  
This quality of quantity of money is important for the way Calon conceptualise 
relationships. People constantly discuss and keep track of how much money any man has 
“on the street”, i.e. in the loans to brasileiros and other Calon. This sum is specific, but 
its “accuracy” depends on one’s closeness. For instance, Calon distinguish between 
“hearing about” and “witnessing” any transaction. Only Eduardo’s family was in the car 
with him when he declared that he had “160.000 on the street”. His family had a better 
idea of his wealth then, than they had about that of unrelated Pedro, living outside of their 
home range. Still, they told me, Pedro could spend R$400 thousand on getting his son out 
of jail, because he had R$3 million in bank. Such awareness of people’s sums starts 
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 Or as Simmel put it, in order to function as money, whatever the absolute amount, it always has to 
remain “a lot of money” (1990: 137). 
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already with the public character of the dowry a bride brings to the union, and is later 
constantly approximated through conversations and rumours.  
Certainly people deliberately obscure how much money they have, especially to 
avoid pressure from their relatives to spend or borrow it. They also complain about 
individuals who “cry a lot” that they do not have money, despite having so much (a 
specific sum) “on the street”. At the same time, I was surprised how easily they discussed 
each other’s wealth and how much they knew about specific transactions with each other. 
This is not only a way of keeping track about another’s reputation (although this is 
certainly important, as I will show in Chapter 7). Here I want to problematise the way 
that Calon use money – as specific sums – to keep track of one’s reputation.  As a 
specific, partible, multiple object, it is effective in making one’s relations evident, 
because a specific whole spent can be imagined in relation to the (amount of) money one 
has “on the street”. When people talk how much money somebody spent on dowry, on 
help, on bail or lent to somebody, the discussion always turns around precise sums while 
people have an idea of how much these parties have “on the street”.  
But, thanks to the same dynamics – since money can be withheld, hidden, 
increased, obtained through loans from others and so on –, people can be accused of 
calculating and not behaving properly. Until the last moment it is unclear, for instance, 
how much money a bride will bring in dowry or even whether the wedding will take 
place. So the two central themes this chapter – the negotiated quality of Calon social life 
and the role of money in making relations visible – are connected. I will try to make it 
clearer, through describing developments in Eduardo’s family during a two-year period. I 
show efforts to stabilise households and their place, tracing the arduous process of 
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arranging Romero’s wedding and the disruption caused by Kiko’s imprisonment. I then 
turn to describing the instability of households in a more systematic manner before 
returning to the role of money in creating and sustaining households.  
 
5.1 Stabilising the Uncertain Environment 
August 2008: The Richest Calon 
Eduardo (42) and his wife Viviane (30) were the richest Calon in Santaluz. Of all Calon 
in Santaluz, they were the only ones who lived in a house and they also owned a house 
where Kiko (20), Eduardo’s son from a previous relationship, and his wife Paula (19) 
lived. Eduardo also built a house for their married daughter Josiene (15) who was living 
in São Gabriel. Eduardo was the only one who owned a car, who always had a mobile 
phone and several guns. He played cards only with other rich Calon, sometimes for 
weeks on end. He was also the best known Cigano moneylender in the town.  
Eduardo and Viviane had not always been rich (ricos). They used to live in a tent 
in a camp with the others and Viviane, who comes from a valente (valiant) but poor 
family, had to go begging. The couple gained their wealth through Eduardo’s association 
with his paternal uncle Lima. He “helped” Eduardo and because he was childless, when 
he died in 2002 his property was divided between his jurin lover and Eduardo, his 
favourite nephew. Eduardo also inherited Lima’s clients and the middleman.  
Other Calon commented on the couple’s riches, and complained of their coldness, 
stinginess and secrecy. Unlike their relatives, the couple never seemed to lack money. 
They did not live in the camp together with others, and were left out of small subsistence 
loans. People were not totally incorrect in suggesting that they were avoiding others on 
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purpose. Eduardo often claimed that he preferred to live alone and he did not try to 
surround himself with his relatives, although he visited them or was visited by them 
almost daily. Unless he went to play cards or to intimidate somebody, he always went 
alone, and like everybody else he obfuscated the exact details of his deals.  He discussed 
bigger deals only with Viviane; the bank account was in her name, and whenever he 
needed to go to cash a check or withdraw money, she went with him.  
When we moved in, to become fully “established”, Eduardo only needed for 
Romero to marry and to move next door into a house he had ready for him. All of his 
children would then be married with his sons living in houses next to him. Therefore, 
soon after we moved in, they started negotiating the marriage of Romero to a rich girl 
from a town about 70 kilometres away. But the wedding negotiations kept failing.  
 
Negotiating Romero’s Marriage 
In late August 2008, Doido asked me in a secretive tone, “Do you know where Eduardo 
was on Sunday? They went to Palotina. To arrange (arrumar) a bride for Romero.”   
A week later, when his brother and father returned from Feira de Santana where 
they went to buy a fighting cockerel, they stopped in Palotina where Romero’s future in-
laws lived. “The Cigana will come next week,” Kiko announced. “This week she has no 
money.”  
“But I do not want to get married,” pleaded Romero. Kiko murmured something 
attending to the cockerel. Romero, who met his future bride only twice, repeated, “But I 
do not want to get married”. 
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Eduardo and Viviane had noticed Luiza (14) at Kiko’s wedding in Alto de Bela 
Vista; Luiza’s mother was a maid of honour (madrinha) to Paula, Kiko’s bride. A few 
days afterwards they asked Luiza’s mother if she would be interested in marrying Luiza 
to Romero. By the end of August, all Calon in Santaluz knew about the negotiations and 
commented on the respective wealth of the bride and the groom and on the potential 
dowry. “She is rich,” Romero’s cousin opined, “but not richer than Romero”. Non-Gypsy 
neighbours also learned about the upcoming wedding. Everybody knew that Romero was 
not happy.  
Early September, Romero, dressed in his best clothes and accompanied by his 
parents, visited Palotina for the first time. In the following months, almost every other 
week Luiza and her mother (her father had been killed) came to Santaluz; always with 
somebody else from her family. Sometimes, the women also visited other of Romero’s 
relatives living in the camp in Santaluz. After all, these were the people among whom 
Luiza was to live.  
In October, the wedding date was finally set for mid-January. Soon Romero quit 
high-school and Eduardo started refurbishing his son’s future house. But the biggest 
challenge was finding a way for Romero and Luiza to like each other. Luiza was happy to 
marry him, but Romero did not want to marry her. Whenever they met, their parents 
encouraged them to spend time together. During one wedding, for instance, Romero’s 
parents started dancing with their future daughter-in-law and a few minutes later Eduardo 
literally dragged Romero to dance with Luiza. Romero did not look at her and left as 
soon as the song finished.89  
                                                 
89
 Although during the wedding men and women stay separated for most of the time, taking into account 
the murmur and the looks, Romero’s statement was clear.  
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At the end of December 2008, two weeks before the wedding, Eduardo postponed 
the wedding after his colega, a Calon peer from a neighbouring town, died in a car 
accident. It also suited Luiza’s mother, who lacked the money for the wedding anyway. 
When Luiza and her mother came next, they brought along presents for Kiko and Paula’s 
baby that was to be born in early February. Meanwhile the dresses arrived: Viviane, 
Paula, Luiza and her mother had three dresses each made by a seamstress in Salvador. 
During this period Eduardo and Viviane together and Paula’s parents needed to intervene 
in a crisis which threatened to split Kiko and Paula.  
At the beginning of February 2009 the second date was also cancelled. Luiza’s 
mother called and told the family that a debtor had not paid her and she did not have 
enough to pay for the wedding. A new date was to be set soon.  
In late March Eduardo bought Romero a car and a week later sent Romero, 
accompanied by another young Calon, to visit his future in-laws. He went, but otherwise 
whenever Eduardo was not around Romero repeated that he did not want to marry Luiza. 
Moreover, he was still in love with his jurin girlfriend.  
Finally, by the beginning of April 2009 the wedding date was set for 10 May. The 
last thing needed was for Luiza’s mother to arrange a priest. Around this time Viviane 
told Eduardo that their son still did not want to marry Luiza. Later that day they were 
sitting in front of their house, with Romero sitting to one side not far from them. When 
Eduardo saw his son “alone” (sozinho) and focused on eating pop-corn, he felt sorry 
(sentir pena) for him. “He is such a child” he commented, and suggested to Viviane that 
they cancel the wedding. Viviane was horrified: “How could we, when she already 
bought the dresses?” “She will return them, then,” answered Eduardo tersely. 
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Most Calon did not think the wedding would be cancelled. “It would ruin him,” 
suggested one. But some also pointed out, that Luiza would not get accustomed to living 
in Eduardo’s family. She loved festas; every week she was on a beach with her friends, 
but the men in Eduardo’s family did not take their wives out. By Good Friday Viviane 
and Eduardo were engaged in a silent domestic conflict and did not talk to each other 
beyond the necessary. Eduardo was scheming to cancel the marriage and was especially 
annoyed with the way negotiation dragged. Thus when Luiza’s mother (who was 
Evangelical) called that she had not arranged a Catholic priest, but the wedding would 
take place in the mayor’s office, he gave her the ultimatum: either the wedding would 
take place in a Catholic church, or it would be cancelled. They agreed to meet the 
following day. That evening, Viviane, who liked Luiza, was trying to persuade her 
husband not to cancel the wedding, while Romero, sensing his opportunity, kept 
repeating that he did not want to marry.  
When the following day I entered Eduardo’s house, Viviane, Eduardo, Romero, 
Luiza and her mother were sitting in a semi-circle in the quintal, the back yard. Eduardo, 
tapping Luiza’s back affectionately, asked, “How much did you spend?”  
“10.000 and will still spend 12”, answered Luiza’s mother.  
“And what is still missing?”  
“The furniture is still missing” responded Luiza and added that they were going to 
buy it soon. Her mother was shaking with tension: “I do not understand what the problem 
is... what the problem with the priest is…and now Romero is saying that he does not want 
to get married”.  
“The most important is how they get along (convivencia),” interrupted Viviane.  
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“And not whether there is a priest or not”, Luiza’s mother concluded.  
Unfortunately, I had to leave. But Eduardo accepted the women’s arguments and 
later I saw the women walking to the couple’s future house. Luiza and her brother also 
came to the festa downtown that evening, where they joined Romero, Kiko, me and 
others. 
On Sunday morning Eduardo received a text message from Luiza, saying that 
Saturday was the worst day of her life. After Romero had gone with the men to the festa 
and she stayed in his parent’s house, Luiza explored Romero’s phone. There she found a 
text message to his jurin girlfriend in which he called her his “only love” and stated that 
the wedding was “forced”. To add insult to injury, when Luiza arrived at the festa that 
evening, Romero kept ignoring her and despite the best efforts of Kiko and Luiza’s 
brother, he spent time with the jurin. Luiza told Viviane and Eduardo about it. They 
asked her not to tell her mother, because she would cancel the wedding. Viviane, eager to 
salvage the arrangement, said that she would go and talk to the jurin, but Eduardo said 
that he would go instead, because Viviane would curse her.  
Driving in a car with Romero the next day, Kiko appealed to his brother, “There 
is no future in spending time with juróns… you have to think ahead…if you want to live 
with jurón, you should have married a jurin.” As if pointing out the advantages, he added 
that Romero should really put large speakers into his new car and that later he could ask 
Luiza’s mother for more money. The following week, Romero and his parents drove to 
Palotina taking along presents from the Easter Fair. The wedding was set for 16 May, 
with a Catholic priest, and a party in a private club.  
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But two weeks before the wedding, Luiza’s mother called to say that she did not 
want the priest after all. Eduardo told her, that because she insisted on the wedding being 
in a mayor’s office, he was cancelling it. One hour later she called again telling Eduardo 
to forget their previous conversation, but he insisted that the wedding was over. Luiza’s 
brother called next, but Eduardo remained stubborn. A few days later, Luiza’s mother 
called Eduardo and told him that he should reimburse her for the furniture she had 
bought. He told her to bring it over along with the receipts and she never called again. 
The Calon in Santaluz blamed Luiza’s mother for the breakdown of the trato, the 
agreement to marry. She was only interested in money, they said, since she insisted on 
the marriage being in the mayor’s office. If they separated, the Calon reasoned, by 
appealing to the court Luiza would be able to receive more money. Romero was 
beaming; the following week he returned to high school. Eduardo was glad too. He had 
started to feel sorry for his son but had been afraid that he would have to bear all the 
costs. The incident, by placing the responsibility on Luiza’s mother, provided a way out. 
Even Viviane was satisfied, since Luiza’s mother proved to be “complicated” 
(atrapalhada) and would have interfered too much after the wedding. A rumour 
circulated, that Viviane had at first been against the marriage cancellation, because she 
feared that Luiza would kill Romero. Luiza apparently told one his aunts, that “if she 
could not have him, nobody would”. Upon hearing this, Eduardo exclaimed that if Luiza 
killed Romero, he would kill her and her family.  
Soon afterwards, I left Santaluz. When I came back in September 2009 many 
things had changed. The whole settlement in Santaluz dissolved after Kiko killed a man. 
In the following section I describe how Eduardo’s family dealt with this dishevelment.  
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Kiko In Prison 
From what I could gather, one Saturday morning in June 2009, while Eduardo was 
playing with his grandson, Kiko stood up, tucked a gun inside his shorts and walked out. 
Neither Eduardo nor Kiko’s wife Paula noticed anything. A few hours later Kiko shot a 
jurón. He was convinced that the man had been planning to kill his father and his 
younger brother. After the murder, Kiko and Paula fled to her relatives in Alto de Bela 
Vista. On Sunday evening Eduardo called Kiko and told him that nobody suspected 
anything and that he should come back. But on Monday morning, just a few minutes after 
Kiko had walked in, the police stormed Eduardo’s house and arrested Kiko. In the house 
they found bullets that matched those Kiko had used, and two old guns that belonged to 
Eduardo’s father, but they did not find the gun Kiko used and which Viviane hastily 
tucked under her skirt. Sobbing, she swore that there were not any other guns in the 
house, and the police soon left – they had enough evidence against Kiko anyway.  
“He was a bandido, but a son of Santaluz” a woman who worked in the town hall 
told me about the man Kiko killed. He came from a town’s large family, was generally 
liked, although a few knew about his criminal activities. Since the Calon in Santaluz 
feared that man’s friends would try to revenge him, the day Kiko was imprisoned they 
fled the town.  
In the series of dislocations which I described in the preceding chapter, Eduardo’s 
household, which now included Paula and the baby, first joined a camp in São Gabriel 
where Zezinho, Eduardo’s brother-in-law, was a strong-man. A few weeks later they 
rented a house nearby. In August, Zezinho died and that camp dissolved; some left for 
other towns, other established a camp next to a busy interstate highway. Consequently, 
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when I met this extended family90, the two settlements where they had previously lived 
no longer existed. The uncertainty over Kiko combined with the grief over Zezinho had 
heightened the overall feeling of despair; even Kiko in prison had a beard in mourning.91 
Unlike a few months ago, Eduardo and Viviane now lived close to their relatives and 
depended on them for everyday emotional comfort. Whenever Eduardo travelled 
anywhere – to collect money in Santaluz, to visit a lawyer in Salvador, or to borrow 
money from a Calon in the sertão – he took somebody along.  
In October Eduardo was weighing up the various possibilities to leave the rented 
house. Eventually, he bought a piece of land, a terreno, in São Gabriel.92 Soon he started 
building two houses and a wall around it, and planned to move there with his sons. In 
November, he invited Nelson, Beiju and Beiju’s son, who used to live in Zezinho’s camp, 
to build their tents on his terreno and to live alongside him. Sara, Zezinho’s widow, also 
moved in, sleeping in an unfurnished tent on a wooden palette.  
Eduardo hired Dr Henrique to get Kiko out of prison. He had been a lawyer to 
various Calon in the past, including Eduardo’s distant relative who recommended him. 
Initially, Eduardo paid the lawyer R$7.000 and gave him his new car. To everybody’s 
dismay, however, four months later, Kiko was still in prison and had yet to face trial. This 
was at least partially down to Dr Henrique, who wanted to avoid júri popular (a people’s 
jury), which would condemn Kiko. Eduardo was frustrated, accusing Dr Henrique of not 
doing enough. He felt that the judge, too, let him down, although he had “done so much” 
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 See Figure 4.2, p. 163. 
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 The distress became most obvious to me when more than two months after Zezinho’s death, I visited 
some of his relatives for the first time. It was a rainy period and a camp of six tents besides a busy intra-
state road and next to an illegal dump was muddy. Bearded and unkempt men walked in and out of tents, or 
sat in small groups hiding from the rain. They left the camp where Zezinho had been a strong-man within 
three days of his death. As Zezinho’s widow explained to me, “Ciganos do not live where someone has 
died”.  
92
 See Chapter 4 
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for the judge in the past. In fact, Eduardo had been certain that the judge would willingly 
sign Kiko’s habeas corpus, maybe for money, while even a temporary release would 
allow them to flee to the sertão. Unfortunately for Kiko, the judge himself was being 
investigated for corruption and was not going to let the Cigano out, especially since the 
popular opinion was overwhelmingly against Kiko.  
“Agoniado” (anxious), as others described him, in early November Eduardo 
visited Roque, the richest Calon in São Gabriel, looking for advice. Roque suggested 
hiring another lawyer. Eduardo was willing to pay more and have two lawyers, but when 
he called Dr. Henrique that night to ask him why he had not shown up for a few weeks, 
the lawyer told him that a hearing would be held the following Wednesday and that there 
was a good chance that Kiko would be released on a procedural mistake. During the 
hearing the judge questioned the witnesses testifying to Kiko’s reputation (testemunhas 
de carácter). Those on Kiko’s side were brought by Eduardo’s non-Gypsy middleman 
and some were paid by Eduardo. On that day, though, the judge only postponed his 
decision.  
Two weeks the judge rejected the habeas corpus. The decision was now to be 
signed by a tribunal made of so-called desembargadores. Dr Henrique was certain that he 
could bribe some of them and asked Eduardo for another R$30.000.  
Every Thursday Paula, Viviane and Romero visited Kiko in the municipal prison 
in São Gabriel. They could see him for ten minutes and hand over a plastic bag with his 
official name written on it containing a few permitted things. Kiko’s in-laws came almost 
weekly. Besides them, each week there were other people – most often his sister and her 
husband, a cousin, one or two colegas, i.e. Calon peers from the region, of Eduardo and 
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me. People came “to give Kiko strength”, to tell him to “stay calm” and to “keep his head 
low”. Eduardo never visited his son in the prison, but stayed outside and asked others 
about his son afterwards.  
In mid-November, a new couple and their daughter Tania visited Kiko. I learned 
that Tania (14) was going to marry Romero and from then on they came every week. 
They were well-off and her brother was married to Romero’s cousin and Eduardo’s niece. 
Romero and Tania liked each other and both agreed to get married. But the trato lasted 
only until January 2010 and as soon as it was over they stopped visiting Kiko. According 
to Viviane, Tania’s mother was “atrapalhada”, complicated, and nobody was good 
enough for her, while her father was tight-fisted with the dowry. To me they did not seem 
committed. Around the time when Eduardo asked for R$20.000 in dowry, which they 
were unwilling to pay, I met Tania’s parents in the house of Romero’s uncle. They 
complained to everybody about being unable to reach an agreement with Eduardo; “he 
[Romero] is not getting married to money, but to my daughter, isn’t he?” On another 
occasion, Tania’s mother, who had just given R$50 to an old Cigana who blessed (rezar) 
Tania so she would marry well, commented to her husband that another rich Calon had 
paid R$500 for his daughter. 
As Kiko’s case dragged, the opinion in Eduardo’s family prevailed that Dr 
Henrique was useless and he only wanted to “eat money” (comer dinheiro). I will not 
describe the various manoeuvres and the work of two lawyers who got involved after Dr 
Henrique stepped down for “health reasons”. I only wish to stress that Eduardo was 
active, constantly called the lawyers, sought advice from others and incessantly 
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worried.93Other relatives also tried to contribute. A cousin offered to collect payments 
from Kiko’s clients, Beiju suggested killing the judge for turning his back on Eduardo, 
and Viviane asked me to give her a photograph I had taken of the judge and the 
prosecutor. She passed it onto her mother, known for her magical skills. 
Hiring lawyers, bribing officials, and buying witnesses cost Eduardo a great deal 
of money. He also bought the terreno and paid for construction there. To amass sufficient 
cash, he sold one of his large houses in Santaluz, tried to collect money from the Calon 
who owed him and borrowed a large sum from a Calon in Serrinha. Viviane was 
especially upset. “Children do not know how much the parents suffer,” she often sighed 
heavily.  During most of this period, five people lived in a rented apartment in 
provisional conditions. On top of that, the lawyer suggested by Roque requested 
R$100.000. Viviane was worried that they would have to sell their remaining property; 
that they would be poor again; that her own son Romero would have to marry a poorer 
bride.  
Many Calon criticised Eduardo for the way he handled the situation. They 
criticised him for telling Kiko, who had hidden with his in-laws, to come back. “He 
should have escaped,” said Eduardo’s sister. Echoing the prevalent opinion, she 
suggested that Eduardo should have made Kiko disappear and come back only with a 
lawyer. Some thought that Eduardo called his son back, because being a “friend” of the 
judge he did not think Kiko would be imprisoned. Others hypothesised, that he did it 
either to punish Kiko, or because he feared that he himself would be imprisoned.  Over 
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 This is not unusual. Lawyers I talked to recognize this anxiety, impatience and scheming as characteristic 
of Ciganos. One lawyer from the sertão told me, that whenever he agreed to take a Cigano case, Ciganos 
had to agree that they would not call him, but he would only call them. “Otherwise, when I tell them that I 
have an appointment with a judge in the afternoon tomorrow, they call me at six in the morning [that day] 
to see what is new.”  
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time, the Calon from the region were growing sceptical about Kiko’s release. They 
criticised the lawyers for not doing enough and compared his case to those of other 
Calon. “Only ten days ago a Cigano was caught and he is already out. He [Kiko] should 
not have let himself be imprisoned,” Camarão argued. Criticisms increased after a Calon 
accused of a notorious murder was released. At first, some claimed that the man had had 
three lawyers and had spent R$1.3 million, but later settled on R$400.000 and one 
lawyer. And as Kiko’s case dragged on, and the outcome was uncertain and Eduardo 
secretive, most became convinced that Eduardo did not want to spend money (saltar 
dinheiro).  
The uncertainty and accusations were mingled with fear. During the only public 
hearing in early November, I arrived at the courtroom in Santaluz with Kiko’s uncle, aunt 
and a cousin. While we waited, the Calon became increasingly worried until suddenly the 
uncle and the aunt left explaining that Eduardo had told them to leave. It was untrue, 
since they had not spoken to Eduardo, who himself had been advised by the lawyer not to 
come.  
The relatives especially feared for Kiko, who was alone among the brasileiros. 
When some prisoners tried unsuccessfully to break out of the prison, Kiko told his family 
that others suspected him of having informed the guards. Distressingly, after such periods 
of unrests, visits were temporarily suspended and some prisoners were transferred to 
other municipal prisons. The biggest panic happened just after New Year when Adriana 
and I were staying in Eduardo’s house. One evening a known Calon called Eduardo and 
said that he saw Kiko being put into a police van and driven somewhere. Immediately, all 
of us left the apartment and went to Eduardo’s terreno where his relatives already lived. 
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There was much discussion about what could have happened. In the prison in São Gabriel 
nobody was picking up the phone, in Santaluz a policeman confirmed that he was not 
there, and the lawyer was not answering the phone.  Only after several phone-calls, 
Eduardo found out that Kiko had been taken to a municipal prison in a small town 
nearby. This prison was in the town hall building and at night there were apparently no 
guards. Fearing that somebody could break into it and kill Kiko, Eduardo arranged for a 
few non-Gypsy men to guard there at night.  
Such continuing uncertainty also strained relations between Paula and her parents-
in-law, and they increasingly held grudges against each other. For instance, one day after 
a meeting with Kiko, Dr Henrique brought a letter for Paula. He gave it to Eduardo who 
opened it before giving it to her. In it, Kiko, who had never before showed any affection 
for his wife, wrote that he loved her more than anybody else. Eduardo got offended, that 
“now he does not think of his brother and father anymore.” The conflict peaked around 
Kiko’s transfer. After Paula’s visit to her family over Christmas, Eduardo and Viviane 
thought that Paula had changed her behaviour and become distant. They accused her of 
planning to leave Kiko. She was not speaking to them beyond a necessary minimum, and 
they learned that some of her relatives had encouraged her to leave Kiko. When Paula 
complained to Eduardo’s sisters about how her parents-in-law were treating her, they told 
her that Eduardo went mad (endoidar) from worrying, but the whole thing was really 
Viviane’s fault: she never liked her step-son and now everything was about him. 
When in mid January 2010, Adriana and I were leaving Eduardo’s rented house in 
São Gabriel, Eduardo, Viviane, Romero, Paula and her son – dressed in their best clothes 
– were going to Palotina. Some said it was because he wanted to show Tania and her 
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parents that he could do better, that Romero had decided to marry Luiza after all. Luiza 
agreed and now they were going to resume the arrangements. The wedding was to take 
place as soon as Kiko got out of prison.  
 
August 2010: In A New Settlement 
When I returned in June 2010, Kiko was out of prison. He and Paula did not move in with 
Eduardo, but left for Alto de Bela Vista to live alongside her family. The tensions 
between Paula and her in-laws, the fear that somebody could recognise Kiko, and the 
general exhaustion of the whole family, all played a role in their decision. Despite the 
fact that relatives, whom they had invited last year, were already living there, and 
although they had started constructing two houses eight months before, Eduardo and 
Viviane also not move to the terreno either. Instead, Eduardo exchanged his second 
house in Santaluz for a house in Muritiba. There, he started constructing a future house 
for Romero and Luiza who were to marry in July. 
At the end of June, Paula called her father-in-law to tell him about growing 
tensions between her brother and Kiko on one side, and her older brother and her uncle 
on the other. I was sitting in a car with Eduardo and Viviane, driving to Santaluz to see 
some customers, when Eduardo changed directions and drove to Alto de Bela Vista. 
Kiko, Paula and their baby son, drove back with us; her younger brother and his family 
also left the town. A week later, Kiko was putting down a concrete floor and poles for a 
tent on his father’s plot.  
Two weeks before the wedding, Romero moved into the house of Luiza’s mother 
in Palotina. His parents and his brother arrived a week later and stayed in a rented 
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apartment. The dowry had not been set, but Romero knew he would receive a car. 
Unfortunately, I missed this turning point as well.94 I soon heard that during the festivities 
the night before the wedding (véspera), Kiko got into an argument with Luiza’s cousin 
who was provoking him, testing his recently acquired reputation for valour. When 
Luiza’s uncle went to his car for a gun, he was spotted by a policeman arranged by 
Luiza’s mother to watch over the wedding. Soon reinforcements arrived, stormed the 
party and imprisoned the uncle.  
That night, some tried to convince Luiza’s mother to cancel the wedding, which 
she did at six in the morning on the wedding day. One hour later, after Luiza had begged 
her, she called Eduardo again and asked for the wedding to take place after all. “I have 
160.000 na rua, Romero does not need her money,” murmured Eduardo after he hung up, 
but agreed to come back. After a few phone calls, even the people who were already 
driving away returned to Palotina.  
The wedding took place in a Catholic church and the party was a sumptuous 
event.  In the middle of the festa Luiza’s mother stood up and taking a microphone from a 
Calon singer announced that she was giving the dowry of R$30.000 and a car worth 
R$12.000. That evening Luiza showed a white sheet stained with blood to the closest 
relatives of both spouses.  
A week later, Eduardo’s mother died.  
The newly weds came to Muritiba two weeks after the wedding and two years 
after I first learned about their trato (deal). When I saw her in August 2010, Luiza was 
bored, Romero ignored her, and she was often left home alone. “She cries all the time,” 
commented Paula. The house was small; the furnishings supplied by her mother and 
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 This time, I was not arranging my visa, but giving a paper. 
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things given by her relatives did not all fit. Even prior to the wedding, people had 
commented on the quantity and quality of presents she received. “I am used to being with 
people,” Luiza complained. She hated her married life, while her parents-in-law thought 
her spoiled.  
 
*** 
 
I limited this narrative to two years between August 2008 and August 2010 which 
overlap with most of my fieldwork. It shows the tensions that arise from personalised 
relations and attempts at behaving properly – for instance, tensions between interests of 
siblings, children and their parents, between step-relations and own children, between the 
affinal relatives. But the instability does not stop there. By the time of editing this 
chapter, in April 2011, Luiza had married another man; efforts to secure Romero’s 
marriage have now lasted three years and included three women, four sets of broken-off 
negotiations and a divorce. Shortly after the death of Eduardo’s mother, his daughter’s 
settlement dissolved because of a series of unlucky events, and Josiene moved from São 
Gabriel to Bomfim. Later, Eduardo himself left Muritiba and constructed a new house in 
Bomfim. Nevertheless, I hope to have showed that stabilising one’s own and children’s 
households and dealing with unpredictable events that destabilise them, requires constant 
effort. In the following section I want to make a few observations about this process. 
 
5.2 Negotiating the Relational Grid 
 
Rather than singular flows, a Calon life trajectory is better approached in a grid-like 
fashion where different paths are taken depending on bottlenecks, accidents and 
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opportunities. For instance, Romero’s wedding was postponed because somebody failed 
to return money to Luiza’s mother, because the family wanted to wait until Kiko’s 
release, because A. died. Take the last one: Although unrelated to either the groom or the 
bride, A. lived a neighbouring settlement and Eduardo felt close enough to grow a beard 
after his death. Demands of respect for the deceased and his relatives made it impossible 
to celebrate the wedding and imposed a different temporality (of mourning) on the 
prearranged date-as-event. 
One’s trajectory also has to be placed within the context of other relationships 
which change almost shape every day. Violence, for instance, is a constant potential 
which influences sociality and the use of space. Within the two years described above, 
besides his older son ending up in jail, there were other occasions when Eduardo felt 
obliged to help out or to at least visit relatives of imprisoned men: when a car with his 
brother and two brothers-in-law was searched by the police who found a gun; when his 
older son’s brother-in-law was imprisoned after shooting in the air when drunk; when a 
man living in his daughter’s settlement was imprisoned for selling drugs.  
Weddings are also constantly being organised or a marriage crises being resolved. 
If nobody in one’s settlement is currently negotiating a marriage, a relative or a known 
Calon somewhere else is or, at least, there is a wedding to attend. Take, for instance, the 
marriage histories of fifteen households in Santaluz at the time of our arrival. Between 
August 2008 and August 2010, two boys got married and one girl (all first cousins) went 
through a failed negotiation. One couple who had lived together for six years separated 
and got back together two weeks later. Two young women who lived elsewhere left their 
husbands and with their small children moved to their parents’ tents. One of them 
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returned to her husband a few months later, but only after a short marriage negotiation. 
Because most partners come from surrounding settlements, the picture can be replicated 
for the whole region. 
At a level of one’s individual family (família) the picture looks similar. In 
Eduardo’s family,95 apart for one niece who lives in a distant settlement, all ten nephews 
and nieces live in four settlements within the area of Eduardo’s everyday business and 
live less than 60 kilometres apart. By the time his youngest niece (age 10) gets married, 
the oldest will be negotiating marriage for her older daughter (age 7). Kiko’s first 
marriage was frustrated by a fight during the véspera, the evening before the wedding; he 
married Paula a few months later. Josiene, Kiko’s sister, married at the age of 12, 
separated a year later, and remarried. One Eduardo’s nephew divorced after three years 
and lives with his parents. During my fieldwork another nephew got together (juntar), 
separated and remarried (casar); a niece left her husband after two years, and returned to 
him after a short effort to marry her cousin; her sister had a problem with finding a 
suitable husband with at least one trato broken off. This excludes all failed negotiations 
and stalled attempts to establish a trato over years. 
Household creation, therefore, has to be seen as a process, which sometimes starts 
when a bride and a groom are still children. Households-as-projects bring structure to 
people’s social lives, also because their success demands much parents’ attention. Take 
the example of Junior, a young man who liked partying, while ignoring his wife and her 
complaints. One night when he did not come back home, his pregnant wife became so 
anxious that she fainted and needed an ambulance. The next day his in-laws arrived, 
                                                 
95
 Leaving out his affinal relatives.  
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staying for a few days and showing their support, while his father made him sell his 
motorcycle, hoping that this would make it more difficult for Junior to leave the house.96 
Violence always lurks in the background. When Faustão sent Daiane, his wife of 
six years, and her furniture back to her father, he immediately borrowed a gun. Indeed, a 
car with five affines arrived the same night. His father-in-law variously threatened 
Faustão, asked him to take Daiane back, and demanded R$100.000. Over the next few 
days, other people from Daiane’s family called or visited Faustão or his relatives and at 
the end Faustão agreed to take Daiane back. His father-in-law bought a whole new set of 
furnishing for their tent and invited Faustão to live in their settlement to “help them”.  
Besides the potentiality of violence and the ubiquitous preoccupation with new 
households, people continuously negotiate their relationship to the dead. When I attended 
my first Calon wedding, I was told that the singer had a beard “because his mother died”. 
From then on I started noticing men with beards (or small black patches on chest 
pockets): Wanderlei, who moved to Santaluz soon after I had arrived, had a beard that he 
shaved a few months later “because of his nephew”; Beredege in a neighbouring camp, 
shaved his beard only five years after his son’s death.  Similarly to the French Manoush 
(Williams 2003: 7), these practices of “deep mourning” are influenced by the time passed 
and the kinship distance. The closer a man feels to the dead, the longer he wears a beard 
or observes a self-imposed taboo.  
Such signs of “deep mourning” (e.g. beards), as well as individual silent 
“sorrows” that follow (e.g. names that are not uttered), make relations among the living 
and their limits visible. The three times that Eduardo wore a beard during my fieldwork, 
                                                 
96
 In similar situations (or in cases of domestic violence), women often leave for their parent’s house and 
negotiations start in the same manner. 
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most other men I knew also wore them – only in such situations, through their common 
respect for the dead, some sort of Calon “group” emerges (Williams 2003: 14). 
Individually, people keep objects that remind them of their dead, which, unlike 
everything else, cannot enter into exchanges. The places where Calon live are directly 
related to the places from which they “abstain” (Williams 2003: 47). For instance, in late 
August 2010, several people from the settlement in São Gabriel, among them Eduardo’s 
daughter, moved to Bomfim because of the death of a young woman and the 
imprisonment of a man made their location “azarento” (unlucky). They had come to São 
Gabriel several years previously, after a death in Barra. People also respect each other’s 
mourning. In January 2009 when Luiza’s family visited Eduardo’s, Kiko asked me to go 
with him and with Romero’s future brother-in-law to a pub. He did not want to drink 
because this would upset Eduardo, who was mourning for A., but at the same time he was 
trying to be generous to his brother’s future affines. So he paid while we drank.  
In sum, achieving the ideal of a stable place surrounded by one’s closest relatives 
(preferably sons) is a Sisyphean effort precisely because relations are so personalised. 
Efforts to stabilise a place for one’s household cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
context within which they arise. They do not stop until one’s death and in a complex way 
combine with the actions of other people. Money serves as a common thread through 
these movements and transformations.   
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Picture 5.1                  A bride and a groom 
 
 
5.3 Money and Households 
 
Eduardo’s story also gives sense of a household lifecycle. Romero’s marriage saga shows 
how the formation of new households depends on parental actions. Eduardo’s negotiating 
Romero’s wedding, getting Kiko out of prison and stabilising his own life illustrate how 
an adult man’s success or failure depend on the breadth of his relations with others – 
Calon and brasileiros. The physical destruction of the household and the dissolution of 
the camp after Zezinho’s death, objectify the end of households, on the one hand, and the 
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relational nature of settlements, on the other. All these processes are accompanied by 
specific movements and earmarking of monies to which I now turn. 
 
Weddings 
A groom comes to his new house or a tent “only with his clothes in a bag”, Paula once 
told me. Everything else is brought by the bride. Although most things are paid for by the 
bride’s parents, other members of her family contribute (“presents”); sometimes they can 
be asked to provide a specific piece of furniture. Things are assembled prior to the 
wedding and after the wedding they stay associated with the wife: Faustão sent his wife 
away together with their tent’s furniture; after six years of marriage he moved back to his 
parent’s tent with just his clothes.  
  A dowry (dote) brought by the bride to the union comes in two parts – furnishing 
and money. While the furniture is associated with the wife, money is given explicitly to a 
husband to “make the future” (fazer futuro), or “take care of one’s life” (cuidar da vida), 
– for himself and his new wife, and especially for their children. Tellingly, among the 
Calon in São Paulo the bride’s family brings pots and pans to the tent of the newlyweds, 
while the groom’s mother fills them with meat and other foods.97 In Bahia, the husband’s 
capacity to provide for his household is also sometimes talked about as “bringing food”: 
Sara told me that with Zezinho she never lacked anything while Doido maintained that 
Zezinho was a great man who “always came from the market with the bags loaded, and 
there was never shortage of meat in his house”. In other words, although it is a man’s 
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 Florencia Ferrari, personal communication, 16.10.2011. 
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activity in the wider world which is assessed, this is always done in relation to his 
household.  
 
Married Couples 
A household is the nexus of a relationship between husband and wife and their proper 
behaviour is evaluated in relation to it. Married women are expected to behave differently 
from unmarried ones (Ferrari 2010: especially 234-245). For the husband, the dowry 
money is loaded with purpose and orients his behaviour. It is a way for him to interact 
with others outside of the household, explicitly given to gain a living, and to establish 
(estabelecer) himself. Only a handful of women I knew read palms or go begging and the 
money earned this way only complements their daily subsistence. Financing households – 
buying new furniture, arranging a dowry or paying major weekly shopping at the 
Saturday market – is the responsibility of their men and money came from their deals “on 
the street”. These deals depended on their reputation and relationships with others. But 
only a necessary portion of this money is spent on food. Most is dealt again, while a 
bigger house, a new car or a wedding of one’s child become visible signs of the man’s 
efficacy.  
A capacity to make money on the street is assessed even prior to the wedding. 
Potential parents-in-law inquire about the groom’s reputation (including his family’s 
reputation for domestic violence) and evaluate the strength (força) of his father and the 
family. Because the couple first moves in with the husband’s family, they will “help” the 
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couple.98Besides his clothes, a husband into the new household also comes with his deals, 
prior relations and reputation (i.e. his potential for further relationships). Eduardo, a rich 
man, could try to marry Romero to unrelated Luiza with a sizeable dowry. On the other 
hand, Babaloo had a reputation for drinking, gambling and partying, while his father 
Renato was a gambler who had lost his house in cards and was talked about as being 
morto (dead). Babaloo did not find anybody to marry in a proper wedding so he “got 
together” (se juntar) with another young Calin, who herself had troubles marrying 
because she had been married twice already. In addition to the tent furnishing she brought 
R$5000 in cash and her father promised another R$5000 if Babaloo proved himself.99 
Within three months Babaloo lost the money in bad deals and cards. People commented 
that he lost all the money of his wife. The father-in-law was not going to give other 
R$5000, conditional on Babaloo’s performance. 
In an inverse way, utilising both its capacity to circulate and its capacity to 
register displacement, the most secure way to establish one’s reputation while “making 
the future” is to keep the dowry money separate and live off one’s skills and money. The 
dowry money is still invested by a husband (less often by a wife) but as “his wife’s” or 
“his son’s” money. Such earmarking requires wealth or thrift (cf. Zelizer 1997). For 
Índio, the poorest man in Santaluz, preserving this separation meant that he was an 
outsider. He did not play cards; he did not socialise with men. Kiko kept money for food, 
money for deals, Paula’s money and money for entertainment separated. He lent out his 
                                                 
98
 Goldfarb notes that among the Calon in Sousa, PB, that although the young husband is responsible for 
sustaining his wife, in reality it is his parents that take care of them after the wedding (Sulpino 1999). 
99
 Miriam Guerra (2007) tells a story of a poor young man, who received weekly payments from his father-
in-law, which he had to reinvest. This strategy was successful and the young family is one of the richest in 
the area now. 
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wife’s money only with her knowledge.100 A man’s reputation, then, is based on how 
much money he has “on the street”, which is never certain but always guessed. When the 
husband does not need his wife’s money, which he keeps for his children in circulation 
while living off brasileiros, his (moral) reputation increases (cf. Williams 1984: 291).  
Because the bride’s parents pay for the wedding and the dowry, for most it is a 
financially ruinous affair; many become indebted and others sell their property. It is also 
the only long-term plan I heard people discussing: When his daughter was born, Pinto 
applied for family benefits, planning to open a bank account in his wife’s name and to 
accumulate the payments there for his daughter’s dowry. Another woman argued that she 
would consider selling a retirement benefit card in the future, just to marry her daughter.  
As traditional structural-functionalist analysis of dowry would predict, the 
existence of dowry among Calon, viewed above all as the property that comes to the 
union, comes with the centrality of the conjugal couple, the existence of bilateral kinship 
system, the importance of negotiations and the focus on alliance (Comaroff 1980: 1-47). 
Among Calon, these aspects can be mostly seen in tensions accompanying affinal 
relations – I show elsewhere that a good portion of violence occurs between affinally 
related people. Or take the case of Kiko, described above: after killing a man, he escapes 
to hide among his affines, who are also the wife-givers and whose parental household 
paid the dowry that Paula brought to the union. The brothers-in-law and his mother-in-
law are also the ones who, apart from his família, visit him regularly in prison. After his 
release, Kiko’s household moves to their settlement in Alto de Bela Vista, but a few 
months later the household is forced to leave the place after Kiko gets into conflict with 
                                                 
100
 However, that does not mean that the dowry money was hers to spend. It is more like money that 
represents the financial stability of a household.  
 210 
his older brother-in-law. As I will show in the last chapter, this brother-in-law accuses 
Kiko of, among other things, not wanting to lend him the money for a good car deal. On 
their part, Kiko and Paula blame her relatives for turning their back and not providing any 
help with the daily subsistence of their household.  
Significantly, among the Calon the only real attempt at equivalence in deals is 
when a couple separates. The dowry money is a commodity transformed into a gift to be 
transformed into commodities; it can be seen as the initial credit for a new household 
project. Equivalence at divorce prevents a man from living on the other man’s money, 
from “eating” another man’s money and trying to “establish” himself in this manner. 
Thus Faustão’s father-in-law demanded R$100.000 (lowered to R$25.000) when Faustão 
left Daiane. The value of Daiane’s dowry was much lower, but because they were 
married for six years, the demanded sum included the increased costs of remarrying 
Daiane (and a probability of not remarrying) and the calculation of how much money 
Faustão could have earned during his period of being married with the dowry – his 
father-in-law’s money.  
 
Deaths 
With wife and a household as a stabilising background and children’s weddings as the 
long-term aim, throughout his life a man generates a variety of debt-creating deals with 
the people living in his area.  This money gets his son out of prison and his deals inspire 
others to live alongside him. When he dies, others leave the settlement. His household 
disintegrates and in grief his widow burns the furniture, which at the beginning came 
with her dowry. Other objects are sold to brasileiros and the money gained goes to his 
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sons. 101 The widow becomes dependent on her children. Some photos and small 
reminders are kept but hidden away for some time; it is too painful to look at them, just 
as places left behind are too loaded with memories (e.g. Vilar 2011: 35-49). Thus while 
the living Calon in their households are non-attached to land, the dead, whose households 
were destroyed, remain attached to places where they died (cf. Williams 2003). The 
movement of people and of money, an attribute of life and especially of masculinity (cf 
Manrique 2009: 97-111), is possible only within a household.  
At the time of his death, the deceased has debts and others owe to him. When he 
died, Zezinho had more debts than money owed to him.  As he did not have any sons, his 
son-in-law Nelson inherited letras, or notas promisórias, on which Nelson was able to 
collect money from brasileiros and from other Calon. Zezinho’s debts were never to be 
paid off, which all Calon creditors understood. It is as if their “money on the street”, 
which included money Zezinho owed to them, registered Zezinho’s death by leaving a 
hole in the total sum other men – his creditors – have on “on the street”. Nelson talked 
about this money as dissimulado – hidden, false, or virtual. But he was also reminded by 
one man that if he gave any of Zezinho’s letras so his brother could recover some money 
Zezinho owed him, “there will be blood.” On the other hand, the debts to the dead are 
inherited by his sons. After all, their father’s “making the future” was justified by the 
interests of his household, and a condition of their own.  
A man’s extraneous activities are given structure and meaning by his wife and the 
nexus of their relationship – a household. His wife’s dowry furnishing creates the 
fundamental relation-position from which he interacts with the wider world, while dowry 
                                                 
101
 English Travellers also burn or sell the deceased’s belongings, including his trailer, while money is 
inherited (Okely 1983: 222). Among French Manoush, who also burn the deceased possessions, money can 
be used only to pay for funerals and tomb decorations (Williams 2003: 4). 
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money serves as a credit to finance his activities. The two are connected but he tries to 
keep them differentiated – ideally he provides for his family using his own money (what 
he received from his parents) while preserving his wife’s money for his sons. He 
improves the material quality of his household while also reinvesting most money he 
makes. His reputation is built on the basis of his behaviour, which is made visible also 
through the ways he uses the money. When a man dies, furniture – his individual 
household – is destroyed while the money is inherited by his sons. It is as if money is 
always there but needs to be personalised through actions of individual men. 
 
 
Picture 5.2    An old widow in her tent on the outskirts of a camp 
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Conclusion  
 
During the two years I described in this chapter Eduardo struggled to stabilise his and his 
children’s households within an uncertain environment. He used various strategies, but 
his efforts were constantly undermined by the same dynamics which demanded his 
efforts in the first place. He sold a house to gain money to get Kiko out of prison and to 
buy a plot where his house and the houses of his sons could be built. But he also become 
indebted and sold the plot when a better opportunity for them arose. During the period 
when he was marrying Romero, bailing out Kiko or buying a new plot for the settlement, 
Eduardo also lent, borrowed, and paid money. Some Calon even refused to lend to him, 
because they were worried that Eduardo was becoming too indebted and incapable of 
paying off his debts. In other words, money “on the street” served as a background 
against which his present and future behaviour emerged and was evaluated: is his 
reputation such, that his son can marry a rich woman? Is his older son still in prison, 
because Eduardo, a rich man, is avoiding spending money on lawyers and bribes? Did the 
events of past two years mean that Eduardo is not so lucky anymore and he will be 
unable to pay his loans? Money is therefore not only a tool of exchange, but as one’s 
whole “on the street” – which is to some extent visible since people keep track of their 
relative’s wealth – it creates a space for negotiation and evaluation. The “quality of 
multiplicity” (Holbraad 2005: 231-254) makes it an efficient way to create and record 
proper relations between people and to become the “food for sociality” (Stewart 1994: 
45-62).  
Such Calon space is created prior to a man’s marriage, with the assessment of his 
potential for making money on the basis of the reputation of his family. But it is 
 214 
intensified after the marriage when dowry money, which is public, is given to finance 
man’s “making the future” – his entering into exchange relationships with others. The 
extent of his achievements becomes visible through the position of his household in 
relation to others and especially during the weddings of his own children. Throughout his 
life, the negotiated and specific sums he uses to save a dying man or gives as dowry, 
which are taken out of circulation in loans, reproduce Caloninity. They highlight the 
efforts of individuals which are recognised by others as truthful and meaningful.  
Bloch and Parry (1989: 1-32) described that some exchanges for individual gain 
deemed positive, because they reproduce a larger social whole. That money is used in 
social reproduction because thanks to the existence of the transcendent sphere, some of it 
is morally assigned there and becomes marked by permanence. But Gypsies do not think 
of themselves as a transcendental group or a community (Stewart 1997;Gay y Blasco 
1999;Ferrari 2010) and there is no transcendental sphere. Rather, Gypsyness is 
individually enacted and money’s capability “of keeping track of what people do with 
each other” (Hart 2000: 255) serves as a useful tool to evaluate one’s behaviour. Because 
different paths and choices always exist, when money is used, its displacement from the 
whole “on the street” merges man’s actions with social reproduction, while obviating 
calculation (cf Holbraad 2005: 250 ft.14) – if you spend it on dowry or on saving a dying 
man, you cannot spend it on loans. In this way, money works as a “double medium”: 
through monetary “flows” – through loans, payments (bribes), gifts (dowry) – Calon 
constantly create themselves as moral persons, but co-ordinately also create the 
environment for these flows, i.e. a medium which can register as a displacement of a 
particular sum.  
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I should note here, that Simmel (1990) also suggested a similar dual property of 
money – first as a means of exchange and then as the environment that makes modern 
exchange possible, which follows after relations between objects have been redefined in 
terms of relations between monetary sums; these equivalences in turn also confirm 
adherence of exchange partners to the social group (178). Simmel argues essentially that 
money fills in the gaps which are created when objects are taken out of the total system 
of exchanges (124). However, following Holbraad (2005), I want to argue that for the 
Calon this environment is not transcendent (universal) in any way, but remains 
personalised, seen in terms of the money each man has “on the street” that consists of 
total money a man will receive from various other men at various points in the future. In 
this manner, each man creates his own environment through relating to others. I will 
argue in later chapters that any creation of society is precluded, because Calon constantly 
redefine transactions as singular dyadic exchanges witnessed by others. Hence, the 
knowledge about other’s people’s deals is not only a way to assess their liquidity, but also 
creates a separate sphere of known Calon. In other words, in acting as Calon by using 
money, they also create the space for their Caloninity. But how Calon assess what they 
and others do with money, the meaning and truth of their behaviour, depends on Calon 
criteria for evaluation. Therefore, in the next chapter I turn to Calon masculine values and 
specifically how they relate to exchanges.   
VI. “ONLY THE DEAD DON’T MAKE THE FUTURE”: HOW MEN 
NEGOTIATE UNCERTAINTY 
 
Introduction 
It was a few days after Romero’s and Luiza’s wedding. Romero was still in 
Palotina with his wife’s family. I had just returned to Muritiba and was sitting 
with Eduardo, Viviane, Kiko and Paula. We were watching the workers finishing 
the house for the newlyweds, when Romero called.  Over the phone he told 
Eduardo that he had just bought a sound system for R$1500 to be paid in one 
year, which he was going to install into the car that came with Luiza’s dowry. His 
father was upset. It seemed to him that Romero was tricked by his new affinal 
relatives and he told Romero to renege on the deal. After Eduardo hung up, he 
and his older son Kiko concluded that the sound system was not worth the money 
– they have seen it before. Moreover, Eduardo grumbled, the man Romero made 
the deal with had tried a few years ago to prevent Kiko marrying Paula and 
recently, while Kiko was in prison, suggested to Paula that she should leave him; 
the man, Paula’s paternal uncle, wanted her to marry his own son. Insinuating 
where the loyalties lay, they also agreed that Romero’s own brother-in-law, 
cunning as he was, knew about the value of the sound system, but convinced 
Romero that it was worth buying. After a short discussion, however, Viviane and 
Eduardo told Kiko to call Romero again and tell his brother not to cancel the deal, 
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but to accept it. Otherwise, Eduardo was dictating, Romero would “fall into 
shame in front of the men (cair na vergonha na frente dos homens)”. 
 
We can see what is happening here: because Romero (age 17) went to Palotina a 
week before the wedding, this is his second week alone among the relatives of his new 
wife. He is spending most of his time with men, especially his brother-in-law. Eduardo 
and Viviane are worried about the impression Romero will make and know that the other 
men will try to involve him in transactions. I shared their concern. My wife and I often 
half-joked privately that ‘Romero did not really want to be a Cigano’. Unlike his father or 
his older brother, he did not play cards, did not care about fighting cockerels and did not 
seem to enjoy negotiations during transactions. From their house, his mother still lent out 
his money, although he would often carry it in his pocket. She would not go after these 
debtors alone; at least once when she sent him to collect the money, he hesitated for a few 
days despite his brother urging him, that it was the end of the month when the debtor, a 
hospital employee, received her salary. Like many young Calon, Romero spent much 
time with brasileiros and dated a jurin, which led to various problems during the 
wedding negotiations.  
In a sense, as I described it in the previous chapter, a marriage negotiation can be 
seen as a process of shifting the focus, an introversion of moral orientation. After his 
wedding, a man’s behaviour is judged and commented upon more thoroughly by others. 
At the same time, the wedding also starts a more systematic engagement with the wider 
world – as Kiko told his brother, when Romero jeopardized his wedding, ‘if he wanted to 
live as a jurón, he should marry a jurin’ and, in the same breath, that ‘there was no future 
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with juróns’. The dowry his wife brings establishes the necessity for a man to “make the 
future” and to intensify his transactions “on the street”. Success is assessed with respect 
to Calon morality, with dowry establishing the basis for such evaluation: did a woman 
marry well, or did her husband squander her dowry in cards? Is he sharp or a fool 
“without a future” who cannot provide for his household? If he is successful and has a lot 
of money on the street, how big will the dowry of his daughter be? 
This confirms observations other anthropologists have made, namely, that 
Gypsyness is perfomative and it is not enough to be born in a Gypsy family – one needs 
to forge oneself a Gypsy man or woman through behaviour (Okely 1983; Stewart 
1997;Gay y Blasco 1999;Ferrari 2010).  Among Calon, o homem, a male self, has to be 
given expression every day and in many activities. Inversely, Romero’s failure to live up 
to expectation would threaten this claim. But there are no fixed rules for behaviour, stable 
or authoritative morality and I never heard Calon talk about “good” or “bad” Calon 
individuals without referring to specific singular acts; what is more, the evaluation of any 
specific situation by the same people often changed over time or in presence of different 
individuals. Rather, there is a system of reasoning, a manner of problematising, a chain of 
questions about meaning of actions, akin to Foucault’s “ethical practice, which, while 
involving codes and rules, consists of manners and exercises for self-understanding 
within a nexus of relationships” (Roitman 2005: 190-191).  
As Ferrari (2010) convincingly showed, at the core of this Calon problematising 
lies vergonha (Port.) or laje (Rom.), which can be translated as ‘shame’. Kiko calls 
Romero to warn him not to reverse the deal, because he would “fall into vergonha” 
among (“in front of”) his in-laws. As a disciplining concept vergonha orients practices; 
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through it Calon also create themselves as moral persons. Used in a variety of 
expressions, in ways that are not easily recognised by non-Gypsies, Ferrari argues that it 
is both a value and an emotion that people feel. Thus, a woman’s dress is the sign that she 
has (ter) vergonha and man’s refusal to go after his Calon debtor, and thus show his 
dependence on another’s returning the money, is justified by being ashamed (estar com 
vergonha). It is not shared by brasilerios, or more precisely, Calon do not judge 
brasileiros within its framework.  As a consequence of this encapsulation vergonha is 
interiorised starting with the female body, but through successive encompassments, 
vergonha turns to be the mode of being Calon (jeito cigano) itself (Ferrari 2010: 157).  
Through knowledge of this superior way of being Calon differentiate themselves from the 
gaje (see also Gay y Blasco 1999). In this sense, it is the Calon theory of the relationship 
between the Calon and the gaje, and a key to Calon conceptualisations of the gaje 
(Ferrari 2010).  
I am less interested in the conceptual basis that transforms behaviour into Calon 
behaviour, than in what Ferrari’s analysis suggests about the “productivity” of vergonha: 
how through the concrete internalised strategies Calon produce themselves as moral 
persons and participate in a highly dense Calon social space. Calon vergonha or its lack 
always relates to intentions made visible, that “appear” (apareçer) (Ferrari 2010). It 
presupposes third parties being witnesses to one’s actions. Each self-fashioning of a 
homem, whether in a narrative and an act is a triad: although a relation with another (e.g. 
a transaction between Romero and the man), it also requires a public (Romero’s in-laws, 
his family, other Calon). It happens, as Eduardo suggested above, “in front of” others. 
Romero’s exteriorizing potency in eyes of others – his reputation among Calon – can 
 220 
only be established by means of his exchanges with other Calon and brasileiros. Men feel 
proud of their capabilities to make money in uncertain money-lending deals on the street 
and obtain pleasure from the thrill that comes with seizing of fickle chances, but they also 
gain in reputation among others (cf Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart 1998). The reverse 
is also true: people cannot assume that others are motivated purely by financial gain or 
that their transaction is isolated. In the example, Eduardo is upset because Romero buys 
the sound system from a man whom Eduardo accuses of plotting against his family.  
Romero’s risk lies not only in the money but also in placing his claims to manhood under 
scrutiny – here and now (Is he aware what is going on in the transaction?), but also as a 
promise for future accomplishment and for other transactions (Will he pay R$1500 once 
he is not among them? What will other people think of him?). 
In other words, man’s actions effect their spatiotemporal control (Munn 1992) and 
in the previous chapters I suggested some forms this spatiotemporal control might take. It 
is visible in money a man has in deferred payments among other Calon, which, together 
with loans to juróns, comprise the total sum “on the street”; here publicly known acts of 
repayment and renegotiation that occur at different moments literally oblige another to 
come and talk to the man, to recognise his agency and autonomy.  People also decide to 
move to a place where their relatives’ reputation promises that their own position might 
be improved through intensifying their relationship – a strongman inspires others to move 
to a town; a deferred exchange multiplies people’ possibilities. Thus, although the actions 
of men are evaluated according to internal criteria (vergonha), the questioning that it 
allows leads to the reshuffling of relations and elaboration of social space. Unlike 
Spanish Gitanos, Calon do not have a concept of a “Gypsy law”, but rather a manner of 
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pondering the truth and meaning of people’s behaviour. Nevertheless, here too, one’s 
reputation for being a homem determines’ his “ability to influence the course of their own 
lives and the lives of others” (Gay y Blasco 1999: 4). Romero’s brother-in-law is thought 
to have undermined Romero’s reputation and Romero should not trust him completely.  
Behaving as homem of vergonha serves as a means of ranking within egalitarian 
context and constantly reorders social space. In this chapter I look at how this done 
through four specific ways men’s actions are ranked, and how in the process Calon 
produce themselves as well as reorder the social space. All four criteria, relate directly to 
men’s activities “on the street”, to their ability to gain spatiotemporal control through 
exchanges with Calon and brasileiros. First, I argue that men fashion themselves as men 
of action attuned to seizing fickle chances and to creating opportunities, a capability 
glossed over as “making the future”. Second, men are also quick to react to any sign of 
disrespect and I argue that valour as a quality is linked to their alertness. Third, their 
long-term success in economic exchanges is made visible in their wealth. Wealth, 
however, is conceived of as a temporary state and cannot be transformed into long-term 
hierarchy. At the end I return to the question of households and settlements, and show 
how “strength”, a capacity to control and divert the flow within one’s environment, is 
spatially distributed.  
 
6.1 Seizing Fickle Chances 
“Making the Future” 
When I returned to Santaluz shortly after all Calon had fled, I expected everybody to 
blame Kiko. Indeed, they blamed Kiko for his carelessness and the traces he left behind 
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to be found by the police. They criticised Eduardo for the way he handled the situation.  
But nobody commented on the morality of the murder. Even more surprisingly, they did 
not blame Kiko for the impact his actions had on them, even though some had had to flee 
from the place where they had lived for more than six years.  
The camp “down there” dissolved as a result of actions by a man who had not 
even been living there. This served as reminder to people that contingency makes it 
impossible to commit oneself to very specific goals, and that plans can “only be imagined 
provisionally pending whatever dramatic upheaval will inevitably come” (Johnson-Hanks 
2005: 376). In the previous chapter I described “social wayfaring” as being based on 
constant attention to changing composition of settlements. In this one, I similarly want to 
suggest that for Calon, decisions are not a part of a conscious creation or shaping of the 
world based on middle-run temporality with a fixed referent in mind. Rather, decisions 
and events are acts of chance that need to be uncovered and seized upon, where effective 
action does not follow prior intentions, but a “judicious opportunism”(Johnson-Hanks 
2005: 363-377). The choices people make are not independent, but every choice changes 
other options and calls for recursive evaluation. Nor are one’s choices provided all at 
once, since not all of them are readily apparent and require people’s actions to be made 
visible.  
Within this uncertainty, of which risk in money-lending is a part, Calon 
masculinity emerges. Successful bending of unpredictable opportunities – improvisation 
and flexibility – allows men to make names for themselves.  Their expression fazer futuro 
– to make the future – that they sometimes use, summarises the act of seizing one’s 
opportunities. I already mentioned two specific uses of futuro: man multiplies his 
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exchanges after the wedding and “makes the future”. Leaving a settlement, because there 
is “no future there” brings new opportunities through a change of location. The logic 
behind it is opening new opportunities through movement and transgression; and as 
Simmel (1990) showed, money is one of most appropriate tools for it. Conversely, when 
a man is seen as lazy, as an addicted gambler, a sit-at-home or incapable of arranging 
things with non-Gypsies, people talk about him as being without future – sem futuro. In 
addition, despite the meaning of futuro, as I will argue in the next chapter, the idiom 
motivates strategies of radical presentism that are not much different from ideas of living 
for the moment found elsewhere (Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart 1998). 
Opening new possibilities through unsettling and keeping options open is crucial 
for seizing chances where uncertainty is the rule. Michael Herzfeld observed that among 
the Glendiot shepherds “each successful demonstration of eghoismos, especially when 
manifested in the bending of fickle chance is to the actor’s own ends and the comfort of 
his guests suggests an infinite swathe of possibilities” (1985: 136). Among the Calon 
such “swathe of possibilities” is opened through change of velocities – diverting flows in 
time. In card-games, one sees one’s “future unfolding” literally before one’s eyes with 
each draw of cards and each bet (e.g. Malaby 2003). In money-lending dividing sums and 
punctuating time multiplies opportunities. Michael Stewart observed that when a 
Hungarian Rom horse-dealer is not able to sell an animal for months, he will at least try 
to swap it “in the hope that one increase in the velocity of his dealings will lead to two” 
(1987: 230). Similarly among Calon, on days where everything seemed to have stopped, 
people at least played cards for small change or swapped like-things as if destabilisation 
was able bring about more opportunities. The word for deal, o rolo, has such 
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connotations. It means a rotation, a tumult, a disturbance of order; Calon used it to 
describe most deals, but specifically swaps. Any next move should alter the situation 
completely by bringing about the opportunities that lie in its wake.  
A disturbance of the status quo, especially if unexpected, also opens space for 
people to perform. The consequences of the murder committed by Kiko allowed other 
men to react appropriately through showing their ability to make use of chances, 
displaying their courage, renewing their kinship bonds and generally trying to force upon 
life's contingencies their own will; i.e. to move. It follows that risk involved in 
moneylending needs to be seen as “productive” and not a rupture (Zaloom 2006). All of 
these situations allow for the foregrounding of men’s abilities to manage contingencies 
which arise from their complete absorption into their environment. 
 
As Bestas  
Like the futures traders in Chicago described by Zaloom, Calon men engage with 
fatefulness and risk which lie in passing time while they value self-determination and free 
will  (Zaloom 2006: 106). They downplay the role of others, while often using the 
language of luck (sorte). These two are not contradictory, but call for an extended 
understanding of the meaning of futuro – it stands not only for temporal unfolding, but is 
also a fate; indeed the other meaning of futuro in Portuguese is the ‘destiny’. Any destiny 
requires that a man recognises the opportunity, differentiates it from an unpromising 
offer, seizes the chance and stabilises odds – he “makes the future”. 
Such constant alertness is most visible in games of luck. Often when driving 
around, men tried to remember number plates of cars that appealed to them. Reasons 
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varied: the number plate could be “nice” or one had made a good deal with the car’s 
owner.  Later they played these numbers in a lottery. The following story shows how 
dreams can be used in a similar way: 
 
A group of men from various towns was sitting in front of Eduardo’s house. They 
recounted recent events, about people who won in lottery or in rifa, and what 
numbers were drawn. “Tell them, how Paulo bet,” Maluco urged Eduardo, “and 
how 4422 was drawn.” Eduardo then told of how Paulo dreamt about guns the 
other night and how the next morning he asked Eduardo what was the biggest 
calibre he had. Because it was 44, Eduardo explained, “Paulo put down 44 and 
then half [of it]. 4422. And 4423 was drawn.” “But he should have put 23,” added 
Maluco, “because he dreamt about three people.”  
 
Many things from dreams can be thus interpreted: guns, birth-dates or ages of 
people in dreams, years when they died. Although I never saw it succeeding, it is 
accepted by the Calon to work as a general principle. Discussing the practice of khoutala, 
a type of scapulomancy practiced by the Glendiot shepherds, Herzfeld suggests that it 
does not fix the future, but emphasizes the dangers of ever relaxing. For Calon, dreams, 
number plates and other signs, similarly “provide a performative context in which men 
explore the deep uncertainties that may one day enable them to show off their true 
prowess” (Herzfeld 1985: 247). This suggests that being alert to one’s environment, to 
grab opportunities, to “make the future”, is not automatic.  
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Among the Hungarian Roma baxt – luck, efficacy, prosperity, happiness – 
associated with success at the marketplace, is “the rightful consequence of righteous 
behaviour” (Stewart 1994: 45-62). Baxt is a sign of personal efficacy, but a man needs to 
prepare for it prior to the market, through avoiding contact with polluting objects or 
people, for instance.  There are thus two types of knowledge, or awareness, at play here: 
on the one hand, there is an immediate acumen denoting capacity to recognise an 
opportunity in a space which is essentially beyond one’s control, to persuade a 
transaction partner, to get a good price, and so on. But a man’s efficacy also depends on 
his knowledge of proper behaviour, on a sort of moral discipline. In the same vein, the 
Gitanos in Spain explicitly distinguish between conocimiento, associated mainly with 
“men of respect” and which refers to knowledge of proper behaviour (a wisdom), and 
saben which refers to being on top of things (Gay y Blasco 1999). Calon do not have 
expressions for two modes of knowledge, although a verb saber (to know) has various 
connotations and it can refer specifically to knowledge about vergonha and respect. On 
the contrary, esperto/a (or sabido/a) refers to one’s acumen, which is primarily financial. 
But such an ability to recognise an opportunity or a bad deal and to react accordingly to a 
novel situation is something which comes only through proper behaviour based on 
knowledge gained with age.  
It is possible to illustrate how this works through looking at negative categories 
related to this conceptual system. People can be judged as “without future” (sem futuro) 
especially when they are seen as passive; significantly, there is not a state of being “with 
future” (com futuro). They can also be seen as without luck (sem sorte or azarento), when 
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they fail repeatedly.102 Efficacy and acumen is also denied to brasileiros and boys, 
because they do not know (saber). They are seen as bestas, beasts of burden, i.e. stupid. 
They cannot be expected to be espertos and do not lose reputation because of their bad 
deals. Not surprisingly, Calon terms for specific non-Gypsies – jurón and burlon – 
originate from words for a mule, jumento, and an ass, burro.   
Once, for instance, I asked Índio why he was still lending his son’s money. 
Romão was 14, an age when some boys are having their wedding arranged. Índio 
explained to me that “Romão is still besta”. On the other hand, because he was now 
lending “his [Romão’s] mother’s money” (i.e. her dowry), in a few years “Romão will 
have his own money”.  
Índio clearly thinks that the state of besta can be eventually overcome. And as I 
argued in the introduction, there is a sense that the real turning point of moral 
introversion is induced by a man’s wedding, when simultaneously the demand for him to 
behave as esperto increases.  Going back to Ferrari’s reading of Caloninity (Ferrari 
2010), young boys can be said to be bestas because they lack knowledge of proper 
behaviour. In other words, they have not differentiated themselves as Calon through 
vergonha yet and cannot be trusted with money. Hence, when in an argument between 
two married brothers, one called another a burro, their nephew and niece both jumped in 
reminding him that “he is talking to a Cigano”.  
But this points to a particular conception of Caloninity, not based on the 
transcendent moral codes but a capacity to force one’s recognition onto others – that one 
                                                 
102
 This is how I understand Paulo’s argument about his son, an addicted gambler. Recently Paulo had to 
sell his retirement benefit to pay off his son’s debts. He argued with other men about a card game and 
admitted that although that particular type was purely based on chance (sorte), his son knew how to play it, 
but he kept losing because he did not have luck (sem sorte).  
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is “talking to a Cigano” – the dynamics to which I will return below when discussing 
Calon notions of strength. Notice that Romão does not have any money and thus cannot 
show his acumen. He remains besta, while the real turning point in evaluation will occur 
with his marriage. I also argued in Chapter 4 that according to the logic of the 
“cosmology of nomadism” the world moves because one is on the move; the “future” as a 
destiny and luck occurs only when one is not passive, when one “makes the future”. 
Similarly, as described in Chapter 5, through multiplying his transactions with others, a 
man creates an environment – a total sum of the money “on the street” – against which 
others – who are the people to whom he also lends or refuses to lend the money – will 
evaluate him. For these reasons a man in Santaluz, who did not have any close family, 
was poor and married to a jurin, was nicknamed Maluco; one way to keep those who fail 
in so many ways as Ciganos, is to conceive of them as crazy – doido or maluco.  
 
Os Mortos 
I have argued that “making the future” is associated with creating movement and 
increasing of velocities in the present. Taking advantage of fickle changes requires 
alertness which cannot be achieved through being passive. This is consistent with the 
logic of the Calon “cosmology of nomadism” (Ferrari 2010) whereby people are readily 
mobile.  Such a view which posits (primarily masculine) movement as Calon, can be 
extended to other areas. A location with bad business is stopped, parado, or dead, morto. 
Inadequate men can be seen as sem futuro, but also dead, mortos. A “shadow concept” 
(Strathern 2008) behind any still life – sickness of the sedentary life or man’s lack of 
business – is death.  
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I should note here, that the expressions futuro or parado are not exclusively 
Calon. Joana, the poor non-Gypsy woman mentioned in Chapter 3, often talked about 
“resolving her future” (resolver o meu futuro), for instance. Writing about sources of 
frustration that give rise to (sometimes deadly) face-to-face confrontations in São Luiz, 
Ceará, Daniel Linger describes being parado as “a culturally recognized condition” of 
“the disturbing state of motionlessness” (1992: 124 ft11). “To be stopped is to rot or 
fester spiritually and emotionally, and to be incapable of resolving personal or other 
problems” (ibid.). The efficacy of these terms for Calon relates to their meaning for 
brasileiros, and how through a combination of various procedures (e.g. conservation of 
old, borrowing, recontextualisation) (Williams 2011: 43-56), such gaje concepts connect 
to social reproduction and their knowledge of appropriate behaviour. 
For Calon, stillness shows man’s incapacity to move things, his loss of efficacy to 
make the future. It ultimately results in loss of his social standing. No homem wants to be 
seen as dead, without agency recognised by others, and even a rich man, who could live 
fully from lending to brasileiros, still borrows money from other Calon. This logic can be 
seen in common joking insults: pai do meu avô (father of my grandfather), o urubú (a 
vulture), sem futuro (without future), a carniça (a carrion), o defunto (a deceased one), 
mulon (dead in Romani), morto (dead), o agouro (a bad omen, a shadow) and so on. But 
people worry about how they are perceived, that such jokes might contain a kernel of 
truth: 
 
Two cousins Sirley and Romero were calling Nelson, who lived in the same 
camp, “Abelardo” – a name of a very old Calon from a neighbouring settlement. 
 230 
At first Nelson played along and called them names too. But because the two 
continued he was becoming annoyed and asked them to stop. He complained 
loudly: “I already have no luck and you call me these names”.  
 
This story illustrates that parado, morto or mulon are not figurative expressions, 
but real concerns. For example, nobody would lend to a person who is considered “dead”, 
which decreases his capability to “make the future” in turn. Men, who lose all their 
money and are not expected to make more, are said to be mortos. Although they might be 
respected for their knowledge, their reputation for entering into transactions is low. 
Following the same logic, living among the brasileiros, which presents a threat of 
assimilation, a failure of differentiation as relations with others are limited, is also 
associated with death (see also Okely 1983: 228). When Maluco stayed in Santaluz after 
everybody had fled, his uncle described him as mulon, dead (Rom.). For the same reason, 
old men see their capacity for gain decrease; a loan to them is potentially lost. The real 
dead become tied to places where they died, their tents – on which justification of their 
interaction with the world was based – burnt. They do not move anywhere, they do not 
open new opportunities; “they don’t make the future”:  
 
After a short discussion, Kiko’s lawyer left a parking lot in a black Chevrolet 
Astra. It was new and Eduardo, who was still paying the instalments, had given it 
to Dr Henrique as a payment for his services. All of us entered into a VW Gol that 
Eduardo had bought from another Calon. I was sitting in the back with Beijú, who 
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looking at the Astra turning onto a speedway towards Salvador commented: “You 
should not have given that car to the lawyer.”  
“I will buy a new one,” Eduardo dismissed it, “and a better one.”  
Viviane, sitting on the passenger seat, turned to us and told her uncle 
assertively: “Only the dead don’t make the future (só os mortos, não fazem o 
futuro)”. 
 
“Making the future”, as an idiom grounded in movement, is thus doubly 
productive: a man creates himself as homem while relating to others. His relation to his 
wife might be his raison d'être for creating and evaluating new opportunities, but these in 
turn established his reputation among others. At death this process stops.  
So far, I have argued that a Calon life requires constant alertness in the present. 
One does not know where a chance lies and what opportunities can change one’s life 
completely. This is not something automatic, but has to be learned over time through 
progressively becoming a proper homem. Young boys and brasileiros, who lack 
awareness of how their behaviour is seen by other Calon, act as bestas and cannot be 
expected to be espertos. This failure brings with it a threat of death and creates a 
feedback loop: Calon embrace uncertainties to demonstrate their Calon manhood, which 
leads to further uncertainties. It also structures relations between people since acumen is 
something that all Calon are expected to share. But such symmetry has to be backed up. 
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Picture 6.1        Building a tent 
 
 
6. 2 Backing up Claims 
Respeito 
Being a Calon man requires a capacity to create a flow or to divert flows as a way of 
engaging with one’s “future” or of “taking care of [one’s own] life”. But to be successful, 
others have to recognise one’s will and intentions. Calon call this ‘taking seriously’ 
(tratar sério) or ‘respect’ (respeito). Inversely, men are keen to show that whatever they 
are doing is due to their own will and are quick to react to any suggestion otherwise. Any 
infringement and bending to the will of another can trigger a violent response even to the 
point of financial loss. When I was once discussing his violent history with Beiju, who 
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had killed five men,  he remarked that all of this had caused him only a loss (prejuízo), 
but at least others respected him (me respeitam).  
In other words, violent acts send a “message of manhood” (Herzfeld 1985) by 
making one’s complete presence and value of self-determination visible. Consider a 
conversation I had with Eduardo and Kiko one evening, a few months before Kiko killed 
the jurón. While we were sitting, observing the street, Kiko told us about his dream and 
what had happened to his brother-in-law. This led him to comment on the nature of 
masculine valour. 
  
Kiko, who had just sat down beside his father and me, started telling us news 
about his brother-in-law, Wiliam, whom he visited. Wiliam lives on one of the 
side streets of Alto de Bela Vista, away from his family. Apparently, sometime 
last week a jurón tried to force his way into the house to kill Wiliam. Since their 
house is a former shop with a rolling door, as the man was pushing the door up 
and asking Wiliam’s wife whether Wiliam was at home, she could already see his 
gun. She told the man that he wasn’t, but behind her back directed husband to 
escape. When the man managed to open the door and see inside, Wiliam was 
already gone. 
When Kiko finished the story, he started telling his father how close he 
was to betting on a correct number in jogo do bicho103: “The whole night I was 
dreaming of 32 na cabeça [one mode of betting]. And today in jogo do bicho 35 
was drawn.” The inspiration for that number came from the calibre 32 of 
Eduardo’s revolver: “It was a Cigano mineiro. Beiju and Pancho were walking 
                                                 
103
 A type of popular lottery illegal in Brazil.  
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down the street and the Cigano gunned them down. Then he wanted to shoot you, 
but I… Pau! Pau! ... and he dropped dead.”  
His father did not pass comment on this dream and the conversation 
moved to other things. They started discussing the money that Darcy owed Kiko. 
After a while Kiko said approvingly that Darcy was not fearful (medroso). “There 
is not one Cigano, who is medroso. I don’t know any Cigano like that,” 
concluded Kiko.  
“And what about Pinto?,” I challenged him. I knew that many saw Pinto 
as a coward and sem futuro.   
“Yeah, what about Pinto?” repeated Eduardo and turned to his son.  
“Pinto, José, the son of Gel, Faustão, Valdeli, Índio would cross the road if 
I so much as yelled at them,” responded Kiko. “From that family, only Gel is not 
medroso.”  
 
For my part, I did not doubt his assessment of Gel, who when I met him had a 
bandage over part of his neck, where a bullet had passed through. Kiko’s stories show 
how violence is constitutive of proper Calon manhood and suggests ways it builds 
sociality. I discussed some dynamics in Chapter 4 when I argued that violence lies at the 
core of Calon segmentary social organisation and separation from brasileiros. The story 
Kiko tells about Wiliam is a reminder that brasileiros are dangerous, perigosos. At the 
same time, no Cigano should be medroso, fearful and fainthearted, but valente (or 
corajoso), bold or valiant. Kiko has to admit that there are individual men who do not 
live up to this, but crucially, he does not compare individual Calon to juróns: there is 
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nothing unmanly about Wiliam escaping although members of Gel’s family are seen as 
cowards when interacting with other Calon. Ciganos are expected to behave according to 
the ideal of Calon manhood, to share a commonality (Gay y Blasco 2001: 631-647).  
As a consequence, unknown Cigano, Ciganos deconhecidos – sometimes known 
as Cigano mineiro, a Gypsy from Minas – could represent a potential danger. This 
became clear to me when once while I was watching the documentary Tarabatara (2007) 
in Candeias with six men. During one scene, in which a Calon man sings, one of the men 
asked rhetorically: “He looks very sofrido. Do you think he is valente? (Será que ele e 
valente?).” Sofrido is used to describe somebody who has passed through a lot of 
hardship; people talked about life in the past associated with one’s deceased relatives as 
uma vida sofrida, a life of hardship. In the context of a man’s valour it serves the same 
purpose as prejuízo, a loss, when Beiju above says that his manly acts have caused him 
only prejuízo, but at least he is respected. Both foreground a difficulty in living up to the 
ideal and are one of the reasons why Ciganos desconhecidos (mineiros) or those “before” 
(antes) seem to be always more violent.  
The knowledge of what proper behaviour entails, establishes the Calon claim to 
moral superiority to brasileiros (cf Gay y Blasco 1999: 108). It also distinguishes 
between Calon and non-Calon violence. When Calon use the word violence – violéncia – 
it is in always in a sense reflecting common Brazilian discourse and concerns. Just like 
their neighbours or the media, they talk about vagabundos (tramps), traficantes (drug 
dealers) and bandidos (gangsters). But violéncia is not the term used to describe Calon 
actions. In fact, there is not an abstract term encompassing Calon violent acts. Rather, in 
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their narratives people focus on individual events and the characteristics of those 
involved. This is a short description of one such conversation from my fieldnotes: 
 
A few men in Santaluz were talking about how Pedro, the father of Beiju, 
was killed by a Calon called Lúcio. Almost 20 years later, the events were 
described in vivid details, recapturing the nature of claims to manhood of the 
main protagonists. They recounted how Lúcio, coming to marry Ira, got into an 
argument and killed her father.  
“Lúcio was very valente. Índio [his brother] is medroso” commented 
someone. 
They recalled exactly how tents in the settlement in Bomfim were laid out, 
which way Lúcio ran, and how passing around a tent pole, Beiju slit his throat.  
“He was a good looking man, wasn’t he? I saw a picture,” asked Kiko.  
“They both were very good looking,” Paulo confirmed. 
 
Such narratives recreate messages of manhood and men often recalled such deeds 
involving themselves or others – fights, confrontations, revenge (vingança) but also 
flights, bizarre and ridiculous situations, especially involving brasileiros. Such stories 
and vignettes are not only forms of entertainment, but carry moral messages. For a 
violent act to be meaningful and successful, justified and credible, “it needs not only to 
have the expected consequences, but also to be judged appropriate” (Whitehead 2004: 5). 
Only when such claims are recognised by others do they lead to respect, respeito. Kiko’s 
dream shows not only his personal craving for recognition, but illustrates the most 
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legitimate reason to use violence: to defend one’s family and to avenge a member of 
one’s patriline. In his dream, Kiko imagines himself saving his father after two uncles, in 
real life known for their acts of boldness and loyalty, were killed. Beiju, for instance, 
avenged his father and his sister, while Pancho is known for being beaten for several days 
by policemen but not telling them the whereabouts of a Calon who was hiding after 
avenging his relatives.  When a few months after his dream Kiko killed a jurón, it was 
because he feared that the man wanted to kill his father and brother. In a way, then, 
because the murder made sense, people could not blame Kiko for their flight from 
Santaluz.  
 
Images of Courage 
In the story he told us, Kiko configures his manhood and realigns the world through 
foregrounding paternal and familial relationships, showing the potential danger an 
unknown Cigano represents and reaffirming morality different from brasileiros. But the 
dream also reminds him that he should be attentive: He could gain in the jogo do bicho if 
he knew how to interpret his dreams. But also, his family could be killed any time.  
Such preparedness is expressed in aesthetic terms; above, Paulo confirms that 
Lúcio and Beiju, both valente, were handsome. There is thus an intimate relationship 
between respect and the physical person (e.g. Pitt-Rivers 1977: 4) where willingness to 
use violence when necessary needs to be visible. I first noticed various strategies to 
achieve this at a wedding when a few men stepped out of their cars and started walking 
towards the wedding place. On a dusty road, in a country style outfit – pointy boots, large 
buckles and white shirts – they walked slowly, legs wide spread; I could almost hear the 
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harmonica. Such bodily postures are encouraged from the early age: “Father was angry 
with you,” a young man told his unmarried brother. “You cannot stand there with your 
eyes down. You should stay straight, so the Cigano knows he is talking to men 
(homens).” 
A gun is another way to show such attitudes. Goldfarb argued that owning one 
and especially walking around with it, is another sign through which men refashion 
themselves as “men of courage” (homens de coragem) and especially their alertness, their 
“quick wittedness” (rapidez de pensamento). They share this aesthetic with the popular 
classes of the sertão in general (Sulpino 1999: 97-100). Other less tangible expressions of 
the individual body are also important: talking and protesting loudly and quickly reacting 
to the slightest insults. As a consequence, to brasileiros Ciganos often seem 
unpredictable and without empathy.  
Calon are aware of their double audience. Any violent act, by focusing on 
messages of Calon manhood and since it pushes other considerations into the 
backgrounds, violates the context (Herzfeld 1985: 11). Unsurprisingly, although valour is 
the ideal, only a few really earn their reputation for it. “You kill and you will go to jail” 
or “I have two sons to take care of” were some arguments I heard in discussions about 
guns. Most confrontations, brigas, are ritualised and do not end in physical violence; just 
like the temporary leaving of a camp, their point is to show one’s preparedness. They 
happen mostly among young men forging their reputation. But even older men who have 
already achieved this recognition are still expected to demonstrate their boldness in order 
to protect their autonomy and their self-determination and to enforce respect.  
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Picture 6.2        Packing up 
 
 
6.3 Avoiding Class 
Signs Of Prestige 
Romero married Luiza because she was rich and brought a large dowry to the union. 
Luiza married Romero because, being the son of Eduardo, he had good prospects for 
providing well for their household. I am not suggesting that other considerations did not 
play roles and I described, for instance, how Romero opposed the marriage and how 
Luiza’s relatives jeopardised it because they did not want her to marry into Eduardo’s 
family. But I also showed that from the beginning people discussed the wealth of their 
respective families and the dowry. In other words, certain representations of wealth have 
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social significance. After all, it is “known” (or “said”) how much money a man has “on 
the street” and this serves as a background to judge adequacy of behaviour; for instance, 
Eduardo’s family often blamed him for not helping his siblings. I want to suggest, that 
seen from the male point of view, wealth is a visible sign of one’s capacity to engage 
with the world grounded in Calon notions of autonomy.  
Despite what juróns in Santaluz thought, not all Ciganos were rich and they 
differed greatly in the amounts of money they controlled. While Eduardo played card 
games with fifty-Real-notes, often losing and winning thousands in a single game, the 
men in the camp “down there” played mostly with two-Real-notes and the stakes in one 
round did not exceed R$20. Many households had difficulties meeting their daily 
expenses, and relied on small subsistence loans from people living in the camp or on 
women’s begging or palm-reading. Or, consider the two dwellings from Santaluz which 
represent two sides of the wealth distribution. Índio and Eduardo were approximately of 
same age and they both lived together with their wives and sons:  
 
Índio’s tent was standard sized of 4x6 meters lying on the outer edge of the camp 
“down there”104; the old side tarpaulin had holes in it. The tent looked rather 
empty: the kitchen section contained a gas stove and a rack with only a few 
aluminium pots hanging from it. The sleeping section consisted of two beds 
alongside both sidewalls of the tent and a wooden chest and a TV with a DVD 
player placed on a makeshift wooden construction stood alongside the rear wall. 
There were no decorations. Two plastic chairs stood in the middle of the tent 
turned towards the TV; there was no table. The chairs, the central pole and back 
                                                 
104
 See Map 4.1 and Figure 4.1, pp.148-149, above. 
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sides of the bedsteads separated the kitchen section in the front from the sleeping 
section in the back. All furniture was placed on bricks to protect it from earth and 
water. 
Eduardo owned two large houses on Rua dos Ciganos – to build each of 
them, two smaller houses had been pulled down. The one he lived in was divided 
into two apartments, one above and one below. Eduardo’s family lived on the 
bottom; the apartment above was unfinished. The house had four rooms: a master-
bedroom, Romero’s bedroom, a living-room, and a kitchen opening into the 
quintal. The kitchen equipment was of better quality than in any of the tents, 
Viviane also had more pots; a large table, with about ten plastic chairs, stood in 
the quintal, the part-covered back yard. Another table with six ornamental chairs 
stood in the kitchen. The living room was delimited by a sofa facing a cabinet 
with a TV set in its centre and surrounding shelves with crystal glasses, bottles, 
plastic flowers, family photos placed on doilies. The master-bedroom contained a 
double bed with wooden chests and a TV set on one; Romero’s room had only a 
bed. None had any decoration.  
 
In Chapter 4 I argued that Calon are readily mobile, that houses or tents are 
strictly occupied by nuclear families and that as physical structures in space they do not 
serve as fixed long-term references. From this point of view, even Eduardo’s house could 
be considered “temporary”. I was also struck by the lack of decoration or appropriation in 
the bedrooms of Eduardo’s house and “little interest in establishing practical or symbolic 
holds over places where they are made to live” (Gay y Blasco 1999: 16). Unlike their 
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neighbours who were constantly adding something to their houses, from the moment it 
was built nothing was done to improve the house; in fact, broken things were never 
replaced. Rather, their disorganisation of bedrooms and clothes piled up on top of chests, 
gave the impression of a family that had moved in only yesterday. In some sense the 
aesthetic aspects or the use of trunks instead of wardrobes, seem to suggest change and 
flexibility (e.g. Tauber and Tauber 2009: 70) and continuity between houses and tents.105  
But the material aspects of dwellings have their significance of which this lack of 
fixity is a part. At the core of a physical household from which a husband sets out to 
engage with the world lies the dowry; the wife brought the furniture within it and also the 
money for further deals of her husband. In fact, a marriage, as a founding of a household, 
can be seen as a founding moment of evaluation, after which man cannot be besta 
anymore, although he can be sem futuro.  As a consequence his capacity to make money 
“on the street” needs to be made visible and recognised by others. From this point of 
view, Eduardo’s houses demonstrate his skills on the street and his capability for taking 
care of his family. These dynamics are similar to those of the houses of Romanian Roma 
which have dowry coins placed in their foundation. Here too, prestige implied by the 
dwellings are “moments of public discourse whose protagonists are the different Roma 
families building their own prestige in the community” (Tauber and Tauber 2009: 71).  
Given the spatial instability, from the Calon point of view, more revealing is the 
location of individual households in the cartographic relation to other tents. I argued the 
emergence of a settlement depends on a complex process of negotiating dyadic 
relationships where money serves as a tool of relatedness – a way to relate to others 
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 Rena Gropper noted that in the interior decoration of a house, sleeping habits and ways of cleaning the 
house, the Kalderaš in New York preserved “aura of the tent” (Cotten 1951: 36-43). 
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through exchanges but also to create a background against which relations are judged. A 
settlement can be seen as a concretisation of relations with other Calon which depends on 
one’s success in diverting money “on the street”. This is can be glossed over as 
“strength” to which I will come in the last section. Here it suffices to remark that the 
biggest house in any settlement is usually the house of a strong-man surrounded by 
houses of his married sons and daughters. Conversely, Índio’s tent, the poorest in the 
camp “down there” lies on the outskirts.  
 
Ricos And Puros 
Seen from another angle, a lack of material fixity seems to be part of a recognition that 
people’s fortunes change over time. Eduardo almost got ‘ruined’ following Kiko’s arrest; 
Beiju suffered prejuízo as a consequence of his concern with honour; Pancho used to be 
well off, but behaved “like a rich man” and wasted everything in bad deals; Renato lost 
his house in a card game. Such changes in fortune constantly reminded Calon that to 
behave properly one not only needs to stay attuned to possibilities of gain, but also be 
prepared to compromise everything.  
In its pragmatic consequences, this instability prevents development of a fixed 
structure that could lead to hierarchy. But Calon also try to prevent wealth conveying 
moral qualities. I already showed some means of doing so above: men jealously guard 
their autonomy and should be willing to back it up by violence; the threat of stillness, on 
the other hand, which makes a man irrelevant for social life and his agency unrecognised, 
forces even rich men, who could live on loans to brasileiros only, to engage with others 
and to open their actions to evaluation (cf. Durham 1995: 111-128). But Calon also deny 
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that the money one makes and which can be made visible in houses or cars can translate 
into superior status. In other words, they recognise failure and success, poverty and 
affluence, but at the same time constantly reclaim equality. This is most readily apparent 
in their use of concepts related to abundance or lack of money – rico, ‘rich’, and puro (or 
liso), literally ‘clean’: 
 
It was the first card game I watched in Santaluz. Kiko, who had called me, 
explained that he was not playing because he was “puro”. I still had problems 
with understanding the Portuguese spoken by these Bahian Calon, and also I 
automatically assumed that he could not compare to these men. So I asked him if 
the men playing were not puros, too. From my point of view the men, including 
deaf-mute Mudo, were definitely poorer than him – he was the only one living in 
a house, for instance. He looked at me perplexed and answered that they weren’t. 
They were nivelado (levelled).  
 
The contrast in perception is telling: Kiko is baffled because if the men are 
playing they clearly cannot be puros, while I am lost since I do not understand how Kiko 
can be “more puro” than the men. What I am not aware of is that there is no “more” or 
“less”. Calon avoid referring to themselves, or those who can hear them, in terms of 
status and to describe their lack of money, they say that they are puros which describes a 
moment when one’s intentions are stymied: “A man wants but cannot”, as Índio 
explained. Inversely, rico, rich, used to describe people like Eduardo, should be seen as 
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the expression of a moment. Alternatively this pair is constituted as (não) ter como or 
(não) ter condições, (not) to have means to or (not) to have conditions.  
Rico was also used to talk about winning in a card-game, or in a successful deal. 
As a temporary status it was assumed that it could go down and sometimes even people 
like Eduardo were puro and had to borrow money to play a game. Even more tellingly, a 
man could have money at home (earmarked for deals or his “wife’s money”) and still be 
puro and not be able to go to a bar; he might even decide to borrow from others. Puro 
and rico, then, denote a capacity for action, and wealth is one way to engage with the 
world. However, since monetary wealth tends to be stabilised in time through houses, 
loans to others or bank accounts, and could be transmitted into another household through 
dowry, rico is relatively durable. 
Nevertheless, to fix economic status in any way would by a denial of one’s 
individual skills to change anything, to bring about a series of successful deals through 
seizing a chance. It implies one’s loss of autonomy in relation to others. Although they 
are aware of it meaning among brasileiros, when referring to themselves or when others 
can hear, Calon avoid words such as pobre, poor; and I never heard them use expressions 
such as classe popular, working class, or classe média, middle income class. They only 
used the word pobre when talking about their life in the past, as if to point out to their 
improved position. They also use it when talking to juróns, for instance when petitioning 
the state officially.  
Asking for money from somebody who has more of it is illustrates this double 
morality well. When women in Santaluz asked for change from their relatives, they made 
it appear as a test of loyalty and generosity and avoided any suggestion of dependency, or 
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a suggestion that their husbands could not provide for them. Requests came abruptly and 
were not repeated. On the other hand, when asking money on the street, a woman stressed 
her own poverty and called the non-Gypsy patron/patrõa, a patron. Meanwhile, her 
husband often stood beside her, as if he did not notice anything.106  
Through constructing their own world of dyadic exchanges, Calon opt out of the 
gaje logic of hierarchy. To use Sahlins’ words, Calon might be puros and “have few 
possessions, but they are not poor. Poverty is not a certain small amount of goods, nor is 
it just a relation between means and ends; above all it is a relation between people.” 
(1972: 37). Of course, people were aware that having money significantly influenced 
their options – although they were not blamed for it, since they did not have much 
“money on the street”, poorer men could not get their sons out of prison, for instance. 
Nevertheless, I want to stress, that there were constant attempts to prevent the translation 
of economic superiority to fixed statuses and therefore to moral superiority. Calon 
consistently refocused on one’s momentary standing among others. In this way the logic 
behind puro and rico is a part of the same one according to which, after men die, their 
tents are burnt and settlements where they died abandoned. While their money is 
inherited by their sons to make their future, memories of the deceased were too tied to 
places and objects. At the same time, in combination with silence over names of the 
deceased, such destruction of objectified aspects of personhood prevented the inheritance 
of reputations. 
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 This reminds Pitt-Rivers’s distinction between “shameless” and “accidental” begging in honour-based 
societies (1968: 21-24;1972: 61-62;1977: 102-104).  
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Picture 6.3                         “Whenever a Cigano sees that there is no future, he moves to a different place.” 
 
6.4 Stabilising Odds 
Força 
Being ready to seize and to create opportunities and to back up claims with violence is an 
embodied practice on which men base their claim to Caloninity. Their actions lie at a 
boundary between social failure and success and complete presence orders spatial 
relation between households. People use engagement with their uncertain surrounding to 
manoeuvre social and physical position – good knowledge of juróns allows for the 
creation of opportunities “on the street”, marriages create new alliances with people 
elsewhere, “making the future” results in a change of settlements. But in a constantly 
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shifting environment where any event can lead to radical change and people depend on 
the behaviour of others, some are more able to stabilise odds and to “demarcate and 
constitute space” of their immediate actions (Vigh 2009: 419-438). This level of potency, 
one’s value that co-ordinately gives rise to spatiotemporal control (Munn 1992), can be 
summarised as força, strength.  
Like futuro, parado, or masculinity seen as a man-gun hybrid, the concept of 
força is shared with their non-Gypsy neighbours. Especially in sertão, força refers to a 
(patriarchal) capacity to project one’s name over one’s family, to control voting 
behaviour through patronage or to impose one’s family name over a territory (e.g. 
Marques 2002;Ansell 2010: 283-294). Calon força is not a clear-cut ideology and its use 
varies with context: In Djavan and Diana (2008), a documentary about a wedding in São 
Paulo, the groom’s father exclaims, that “papai is still strong (forte) enough” and 
explains that he will “help” the newlyweds. In other words, his skill of engagement with 
the world, almost as a substance, will enhance the capacities of his own newly married 
son to engage with the world. Força can also be “given” (dar força) to others, for 
instance, by supporting people in conflicts through which new limits on their home range 
regions were set. Alternatively, a family dominating a region is a strong family, a familia 
forte.  
Wealth, a reputation for valour and acumen “on the street”, do not, however, 
translate directly into força.  Beiju, although highly respected and feared, lacked money 
for deals to make other people want to join him. Eduardo, on the other hand, preferred to 
live alone and not to build a following. “Look at Eduardo, he could be a chefe of 
everybody (todo mundo) here,” Kiko, his son once told me, “But he doesn’t want to.” He 
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was pointing to the visible separation between Eduardo and the rest of his family who 
were living on Eduardo’s property. He explained that Eduardo would be able to become 
chefe, by being more generous to others, “not giving them money, but lending them 
money, you know.” Strength, then, is a generic value based on one’s name, as it were. It 
is also a capacity to impose on all demonstrations of manhood a sign of one’s força – one 
is not only courageous or sharp, but his acts show, and thus extend, his strength. Força 
then summarises a man’s efficacy to behave properly in eyes of others and thus his social 
standing.  
Inversely, a man who lacks strength, whose value is low and whose name 
therefore does not extend much in time and space, is fraco, weak. Maluco complained 
that he was fraco and therefore could not buy a Gypsy dress for his jurin wife. Márcio 
Vilar, who did research among the Calon in Southern Bahia, reported that when some 
men failed to visit the graves of their relatives on the All Souls Day, a woman explained 
to him that that they were fracos.107 An individual’s força then can be seen as liquidity, a 
reputation, an ability for stabilising odds and forcing luck going his way.  
Força is visible in the space for strategising it creates – in one’s being 
“established”, estabelecido. I have shown how settlements emerge around men I called 
strong-men. These are usually men with married sons, who have the highest “capital 
gağicắno” (Piasere 1985: 146) – good relationships with important non-Gypsies. In the 
past they negotiated municipal permits and spaces to camp with landowners; today they 
have the most solid claim on land on which settlements stand (through ownership or 
rent), have the most deals outside the settlement and know local policemen. Their 
position varies: Some present themselves readily as líders, others would never claim to be 
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 Personal communication 2011. 
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one and nobody would believe them.108 Individual households, including their married 
children and brothers, leave or join their settlements following their own recursive 
evaluation and no respectable homem would accept orders, show dependency or forgo a 
better opportunity.109  
 
Creating Calon Gaps 
Strong-men play an important role in bringing about spaces for Calon sociality – often 
literally, such as when they find place to camp. Força is therefore also a capacity to rip 
things – money, a plot, a retirement benefit, a grave in a local cemetery – from the gaje 
world and make them basis of Calon sociality, to create a Calon “gap” or  “disturbance” 
in midst of gaje (Williams 2003). Tied to individual men, it demarcates the space of 
one’s action and força can be illustrated spatially.  
Distribution of força is also objectified in the cartographic character of a 
settlement. The most powerful man, who is usually also the richest, lives in the most 
expensive tent or a house, located in the centre of the settlement. He is surrounded by 
those whom he supports financially and who can back up his claims. In turn, living close 
to a strong-man improves the capacity of others to behave properly: to strike deals, to 
organise weddings, to resolve conflicts and to “make the future”. The outskirts of any 
settlements are always occupied by the fracos.  
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 The varied nature of leadership even between neighbouring and even interrelated communities has been 
noted also for other Gypsy groups (Salo 1981: 71-97). It seems to me that in areas where there is a higher 
density of Calon turmas, competition for space or authorities’ interference, strong-men are more readily to 
use title, such as líders (see also Kaminski 1987: 323-356;Stewart 1999: 27-44). 
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 Of position of chiefs or kings that lead vitsas of the American Kalderaš, Rena Gropper writes that “the 
men of a vitsa are always ready to listen to anyone who promises efficient leadership” (Cotten 1951: 19).  
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To illustrate what I have in mind, consider the camp “down there” in Santaluz. 
When I arrived it had nine tents. I will discuss two extremes of the distribution of força – 
Djalma, a strong-man, on the one hand, and Índio and Maluco, on the other; tents I, XIII 
and XIV respectively, on Figure 4.1 and Map 4.1. I hope to show how the strategies of 
manhood that I described above, are not only personal performances, but also give rise 
and order to the social space. 
 
Djalma’s tent stands in the centre of the settlement. The tents of his closest 
relatives create a semi-circle around him; as Djalma does not have married 
children or siblings these are his affinal relatives and their children. In front of his 
tent lies “the central space”, the most public area of the settlement where deals are 
struck and games played, where people argue. Being “established” requires a 
constant effort and people do not settle with Djalma automatically: Djalma is the 
only one who owns the lot underneath his tent and he planted a fast growing tree 
in front it to provide the shade for the “central space”. He ‘helps’ his relatives 
through subsistence loans; he borrows money from other people living in the 
camp and is known for repaying before the due date. He is the only one who 
always has a gun and is a self-proclaimed “pistoleiro”, gunman. Out of all people 
in the camp, he has most deals with juróns in the area of Santaluz and over the 
years has created a stable customer base; many brasileiros come directly to the 
camp to borrow money from him. Most Calon men, who come from other 
settlements to visit somebody in the camp “down there”, stop to exchange a few 
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words with Djalma; he is always ready for another Calon to come and ask him: 
“Djalma, make a rolo (a deal) with me”.  
If the ground in front of Djalma’s tent and in the “central area” is beaten 
and without grass, there is only a trodden track through tall grass leading to 
Índio’s tent. It lies separated about fifteen meters from other tents and is followed 
only by the tent of Maluco and of a widow. Índio and Maluco do not “make the 
future” easily: Índio mostly collects debts for shopkeepers and is also considered 
fainthearted; some even call him “a dog” behind his back. Maluco or Doido, 
literally a crazy one, is a source of embarrassment. His mother is dead and his 
father is in prison. He runs errands for Eduardo and Kiko and he lives on the 
bolsa família of his baby. Every day he eats in the house of Eduardo and Viviane. 
He lives with a jurin.  
Wealth also visibly changes along this continuum.110 The central tents 
have a table, a fridge and a TV with DVD player, those around them lacked tables 
while Índio’s and Maluco’s tents lacked both fridges and tables. Those who do 
not have a fridge or a table are the poorest ones and have least cash in circulation. 
Such people have a smaller network of supporters, colegas outside the camp to 
make business with, and not many other places to go.  Both Índio and Maluco can 
be said to have failed to demonstrate their capabilities through establishing 
households with fridges and furniture. Nobody comes randomly to their tent to 
deal or to chat with them and they never have an opportunity to share their food – 
a sign of recognition.  
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 See the description of Índio’s tent above. 
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An old widow who lives on the outskirts of a camp is the trace of a dead man; a 
man who cannot build relationships and behave as a Calon anymore. His name is not 
uttered and he is slowly subsumed alongside other anonymous dead. Widows mark 
natural ends of households which compose settlements, households from which men’s 
engagement with the world started. If being a Calon man with força means being steadily 
able to “make the future” for your household, to make money flow and to create a space 
for Caloninity through imprinting your own presence on the gaje world, then a Calon 
widow is the antithesis of this. She is a woman; she burnt the possession that served as 
the basis of her household; she depends on the relatives. An opposite to Djalma and in 
Santaluz also a visible physical limit of the camp, she also reminded everybody why 
settlements disintegrate – nobody stays where a man dies and a new space of the living 
has to be created elsewhere through actions of other men. 
In other ways this distribution reflects uncertainties, which permeate Calon life: 
Maluco does not have any close family, and his household was never established through 
prolonged negotiations and did not profit from a dowry; three of Índio’s four brothers 
were killed and he fled the sertão; the widow’s husband died. Thus any position of 
strength, no matter how carefully crafted, is frail and tentative and a year later, the 
settlement “down there” concentrated around Djalma was gone. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have tried to lay out orientations that motivated the behaviour of the 
Calon men I knew – their struggle to avoid any suggestion that a lack of money is 
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anything but a temporary drawback, their desire to build up a presence in the world 
through their own actions, to be seen as capable of seizing opportunities and to be 
respected for valour.  These orientations and the conceptual apparatus related to them do 
not provide a blue-print for behaviour, but open a space for questioning of acts of 
individuals. Unstable hierarchisations (cf. Gay y Blasco 1999) constantly emerged, most 
visibly in the way heterogeneous Calon space was organised. 
Young boys have some liberty in what they do, but over time they are expected to 
behave as men - homens. Expectations are gradual and come with increasing knowledge 
about what constitutes proper behaviour; the real turning point in evaluation is the 
establishment of one’s household. A man must be able to negotiate and to know how to 
use his language. He must keep his promise to another Calon, while he is expected to 
profit from any deal he makes. He should stand up to anybody who insults him, protect 
his family and use violence when necessary. He should provide for his guests. He is in 
competition with other men, while depending on the support of his patriline. A man 
should be individualistic, and never show his dependence on other men, while being 
closely connected to others through cohabitation, debts, feasting, kinship links, violence, 
and so on. His success is demonstrated in various ways, including things he owns, 
marriages he is able to negotiate for his children, or amount of money he loses in cards.  
Such stress on masculine assertiveness and autonomy has implications for the 
way they make a living. Money lending is risky and its risks lie in passing time: every 
loan a Calon makes brings a possibility of non-repayment when the due date comes. 
Usury is also illegal. Sometimes their clients asked for extension on loans or refused to 
pay, which jeopardised their own agreements. Nevertheless, as I will argue in the next 
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two chapters, it is precisely through the constant manipulation of money and time that 
they make their living and in the process create an event-full way of living where people 
are expected to know how to behave. 
 
 
VII. LIVING FOR THE PRESENT: HOW EXCHANGES AMONG CALON 
MULTIPLY EVENTS 
 
Introduction 
Until recently, dowries among the Calon consisted of animals rather than money. These 
were not valued as animals per se but as carriers of wealth, potential money. In the 
interior of Brazil, beasts of burden were used as the prime form of thesaurisation and 
trade with animals served to convert money into animals and back (-M-C-M’-). After 
receiving them as dowry, animals had to be resold by the newly married husband which 
allowed for the intensification of his engagement with the world. These animals, and in 
the nineteenth century also slaves, brought gain by being moved across distances, where 
they could be resold for profit. From this point of view, institutions such as marriages and 
violence, by the way they for each man created alliances or marked regions inhabited by 
unknown or enemy Ciganos, mediated and divided the space into heterogeneous space of 
Calon. In other words, following Gregory’s analysis of mercantile kinship of Marwari 
merchants in India, for Ciganos as itinerant traders, territoriality could be understood as 
value (Gregory 1997: 163ff). Gregory suggests that this territoriality-as-value can be 
imagined as the shade of a big tree that can bring advantages to those under it and 
disadvantages for those who live outside it (165). In a sense, one can think of masculine 
força, the capacity to lend a name to various transactions within a region, as such a 
shadow.   
 257 
Since the mid 1980s, due to the general decrease in use of animals, increased 
accessibility of money and especially the novel monetary flows created by 
financialisation, Calon in Bahia started making money primarily through lending money 
to brasileiros. This change in occupation coincided with changes in other Calon 
exchanges: dowries, for instance, are given today directly in money for a husband to 
“make the future”, while a young man from a “rich” or “strong” family will be more 
likely to marry a woman with a high dowry.  In addition, money is recognised for its 
“magical” potential to bring more through interest-bearing loans to brasileiros and this 
potential has become integrated into exchanges among Calon. Today, small subsistence 
and emergency loans among the Calon are also interest bearing.  
  Before turning to moneylending to brasileiros in the final chapter, here I want to 
explore the character of monetary exchanges among Calon in detail. I will argue that the 
dense net of monetary deferred payments among the Bahian Calon helps individual 
households survive and provides the men with liquidity for dealing “on the street”, with 
the brasileiros. Individual households depend on credit in a form of reputation of the 
Calon homem, which situates each household in a unique way in relation to other 
households. Reflecting the performative character based on notions of personal autonomy 
and complete presence in one’s environment, deals between Calon men focus on acts of 
negotiations and acts of repayment of debts rather than promises to repay. In other words, 
in deferred payments among Calon, the Calon guard against the tendencies for 
“hierarchy” which according to Graeber (2010; 2011) lie behind every debt. I will show 
how Calon constantly recast loans and deferred payments as singularised “exchanges” 
between equals.  
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Through constantly reasserting his lack of obligation to lend to anybody, the 
existence of various “dates-as-events” (Guyer 2006: 409-421) – of payment, receipt of 
money, renegotiation – and his capability to obtain further loans become signs of a 
Calon’s autonomy and recognition by others (cf. Durham 1995: 111-128). In a process of 
constant entrustment, Calon lend money and buy and sell on credit, believing that others 
will act as the Calon in the future. Proliferations of monetary deferred exchanges 
punctuate time and create new moments for such behaviour, bringing about the feeling of 
event-full present where Calon continue behaving as Calon and where something is 
always bound to happen to “men of action”.   
To illustrate this process I start by describing individual transactions. I argue that 
every exchange is considered unique where scales have to be matched anew. I then 
describe various types of debt-incurring-exchanges and describe how Calon space and 
time is punctuated by exchanges as well as by the awareness of those transactions that 
emerges from them. I conclude by pointing out some limits of these transactions and how 
people talk about when limits of proper moral behaviour are trespassed.  
 
7.1 Creating Dates-As-Events 
Making Money With Money  
Money gained through loans to brasileiros and things obtained from them are often 
exchanged among Calon. There are many things a man can do with them: money that one 
gains “on the street” can be lent out to other Calon or back to brasileiros. Retirement 
benefits from the state can be sold to another for a certain period, or “for life”. An object 
can be sold to another Calon for a smaller amount in cash immediately and the rest of the 
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payment in the future, or it can be sold for a larger sum to be paid at a later date. A man 
can run a rifa, a raffle, on it among Calon, or he can sell it “on the street” back to 
brasileiros.  
The following story describes an exchange between Pancho and Babaloo, his 
nephew. I was sitting with a few men under the shade of a tree in the “central area” in 
front of the camp “down there” in Santaluz when Pancho swapped his watch for 
Babaloo’s, complemented with money.  
 
Babaloo walked out of his uncle’s tent looking at the watch he was holding. “It’s 
light,” his uncle Pancho pointed out and told Babaloo that it was a good watch 
and he should buy it. When Babaloo did not respond for a moment, Pancho 
offered to swap their watches. But Babaloo would have to add some money on 
top.  
Babaloo asked if it were not paraguaio, countefeit, but Pancho insisted 
that it was original. “You can go into a shop and see that it costs 300. Yesterday I 
bought it from Faustão for 150, isn’t it?” he asked rhetorically turning to Faustão 
who was sitting next to him. Faustão did not say anything and Pancho continued: 
“You give me R$70 until 20 March [i.e. in three months. Plus Babaloo’s watch 
now.].” 
The blind Paulo, married to Pancho’s wife’s sister, and Babaloo’s fraternal 
aunt, was now feeling the watch and declared that it was Oriente Automático (a 
brand). He commented that it still had the original wrist band, and that he would 
buy it if he had money.  
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Otherwise, other men did not become involved.  
“I cannot give you 70 in March. I will give it to you in April,” said 
Babaloo.  
“Then, give me 80,” responded Pancho.  
They swapped the watches. Immediatelly, Babaloo doubted his deal: “I 
screwed up (me lascei), no?”  
“No it’s a good watch. In a shop it costs 300,” answered Pancho.  
“I will sell it to a jurin for 70 tomorrow”, declared Babaloo who looked 
unconvinced. “You blocked me,” he added using an expression from volleyball.  
Pancho was beaming. He started telling Faustão and Paulo that since the 
previous day he had made five deals: “two good ones and three so-so…”.  
After Babaloo left and Pancho started walking to his tent, Paulo told 
Pancho that he should not deal with his own nephew like this. Pancho waved his 
hands and grumbled: “But tell me, who knows about our suffering. Who does?,” 
And continued walking. 
 
This snippet shows how money can be used to reconfigure manhood: it is 
divisible which makes it an ideal vehicle for individualistic men to make deals. It can be 
earmarked, divided up, postponed, hidden, added up or given in advance. It can also be 
confused. The condition for any of these possibilities to happen is opening of a time gap. 
In the above example, Babaloo agrees to pay Pancho R$80 in three months. Immediately 
after the transaction Babaloo realises that it probably is not a good deal and declares that 
he will sell it the next day. Although the sum he plans to ask for it from a non-Gypsy 
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woman would be lower that the one owed to Pancho, if he manages it well, within three 
months, by the time his money to Pancho is due, he can come out ahead on the deal. And 
Pancho will receive R$80 in four months and can still do something with Babaloo’s 
watch in the meantime.  
As Keith Hart notes, time is intrinsic to transactions that result in debt, with the 
most interesting things happening in between (2000).  Or as Roitman put it, debt “induces 
deferred exchange through the multiplication of possibilities” (2005: 75). For Calon, 
every creation of deferred exchange multiplies possibilities and creates a window of 
opportunity to make margin through passing time. In essence, this is the reason why the 
Calon like moneylending: money is divisible and time can be punctuated which creates 
various combinations and foregrounds the skills of individual men. Even men who had a 
lot of cash on them – when they came to play cards, for instance – bought things like 
mobile phones and watches for deferred payments or for split payments where one part 
was deferred. Moreover, if they won at cards, after they had borrowed money, they only 
repaid the loan on the agreed date, never on the spot. The resulting punctuation of time by 
dates – in the case above, through money to be paid or received, yesterday, tomorrow, 
three months, four months – opens spaces for speculation since “embedded in a matrix of 
such dates-as-events, people’s actions and imaginations pivot around compliance and 
delay, synchrony and avoidance, and the multiple possibilities for forward looking and 
backdating” (Guyer 2006: 416).  
Actually, as I found out a few days later, this is what happened to the watches: 
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When I walked into the camp “down there” in Santaluz, I met Laécio from 
Bomfim. For R$70 until the 15 February, i.e. in two and a half months, he had 
just bought the watch that Pancho had obtained from Babaloo. He immediately 
tried to sell it to me.  Meanwhile, Valdeli was wearing the watch that Babaloo 
gained from Pancho. When I asked him about it, he started taking the watch off 
his wrist and offering it to me. I never learned how much he paid for it, but I am 
certain it was not for cash.  
In addition, while Pancho had been swapping watches with Babaloo two 
days ago, Paulo had remarked that the watch on his wrist had been so good that he 
would not give it up.  But today Pancho was wearing it. 
 
Seen from Pancho’s point of view, the swap with Babaloo will still bring R$70 in 
two months from Laécio and R$80 in four from Babaloo. Of course, the R$70 can be 
recombined until he receives R$80. 
 
Matching Scales 
Every deal is singular and a lack of official guarantees in transactions, non-existence of 
any transcendent social structure, and the performative nature of Gypsyness turn deals 
into events. On the one hand, every exchange is an event because it has its own ritualised 
aspects – timings, utterances and embodiments. One cannot be seen as too eager. One 
should pretend it is good for both parties. The deal takes place in front of others. Even if a 
man comes to borrow money he urgently needs, he never asks for it right away, but only 
asks if a person had money to lend or waits for an offer, often stimulating it by talking 
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about his other obligations and when and what sum owed towards him is due. At the end 
of transaction, thanks were never forthcoming as if to stress that it was mutually 
beneficial and did not create a debt. As if the “logic of a swap” (Stewart 1987: 224), 
which as I will show is opposed to predatory and trickery deals with brasileiros, allowed 
people to treat “exchange” as “communism” (Graeber 2011: 122-124) or a form of 
sharing. 
There are various ways to start a transaction. Many deals I watched started with a 
casual remark about an object. Just like Laécio and Valdeli above, the other party 
responded almost invariably with “do you want to buy it?” already handing the thing 
over. Or one asked if another wanted to borrow money. One of the favoured ways to do 
this was to ask: “Do you have money to lend?” If the response was in negative, the 
second question was: “And do you want to [have]?” The beauty of this one was that it 
confirmed mutual benefit of deal-making and giving an impression of transactions being 
about the joy of dealing rather than results. While negotiating, men exclaimed 
dramatically that that particular payment at that particular future date would “kill” them; 
they downplayed the value of a thing by saying that it was not original; they claimed that 
they could get a particular thing for much cheaper and so on.  
As argued in the previous chapter in connection with the concept of “making the 
future”, anything can turn out to be an opportunity to be seized upon. Therefore, the best 
strategy is not to show any interest or to offer a price that is obviously ridiculous. Often 
exchanges ended just as quickly as they started:  
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Nelson was chatting with two men who visited him in his camp in São Gabriel. 
“And your phone can do this?” he asked throwing his phone into the air; it opened 
in flight while rotating.  
Everyone laughed.  
“Let’s do barganha [barter] with the mobile?”  
“OK. Talk, talk…” prompted one man.  
“For two months for 75…”  
“No way (assim não),” the man responded and they never returned to the 
topic again.  
 
But every transaction is also an event because various heterogeneous things, and 
scales of valuation (Guyer 2004), such as interests and types of relations between people, 
the monetary scale, temporal scales, and evaluations of persons involved, have to be 
brought together and stabilised anew. Some things are better than others, and things of 
same kind are distinguished through their characteristics. In the example above, the watch 
is characterised by the brand (Oriente); its weight suggested that it was original as 
opposed to paraguaio (smuggled counterfeit from Paraguay); it had the original wrist 
band. All these allow Pancho to establish in his exchange with Babaloo, that Babaloo 
must supplement his own watch with add R$80 in four months.  
Some scales of valuation used by Calon -- such as time and price -- reflected their 
general use and valuation in Santaluz. Unless due dates were set on specific dates for 
whatever reason, they reflected logarithmic oito dias (eight days, i.e. one week), quinze 
dias (fifteen days) or trinta dias (one calendar month) or its multiplication; bigger deals 
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could be set in “one year”, “two years” and so on. Alternatively, due dates were set on 
important dates – “until São João”, “until Christmas”, “until Semana Santa (Easter)”. In 
monetary loans, the repayment sum was relatively fixed for loans under R$1000: to 50 on 
100, 100 on 300 and then usually to “20 percent” per month, dependent on the type of 
loan. For instance, the interest is higher for gambling loans.  In addition, 20 percent could 
also mean “20 percent of 1000 added to the principal”, usually in loans above 500. 
Despite some of these standards, the relevance of scales has to be established for each 
transaction anew. In fact, men tried to prove their worth and mutual benefit through 
constant renegotiations of slight margins – a week extra to one month.  
The interest is not really a “rate” and does not increase when a person failed to 
pay on time. Otherwise, it would suggest either that two people are unequal or that a 
person might not be trusted when he renegotiates a deal – an independent rate is 
essentially a tool of mistrust, a calculation backed up by violence. In some sense, then, in 
deals between Calon money serves as a means of pricing, through which the negotiated 
aspect of the transaction is highlighted and which allows further gain, and not as means 
of exchange.  
There is not a complete separation from the price on the street, however. In the 
example above, Pancho claimed that the watch cost R$300 and Babaloo assumed that he 
could sell it for R$70.  After all, complete separation would not allow successful 
arbitrage between the two domains. “The logic of a swap” (Stewart 1987: 224) among 
Calon can only be maintained because money could also enter (or flee) other regimes of 
value; money thus serves as a standard of value to compare gain from potential predatory 
loans to brasileiros. In other words, monetary valuation “on the street” comprises 
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calculation and argumentation of a price, through which the difference between two 
domains – deals with brasileiros and among Calon – could be highlighted.  
Take the following example: 
 
Sirley tried to persuade Kiko to buy a watch off him for R$120 for one month. He 
claimed that he had bought it for R$140. Kiko retorted that Doido could steal the 
same one for him for R$100. Sirley insisted that Kiko buy the watch for R$120. 
“Okay. I will buy it. But only to help you,” agreed Kiko seeing that his cousin 
needed that deal. “And I am only buying it, because I know that next week I will 
get 2000 from a jurón.” 
 
The three prices – 100, 120, and 140 - are “objectively” false. They are relative 
and depend on performance deemed as “truthful”. As I have already argued in the 
previous chapter, Calon morality is not categorical but an ethical practice, a chain of 
questioning about truth and meaning of people’s actions. Thus Ferrari writes how in 
every version of a story a Gypsy tells, small alterations which could be seen as lies 
appear. However, the immediate question in any talk is its purpose and not its details: 
“when a story is being told, what is at stake is not “a performance of truth” but rather “a 
truthful performance”. An emotional charge in the present is what connects persons and 
the “reality” of a story (Ferrari 2010: 182). Similarly, within deals-as-events, what 
matters is involvement of persons, pragmatic effects of statements and not absolute price: 
in other words, what works at that particular moment. Price or the “interest” is not 
inherent in a thing sold or an amount lent and is not determined by a price somewhere 
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else, although this can be used in argumentation. References to the price on the street are 
devices, not matters of fact, and dealing men expect exaggerations. Claiming a higher 
price is advantageous when a thing was bought from a shop in bigger towns, where 
negotiation is limited, because it increases one’s value in eyes of others to whom he 
might sell it later.  On the other hand, a man can claim that he bought it more cheaply if 
negotiation was involved, which shows his skills.   
Each deal is thus framed as a single event between two autonomous men where 
equivalences have to be negotiated anew bringing together various scales of valuation. 
For the same reason, during the swapping of watches above, nobody expects Faustão to 
say anything when Pancho asks for confirmation that he sold Pancho the watch for R$150 
the previous day and Faustão remains silent. Similarly, Paulo criticises Pancho only after 
the swap. The trick is to remain alert to the world, to have an overview of others’ 
transactions (or at least give an impression of having one) and to be able to compare 
instantly. As Okely remarks “[I]f a Gypsy makes a poor deal with another, he cannot cry 
shame; it is a shame on him” (1983: 197).  
All sales are either credit sales, i.e. deferred exchanges with (part of) money to be 
paid at a future date, or direct monetary loans. As the reframing of each exchange as the 
singular event without connection to other transactions already suggests, the final purpose 
is not acquiring material objects, but opening space for further recombination through 
movement in time and space. Men see their future unfold in transaction-events while they 
are imagining new possibilities opening: they imagine reselling the thing later elsewhere, 
to a different person or at least in a different deal; they imagine the money that they will 
obtain on a stipulated date and how they will lend it somebody else. The creation of time 
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(space) lag is the mechanism, but at the same time possibilities can shrink during the 
negotiation if one is not careful. Babaloo learns this too late. But even for Pancho, there 
is a possibility that Babaloo will not pay him in four months and that Laécio will not pay 
him in two. In other words, trust in people’s future behaviour is involved. 
 
Evaluating People  
Scaling people depends on people’s acts and how through these they relate to others. In 
the previous chapter I described four different dimensions used for evaluating men – 
“making the future”, valour, wealth and strength. Crucially, when Calon men were 
talking about loans to brasileiros they usually talked about ‘the jurón over there on the 
street’ to refer to a person who had borrowed something. In contrast, whenever they were 
discussing transactions among other Calon, they were very specific and mentioned 
names, utterances, dates and sums. Awareness of these two sets constitute the knowledge 
about money that men “have on the street” and I argued in Chapter 5 that this money 
allows the evaluation of relationships between people by creating a way to register 
displacement: a man with much money on the street can afford to help others, to finance 
large dowry and generally to provide for his family.  
 
Consider Beiju (55). He has an air of Clint Eastwood in older Westerns – tall, thin 
and taciturn, with chiselled features. The funniest thing he ever said was teasing 
my partner Adriana by saying that there were piranhas in the São Francisco river 
in the backlands, where we were going to go swimming. One evening, shortly 
after he was released after being arrested for illegal possession of fire arms, he 
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was telling several men that he used to have R$15.000 on the street prior to the 
arrest, but he spent R$10.000 on bail. From the rest, Beiju explained, “2.000 is not 
mine, it is Hugo’s”.  
 
Consequently, everybody present could visualise the sum on the street shrinking 
and therefore see Beiju’s options becoming limited. Everybody had an idea of what they 
would do with the money and also realised that Beiju was “dead”. Moreover, although I 
was not sure whether this was a “true” sum, I am certain that shortly after this 
conversation, Calon across the region would have heard about this sum or some version 
of it.  
But nobody doubted Beiju’s vergonha, honour and reputation, or that he would 
actually pay Hugo. Among the Calon, this kind of reputation is sometimes referred to as 
crédito, credit, or nome, name; as in the expressions “he does not have a crédito even for 
10 cents here anymore” or “your nome is dirty here”.  Men are also recognised as honest 
(direto) or complicated (atrapalhado). An honest man pays on time and does not try to 
manoeuvre out of paying. There is no transfer of collateral among Calon. Although a 
direto man does not have an unlimited tap, transactions are not be stabilised by any other 
means than his word, the strength of which depends on reputation.  
On the other hand, people refused to lend to somebody who they considered 
atrapalhado, pretending they did not have any money or they used promissory notes 
(notas promisórias) with such individuals. These were also used for sums to known 
Ciganos (conhecidos) who did not live in one’s settlement, and were neither a parentes 
(relatives), nor colegas (one’s peers from the region). In other words, as trust decreases, 
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notas are used. This is a description an excerpt from my field notes describing how 
Eduardo used a nota promissória when he lent R$500 to Dirceu: 
 
Although he used the same pre-printed yellow slip, unlike shopkeepers Eduardo 
did not write down official information such as Dirceu’s name on the ID card, his 
address or CPF number. Neither did Dirceu sign the slip. They usually don’t. The 
nota fixes the date, the sum and the name but it does not serve as an official 
judicial proof. Money was on “20 percent”, which meant that Dirceu was to return 
700 in one month. He did not negotiate, although it was quite high. It was due on 
15 March but Dirceu asked to pay on the twentieth, because this is when he was 
to receive money from somewhere else. Eduardo rewrote the date.  
 
Although he lives in neighbouring Bomfim, his father often plays cards with 
Eduardo and his brother is considered direto by Eduardo and his family, Dirceu cannot be 
trusted. They agree on “20 percent in thirty days”, the interest that is technically 40 
percent – Dirceu is about to go gambling. Notice also the margin of five days – men were 
never satisfied with deals if there was not something extra added, the fact that highlighted 
the negotiation involved.  
Every man is responsible for “making the future” and there is not an obligation to 
lend to anybody in particular; although avoiding lending to relatives might prove 
difficult. In such cases, most often people claim that they are puro, without money. 
Sometimes at least some people know that it is not the case, but they do not push the 
topic. Knowledge whether a person is atrapalhado or direto, or even sem futuro (without 
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future) or morto (dead) is established through constant discussion about the deals and 
behaviour of others. Men ask each other about other men, especially once they move to a 
new settlement. It helps people orient themselves in changing circumstances, since 
“culture of credit is about circulation of information” (Muldrew 1998: 2). Calon see 
evaluation as recursive: they speculate, that a man’s debt in cards acquired last week, can 
mean that he will probably not be able to pay them in future and they should therefore 
refuse to lend him money. A man will only reluctantly lend money or strike a deal with a 
man who avoided paying properly and will make other aware of the fact. Being owed 
money by a rich man increases one’s liquidity; although a general principle of 
enchainment through proliferation of credit among Calon, such promise of a future 
payment by a man with wealth or good reputation is more effective in serving as a sort of 
long-term bond against which smaller transactions can be made. In sum, existing and past 
financial relations are used to evaluate current deals (other relations). In this way people 
avoid missing their payment by a huge margin or being seen as doing it intentionally. 
This could complicate their possibility of borrowing in future since like in all regimes of 
rating and ranking such continuous recursive evaluation means that any failure takes ever 
increasing effort to overcome (Guyer 2010: 4).  
Deals between Calon serve not only as a tool for making a profit, but also as a 
way to configure manhood. Sales, swaps and loans always result in deferred payments, 
which allow men to imagine and create new opportunities to make their “future”. Each 
deal is imagined as a singularised event where although following a fairly stabilised 
repertoire, diverse scales of valuation have to be brought together. Yet one of the most 
difficult tasks is to assess another man’s worth and to face one’s own evaluation by 
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others; both depend on knowledge gathered over time with the possibility to project 
accomplishments for the future. Thus, successful deals create moments within which 
one’s attuning to his environment can be highlighted while simultaneously tying one’s 
future performance to that of another.  
 
 
Picture 7.1      A young couple with their children 
 
7.2 A Dense World of Monetary Loans 
Fridges 
Each exchange between men is portrayed in as a singularised agonistic masculine contest. 
But while they are treated as events, deals are not disconnected; I showed, for instance, 
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how a watch swap made other deals possible. But although households, brasileiros and 
other Calon are pushed into the background to highlight the skills of individual men, they 
are nonetheless present: Babaloo decides to sell the watch to a jurin; Paulo blames 
Pancho for being manipulative with his own nephew; Pancho declares that nobody knows 
about one another’s suffering, i.e. how difficult it is to feed one’s household. Any deal is 
therefore set within the context of other sorts of transactions. 
To illustrate the various issues involved I will now turn to a series of transactions 
with fridges that occurred in Santaluz during my fieldwork. From a more macro 
perspective, fridges are a sign of the spread of consumer goods and accessibility of 
consumer credit in shops. This, as I have argued, is a part of the broader process of 
financialisation within which Ciganos emerged as one of several local credit institutions. 
Fridges are also a good example of household interests and gender relations. The first 
fridge is normally brought as a part of the dowry a wife brings to the union and its 
subsequent replacement is a visible sign of the man’s capability to provide for the 
household. As I have shown in the context of masculine strength, the most successful 
men are from better-connected households, which have the best material equipment, 
including fridges.  Among the Calon in Santaluz the fridge was the single most expensive 
item found in any tent, and there were still households that did not have one, or had to 
sell it because they needed money. Its quality demonstrated the wealth and capacities of 
the owner. In a limited manner the transactions around fridges also point to the power of 
imitation and how one deal can lead to another: selling and swapping fridges surfaced as 
a legitimate option to make a margin in the specific moment in Santaluz. It was replicated 
laterally, very intensively, until this trajectory for diverting and creating wealth was 
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exhausted. Lastly, fridges are bought on “on the street”, either in shops or from individual 
brasileiros, to whom they can be resold later.  
This is therefore an example of what happens to money and goods taken from the 
brasileiros once they cross the divide.  In the following episode the fridge is first bought 
by Paula’s mother and was a part of Paula’s dowry. Kiko sells it to Pinto who in an 
extraordinary feat manages to sell it to a jurón and to buy it the same day for less. A few 
days later, the fridge becomes the prize in a rifa among Calon and is won by a man in 
Bomfim.   
 
2 February. Early in the morning I saw Pinto and three juróns carrying a 
fridge down the stairs from Kiko’s house on Rua dos Ciganos taking it to Pinto’s 
tent in camp “down there”. The fridge was 1,5 years old and had originally been 
part of Paula’s dowry.  
3 February. Kiko, Paula and Viviane went to the Guaibim furniture store 
to buy a new fridge. They bought one for R$1800; 24 monthly instalments will 
add up to R$2100.  
28 March. A group of men was sitting in the camp “down there” chatting. 
Adelino just sold his fridge to his cousin Pinto, who said it was better and newer 
than the one he had brought from Kiko. Later that day, Kiko walked into the camp 
and upon hearing that Pinto bought another fridge in less than two months, he 
asked Pinto until when Pinto owed him the money for his fridge.  
“Until August,” answered Pinto.  
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Kiko became angry and claimed that it was due São João in late June: 
“You should be a honest man (homem direto).”   
Nobody said anything although Maluco suggested that they try to figure 
out when the payment was due. Meanwhile blind Paulo returned and he had 
barely sat down when Pinto asked him if he remembered when his money to Kiko 
was due. Paulo answered that until August.  
“In my head it was until São João,” Kiko answered. “But it is my father’s 
debt now anyway and so I don’t care”. 
29 March. A group of men were sitting in Kiko’s house when a jurón 
appeared. He was hysterical and sweaty, yelling something about a receipt (nota 
fiscal). When he calmed down, he explained that he had just bought a fridge from 
the Cigano standing next to him (Pinto), but that it did not freeze properly and 
since it was the fridge Pinto had bought from Kiko he had come to Kiko for the 
receipt. The jurón also mentioned that he was well connected and that he would 
have not done something so stupid, had Jacira, Pinto’s mother, not put a spell on 
him.  
After chastising him for being ignorante and for coming in shouting, Kiko 
gave him the receipt for the fridge.  
When the man left, we all laughed. “I never saw a jurón like this,” said 
one man, “he bought a bad fridge and blamed it on a spell (feitiço).” 
The very same day Pinto bought the fridge back from the man for R$200 
cheaper; he now had two fridges in his tent and extra R$200. 
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1 April. To replace his fridge, Adelino bought (on credit) a fridge from 
Valdeli, his fraternal uncle and Pinto’s father. As a result, Valdeli and Jacira went 
without a fridge and were hoping to use one of Pinto’s, but Pinto and his wife 
Sandra refused to sell one of their fridges more cheaply to his parents. Neither did 
Daiane, their older son’s wife, want them to put food into her fridge.  
“My daughters-in-law are good for nothing,” yelled Jacira and reminded 
Pinto that it was her who arranged that deal with the jurón two days ago.  
The shouting among the women continued, while Pinto kept repeating that 
the fridge was a prejuízo (a financial loss) and he could not give it to them.  
“When Muda’s retirement benefit comes, it will be all mine,” shouted 
Jacira from her tent towards her daughters-in-law.  
People observing the exchange slowly picked up their chairs and went 
back to their tents. Tiago came and sat down next to me. “I thought that he was a 
man (homem), but he is just a slut (puta),” he shouted so Pinto would hear him. 
Pinto was the slut, he explained, because he did not want to sell his fridge to his 
own mother.  
A few days later Tiago had the idea to organize a rifa, a raffle, for Pinto-
Kiko’s fridge. It ran on Saturday three weeks later. Meanwhile, one hundred two-
digit numbers were sold between the Calon in the area. The person who got the 
last two digits drawn that day in the Federal Lottery won.  
 
In other words, 15 months after Paula’s mother had bought the fridge on 
instalments in a shop in Palotina to marry her daughter to Kiko in Santaluz, it ended up 
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with a Calon in Bomfim who had won the rifa. We can see the opening of various sorts 
of transactions as a result: Since Pinto’s debt to Kiko was in half a year it opened a space 
for gain for him.  By selling and re-buying it from the jurón, he made R$200 and later 
made R$700 on the rifa. But he also ended up with a debt to Eduardo in August and to 
Adelino during São João, so the final profit depended on what he did in the meantime. Of 
course, there is no “final” profit since meanwhile Pinto entered into more exchanges. We 
can also see that one’s acts are a foundation for evaluation of people and have recursive 
impact on their future possibilities. In addition, although it is the responsibility of each 
man to remember the dates of his transactions, memory also works collectively – deals 
and dates are discussed by others, who, like Paulo above, can be called on as witnesses. 
 
Types Of Exchanges 
The last transaction in this “fridge” series involved Faustão, Pinto’s brother, who sold his 
fridge to Índio, who was married to Faustão’s mother’s sister:  
 
20 April. After ten days of playing cards, Faustão owed R$14.000 to several 
Calon in neighbouring settlements. His only option was to renegotiate his other 
agreements.  
Índio had been looking for a fridge for some time. The poorest man in the 
camp, his tent was the only one still lacking a fridge. A fridge he had found “on 
the street” was not good, however: “A jurón in São Gabriel wanted to sell me a 
painted one [i.e. old and repainted] for 500.” Faustão offered a better one. They 
 278 
reached the deal, Índio told me, because “I have a different deal with him. He 
owes me 5000 for four years.”  
What he meant, was that Faustão had owed him R$3000 until São João of 
the current year, but had asked Índio to give him four more years for extra 
R$2000. The deal also involved Faustão giving Índio the fridge and a watch, 
while in two months, on the 20th of June 2009, Índio would give Faustão R$400. 
Índio would be able to give it to him, because Djalma would pay him on São João 
in June.  
 Only Romão, Índio’s son, was not excited about the whole deal. The 
R$3000 that Faustão had owed was in reality his money. It was a part of the 
dowry of his mother, Iracema, which his father was reinvesting. Índio, for his 
part, reasoned that in four years Romão was going to be 18 and “he is going to 
have his own money.” 
 
These were not the only deals that took place that day. Just before noon a group of 
men from neighbouring settlements came to play cards. They were hoping to play in the 
house of Eduardo and waited for about 30 minutes in the camp in Santaluz talking in 
front of Djalma’s tent. They were busy discussing debts, and, visibly geared up to see 
what “the future” would bring, they were already busy negotiating: 
 
Índio sold the watch that he had just bought from Faustão to a man from 
Volta Redonda for R$70 – R$50 today and R$20 next week. “I need to eat 
something, we are without money (a gente tá pura),” Índio explained.  
 279 
Giovanni who lived in Boa Vista was trying to sell or swap his mobile 
phone. There was a general agreement that the phone was not good.  
Sim from Bomfim bought a mobile phone from Maurício from Volta 
Redonda for R$290 for two months.  
Adelino was looking at yet another watch in his hand, which he then 
bought.  
“Bought it, didn’t you?” somebody asked.  
Adelino confirmed.  
“Off whose hand (na mão de quem)?”  
Adelino murmured a name.  
“Fiado [open ended credit purchase]?”   
“No. Until the 30th; for two months for 40”.  
Fourteen-year old Romão corrected him that he actually had bought it for 
R$80, but somebody retorted that Adelino could say any sum he wanted to.  
Because Eduardo continued sleeping, eventually the men left to play 
elsewhere. I left the camp with Wanderlei and Romero, who was complaining that 
Tiago, his cousin, had been waiting in front of his house since the early morning: 
“He always comes to borrow money to play. Once from me and once from my 
father.”  
 
The examples above are restricted to the exchanges that I witnessed at that time in 
Santaluz. Somebody surely had to borrow money during the game in Bomfim later. 
However, the transactions bring out a variety of reasons that exist for buying and selling 
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on a deferred payment or for borrowing money. Let’s look at the main protagonists: Índio 
extends the loan to Faustão of the money he is lending in the name of his son; he buys a 
fridge to improve his family’s situation. Because he has no money to buy food for his 
family He also sells a watch that he just got from Faustão on part deferred payment to 
Maurício from the neighbouring settlement with whom he has no kin ties; this same 
transaction, when viewed from the point of view of Maurício, was a great deal, a rolo, an 
opportunity seized.  
Faustão who acquired a large gambling debt within a very short period, has to sell 
a part of his wife’s dowry, the fridge. In fact, it was my impression that Faustão was poor 
and R$14,000 he owed in cards was not something he could earn easily. But when later I 
asked one man why others agreed to lend him the money to gamble, I was told that 
Faustão was a ganhador (one who knows how to bring money) and could pay off his 
debts. A few days later, though, the same man commented in front of others that Faustão, 
who went partying with some men from a neighbouring town, “does not bring bread to 
his table and left his wife, Daiane at home”.   
In other words, there is a variety of reasons why people agree to pay each other in 
future. Schematically deferred payments can be divided according to their main 
motivation into: subsistence loans/deferred exchanges of objects, gambling loans, deals, 
support, and event loans111. These five categories differ in reasons given, sums involved, 
typical due dates, and justifications.  
                                                 
111
 Medieval thinkers divided usury according to similar criteria. For example Bernandine of Sienna (1380-
1444) who argued that usury was unnecessary and it hurts the whole community divided borrowers into 
five categories: 1) needy poor 2) gamblers 3) tradesmen and merchants 4) usurers 5) people in emergency 
(Noonen 1957).  
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Subsistence Loans. Often Calon in Santaluz lacked money for daily expenses. 
Even for Djalma, the strong-man, days with available cash alternated with days without, 
when he was puro (cf. Seabra Lopes 2008: 262). Men lost money at cards, were 
unsuccessful in collecting from their debtors “on the street” or lent out all their money. 
Not all could buy on fiado from local shopkeepers. In poorer households, wives actually 
put food on the table by reading palms as their men tried to tie their money in constant 
loans “on the street”, but fortunetelling was done mostly on Saturdays, on market days. 
The subsistence debts were created among people in one settlement. Men would normally 
either try to sell something to another or borrow small cash for “bread and butter” or 
“coffee and bread”, a basic meal eaten for dinner. Deferred payments were for one month 
and normally ranged from “5 for 10” to “100 for 150”.  
Rolos. Most financial obligations result from exchanges of objects against 
deferred payments or monetary loans. These were known as rolos, but also barganhas or 
negócios; I translate them as deals. “Deals” were done with men from an individual’s 
home range, some of whom met on daily basis but some only rarely. They served to 
prove one’s skills, capacities to find opportunities, to orient oneself and to make a 
margin, but also as a promise to have a relationship in the future. These were the most 
public of all deals and allowed both parties to present themselves as equals and to 
establish their reputation. But the ideal of equality was not the result of a discursive 
presentation of being “brothers” or “orphans” (Stewart 1999: 27-44), but of recognising 
each others’ autonomy linked with a strong sense of honour. 
There was a sense of excitement in rolos and as I have already mentioned above, 
some happened literally just as if to see what would happen through creating a 
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movement. To some extend, rolos follow the “logic of a swap” (Stewart 1987: 224) and 
they occurred when everything else seemed stop – two men would decide to swap 
(trocar, berganhar) objects – watches, phones, DVD players – with a deferred sum added 
by one party, or to swap money now for a higher sum in a few months. The deferred 
payments that resulted from rolos varied significantly, which was part of their appeal – 
from R$80 in two months for a watch, loans of R$1000 for R$1300 in one month, to 
R$100.000 for a SUV in five years.  
Gambling Loans.  Usually during a game somebody ran out of money and 
borrowed more in order to continue. Some men often sat around players, hoping that 
players would borrow from them. These gambling loans had the highest interest rates – 
100 percent in a few months or, as in case of Dirceu in the example above standard “20 
percent” turned out to be 20 percent out of 1000 on the principal of 500 (i.e. 700 in total).  
Support.  Calon told me that in the past monetary loans were not interest bearing 
and they were given to help (ajudar) a relative. Whether this is factually true or not, it 
reflects the presentation of before (antes) as a difficult life (vida sofrida) but when people 
followed the ideal morality. Likewise, today there are deferred exchanges marked out as 
ajuda and which carry with them specific moral weight. This translates as “help”, but it is 
better to think of them as support; the amounts of money involved in them varied.  
Generally, there are two types of ajuda. The first is a gift from parents to children 
and is continuous with efforts to stabilise new households112. For instance, Beijú gave his 
retirement benefit card to “help” his son; Eduardo gave a card he had bought from 
another Calon to Kiko and on other occasions Eduardo gave a new telephone to his son-
in-law or a motorcycle to his son. The second type of support loan is a deferred exchange, 
                                                 
112
 See Chapter 5 
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either a loan or buying/selling of an object for deferred payment. In the example 
mentioned earlier, Kiko tells his cousin that although his buying a watch might be 
presented as a rolo, he is only doing it to help his cousin in need. Importantly, these 
transactions might seem similar to rolos but conceptually they were distinguished.  
Event loans, or emergency loans.  These were generally the largest loans and for 
longer periods of time, normally of several years. They had the smallest monthly interest. 
They were related to re-establishing oneself, for instance after a disarray brought about 
by violence such as when Eduardo borrowed to put together enough money for costs of 
re-establishing himself after leaving Santaluz and having spent much money on getting 
Kiko out of prison. Men also borrowed in order to put together dowries for their 
daughters, since even richer men might have much money in circulation, but not enough 
cash readily available. Most of the time such event loans or sales came from relatives or 
colegas – peers of similar age, who grew up together and often socialised together, but 
were not siblings, and had crossing-cutting financial obligations. These loans could also 
come from people outside one’s home-range; Eduardo borrowed from a man in the sertão 
400 kilometres away. These loans are much riskier: As a consequence, only men with a 
reputation for being able to make large money had access to such loans; they also came 
from Calon who were strong enough to enforce their repayment.  
 Of course, these types of exchanges are simplified and reality is much messier. 
Going back to the exchange between Índio and Faustão, for instance, does Índio agree on 
a deal with Faustão because he wants a new fridge? Or because he sees that Fastão, who 
lives in the same settlement and whose mother is his wife’s sister, is in trouble through 
gambling? Or because he also gains a watch which he plans to turn into food? Or does a 
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nice opportunity to make more money for his son’s future present itself? Probably all of 
the above – seizing a chance, after all, is polyvalent. 
Through establishing closeness and distance, through reconfiguring all parties 
involved and through aiding social reproduction, exchanges create a “gap” or 
“disturbance” (cf. Williams 2003) for Caloninity in the midst of gaje – moments where 
proper behaviour can be expressed either in acts of negotiation or acts of repayment or 
renegotiation. Through these exchanges people constantly define what it means to be 
Calon, while they also create spaces for Caloninity. In other words, through manipulation 
of time and enchaining people, deferred payments open tense moments in the present and 
future when individuals have to decide how to act towards another. This “gap” is both 
temporal and spatial and in my concluding section I discuss both aspects.  
 
7.3 Morally Informed Gaps of Interaction 
Everything is an Exchange 
The uniqueness of Calon sociality lies in treating all debt-incurring transactions, 
including “help” and subsistence loans, as exchanges between equals – as events where 
scales of valuation have to be aligned anew and where male reputation is put on display. 
The Calon define loans, repayments, renegotiations as singularised acts, and guard 
against any implication that such an act could be a promise which would put people into 
different status positions (Graeber 2010) or against any suggestion that one cannot take 
care of himself and depends on the charity of others. It is as if they have taken a general 
indebtedness that has been the basis of Bahian social life – patronage, fiado, an 
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extroverted economy based on debt to financial centres, where friends used to lend to 
each other money without interest, but nevertheless included the rate of inflation – and 
made it explicitly the basis of their relations. At the same time, they insist that these are 
not debts at all.  
 
Picture 7.2       Men talking during a wedding 
 
Nevertheless, people differentiate between events that lead to deferred payments, 
even if transactions share the same formal characteristics – a watch for the same sum 
deferred can be bought in a rolo, but can also be a way to help (ajudar) a cousin. This 
distinction between exchanges, and therefore certain forms of relationship, is constitutive 
of “morally informed spaces of interaction” (McCallum 2003: 71). For instance, what I 
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called subsistence loans characterise one’s settlement. Most of the people in the 
settlement were close relatives who got along with each other around a strong-man who 
was usually the father of several men in the settlement. These small loans could almost be 
seen as pooling among those who live together, where people would not let another to go 
hungry or to lose face. At the same time they had to be careful not to suggest dependence 
or abuse. Rolos, deals, on the other hand, are done with men from the same region, 
known Ciganos and relatives (parente). It is the prime site for building one’s name for 
being able to “make the future”, while highlighting equality between men. Sheer intensity 
of rolos serves to display (or perform) masculinity through which men create themselves 
as daring autonomous individuals, and also establish their “name” since all deals are 
immediately discussed by others. 
Support loans, ajuda, are given with an explicit aim to help another to establish 
their household and unlike other deals, they also foster longer-term reciprocities. People 
who “help” each other are also the people who will stand up, or stood up, for one-another 
in violent events. The prime model here is the relationship between parents and children. 
Through “help” affines also show commitment to their relationship; and any refusal is 
fraught with tensions which do not exist in other type of exchanges. Framing transactions 
as ajuda serves to confirm relations established through marriages. Possibly because of 
such close watch over each other’s behaviour these relations are volatile and sometimes 
turn into enmity: Manuel was killed by his sister’s husband Mauro; Beijú and Camarão 
killed a man who came to marry their sister but a night before the wedding killed their 
father instead; Viviane’s father was killed by her maternal uncle, and so on; in fact, most 
enemies, inimigos, are (former) in-laws. Next, there are no exchanges with enemies or 
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unknown Ciganos. Lastly, they also avoid borrowing from juróns, who are the ‘outside’ 
(Zatta and Piasere 1990: 163-172). As I will describe in the following chapter, economic 
transactions to them are presented as predatory and a question of one’s adroitness, where 
money should flow only one way.  
However, different links created by various types of loans do not create separate 
spheres of circulation. They are individualized and follow one’s reputation, his kinship 
position and age, whereby, for instance, fathers and sons have different colegas with 
whom they play cards and they “help” different people, usually their own in-laws and 
children. Debts result from individual circumstances and objectify a man’s singularity – 
his inter-subjective relations with others and his success or failure as a Calon. After 
death, their debts are forgotten, places where they died abandoned and their individuality 
slowly subsumed into the anonymous Ciganos of “before”. 
 
Between One’s Rancho And The Street 
So far I have argued that individual exchanges serve as a place to configure manhood and 
that they define social space. At the heart of the system of exchanges lies gender 
difference, more specifically the relationship between a husband and wife (Chapter 5) 
and a forging of autonomous and bold masculinity capable of engaging with others 
(Chapter 6). This dynamics is given coherence through the idiom of food. 
As could be expected from the performative nature of Caloninity, this dynamic 
becomes visible when a certain threshold is reached. The following example describes 
difficulties that arise when something goes wrong and people do not act as they are 
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expected to. In it, Sirley is complaining about Adair who has failed to pay on an agreed 
date:  
  
Sirley was talking to a man who visited their camp in São Gabriel. He complained 
that Adair had bought a car from him on a deferred payment but has still not paid 
the money, which was due two months ago. This was creating all sorts of 
problems, since he had his own debts.   
 Sirley’s wife, who was standing not far from where the men were seated 
and listening to the conversation, declared loudly as if to nobody in particular, but 
so that everybody could heard her, that Adair always paid everybody else, “except 
you” – meaning her husband. Adair “wants to steal” from them, she added, and 
wondered: “How can he do something like that since he has the means 
(condições)?”  But then she slapped her own cheek and exclaimed: “But it is not 
for woman to chat with the men (bater papo com os homens)!” and walked away.  
 But Sirley was too proud to call or visit Adair and to discuss the money. In 
fact, a few weeks previously, Sirley’s father had gone to Alto de Bela Vista where 
Adair lived to collect some money from juróns, but he did not stop and ask about 
his son’s money, because he was ashamed, com vergonha.   
 After listening to their complaints, the visitor told Sirley that personally he 
would definitely call Adair. If it were a jurón, he continued, he might even forget 
about the money. But not with a Cigano. “Otherwise how could I eat at his 
house?” he asked rhetorically.   
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This conversation brings out several motifs of exchanges between Calon that I 
have discussed already in different ways: the deal is discussed publicly in front of others, 
which will have impact of Adair’s reputation. It is Adair’s responsibility to bring the 
money and because he is a rich man, his evasion can only be an intentional affront. Sirley 
and his father refuse to go asking about the money, as this might be a sign of distrust, 
declaration of dependence, or both. It would also be difficult to avoid a conflict if it 
arose; in fact, Sirley’s wife is insinuating that he is not as respected by Adair as other 
men. It also shows that demands of masculinity “on the street” can be contrary to 
immediate household interests. But generally, women are expected to keep out of men’s 
deals, although her intervention makes it clear that it is also her private concern. The 
visitor also points out to the distinction between exchanges to juróns and to Ciganos and 
as I will show in the next chapter, despite their best efforts men often have to give up on 
their loans to juróns.   
But what struck me the most, is the man’s reaction: that he would not be able to 
eat at Adair’s place. Sometimes, I met Ciganos eating in restaurants and kiosks owned by 
juróns who owed them money after its due date, sometimes for free. Clearly, they were 
exploiting the logic of debts, which reordered relations into modality of hierarchy 
(Graeber 2010). However, for the Calon, random eating at another’s place should follow 
a different morality – the man would not be able to eat at a place of somebody who had 
not behaved properly. Hidden within this is the ideology of Calon food, which establishes 
amicable relations, but is premised on the recognition of male autonomy.  
In Chapter 5 I argued that after a marriage, when a new household is created, 
dowry creates a framework within which men are expected to “make the future” and to 
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intensify their exchanges with the world. The capacity to do this successfully – to risk his 
reputation among others and to provide for the household at the same time – is often 
described as “bringing food”; Zezinho, for instance, was described as a man who “always 
came from the street with a bag of meat”. Related to this, the idiom of eating is also used 
to describe predatory relationship, when somebody gains something at another’s expense. 
For instance, when Djalma and Eduardo were discussing prospective brides for their 
sons, they agreed that around here there weren’t any good ones around here and all of 
those that want to marry their sons only because they want to eat (só querem comer).  
Lastly, just as among Gypsies described in other ethnographies there is an idiom 
of common eating, which serves as an ideological expression of correct sociability (see 
Stewart 1997;Sutherland 1986;Tauber 2006). Calon visiting or just passing through a 
different settlement are offered food to eat. Sometimes, travelling with them, I ate four 
times before noon. Each time, however, people serving the food stressed that “it is simple 
food”, that “the food is not good” or that “it is whatever we have at home”. All, including 
visitors, ate fast from whatever pot they could find as if in hurry. The messages sent were 
clear: sharing food does not denote an event of hosting by men more capable of providing 
for their family, but is a basic thing that the Calon as Calon do. 
Once, for instance, Adriana and I were eating with Kiko and Paula in front of 
their tent in Muritiba when Paula noted that Renato must be hungry, because he was 
walking in and out of his tent. We all knew that he was without money and there was 
nothing to eat in his tent. Kiko called his uncle, who ate quickly and abruptly pushed his 
plate away making it appear that he only ate because they invited him to. For the same 
reasons men avoid household feasts given by other men. They do not allow another man 
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to host them, to show his power, money and make them feel inferior, or obliged to 
reciprocate. When Eduardo organised a Christmas day lunch, or a birthday party for his 
daughter, no older men from the camp “down there” came. Their wives, young men and 
children did, but older men did not. Similarly, his three sisters, a sister-in-law and their 
children came, but Beijú, Zezinho, Pancho, his brother-in-laws, and Renato, his brother, 
did not. 
In other words, sharing food and eating at someone else’s place is premised on 
equality. The capacity to offer food is predicated on the existence of independent 
households that nevertheless depends on other households, and men capable of providing 
for their households. Accepting food from another constitutes recognition of 
commonality as Calon, but people avoid eating their neighbour’s food as it could suggest 
dependency and abuse. However, to be able to treat food this way requires that people 
fulfil their obligations, respect another and do not intentionally hurt each other’s claim to 
integrity. The ideology of sharing food is an acknowledgement of equality and amicable 
relations, but also of the capacity of another man to engage with the world; clearly one 
cannot eat at the house or tent of somebody who, through not paying back the loan, 
refuses to recognise his claim to masculinity.  
More than three months after the agreed date Adair had still not paid the money 
for the car he had bought from Sirley. I happened to be in Alto de Bela Vista when his 
brother Nelson visited him. Since Nelson lives in the same settlement as Sirley and is 
married to Sirley’s cousin he felt obliged to tell his brother to finally pay the money.  
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Nelson told his brother that as he had been leaving, Sirley asked him to talk to his 
brother and to tell him: “Don’t put me together with them. I want to create my 
own future (criar o meu futuro).”  
Adair countered that he would only pay Sirley once Sirley’s father Beijú 
and Sirley’s uncle Pancho returned money they owed to him; Sirley’s deceased 
uncle Zezinho also owed him. All of them used to live in Zezinho’s camp. 
“But he has nothing to do with it. You cannot discount his debt from a 
debt of Pancho,” argued Nelson.  
“What do you mean he doesn’t? He was there when I told him that I 
would pay him when others returned my money,” responded Adair adding that he 
could not pay if nobody paid him. On top of that, the car that Sirley sold to him 
was actually pocado (obtained through a financing fraud), so he had to sell it 
cheaper than he expected to.  
 “Do not put them together,” Nelson insisted, “Fulano [Zezinho] died. His 
father [Beiju] is close to dying. Pancho is dead. Pay the ciganinho. He has nothing 
to do with them.” 
 
Behind any still life, including the incapability of a man to make further deals and make 
the future, lurks death: only Zezinho, was dead and Nelson’s use of a word fulano, 
meaning an indeterminate individual, has a double effect of showing respect towards the 
dead by not uttering his name and of pointing out that his debts were therefore non-
existent. Pancho is not dead and Beijú is not close to dying, but they are unsuccessful in 
deals, have a negative balance and low credit. Pancho, in his late 30s, lost a lot of money 
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to bad deals and has two young daughters to marry for which he will have to borrow. 
Beijú, in his late 50s, has cared more for his violent reputation and respect, than money. 
At the same time, Adair’s refusal to return the money, for which he did not have any 
good reason, threatened young Sirley’s capability to make the money.  
 
Living For The Present 
Calon do not fall into debts simply because they have to borrow in situations of distress, 
because of kinship obligations or to impress others. Deferred payments include visions of 
what money (and things exchanged for money) can do, since, when used correctly, lent to 
a person who will behave as expected, they can result in more money. In addition, many 
transactions are not only simple deferrals of payment. Rather, a single act can multiply 
and recombine obligations.  
Recall the fridge transaction between Índio and Faustão: to be able to meet his 
gambling obligations set at various dates, Faustão ignored his household claims; he gave 
the fridge and the watch to Índio right away who sold it immediately for a part deferred 
payment; he delayed his payment to Índio, which is actually Romão’s future money; and 
in two months will receive R$400 from Índio, who in turn is counting on Djalma paying 
him on São João. In other words debt-relations are criss-crossed with other deals 
accompanied by intensive discussions and rumour about them, while their existence 
serves as liquidity for making further deals. Even men, who could live from more 
profitable loans to brasileiros alone, continue engaging in such deals and avoid 
interrupting the flow or being seen as dead. The Calon create sociality through constant 
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making of loans and selling things on debt, which co-ordinately punctuates time with 
proliferating obligations.  
This proliferation of such dates changes the quality of time. Constantly looking 
for possibilities for arbitrage and negotiation, a man recreates himself as a risk taking 
man of action and demonstrates the ease with which he can make money without gaje 
arduous work (cf. Stewart 1987;1997). Here taking risks successfully means being aware 
of one’s present options – from prices on the street to the knowledge of deals that other 
people have – and demonstrating one’s complete presence. By placing stress on the 
temporary nature of a lack of money, an experience of the changing fortunes of 
individuals, and the punctuating of temporality through heterogeneous deals-as-events, 
the narrative link between past and present exchanges is broken, bringing to the fore 
people’s “acute alertness in the present moment” (Zaloom 2006: 130).  
The punctuation of time through due dates opens space for further transgression 
and deals-as-events become active interventions in unfolding of future. Just as with 
changing the place of a settlement, transactions provide a change of position and 
possibilities. Additionally, deferred payments tie up the performances of others in time; 
through rapid debt-creating deals people re-tie, or enchain, each other’s behaviour. 
Wealth is constantly entangled in future dated obligations and each act of – of negotiation 
and of repayment – is interpreted as behaving as a Cigano. Knowledge of such behaviour 
is extended through discussions, constantly reinterpreted by others and becomes 
recursive.  At the same time, the existence of debts becomes a way of reinforcing and 
marking people’s continued performance as Calon moral persons. Borrowing, lending 
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and paying creates one’s reputation/credit as an objectification of such enchainment – of 
relations to other Calon – and of successful performance of Gypsyness.  
Men constantly think of what they would do with money received from others; 
they plan to lend large lumps to rich Calon; they complain when somebody brings money 
before an agreed date and tries to renegotiate the sum. But beyond individual plans, these 
exchanges also secure people’s behaviour in an unstable environment. It is not that 
deferred payments can prevent violent breakdowns, for instance: there is no direct 
continuity between exchange and violence, except in cases of unreturned dowry. Rather, 
it creates constant expectations from others and changing imagination of opportunities. 
By transposing performances onto future dates they extend Gypsyness in time and space 
– it is serves as a way to demonstrate commitment to a shared framework for evaluating 
behaviour. Violence, among affinal relatives, for instance, can occur when people are 
seen as failing to act properly, failing to “help”.   
Calon preserve their sense of a separate ethical framework guarding their 
economic transactions without feeling that asynchrony and rupture caused by dates-as-
events, by precisely defined dates of repayment, is a failure or a problem. In fact it is 
precisely this proliferation of dates-as-events, which refocuses on individual exchanges, 
that is important. Here, “living-for-the moment” is not an ideological abstraction separate 
from the transcendent durational time (e.g. Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart 1998), and 
in this way automatically opposed to implications of debt which rely on such temporality. 
Rather, I have tried to show that deferred payments, whether resulting from loans or 
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exchanges of material objects, by their focus on performance and negotiation – on acts of 
-- serve as “the technology of tempogany” 113, a way to extend a present moment.  
In this manner, the asynchrony brought about by awareness of the sheer 
multiplicity of deals between specific named individuals which are impossible to follow 
but which are constantly talked about, which do not add up, where the interest is not a 
rate and does not depend on the passage of time, where the living “make the future” 
separated from the dead whose debts are forgotten and names silenced, creates the feeling 
of living in a constant event-full present with the others who try to live as Calon. Because 
there are more deferred payments than actual money and debts are cancelled after death, 
a balance is never reached and it does not make up a totality; there is no equivalence. 
Deferred payments are directionless, criss-crossing any settlements of people recognizing 
each other as sharing Calon morality, in this way extending Gypsyness in time and space 
through retracing “gaps” within which fragile Gypsyness can constantly recreated. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Analysing the temporality of the present late-capitalist era Jane Guyer sees the evacuation 
of the middle run as related to the filling of the near-future with the dated time. This is 
especially evident in dynamics of debt management (Guyer 2006: 409-421).  According 
to this narrative punctuated temporality threatens any middle-term processes through 
constant rupture while breaking down coherent (social) wholes. In this chapter I have 
argued that the Calon preserve their sense of their separateness and a separate economic 
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morality without feeling that asynchrony and rupture that result from these dates-as-
events (Guyer 2006: 416) and associated with work of indebtedness (Han 2004: 169-187) 
represents a failure or a problem.  
They do this by denying that deferred payments create debts. Their focus is on 
trying to behave as Calon which allows the management of deferred payments to be 
embraced as arenas where Gypsyness is foregrounded.  They are Calon because they try 
to behave as such and are recognised by others for it: each debt-managing event becomes 
a sign of a man’s acute alertness to his surrounding, and a space to show capability to 
“make the future”. Men are evaluated according to their actions and while they create 
their own personal value, they also make money.  
In the following chapter I will look into how these dynamics connects to 
arbitrages with brasileiros, but it is already possible to indicate a few differences: Unlike 
in deals with brasileiros, even while lending large sums, there is no transfer of collateral 
among Calon. Calon are expected to return money without much ceremony, although 
they let everybody know that they came back to pay their debt. In contrast, when it comes 
to debts to brasileiros where one goes immediately in the morning to collect money, 
before a debtor could leave for work, seen as being too eager is almost a loss of face, sign 
of mistrust and possibly dependence. When a jurón does not pay on time, a Calon asks 
him to pay a monthly interest and the following month the debtor is expected pay off the 
principal plus another monthly interest. Among the Calon interest does not normally add 
up and debtors pay back the same sum later. Creditors are also expected to be more 
lenient and there is the option of renegotiating a debt, setting a new event; after all, Calon 
maintain the impression that rolos among them are fun and advantageous for both parties. 
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Calon try to turn juróns into long-term clients, by convincing them to keep the money 
borrowed and to pay only the interest. This option is not viable with other Calon – this 
would be living on their money. In summary, while with the Calon, the expectation of 
behaving as a Calon is manifested in acts of repayment, renegotiation and enchainment, 
with the brasileiros it is primarily a contract, a promise to repay. 
VIII. LENDING TO A JURÓN: HOW CALON MANAGE LOANS TO NON-
GYPSIES 
 
Introduction 
“The Ciganos do not work, but strike deals”114, Renato retorted. It was only my second 
week in Santaluz, and I had just asked Renato whether he had a lot of “work” (trabalho) 
that day. He was at least partly boasting in front of a gringo; in fact, during that period, 
people often answered my questions objectifying their practices, telling me about their 
“tradition” (tradição). But even later, I heard both the Gypsies and non-Gypsies make 
this distinction between work, trabalho, and deals from which Ciganos live -- negócios, 
berganhas, or rolos.  
There were slight differences, however, between what brasileiros and Calon 
meant when they said that “Gypsies do not work”: the non-Gypsies normally went on to 
explain Cigano lack of scruples when trading on the marketplace. On the other hand, 
when the Calon talked about their deals, they presented themselves as living, or rather 
“eating”, easily thanks to the money made “on the street” (na rua). In doing so they put 
forward the image of Calon men attuned to their surrounding. Men constantly discussed 
and commented on each other’s deals, and knowledge, rumours and assessment of the 
amounts of money people had “on the street” and what they did with it, also created a 
context to evaluate each other’s behaviour. So there are three levels to Renato’s response, 
all of which fit with observations made by other ethnographies of Gypsies (e.g. Okely 
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 “Os Ciganos não trabalham, mas fazem negócios.” 
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1983;Piasere 1985;Stewart 1997). It establishes the distinction between Ciganos and 
brasileiros and describes the ideal way of making money. But implicit within it is a 
commentary on the way this type of transaction relates to the exchanges which build 
Calon sociality.  
Reversals and subversions of the dominant ideology of work and labour, and 
preference for autonomy to wage employment, is one way Gypsies remain distinct and 
independent from non-Gypsies (see also Zatta and Piasere 1990: 163-172). Writing about 
English Travellers, Okely argued that “the Gypsies’ history is also the history of their 
refusal to be proletarised”, i.e. to rely on wage-labour for stable income (1983: 43). The 
preference for self-employment becomes a crucial boundary between gorgios (the non-
Gypsies) and the Travellers, although individual economic activities may differ at the 
level of exoticising or concealment of ethnic identity (Okely 1979: 17-34).  
In the case of the Hungarian Rom described by Stewart, their ideas about “work” 
were shaped by their interaction with peasants. Although at the time of his research they 
were fully employed in the factories of socialist Hungary, in their social philosophy they 
highlighted romani butji, Gypsy work. The concept, which covered a range of practices 
from scavenging to horse-trading, celebrated Gypsy cunning, intelligence and a capability 
of gaining wealth for nothing (Stewart 1997: 17-26). Although the discourse concealed 
the Rom economic marginalisation, the importance of women’s work and of the factory 
work itself, it allowed them to create an image of an abundant world where the relation 
with gaźe (the non-Gypsies) was redefined as exploitative, in which the Rom gained 
something for nothing. Stewart also suggests that money which is not gained in this way, 
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but in factories, has to be ‘ritually cleansed’, especially through gambling (Stewart 1994: 
45-62).  
Writing about the Slovensko Roma in Italy, Piasere agrees that becoming 
employed would threaten them with absorption into gaĝe (the non-Gypsies), but suggests 
that we look at the conjunction of exchange practices rather than ideology only (Piasere 
1985).115He argues that the cultural survival of the Roma in Italy is premised on 
endogamy and endo-cuisine, i.e. exchange of women and food among the Roma, and on 
what he calls “exo-ergie”, exchange of services with the gaĝe. Put simply, food and 
money can only be obtained from exchanges from gaĝe. Because the Roma live in the 
midst of the gaĝe and depend on them, they have to enter into exchange relationships 
with them. These range from predatory ones, where Roma give nothing for gaĝe goods, 
to those viewed positively by gaĝe, i.e. exchanging goods, services or labour for other 
goods. The latter comes to constitute what Piasere calls “capital gağicắno”, i.e. good 
relations with influential gaĝe, which are essential for the Roma to live in gaĝe territory 
(Piasere 1985: 143-146). This “capital” can be inherited, passed on, and also strengthened 
through institutions such as god-parenthood. In this way gaĝes become a part of the 
Roma world. They are the source of income while through exchange relationships with 
them space for the Roma reproduction is created. 
Renato’s comment above also makes a distinction with brasileiros and 
foregrounds the ideal relationship, where through one’s skills money flows one way. 
Moneylending to brasileiros is potentially the most ideal form of interacting 
economically with them, because nothing is really given by the Gypsies and money 
grows directly, even without intermediary objects such as animals (Stewart 1987: 284).  
                                                 
115
 I would like to thank Catalina Tesar for her help with French.  
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But beyond ideology, moneylending, the most common content of negócios, should be 
seen in terms of its pragmatic effects. Here the productive capacities of credit and debt 
organise people in time and space (Peebles 2010: 225-240).  
In previous chapters, I showed how ways of making money “on the street” served 
to forge Calon men, how household relations related to the money “on the street” and 
how through credit and debt among the Calon, people created morally informed spaces of 
interaction. This is what I had in mind when I talked about money as a double medium – 
as a medium of exchange as well as an environment for other actions. I do not wish to 
downplay the ideological contrast between trabalho and negócio: money “on the street” 
can serve as a medium-as-environment only because it is portrayed as distinct from 
money from the gaje arduous work or formal employment. But I want to stress that 
moneylending is not only an exploitation of opportunities, but also serves as a medium-
as-means through which the Calon create their world, a niche in which they can remain 
Calon. Moneylending is not only a way to make a living, but also a way of life.  
Turning outwards as it were, in this chapter I describe this niche from the point of 
view of credit providers; what Calon do and what they mean when they “make the 
future” (fazer futuro) “on the street” (na rua). To put it simply, rather than exploring 
Ciganos as moneylenders, as one credit institution among many, this chapter looks at 
how the Calon view their clients; how they decide who to lend to; how money lending is 
organised in terms of collateral, enforcement and dates of repayment; what is the 
conceptual apparatus behind it; and how all of this relates to Calon sociality. The chapter 
thus builds on observations made in the preceding chapters. The first section explores 
who the Ciganos’ clients are and how they view them. In the second section I turn to 
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analysing loans themselves and in the third I relate these to questions of Calon spatiality, 
households and kinship. 
 
8.1 “Ciganos Have Many People In Hand”  
Calon Clientele  
It was Tuesday afternoon, and Viviane, Romero, Paula holding her baby, Adriana 
and I were sitting in front of Eduardo’s house observing the street, chatting and 
drinking coffee. Since the morning, Eduardo had been playing cards in Bomfim 
about 15 kilometres away; Viviane was becoming nervous and called him several 
times to tell him not to come home late. Kiko, Paula’s husband, had gone at 
around noon to the neighbouring town of Parnamirim, to collect money. A few 
people stopped by or called asking about Eduardo.  
At about 4pm, Diego, a non-Gypsy middleman of this family, and Kiko 
arrived in a white Chevrolet with a non-Gypsy man in the back seat.  The car had 
originally belonged to the vice-mayor of Muritiba who had given it to Eduardo 
the previous year as collateral for a loan. The car had changed hands several times 
-- mostly as temporary collateral (garantia) since it was still being paid off; every 
now and then it appeared in Eduardo’s garage. This was the second time that 
Diego had this car.  
 As they got out of the car, Kiko handed a small piece of yellow paper to 
Diego: “Here you are, 3,5 litres of gasoline. It is from a man who owes me. You 
can fill the tank anywhere.”  
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Diego became upset that it was not enough for his driving Kiko around 
Parnamirim and, besides, the car ran on ethanol. 
 “You exchange it for alcohol,” said Kiko. “It is three litres... how much is 
the gasoline... 3, 24 ... it is almost 15,” he said, clearly exaggerating.  
Diego told him to stop fooling around. “Romero gave me 40 last month.”  
“And I paid 50,” countered Kiko.  
“But I am a family man,” pleaded Diego.  
“Me too,” answered Kiko.  
“But you only have one small son,” said Diego but Kiko only turned 
around, handed the yellow slip to Paula and went to a bar to play dominos. 
Meanwhile, Viviane had entered the house. The man, around 45 years old, 
who had not been greeted by anybody and was still standing behind the car, 
started telling Diego that he owed Viviane R$150 until the 4th, the day after 
tomorrow.  
When Viviane came out again Diego asked her: “How much will you give 
him for three monthly salaries? ... It is 420.”  
“443” corrected the man.  
While Viviane was considering it, Diego asked her where Eduardo was. 
“He went out,” answered Viviane.  
Diego murmured that he would wait for him, because he needed to talk to 
him.  
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“He will not come any time soon. You know how he is when he gets the 
money,” said Viviane and turning to the man she added, “I will give you 900 for 
three months. But the cheque [with his salary] is mine, understood?”  
Without a word Viviane, Diego and Romero entered the house. Standing 
there, the man started explaining to Paula, Adriana and me: “I would not borrow 
money, but the women took me to court.” He had three daughters with three 
women with whom he did not live anymore. The oldest daughter was already an 
adult, but because he was late in paying child support for the other two, the court 
had ordered him to pay R$250 and R$ 350. 
Viviane came out again, followed by Diego and Romero : “But you still 
owe me 50 on 100.”  
“That’s right. I was telling Diego that I owed you money,” said the man, 
“but my business is an honest one.”  
Viviane made the man reiterate that the R$150, which was due the day 
after tomorrow was unrelated to the current loan. “I will give you 600 for two 
months. And tomorrow you will come to pick 300 more for three months”.  
It took a while for the man to absorb what she was saying. Clearly, 
Viviane did not have all the money in the house and Eduardo was out playing 
cards. Diego asked the man if he wanted to wait for Eduardo. Viviane countered 
that she did not know when Eduardo would return, but that tomorrow Diego could 
come and pick up the remaining R$300 for three months.  
“This 600 is for two months,” she reiterated. There was a moment of 
silence.  
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“Mom, don’t you want to give him the money right away?” Romero 
offered to lend her his money.  
“Keep your money to yourself,” answered Viviane.  
The man decided to leave with Diego without borrowing, saying that 
Diego would come back tomorrow.  
 
The excerpt covers most of the topics that I will discuss in this chapter: 
organisation of moneylending within a family, management of debts and ways of 
calculating interest. But what interests me in this section is what it reveals about the kinds 
of clients to whom Calon lend money and how these clients view Ciganos.  
Seen from the Calon point of view, the client who Diego brings from Parnamirim 
is a good client– their middleman knows the man as they live in the same town; the man 
already has debt with the family; he has a stable income. He is forced to borrow, because 
he has to pay child support. If he does not pay, he runs the risk that the company he 
works for will be ordered by the court to deduct the money from his salary directly and 
he would not be able to do anything until his daughters grow up – at least that is what the 
man thought. And like most working-class Bahians living in the interior, who puzzle each 
week over how to make ends meet, and even to make a profit, the man felt it was better 
for him to be in control of his money.116Because Viviane is aware of this preference, she 
stresses several times, that the man’s monthly cheque “is hers”; she does not want him to 
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 “It is better to have money in the pocket” many commented. One small-scale non-Gypsy agiota, hung 
around each Saturday by the gates of one company since workers who had just finished their work and 
received their weekly cheques with their salaries, were often eager to exchange those for cash directly for a 
10 percent commission, rather than wait until Monday and go to the bank.  
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bring the cash, which would always create the possibility for him to try to renegotiate and 
rearrange the deal.  
The man represents one type of client, whom Kiko once described as 
“apressados” (literally, “in a hurry”). Some of the urban poor who cannot rely on farm 
produce – like Joana mentioned in Chapter 3 – are sometimes forced to exchange their 
bolsa família cards for cash with moneylenders, agiotas. Other people borrow to pay for 
emergencies: health-care costs, funerals and so on. These are good clients, because they 
do not have many options and generally accept the conditions, but the Calon I knew did 
not like these deals very much. These clients borrowed relatively small sums and the 
Calon pitied them – despite their pronouncements, if clients could not meet their 
obligations, Calon often reluctantly agreed to renegotiate the debt or even lower the 
interest.  
Besides such existential pressures, there were other reasons for borrowing from 
Ciganos. A decision could result from investment planning and navigating between 
financial institutions. There were entrepreneurs, peasants or caretakers of fazendeiros, 
who had cheques, animals or goods to use as collateral. Calon often called such 
transactions rolos, deals, rather than empréstimos, loans. They generally involved larger 
sums, longer periods of time and even the transfer of animals or land. Nonetheless, most 
clients in Santaluz came from the aspiring middle-classes, mostly teachers and other state 
employees, and retired people living on a contributory pension.117  
The makeup of the clients shows some continuity with their traditional trading 
partners (peasants, farmers) but also illustrates that the rise of the Cigano moneylending 
niche has to be understood within the context of the financialisation of daily life in the 
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Bahian interior. Here the expansion of official financial services combines with other 
developments such as currency stabilisation, increased minimum wage, welfare transfers, 
demand for consumer goods, and the increased demand for cash. Seen from this point of 
view, Ciganos are one of many credit institutions and fit alongside a range of institutions 
-- some of them traditional, others novel or directly encouraged by the state. Depending 
on their position, their interests and their needs, individuals navigate and manipulate 
various institutions.  
Another consequence of this monetisation is the changing nature of social 
relations, especially of political patronage. Recall that in the story above, Diego arrives in 
a car that Eduardo received two years before from the vice-mayor of the town of Muritiba 
as a payment on a loan he took out to finance his campaign. Kiko, who returns with 
Diego spends several days going to Parnamirim because his biggest debtor there, who 
owes him R$2000 in interest alone, avoids paying him. The problem was resolved only 
after the mayor of the town personally intervened and guaranteed that the debtor would 
repay the debt; otherwise Kiko would take his mules. Many of Kiko’s and Eduardo’s 
clients in Parnamirim were given jobs in the town hall after the election, which in turn 
made them more trustworthy as borrowers. On another occasion, a bank manager living 
in Santaluz explained to me that in Volta Redonda, “Ciganos were in the town hall every 
day”. Although an exaggeration, it was true that the local Calon strongman, Barão, had a 
good position there, because the mayor had borrowed from him to pay the salaries.  
Most rich Calon lend money to local politicians. This tendency has intensified, 
because due to the impact of monetisation, the candidates have to resort to short-term 
“clientelism” – buying votes with cash just before elections – and unlike in the past 
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cannot rely on a long-term relationship of patronage presented in the language of kinship 
(Ansell 2010: 283-294). And just like everybody else, politicians often resolved their 
varied financial obligations and responsibilities – the salaries of their clients, 
development work, their personal debts and instalment plans – through manoeuvring 
various sources of income – e.g. federal transfers (verba) and loans from agiotas.  
 
What Clients Think About Ciganos 
In the elections during my fieldwork, there were three serious contenders for the mayoral 
office in Santaluz. Two of them came from established families that had alternated in the 
mayoral office for decades. For the first time, however, there was a serious candidate 
nominated by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker’s Party, PT) benefiting from the 
popularity of President Lula. One day during the campaign, I was sitting with Kiko in a 
bar near Rua dos Ciganos playing dominoes, when a man from the neighbourhood came 
to our table. A PT activist himself, he accused Ciganos of wanting the candidates from 
the two families to win, because it was better for their moneylending business. But he, the 
man asserted, would vote for the PT candidate because he wanted “progress”.  
The biggest tensions were between the factions of the two main contenders; many 
people were hoping to find or keep their jobs at the town hall. One evening, after the 
rallies finished and people converged into the town centre, a large fight broke out 
between the two factions. Watching the commotion with me and Maluco, our common 
non-Gypsy friend said accusingly to Maluco that the “confusion was entirely your fault”. 
When Maluco asked him what he meant, the friend – a closeted supporter of PT – 
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explained that it was the fault of Ciganos, because “the candidates need to win in order to 
pay off their debt (dívidas) [to Ciganos].”  
As far as I know, the Calon in Santaluz had not lent any money to mayoral 
candidates that year. In fact, they had divergent opinions on whom to vote for, which they 
often discussed. At one point there was a flag of the PT hanging from a pole in the 
middle of the camp “down there” while the banner of another candidate hung from 
Eduardo’s house. Similarly, in a small town nearby Salvador, Calon complained of their 
alienation from politics. Politicians did not even come to ask for votes because they were 
afraid to be seen as “eating from the hand of Ciganos.”  
I would say that the influence of Ciganos on local politics is exaggerated. In the 
area, Ciganos were not the dominant agiotas and recall, that the Bradesco bank manager 
in Santaluz was fired for a loan to a brother of one of political candidates. But as the 
comment of the PT activist shows, there was a feeling that Ciganos were somehow 
profiting from the confusion; this builds on an established image of Ciganos as trickster-
figures. Similarly to mythical tricksters who subvert predatory relationships in a way that 
brings them gain without becoming a prey or a predator (Hyde 2008), Ciganos are seen 
as manipulating hierarchical relationships while seemingly escaping them. 
Consider the excerpt again. The man is pressured by the demands of the State 
(alimony) and he turns to Ciganos. Viviane offers to give the man R$900, which he 
would repay by giving her three monthly salary cheques, each worth R$443. But because 
Viviane does not have enough cash she suggests that she gives him R$600 today in 
exchange for two monthly cheques. Tomorrow, when Eduardo is at home, the man can 
come and pick up another R$300 and the loan will extend for another month. Her 
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reasoning is clear to all of us, but the man is utterly confused. He worries that there is a 
trick involved in the deal Viviane is proposing, but cannot figure out what it is. And when 
Viviane refuses to consider her son’s money – for reasons that have to do with how 
money is managed within a Calon family and thus external to this transaction – his 
suspicion is augmented and he decides not to borrow the money. Most Bahians consider 
Ciganos cold, single-mindedly money-loving, masters of artifice and potentially 
dangerous. This is not a mere image, but rather a Simmelian “social form”, with 
interactions marked by a level of historical continuity, despite the fact, that the “content” 
of interactions shifted from animal dealers to moneylenders (Simmel 1972).  
Facing this ambiguity, in some places in the interior people visit Ciganos after 
dark so nobody sees them118 and most people in Santaluz claimed that for them Ciganos 
were a credit source of the last resort.  But, as these things go, it is true only to a point 
and many people actually use Ciganos as just another source of money that could lead to 
profit. Money is not only borrowed from Ciganos when all else fails. I know of several 
cases when people went to banks to take a loan to pay Ciganos and the director of one 
financeira told me that they had people come along with the Ciganos they were to pay. 
Many know that as long as they have some property or a stable income, Ciganos do not 
ask for any collateral or paperwork. 
Thanks to the reputation Ciganos have, shopkeepers also hired them as debt 
collectors (cobrador). It was preferable to recover at least a portion of their money from 
those who bought fiado or on a promisory note, but failed to pay, than to pass their names 
to SPC or Serrasa – credit history agencies – and to lose the money anyway. In Santaluz 
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Ciganos as cobradores were marginal to non-Gypsy ones, collecting sums between R$30 
and R$600.119 These were mostly poorer Calon who collected for smaller shopkeepers 
and received around 20 percent commission. This way, José made about R$10 to R$15 a 
day. Since he had plenty of time, he sat around in front of people’s houses, waiting until 
they paid in full or in part, or arranged a payment plan. Most of the time people felt 
intimidated and shamed, although some threatened him with justiça (court) – in vain, as 
cobradores had lists of names or even notas promissórias tied to shops’ crediários.  
It is clear then, that people of varied social background borrowed money from 
Ciganos. Just like those of the non-Gypsy agiotas, Cigano loans were considered 
exploitative. Ciganos were seen as calculating and distant, not a part of “familial” 
relations of patronage, god-parenthood or affinity. This put Ciganos in an ambiguous 
position at the thresholds between “regimes of value”, between the “traditional” one and 
another where the State was the ultimate guarantee as well as the main origin of value (cf. 
Keane 2002: 65-90); of course, as I have argued in the introductory chapters the 
confusion is caused by the new distribution regime which redefined the sources and flow 
of wealth making the state more central.  In any case, Ciganos are seen as profiting from 
the confusion between various regimes. José felt, for instance, that the debtors could not 
complain to the police about him collecting the money in an informal arrangement with 
shopkeepers, because the state guaranteed the value of the promissory notes in 
transactions between the clients and shopkeepers.120 But hiring Ciganos as cobradores is 
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promissórias were standardized and defined by law in 1908. Paid harassers and debt collectors existed in 
the past as well. 
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also one way shopkeepers can sell fiado (on credit) to their “neighbours” (vizinhos) and 
“friends” (amigos), and to get their money, which they often need to meet other 
obligations – to their suppliers, for instance. Recall that Fernando, who could not borrow 
officially because his name was “dirty” with SPC, put up a poster announcing that he 
would sell the debts in his bar to Ciganos; he never planned to do this, although Kiko 
offered to do it for him.121  
But Calon are not immune from the slippage between “the regimes of value”. The 
separation from brasileiros has to be constantly recreated since the warmth, friendship 
and consideration that clients demand threaten to redefine the meaning of a loan, and 
therefore the capability of Calon to make money through the niche threshold. 
 
8.2 How Calon Manage Loans 
A Cigano vs. a Jurón 
Calon are aware of their image as Ciganos. It brings its advantages, for instance when 
collecting money. But it has to be carefully managed, as the following story shows. In it 
Eduardo reminds a young Calon, that he should be aware of how actions by Ciganos are 
seen.  
 
One day Eduardo and I were talking to old Augusto and his youngest son in his 
camp in Alto de Bela Vista, when a boy came looking for Augusto’ oldest son. 
The boy explained that his father, who was a director (gerente) of a farm, sent 
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him to tell Augusto’s oldest son to come and collect some animals, since the 
owner of the farm was away.  
Augusto told the boy to tell his father that tomorrow they would “send 
somebody” to pick up the animals.  
Probably because he felt he had to say something too, Augusto’ youngest 
son added: “Good. Tell your father that I will come for the animals tomorrow.” 
“No. Don’t go. Send somebody,” Eduardo, who had been quiet until then 
intervened and in part chibi explained to the young Calon that it was not good 
when non-Gypsies saw Ciganos as they went about collecting animals.  
“We will send somebody tomorrow,” Augusto dismissed the boy.  
 
Eduardo is concerned about how the non-Gypsies would interpret seeing Ciganos 
with animals taken from the farm; a picture the consequences of which Augusto’s 
youngest son, does not seem to grasp fully. Similarly to what happened during the 
aggressive mayoral campaign, they could be blamed for profiting from any adverse 
situation. Most people also saw Ciganos as only interested in money, and not to be 
trusted even when they were “friends”. But although such a distancing image certainly 
exists, to be successful as moneylenders, an image of “impersonal business” had to be 
constantly constructed by Calon (cf. Hart 2005) for the reason that in Bahia – as 
elsewhere to lesser or larger degree – loans have a tendency to turn to other types of 
reciprocities when they are only weakly supported by the state.122  
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 Graeber (2010: 119) describes patronage as a “slapdash of all three principles” – what he calls exchange, 
hierarchy and communism – that has to continuously be recast in the language of exchange (and debt). 
 315 
To illustrate the effort put into keeping the business “impersonal”, consider the 
story of a man who comes to borrow money from Eduardo to pay for health costs. 
Because Eduardo is not interested in lending a small sum to a relative stranger, Viviane 
offers to lend. But despite the man’s attempts, she is not interested in hearing his pleas, 
while Eduardo later blames her later for not squeezing the man more.  
 
Eduardo, Kiko, Romero and me were sitting in Eduardo’s house eating breakfast 
and planning the day ahead, when Viviane walked in from the garage and leaned 
on the table: “That sick man (aqeule homem doente), who wants to borrow is 
here”.  
“Tell him I don’t have any money,” replied Eduardo, smoking slowly and 
content with the game yesterday in which he won R$5000.  
Viviane was leaving when she turned around and said, “He wants 200, 
doesn’t he? I’ll lend him that”. She put her hand into her purse, taking it out very 
slowly, eyeing Eduardo.  
“We don’t even know where he lives”, Eduardo objected not too 
forcefully. After all, as Viviane’s hesitation revealed, he could have just 
commanded. 
“He is a pal of João, from the shop Preço Bom. And he says he lives on 
Rua da Lama,” answered Viviane, pointing towards the borders of the 
neighbourhood. 
“Call him in.” 
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Soon Viviane returned saying that the man was scared of their pit-bull 
running around the garage. The man would not enter for anything. 
“Give it to him for 30 percent” Eduardo told Viviane as she was leaving 
again; Kiko had already joined the man. A moment later Eduardo came too, and 
with a friendly air offered the man a chair to sit on.  
Viviane, who didn’t know how to write, handed a yellow promissory note 
to Kiko to fill in: “It will be for 300 for 30 days.”  
 “Cut off 20 Reais” pleaded the man.  
“Today is the 5th...”  
“Cut off 20” the man repeated. 
“What shall I put on the note?” asked Kiko.  
The man said his name. 
“And where will I find you?” enquired Eduardo. 
“Ask around for Rogério, the car mechanic. Everybody knows me there 
[on Rua da Lama],” and he asked Viviane to cut down R$20 again. He also 
repeated several times, that if he did not have to, he would not be borrowing the 
money, but he needed to go to a doctor with his son.  
Viviane responded that she would not give him money for free and added 
tersely: “I would not give you the money, even if you told me that you had a pain 
in your head.”  
But she discounted R$20 anyway. Later, Eduardo commented bitterly to 
Kiko so that Viviane, making lunch, would hear him, “Your mother does not want 
 317 
to earn more when she can. Whenever I earn a bit, I buy bread, when a bit more, I 
also buy butter, and when even more, I buy cheese.” 
 
The story highlights that the interaction between Calon and juróns is fraught with 
tensions of how to relate properly both to juróns and to other Calon. On the one hand, 
there is a constant danger of this exchange slipping into other reciprocities. When the 
man pleads with Viviane, she answers that she would not lend him money even if he told 
her that he had “pain in his head”. Although a stupid comment in hindsight, the message 
is quite clear – she is not his friend and has no responsibility for his well-being; nothing 
personal, just business (Hart 2005). Consider also the impression that man had walking 
into Eduardo’s and Viviane’s house: the huge house of the most renowned Cigano with a 
pit-bull running around. The ferocious-looking dog that Eduardo raised for dog-fights 
scared most people, Calon and brasileiros alike. Eduardo, like most Calon, cultivated his 
violent image and whenever he negotiated, he would switch between terseness of 
questioning and a friendly manner. In the case above he offers the man a chair, questions 
him, but otherwise just sits silently and smokes slowly as if supervising the transaction.  
There were other techniques of managing distance in interactions especially with 
new clients: whenever present, Calon supported one another in convincing a jurón that 
the deal was good. They also often switched to chibi among themselves thus shutting 
brasileiros off. At times, they called a client gajão/gajin, a term which brasileiros 
recognise as the one which Ciganos call the non-Gypsies. But even here Bahians would 
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try to invert the terms and in an effort for a joking familiarity and friendliness addressed 
individual Calon/Calin they recognised but did not know the name of as gajão/gajona.123 
Through creating the distance and managing their image, Calon try to create a 
proper clientele and their place in the world. This is not unrelated to a man’s life-cycle 
that as I described it in Chapter 5. As young men Calon often go out with their jurón 
friends and have jurin lovers. As they mature others encourage them to socialise with 
Calon more as a way to think about “the future”. This culminates in marriage and the 
founding of a new household, and intensification of exchanges with other Calon. To 
manage to establish oneself means finding a balance between personalism and 
impersonalism, by becoming a trusted but respected Cigano, through which one should 
gradually be able to make an easy living, in which money flows in one direction only and 
the Calon live without work.  
So the tension that the exchange between the man and Viviane highlighted is not 
only a question of making less money. There is always a danger that proper Calon 
sociality will be endangered. Although the money nominally belongs to Viviane – money 
that Eduardo gives her – she cannot go directly against his wishes. In fact, the man came 
the day before, but because Eduardo was playing cards, Viviane told the client to come 
back later. But her giving the man a discount threatened their capability to demonstrate 
their success “on the street” and especially their capacity to provide for their family and 
to host others. This is why Viviane’s failure to grab an opportunity to build more pressure 
on the client upset Eduardo, and why he talked about it in the idiom of food.  
 
                                                 
123
 See the Introduction. 
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Creating Clients 
Although clients often resorted to the language of trust, Calon knew that it was important 
to reinforce its character, and therefore its repayment, by other means.124Going back to 
the example above, Eduardo and Viviane know almost nothing about “that sick man”. In 
this transaction, the Calon rely on the promissory note, on knowing roughly who the 
client is, where to find him and on intimidation connected with their Cigano image. 
Without any previous relationship with the client Viviane feels justified in stressing their 
non-relation and defining the deal as “impersonal”. But for the same reason, Eduardo 
thinks that they could have squeezed the client more; such loans to relatively unknown 
people are usually small, on high interest and for one month, and the client might never 
borrow again.  
It always surprised me how little Calon knew about their clients and how little 
they cared to find out. They trusted their senses, and that sooner or later they would bump 
into a debtor on the square or in the marketplace. Of course, they did not always lend the 
money, and on a few occasions, when in doubt, they would ask other Calon about 
potential clients. Most of the time, however, they did not even know clients’ family 
status. Trust was enforced by other means: in most cases they took CCT or retirement 
cards as collateral; sometimes people pawned small objects.  
From the Calon point of view, the most reliable clients were those who were 
employed by the state or by a few large companies or who were receiving a contributory 
retirement; these were also their most common clients. These people had the option to 
borrow also through new credit institutions (financeiras, banks etc.), confirming James’ 
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 For a discussion of trust in “cracks of mass societies organised by states and markets” see (Hart 2000, 
Chapter 3). 
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observation that both official and illegal credit institutions rely equally on clients’ bank 
accounts and state guaranteed income (James 2012: 20-40). Calon would either have 
these clients fill in cheques beforehand or hand over their whole chequebooks or 
bankcards. In his bedroom, which stayed locked during the day, Eduardo had a plastic jar 
with a lid, in which he had cards with PIN numbers and chequebooks together with the 
promissory notes.125 
 All this notwithstanding, it was other kind of deals, which I would like to call 
“spectacular loans”, which excited them the most. Although money coming from the 
withheld cards of state employees brought more stable and secure income, it was in the 
“spectacular” loans that men showed their skills and created their reputations. Here, 
politicians, employers, self-employed, fazendeiros and so on, borrowed larger sums, 
usually against some kind of collateral (garantia). But although Eduardo sometimes 
ended up with a key to a small house, a new motorcycle in his garage, or a gun -- given 
either as a payment or a guarantee -- garantias served mostly to demonstrate solvency 
beforehand. These clients were also turned down most often, when they were unknown, 
the garantia too low, or a person did not have a reputation for being direto (honest). 
Thanks to the large sums these deals brought, the dates of their repayment influenced 
timing of social events, such as weddings or relocations, and generally led to periods of 
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 A press release reporting an imprisonment of a Cigano in Bahian sertão gives an idea of a type of 
collateral and objects pawned by his clients. I should note that the amounts are far from representative. 
According to the article the police evaluated his wealth at R$8 million, while an average Calon I knew, 
who lived above 500 kilometers away, had somewhere between R$20 and 75 thousand “on the street”.  
“In the house of a Cigano couple “Rogê” and “Zeza”, police found 43 watches – the majority of 
them Rolex –, necklaces, pendants, earrings, bracelets and other jewellery. Police also found ammunition in 
huge quantities, including of the restricted use, magazines for 9 mm pistols, a telescopic sight, holsters and 
dozens of cold steel weapons. In the building were also seized 331 cheques from various banks, 97 
promissory notes, 26 cheque halves and 21 chequebooks. In the quintal of the house there was a ring for 
cockfights and twenty cages with cockerels.  According to Commissar Antônio Carlos Santana, the 
volume of objects seized strongly suggests usury.”  
Preso cigano autor de quatro homicídios no interior da Bahia, Journal Classe A, 20.10.2010 
<http://www.classealem.com.br/index.php?opcao=1a&id=4619>, last accessed 13 February 2012. 
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intensive card playing. Nevertheless, it was precisely these types of clients that, in a 
similarly spectacular fashion, threatened to bring financial and social ruin to individual 
Calon.  
This ruin was in part caused by another tendency. In order to “establish” oneself 
one needs long-term clients; akin to Piasere’s “capital gağicắno” (1985: 143-146). These 
are not long-term clients, in a patronage sense, but reliable (direto) people who would 
come often to borrow larger sums of money.126 In reality they are often richer and more 
powerful than Calon lenders themselves; recall the betrayal Eduardo’s family expressed, 
when the judge “for whom Eduardo had done so much” refused to release Kiko.127 To 
such long-term clients, Calon would offer lower interest rates, for longer periods of time 
and even end up lending more than clients were willing or capable to return. 
One of the most common ways to create long-term clients was to collect only the 
interest and to dissuade them from borrowing from other Ciganos. When Kiko moved 
from Alto de Bela Vista to Muritiba, Eduardo advised him to hang onto a good client, 
who had borrowed R$1000 for R$1700 in two months and to collect only the interest. In 
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 For Ciganos, one-off small loans against monthly CCTs were not worth it, although as I have showed 
non-Gypsy agiotas made a living out of it. Note that the imprisoned Cigano in the previous footnote does 
not seem to have any such cards. On the other hand, Galeguinho, a non-Gypsy agiota in Amargosa, was 
said to have said 3000 cards (bolsa familia and bank cards) when imprisoned.  
There were two types of loans with CCT cards: Calon in Amargosa would sometimes “buy” a 
card. Say one receives R$128 per month. A Cigano would buy it for one year for 1000. Every month for 12 
months he would receive the full cash benefit before giving the card back. Here the risk was that at times, 
people blocked their cards. 
Galeguinho organised it differently. He would lend you only 100 per month with R$28 or more 
being the interest. Usually a person would fall short, and come to borrow money again. Once a month 
Galeguinho’s assistant together with a client would go to the bank and take out the whole sum. The 
assistant would collect the interest and keep the card, giving the client the rest (see Joana’s case Chapter 
IV).  
It is possible that visibility while withdrawing money from the state Caixa Economica or Banco 
do Brasil,  in combination with meagerness of sums and a preference for “deals” (rolos), where one could 
lose more easily, rather than “pawning” (penhora) of a card, made this a less desirable option for Ciganos. 
Some Calon told me that they felt pity for their poor clients and that is why they preferred not lending to 
them. Most would agree than lending below R$1000 was not worth it.   
127
 See Chapter 5. 
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this manner, during their lives men built a network of clients dispersed throughout their 
home ranges. Thanks to mobile phones, cars and cheques, retaining customers dispersed 
across their home ranges is even easier than in the past.  
Once he moved to Muritiba, Kiko also explained to me how he was going to build 
up his clientele. Those days he often walked down the street, sat around the square or at a 
local bar and everywhere he greeted people enthusiastically, making himself visible. 
“Next week, I am going to tell him [the bar owner], that ‘I am a Cigano and I have 
money to lend.” Apparently they always refused at first. “But they always come and 
borrow the next day. You will see, when you come next, this guy,” and he pointed at the 
bar-owner, “is going to owe me money.” Not all men succeed, and as I showed in 
Chapter 4, leaving a place because “there is no future”, is an acceptable reason for 
changing one’s settlement.  
In fact, the bar owner turned Kiko down, but within three weeks, he already had 
three clients in Muritiba worth R$4500 in total. Although he would receive individual 
payments at different times, Kiko explained that his “giro”128, as he sometimes called his 
money “on the street”, was R$21,200. The sum included the interest on loans, the bolsa 
família his wife received for their son and two other benefit cards totalling around 
R$600/month. These two cards he owned “for life” – he bought the bolsa família card a 
few years ago from his uncle and it will expire next year; the retirement benefit card Kiko 
received from his father who had bought from another Calon.  
 
 Table 8.1                                                            Kiko’s Debtors in August 2010  
                                                 
128
 Money in circulation or total commercial activity. 
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A Person  Amount 
Lent 
Place 
Jurón (managed by Diego, 
the middleman) 
R$1350 Parnamirim. Live in nearby Santaluz until August 2009.  
Cigano (Brother-in-Law) R$1450 Alto de Bela Vista. Lived there between March-July 2010. 
Cigano R$1300 Alto de Bela Vista 
Jurón R$1700 Alto de Bela Vista 
Jurón R$1400 Muritiba. Moved there in July 2010 
Jurón R$2500 Muritiba 
Cigano R$3900 Boa Vista. Between Muritiba and Santaluz. 
Cigano (Father) R$4000 Muritiba 
At home R$3000  
TOTAL R$20,600 4 localities 
 
When I had gotten to know him two years previously, most of Kiko’s deals were 
in Parnamirim, but because he had killed a man nearby, after he got out of prison he 
stopped going there. When he got out of prison he stayed for two years in Alto de Bela 
Vista with his wife’s affines and the overview above does not include about R$2500 in 
debts that Kiko has to various Calon there. “When you are smart, you can double you 
money in one year,” another man told me. In reality, however, the Calon sociality and 
contingencies that come with it, deflect them from any easy trajectory.   
 
“Running After The Money” 
Note that in the table above the two largest sums – both around R$4000 – were owed by 
other Calon. Although it is not readily apparent, young or poorer men, i.e. those with less 
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“strength” and who generally have only a few deals, prefer to lend larger sums or for a 
longer period of time to other Calon. They have good reasons for doing so: although 
loans to juróns bring larger profits, they also require more effort.  The following story 
illustrates both aspects well. 
 
One day in November 2010, I drove with Eduardo to meet Diego, his middleman. 
We met at a gas station in Santaluz. 
Diego walked towards Eduardo’s window and rather hastily handed him a 
wad of money. Apparently there was R$600 for Eduardo, Romero and Kiko, who 
was still in prison. Eduardo did not like that, so Diego took the money and passed 
R$100 to Romero on the back seat and explained the rest.   
As he was leaving, Eduardo told Diego to stop by at the house of a high-
school teacher, Kiko’s client. Incidentally, I remember visiting that teacher with 
Kiko before, in February 2009. She had borrowed R$500 at a monthly interest of 
R$150. That time she had already paid R$450 for accumulated interest once, and 
arranged with Kiko to pay another R$450 in April 2009, but without planning to 
pay off the principal.  
I had lost track of what happened in the meantime, so I decided to go with 
Diego. We stopped at the teacher’s house. When she came out and Diego told her 
that he had come to collect money she looked like she did not know what he was 
talking about. Diego told her that he was going to call Eduardo to confirm it. 
While he was trying to call Eduardo, he continued explaining to the teacher that 
Eduardo told him to stop by and collect Kiko’s money. The teacher finally said 
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that before Kiko was imprisoned she had agreed with him that she would pay 
everything in December. It was obvious to Diego and even to me, that she was 
lying, but we left.  
 
In the previous chapter I described how Calon men thought it a point of honour to 
pay the money to their Calon creditors without probing. With the jurón this was not 
automatically assumed and men had to “run after the money” (correr atrás do dinheiro). 
Men preferred to set due dates just after paydays and to come early in the morning of the 
due date before debtors could leave their houses; at ten they were often ready to play 
cards. Sometimes they had to return several times. Wanderlei once went four times by 
bus to a town about 50 kilometres away to collect a few hundred, without any success. At 
other times, it was almost comical to see, how poorer Calon couples searched for their 
clients up and down the town. 
Men, therefore, had to remember their dates and I was surprised when even in 
prison Kiko reminded his wife or his brother what debts were due. In addition, the deals 
with Calon always assumed a third party, other Calon. But unless deals with juróns were 
especially “spectacular”, the details were not generally known although people kept 
guessing and trying to find out. The only exception was the families. Wives, sons and 
fathers generally knew about each other’s deals and reminded each other’s clients of their 
dues when they met them. Sometimes, fathers and sons collected debts for each other. 
This was considered “help” and they did not share the profit or pay each other a 
commission. 
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Despite this, men often failed. Many clients, who were supposed to bring large 
profits, turned out to be atrapalhados or enrolados, avoiding paying for years or paying 
only in part. Blind Paulo had to concede to one R$300 loan being paid in instalments of 
R$20 – R$40 sums whenever the client had money. It took more than two years and the 
client never paid any interest. Making money was not as simple as Calon made it sound, 
and all Calon lost money to bad loans (tomar callote). I see one reason in their 
nonchalant attitude to information and a desire to create long-term clients, a technique 
which relied heavily on both trust and their violent image, especially when taking a bank-
card was not an option. In the example above, for a loan of R$500 the teacher had paid 
Kiko at least R$900 in interest in the 6 months I witnessed, and in 1,5 years she must 
have paid him much more. As soon as Kiko’s situation changed, however, she decided, 
although not very assertively, to deny her debt. For this same reason in the first vignette 
Viviane reiterated several times that the money the client was borrowing against his 
cheques, had nothing to do with the previous loan. Resisting payments, clients often 
decided to stop paying the interest, renegotiated the payment terms or outright refused to 
pay. Despite their notoriety, there was very little men could do about it. Relatively 
frequent burning of Calon settlements by mobs reminded them of their weak position. 
Consider Adair with whom I spent a few days in Alto de Bela Vista. He was 
extremely satisfied and confident. He had just killed a bull to celebrate his return from 
Bom Jesus da Lapa, a pilgrimage site in the Bahian interior. He had taken an oath 
(promessa) to go there every year and was convinced that this was the reason his 
economic situation was improving steadily every year. But a week later when I meet him 
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at a house of his brother, he was anxious about what to do about an invalid cheque from 
his client.  
 
Adair was quiet and left the food his sister-in-law put in front of him almost 
untouched. A man who owed him money had given him a cheque for R$8500 that 
had turned out to be worthless. Today he came to see the debtor, who, however, 
had gone to Feira de Santana to buy cattle.  
“It is missing one signature,” Adair explained when his brother suggested 
that maybe it was not valid. “I was in the bank and the manager told me that the 
man had money on his account, but one signature was missing. He [the manager] 
wrote a code 22 on the cheque, which means that it is missing the signature.”  
Because it was a company cheque, it apparently needed two signatures.  
Adair passed me the cheque. He also handed another one to me, worth R$ 
1000. It was dated for the 18th – ten days ago. “11” written on it meant that the 
cheque was “sem fundo”, without enough money on the account.  
“If I had to kill for every unpaid debt, I would have more than fifty crimes 
on my back (nas costas).” I looked at him puzzled. “Seriously”, he reiterated.   
“We should be more violent,” said his nephew who came with him, “so 
people fear us.” Nobody said anything. 
The whole afternoon, most of which we spent at the marketplace, Adair 
was distraught. “What will I do with it? How can I solve this?” he repeated over 
and over. “Every day I spend 50 just to come here to São Gabriel. I spend a lot of 
money.”  
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“If you don’t spend you won’t gain,” his brother tried to calm him down. 
“Yes,” agreed Adair, “but the due date (prazo) was Monday. I also came 
on Tuesday. Then I had to come back on Wednesday. Today is Thursday. And 
tomorrow Friday.” He tried to call the client, but his phone was out of range – he 
was still somewhere in the interior buying cattle. “What will I do now?” he 
continued in his lament.  
 
These were not trifling sums. In addition, as good deals increase one’s efficacy as 
Calon, bad ones can hamper one’s capability to meet their agreements towards other 
Calon. Often, men had to renegotiate their deals with each other because their jurón 
debtors did not pay. Large, spectacular deals sometimes threatened to totally ruin one’s 
efficacy as a Calon. Recall, that in the previous chapter I mention a situation when 
Nelson comments that Pancho was “dead” (morto). I explained that although Pancho 
used to have a lot of money he wasted it all in cards and bad deals. Sometimes he 
complained to me that people stole from him: one man owed him R$5000 and paid only 
R$1000. Another owed him R$18.000 for which he gave him an old VW van that Pancho 
sold for R$3000. He said he accepted that because it was better than loosing everything. 
One of the clients also threatened to take Pancho to court since usury is illegal, although I 
never heard about it happening. In any case, through such deals Pancho became “dead”, a 
person untrustworthy to lend to in the eyes of others. More distressingly for him and his 
wife, his older daughter reached a marriageable age, but without money to pay for the 
dowry and wedding costs, she had little prospect of finding a rich groom.  
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To summarise, although Ciganos built on their image as ruthless tricksters they 
had to constantly work hard to keep their business “impersonal” and to prevent loans 
turning into other forms of relationships. There were two types of customers: on the one 
hand, there were those with a guaranteed income, either in the form of CCT, retirement 
pensions or stable employment, who borrowed small sums on 30 percent interest, usually 
for consumption. But what I called “spectacular deals” were more desirable from the 
point of view of the Calon – they brought large single sums and reputation (cf. Stewart 
1994: 45-62;Pine 2002: 75-97). But because they depended on trust and a violent image, 
they could also bring ruin. Throughout their lives and changing of settlements, men built 
a network of customers across the home-range region, where their relatives and known 
Calon lived. Before concluding, I will look at how Calon sociality fits this dynamic. 
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Picture 8.1        Women watching silently 
 
8.3 Loans to juróns and Calon sociality 
Husbands and Wives 
Just like most of the thesis, the majority of stories in this chapter concern the family of 
Eduardo and Viviane, and take place in their house. On the one hand, as I described in the 
Introduction I know them the best. On the other, I believe that these stories illustrate a 
larger point I that make in this chapter. They show that in exchanges with juróns, 
cooperation within the household and between Calon plays an important role. Although 
in deals between two Calon men, households were pushed into the background and third 
parties were criticised for interfering, loans to juróns followed a different logic.  
Consider another morning in the house of Eduardo and Viviane. A man comes to 
borrow money and Eduardo refuses to lend it to him. If he were a Calon this would be the 
end of it, although Eduardo would offer him food to eat. But after some discussion, in 
which Viviane and Kiko unsuccessfully try to change Eduardo’s mind, Kiko decides to 
lend to  man himself.   
  
We were sitting in the quintal of Eduardo’s house, attending to fighting cockerels 
when a man, who I knew as a town councillor, walked in. Eduardo called him into 
the kitchen. When they came out a few minutes later, Eduardo was visibly angry: 
“I will go and ask him if he still wants to cheat me (enrolar),” he commented and 
stormed out of the house. We followed him to the gate trying to see better what 
would happen, but without a word he left in his car followed by the councillor. 
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While he was gone an unknown man appeared. He was about 65, bald, 
thin and well dressed. He explained that a clerk at Bradesco bank recommended 
that he borrow money from Eduardo. Viviane told him to wait and that her 
husband would come back soon; Kiko offered some coffee. For about fifteen 
minutes he sat quietly behind us by the wall, while we ate by the table in the 
middle.  
When Eduardo finally returned he was not pleased to see somebody in his 
house. Viviane explained that the man had come to borrow money, only R$200. 
Eduardo turned to the man asking him whether he came to borrow money – he 
had to speak up as the man was slightly deaf. 
The man started to explain that he lived in Retiro, a small town about 15 
kilometres away, on such and such street, that he owned a house; that he was 
retired, used to live in Salvador, but because he came from Retiro he had moved 
back. He started dropping names of the people that they could both know and said 
that he came only because Elena in Bradesco told him, that “I should go to 
Eduardo Cigano, that he will lend me money”. 
Eduardo did not seem interested and he was still angry because of the deal 
that councillor had arranged. He was cold, but not rude: “I will be straight with 
you. I don’t know you at all, I have never seen your house…. Do you have 
cheques?” 
The man clearly wanted to borrow and it seemed to be his first experience 
with a moneylender. Stressed out and intimidated he started to show not only a 
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Bradesco chequebook, but also his various cards explaining that he was retired 
and every month he received a retirement benefit.   
Eduardo cut him short: “But o senhor knows that it will be 200 for 400.” 
The man stared in incomprehension, stammered that he did not know, that it was 
too much. He turned to leave. 
Loudly enough so that Eduardo – but not the man – would hear him, Kiko 
remarked critically to Viviane that it had been clear from the beginning that 
Eduardo did not want to lend to the man. Viviane turned to her husband: “Lend 
him the money; you can see he is direto.”  
“But it is caden (money in Romani)” snapped Eduardo and started putting 
farinha into the bowl of beans which Viviane had handed to him. For a while both 
Kiko and Viviane tried to convince him to lend to the man, but Eduardo was 
adamant. 
The man was already in the garage, leaving the house, when Kiko stopped 
him that he would lend the money to him: “200 for 300, can be?” The man 
agreed.  
“If he does not pay I am going to cut his ear off,” murmured Eduardo 
eating.  
Kiko was telling the man what to put down on a cheque to be cashed in 
one month’s time while Viviane got R$200 from the inside of the house. 
 
In this episode both a wife and a son try to convince a Calon to change his mind. 
They challenge his opinion. It is obvious that the client is honest, and is willing to 
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exhchange pre-dated cheques for urgent cash. The rate is standard for small loans: what 
the Calon call “thirty percent” – 100 for 150, 200 for 300, etc. – for “thirty days”. At the 
end in a rather direct challenge to his father’s opinion, Kiko decides to lend the money.  
The first thing to notice is that Viviane gets involved in the transaction – in 
talking to the man, in trying to convince her husband. Admitedly, Viviane was more 
involved in Eduardo’s deals than other women in the region; his relatives complained that 
he did only what she wanted. This is more a matter of degree, however. Everybody in 
town knew Eduardo and where to find him. As a consequence most of his deals were 
conducted at home in Viviane’s presence. In Santaluz, apart from Djalma, the strongman, 
who would be visited in the camp, most men hung around the market place, making 
themselves visible or looked for clients while their wives remained at home. 
Nevertheless, when collecting their debts, especially from atrapalhado (difficult) clients, 
they turned to their wives for help. I often met Calon couples and even women alone 
looking for their non-Gypsy debtors. Admittedly, most rich men or those negotiating 
more “spectacular” deals drive with their sons or brothers, but, although they would not 
easily admit it, whenever their wives were present, which would happen when deals were 
concluded at home, they would get involved.  
One day, teaching me what it means for a Calon to be esperto, Maluco told me the 
following story which illustrates the point:  
 
‘A Cigano once went swimming into the sea apparently without realising that in 
his shorts’ pocket he still had a nota promissória worth R$25.000 due the next 
day. When he got out the nota totally fell appart in his hands. Fearing that without 
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it he might never get his money, he came up with a plan. When the client called, 
the Cigano told him that although he was not at home, the client was to come and 
to give R$20.000 to his wife.  He promised that later that week the client could 
give him the remaining R$5000 in exchange for the the nota. While the Cigano 
was hiding, the client did exactly as told. When the Cigano later showed him the 
scraps, he accepted that it was his nota and handed over the remaing sum.’  
 
The moral of the story is clear: a loans to a jurón has to be carefully managed, 
since the two parties are adversaries. Underlying the resolution of this specific dilemma 
lies a household unit which acts with one single interest. This supports what I described 
before, namely, that although a man is the one who is responsible for finding the deals 
“on the street” among brasileiros, he always does so with the household in mind. 
Therefore, wives can support their husbands in deals with brasileiros.  
Some women are known for their magical skills and are hired by other Calon for 
their services especially in relation to marriages – to split a boy from his jurin or to bless 
a girl so she marries well. Recall the case of the fridge transaction described in the 
previous chapter.  After Kiko had sold it to Pinto, Pinto sold it to a jurón. The jurón came 
the same afternoon to demand that Kiko gave him the shop’s receipt (nota fiscal), 
because the fridge was not working properly and he wanted to return it to the shop. He 
claimed that he made such a bad deal because Pinto’s mother, who helped arrange the 
deal, had put a spell on him (“a Cigana me rezou”). Several young Calon men who 
listened to the story were amused by what the man was saying. To me it seemed a perfect 
example of a female staging of Gypsyness, manipulating the gaje image of herself. I 
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knew these things myself – the way Iracema stared intensely into my eyes, when she was 
confirming with me that I indeed planned to sell a phone to her husband. But this is only 
a part of the story. When a few weeks later, I mentioned to Pinto how funny it was that 
the jurón had thought his mother had put a spell on him, he turned to me with a serious 
air, “But she did put a spell on him.” This might also explain why the women should not 
talk during and comment openly upon negotiations between the Calon. On the one hand, 
abstention from talking with an unrelated Calon shows her shame (vergonha). On the 
other, men are also ambiguous about women’s efficacy. 
 
A Moneylender Among Other Ciganos 
Normally men struck deals alone, outside their households, “on the street”, or during their 
travels with their sons or brothers. In some cases, however, their wives’ seduction, 
powers of persuasion or even magic could also be mobilised. Men also guarded hid the 
identity of their clients, and the nature of deals from other Calon. Others would learn 
about them only if present by chance or from other people. When asked directly, which 
they seldom were, they always exagerated or downplayed the amount. When questioned 
about their clients’ identity they always responded that it was a “a jurón on the street” (“o 
jurón la na rua”), in town X., and so on. Clearly, this adds to the mystique of a man of 
action making easy living “on the street”.  
I was also sometimes told that a man cannot take another’s client, but there were 
juróns who borrowed from several Calon. Men living in the same settlement also asked 
each other about specific juróns, and whenever one was dealing with a client, other 
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Ciganos supported him. But people also complained about localities where there were too 
many Ciganos.  
One exception to this secretiveness and individualism are the man’s sons. From 
an early age they accompany the man on his business rounds –most cars would have a 
father with one or two sons. Consider again the example above. Viviane recognises a 
good client, but she cannot convince her obstinate husband. As it became clear that 
Eduardo does not want to lend to the man, she supports her stepson in making the deal. 
Importantly, however, Eduardo also murmures his willingness to back Kiko up if the man 
turns out to be dishonest. On other occasions, Eduardo accompanied Kiko when a client 
turned out to be atrapalhado; they sometimes lent money together or collected money for 
each other. Eduardo even passed some clients to Kiko. One always had to remember 
whose client a person was, though – Kiko could not just take over Eduardo’s clients and 
they could only advise, never force each other. And as I already discussed, after a Calon 
man dies his sons inherit his debtors (cf. Piasere 1985).  
It is important to take into consideration relations to other Calon. In chapter 4 I 
described how after fleeing Santaluz, Eduardo and Viviane changed places several times, 
until they ended up in a house in Muritiba. Once there, they started constructing a house 
on the house’s large plot for Romero, who was about to marry Luiza.129 Kiko was not 
living with them, since after being releseased from prison, he moved to Alto de Bela 
Vista with Paula’s family. They lived there until he got into conflict with his in-laws, 
when they also moved to Muritiba. But, the father and the son had different ideas about 
inviting their relatives to join them. 
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 See Chapter 5 
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Eduardo was excited about Muritiba – in the town of about 14.000 there weren’t 
any Ciganos. When I asked him, whether he was planning to invite his relatives, 
who used to live on his plot in São Gabriel because he had invited them, he 
winked at me, “Am I going to bring my competition here?”  
A few weeks later Kiko got into a conflict  with his in-laws and Eduardo 
came to pick him and Paula up. Driving them to Muritiba, Eduardo was 
explaining to his son, that it would surely be better than Alto de Bela Vista. There 
were no Ciganos, and the biggest non-Gypsy moneylender had been imprisoned 
(not for usury). Also, only a month after they had moved in, people already 
learned about the Ciganos and came to borrow money and a local corretor 
(intermediary) offered 10 percent interest on a loan. As if to prove his point, the 
next day, he gave a retirement benefit card to Kiko with the steady monthly 
income.  
After a few days, Kiko agreed that Muritiba could be a good place to live. 
However, because of continuing tensions with his father and stepmother, he tried 
to improve his position by having at least some of his cousins live alongside them. 
Whenever he met them, he tried to convince them to move to Muritiba, using the 
same arguments as his father had used with him before. When I asked him 
whether he was not worried about their competition, he exclaimed that they were 
“afraid to lend to brasileiros” and only lent to Ciganos.  
 
Although there was no fixed rule, if a town was as small as Muritiba and dominated by 
another Calon, unrelated Calon were hesitant to move into it; especially when the latter 
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had several supporters around him. Even when a man came and stayed in his relative’s 
settlement for a short period of time, he would settle in the camp only when invited by 
others. Afterwards, through proliferation of deals among the people living in close to 
each other new “morally informed spaced of interaction” emerged.130 Hence Kiko and 
Paula argued that the conflict between them, on one side, and her relatives, on the other, 
was a culmination of her family’s “turning their backs” on the couple although they 
needed them: her family did not “help” them or invite Kiko to join them in deals. 
Eduardo, on the other hand, clearly praised the opportunities in Muritiba and, as if to 
prove how this also connected to him being there, on the first day he gave Kiko the 
retirement benefit card he had bough from another Calon.  
Like most men, Eduardo is trying to dominate a small town and to be recognised 
as the Cigano by its brasileiros. Santaluz where he used to be the Cigano until he fled, 
and where he still has most customers, is only 25 minutes by car. Parnamirim is only 
about 30 minutes. He feels that he has a good reputation there too; his deals are managed 
mostly by his middleman, Diego, and there are no Ciganos there either. I also learned 
over the years, that Eduardo was not like most men. Most men in his position tried to 
become strong-men, surrounding themselves with a few supporters. Eduardo was too sly 
for this, did not want to live too close to other Calon (apart from his sons) and was 
extremely secretive about his deals.  
In other words, although Eduardo has built a good reputation among brasileiros, 
he was unwilling to transform it to força among Calon. But he could not totally escape 
his obligations if he wanted to remain Calon. Last time I saw him, he lived in Bomfim 
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surrounded by his relatives, who had moved to a plot that he had bought, although they 
complained that he was tight-fisted. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Calon like to image themselves as able to “eat” through their wits and complete presence 
materialised in negócios with brasileiros. Ideally, it should be an asymmetrical type of 
exchange where question of commensurability with brasileiros does not arise – the only 
consideration is for their prestige among Calon. But to be able to do this successfully they 
need to establish themselves not only within the heterogeneous Calon social space, but 
also to gain a reputation among brasileiros. Money-lending thus not only brings a 
monetary gain, but reorders the social space whereby loans to brasileiros are 
incorporated into Calon sociality. As I have argued in Chapter 6, capability to “make the 
future” “on the street” and prestige brought by the visibility of wealth are tools to claim 
Calon masculinity. In addition, one’s name among brasileiros – how well one is 
connected to important people in the locality, how useful one’s name is for backing up 
claims with brasileiros – is the distinguishing marks of one’s strength, força. For 
instance, Eduardo once worried, that an unrelated Calon who was thinking about moving 
to Parnamirim, a small town in that Eduardo almost had a monopoly as a Cigano, would 
claim to be Eduardo’s cousin and ruin his good name. 
To be recognised as the Cigano in a small town thus requires a careful balance of 
closeness and distance. A Calon man constantly strives to keep his business impersonal 
and to thwart any attempt of juróns to divert loans from their paths and to convert them 
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into other types of reciprocities. Simultaneously, he competes with other Calon in 
building up a stable clientele that prefers him to others. This brings men not only to 
conflict with demands of their relatives, but also threatens with too much dependence on 
juróns – if a client refuses to pay there is very little one can do about it apart from 
threatening with physical violence, which is most often an option only in theory. In 
reality, during their lives even the most successful Calon are often forced to give up on 
loans they make.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Neo-liberal Moment  
“The Time of the Gypsies”, in the title of Stewart’s ethnography of the Rom in Hungary 
(1997), refers to the capability of these Rom to create temporal and geographical “gaps” 
(Williams 2003) of Gypsyness in the midst of non-Gypsies, through, for instance, 
spending (sharing) money made on the market-place on communal merry-making. But 
viewed from another angle, the expression also denotes the last period of the socialist 
regime in Hungary, when many people became convinced that nothing could be attained 
through adhering to official procedures, and that their social reproduction increasingly 
depended on who they knew and even on income gained outside their formal 
employment; on behaving, as they saw it, like Gypsies. Reflecting somewhat similar 
concerns about the nature of the system, in the early 1980s activists of the Solidarity 
movement attacked Gypsies in Poland (Kaminski 1987: 324ft.2). These activists were the 
unionised urban skilled workers who in the 1980s saw their economic situation 
deteriorating, especially in relative terms – in status – when compared with auxiliary 
workers and those not in heavy-industries – peasants coming from villages, market 
traders from border areas or Gypsies – all of whom were able to supplement their income 
and even gain alternative strong currencies through migrant work, smuggling or selling 
farm produce on the market place (e.g. Pine 2002: 75-97).  
These two examples illustrate how Gypsies became the target of popular 
resentment during the historical moment when the state project based on impersonal 
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bureaucracy and the promise of stable and sufficient formal employment on which social 
reproduction was based, was coming to an end in Central Europe (cf. Hart 2000). Thus, 
idioms of “Gypsyness” not only reflect inter-ethnic relations, but are also commentaries 
on the character of the state, its promises and its insertion into people’s lives. Even today, 
following the structural adjustment of the 1990s, it is impossible to talk about Gypsies in 
Central Europe without evoking to the nation-state (e.g. accusations of abusing welfare 
without contributing to its costs or the demographic take-over of states).  
Seen from this point of view, the Brazilian situation presents a contrasting case 
but one that points to a similar general logic. Here novel modes of insertion of the state 
into the economic lives of its citizens have also led to a new role for Ciganos and novel 
popular views of them. Traditionally, during most of the twentieth century, apart from the 
“aristocracy of labour” and the middle classes, the majority of people in Bahia survived 
within the informal sector. In addition, again perhaps with the exception of the urban 
middle classes, most people saw the world as dominated by personalised ties, networks 
and non-transferable trust. In any interaction, people were expected to promote the 
interests of their família, which included one’s patronage clients (DaMatta 1987: 115-
136). Related to this, the famous “Brazilian dilemma” has been identified as the demand 
for the impersonal state in general, but the expectation of personalised treatment in one’s 
own specific case (DaMatta 1997b).  
Certainly, it could also be argued that the “Brazilian dilemma” is nothing but a 
transformation of Brazilian cultural ideas about paradise and future promise, and about 
the seductive, but opaque, world of appearances (Pina Cabral 2007: 477-525). In the 
economic sphere, the idiom also attests to the subaltern incorporation of Brazil in the 
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world system, where until recently the state was unable to control the flow and the value 
of money and secure formality (Sansi-Roca, forthcoming in 2013). On the other hand, the 
fact that the “dilemma” was often retold in relation to the modern state and its failings 
(e.g. DaMatta 1982: 11-44) and that Brazilians increasingly experience corruption as a 
problem, is a corollary to the expanding role of the state in everyday life; put bluntly, 
there is more space for bribes. Counter-intuitively, this can be seen as the testimony to 
the success and even internalisation of the idea of the impersonal state (cf. Parry 2000: 
27-55). Today, for instance, the growing number of “the middle class C” and the poor, 
who have profited from the new “distributional regime” which has recognisably neo-
liberal characteristics (e.g. Ferguson 2007: 71-86;James 2011), petition the state for 
improved services directly. Although in the post-structural adjustment era, the new 
controlling state has given up some of its previous tasks, such as promoting formal 
employment, it also increasingly directs the flow of wealth, through provision and 
regulation of credit and welfare, and serves as the ultimate arbiter of value – particularly 
in the form of stabilised currency. In other words, new material links between the state 
and the people are redefining the nature of citizenship, and this is also changing the 
position of Ciganos in Bahia. 
As I argued in the first chapter, traditionally, because of the way social order in 
Brazil was conceptualised, Ciganos fit only as marginal figures in established 
“patriarchal relations”(Freyre 1951: 790). The non-Gypsy Bahians saw Ciganos as 
somewhat sly traders, petty thieves and fortune-tellers, but essentially localised trickster-
figures, fitting alongside other trickster characters such as malandros (Candido 1993;see 
also Pina Cabral 2007: 477-525). Ciganos relied on powerful people for places to camp, 
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and although at times authorities included them alongside other segments of the people – 
o povo -- deemed problematic, Ciganos remained peripheral to most discussions about 
the character of the state.131 In fact, the lack of academic interest in Ciganos between the 
late 1930s and the early 1980s coincided with their general invisibility when, in 
comparison with earlier and later periods, only a small number of newspaper articles 
appeared and when there were no policies or policy plans regarding Ciganos either at the 
Federal or state levels.  
Broader developments, following the structural adjustment of the 1980s, have 
been paralleled with a change in Cigano ways of making a living. In the era after 
structural adjustment the state became more directly involved in the financial life of 
citizens in small town Bahia, as both the main arbiter of value and the origin of wealth. 
Stable currency, increased minimum wage, micro-credit to farmers, conditional cash 
transfers to families, the extension of credit for consumption through state banks and the 
stimulation of non-state credit providers, increased the role of state-money in daily life in 
daily life in Bahia and led to the proliferation of official financial institutions, the process 
I called financialisation. Thanks to the flow of state-money through these institutions, the 
state became the ultimate source of value and challenged the traditional older regimes of 
value (cf. Keane 2002: 65-90). In fact, part of the reasoning behind programmes such as 
Fome Zero, a showcase for Lula’s government’s new social policies, was to  undermine  
patronage  and  to  reorder  the vertical  intimacy that went along with it into  a  
horizontal association of free persons (Ansell 2007). The project aimed to replace 
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satirical magazine A Cigana (“A Gypsy woman”) came out in Recife. Here the Cigana symbolised freedom 
(Teixeira 2007: 106). 
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regimes of value and  social  hierarchies associated with debt through which familial and 
social links used to be reproduced over time (e.g. Roitman 2005: 95),  with  a  neoliberal  
relatedness whereby  the  state  became the  initiator  of  value-generative  welfare  
through  creating  “market  peasants”. Similarly, while local clientelism was the main 
problem in the earliest stages of bolsa família, a conditional family benefit, through 
increased formalisation the state established a direct link between itself and the 
beneficiaries; critics also point out that bolsa família is a retreat from traditional welfare 
and the commitment to fight inequality and that through a system of direct hand-outs it 
dilutes the mobilising potential among the poor (Hall 2006: 689-709;but see also Gledhill 
and Hita 2009). Legitimised as a source of “financial democracy”, loans from a 
burgeoning number of official sources – financeiras, banks, shops – are backed up by 
state regulation and agencies evaluating personal credit.  
Individuals belonging to the lower middle classes, who have felt especially 
mobile in the past ten years and who have profited from increased public employment, 
from the creation crédito consignado primarily from state banks and from availability of 
consumption credit from department stores, often cannot meet their financial obligations. 
Since the money is discounted directly from their accounts, debts cannot be redefined as 
fiado or turned into other forms of (personalised) reciprocities, such as patronage or 
friendship. Faced with their obligations, people have no option but to turn to informal 
moneylenders, agiotas, using their salaries as collateral. In the same vein, poorer people 
often sell their bolsa família to agiotas for a certain period, to gain access to larger lump 
sums of money. And in the monetised environment, politicians need to borrow money to 
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“buy votes” as they cannot rely on long-term reciprocities any longer. As I showed, 
however, people do not use moneylenders only under pressure. 
In other words, the insertion of the state unsettled established forms of economic 
redistribution and integration and traditional regimes of value. This unsettling opened a 
space for monetary gain through the diversion of flows of wealth, in a way that raises 
questions about the legitimacy of wealth. In the case of Ciganos these doubts can be seen 
as novel elaborations of Bahian ideas about the artifice and capacities to challenge 
established hierarchies that are traditionally associated with Ciganos. The statement made 
by the activist (militante) of the Workers Party (PT) that I mentioned in the last chapter 
illustrates both shifts.  
One evening during the election campaign, after comícios, rallies of the three 
candidates for the mayor, the PT activist told a Calon friend of mine, that unlike the 
Ciganos, he wanted the PT candidate to win, because he wanted progress. There are 
several things going on in this statement: The PT candidate was, due to her party 
membership, associated with the popular president Lula, who was increasingly being 
seen as the guarantor and the personalisation of economic growth and of progress. For the 
activist, the success of Lula’s presidency at the national level was to trickle down to the 
local level if the PT candidate won. As for many people in Santaluz, for him the other 
two mayoral candidates, who came from two families that had alternated in the mayoral 
office for decades, were associated with backwardness and traditional patronage. But this 
was not a transparent contest, and people felt unclear about who would actually profit 
from the victory of any of the two traditional candidates. Like many people in Santaluz, 
the activist suspected that the money that these spent on their campaigns was borrowed 
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from Ciganos. Echoing popular visions of how flows from the state can be diverted and 
of an increasingly problematic source of strength behind the traditional candidates, 
namely Ciganos, the activist implied that Ciganos were the ultimate winners in, and 
cheerleaders for, the continued lack of progress. Paradoxically, pointing to the emerging 
hegemony, the only entity which now seems to be able to resolve these tensions is the 
state itself, a change described by the activist as “progress”.  For instance, in a story by a 
leftist politician-writer Euclides Neto Os Ciganos (2006: 65-78), Ciganos gain influence 
in the town hall through lending money to politicians, until their take-over is annulled by 
the Supreme Court.  
All this makes evident, that although there is some continuity building on the 
perception of Ciganos as tricksters, the new distributional regime has also resulted in new 
fault lines. We can also see glimpses of possible future developments. The inclusion of 
the state in the definition of proper forms of economic behaviour and forms of 
relatedness, the new material links between citizens and the state, could in the long-run 
engender the redefinition of Ciganos whereby rather than customary tricksters Ciganos 
will be increasingly perceived as strangers (cf. Bauman 1990: 143-169). Ironically, the 
logic of the current incarnation of Brazilian multiculturalism, by creating a discursive gap 
between “traditional” and “present-day” practices, will feed into this development. In this 
state-led project, Cigano culture is being objectified as “traditional” heritage, seen as 
rituals and symbols to be represented, owned and protected from the impact of the 
inevitable progress. At the same time, since the “traditional” past as a whole is gone, by 
definition, individuals can represent this heritage in the present only in fragments. The 
 348 
recognitions thus marks the “loss” and simultaneously opens space to question 
individuals’ authenticity (Povinelli 2002).  
 
An Economic Niche 
 
Here lies the source of ambiguity behind current popular views of Cigano moneylenders: 
While navigating their “dense financial lives” (Abramovay 2004: 21-67), people rely on 
Ciganos or other informal sources of credit that have recently proliferated alongside the 
formal institutions and have accompanied the process of financialisation of daily life. 
Moneylenders are a part of the current distributional regime. Both official and unofficial 
credit institutions tap into people’s bank accounts (the existence and functioning of which 
was stimulated by the state in the first place) or into the flows of money that are at least 
partially formalised (James 2012: 20-40). What is seen as Cigano trickery then, is not 
located at the threshold between “order” and “disorder”, as a classical reading of 
Brazilian tricksters would have it (Candido 1993), but is produced out of the system 
itself, which, characterised by an ever-increasing field of state intervention, regulation 
and formalisation, is redefining wealth flows and forms, while unsettling traditional 
regimes of value (e.g. a family name) and distribution (e.g. fiado) (cf. Roitman 2005). 
And when faced with nonnegotiable and non-optative obligations backed up by the state 
(in the form of court-ordered alimonies, crédito consignado and so on), and when in 
return for a loan, people give Ciganos cheques pre-dated for dates when their salaries 
come, they see Ciganos as benefiting from their own liability.  
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Just like in Keynesian England (Okely 1983) or socialist Hungary (Stewart 1997), 
then, Cigano economic activities emerge from within local economic circumstances. 
Similarly to Gypsies described by other anthropologists (see Gmelch 1986: 307-330), 
Calon in Bahia value autonomous ways of making money, o negócio. Although the term 
includes all sorts of buying and selling, at the time of my fieldwork, it referred primarily 
to lending money on interest “on the street” (na rua). As a young Calon in a small town 
near Salvador once told me, since Lula’s presidency it is difficult for Ciganos to do 
negócios, through selling and buying, and their only possibility is to lend money on 
interest. And concomitantly, Cigano has become a synonym for agiota, a moneylender.  
As with Gypsies elsewhere, the Calon ideology of negócio is embedded in local 
history and culture. Judith Okely, for instance, argued that the preference for making 
“chops”, deals, and self-employment among the English Travellers, can only be 
understood in the context of industrialisation and the creation of the English working-
class. Viewed from this angle, the Travellers represent those who refused to become 
proletarised. Michael Stewart showed that the market ideology of the Hungarian Rom, 
even their way of dressing, can be understood in relation to, and as an inversion of, an 
ideology of a self-sufficient Hungarian peasant. Calon negócio, described in this thesis, is 
also contiguous to dominant ideology. The idiom of “the street”, or of the movement and 
stillness, reflect the use of these expressions in Brazil in general (e.g. DaMatta 1997a). It 
is characteristic of the ethics associated with “the street”, for instance, in that it ignores 
both productive labour and hierarchical appropriation. For instance, as Candido (1993) 
pointed out, Almeida’s nineteenth-century novel Memórias de um sargento de milícias 
that depicted the first street trickster (malandro) in Brazilian literature, leaves out slaves 
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or slave-owners. In other words, despite being based in Rio de Janeiro of the period, a 
malandro sidesteps and ignores the predatory and hierarchical social relations of the 
slavery that formed the basis of the extroverted economic and social system of the period, 
the system in which he was largely impotent (cf. Marino 1982: 211-234).  
In the introduction, I used the term niche to describe this Cigano moneylending 
specialisation. On the one hand, I was referring to those studies of economic 
specialisation that tried to explain the specificity of Gypsy mode of making a living 
through exploiting temporary opportunities (e.g. Okely 1979: 17-34;Gmelch and Gmelch 
1987: 133-153;Rao 1987: 1-32). On the other hand, I drew inspiration from Guyer’s re-
theorisation of the concept of the niche, which she sees as a named specialist production, 
with specific standards, expertise and definitions, fully embedded in the commercial 
economy (Guyer 1997;2004: 173-191). Although normally the concept is associated with 
the images of natural adaptation or of dispersed customers waiting to be serviced, “the 
demand side”, I focused mainly on “the supply side”, that is, on ways Calon organise 
moneylending, how these activities fit Calon sociality and what conceptual apparatus 
related to this. In this way I wanted to avoid suggesting that there is any single cause for 
the rise of this specialisation but rather retain a sense of the niche’s historicity and 
cultural specificity.  
The increasing association between Ciganos and agiotas, builds, on the one hand, 
on the capacity of money to transgress and to negotiate distance and closeness through 
objectifying the external activities of the subject (Simmel 1990). Related to this move, 
through linking it to desires of others, money also stabilises personal identity in time and 
space and serves as a “memory bank” (Hart 2000). It is a way to extend towards “the 
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outside” and a way to produce “the inside”. Transactions between Ciganos and gaje, 
allow Calon to make money across the niche threshold, while the almost magical way of 
creating such unilateral flows serves for Calon to confirm the moral distinctiveness of 
their way of life.  
The exchanges depend on established features Ciganos have in Bahia. When 
lending money Calon constantly try to redefine transactions as impersonal, manipulating 
the image of Ciganos as being outside of established social relations, especially those of 
social debt, which lie at the heart of the small town sociality. Guyer’s analysis also has 
the advantage of focusing on the importance of standardisations that this niche involves. 
Interest on loans to juróns on the street usually follows an established temporal 
algorithm, where smaller loans involve withholding of predated cheques or bank-cards 
and low monthly interest, while more spectacular loans usually are over longer periods of 
time and involve the transfer of collateral and higher interest. As long as the Cigano 
knows who one is (one’s familial, employment or home ownership status), loans are easy 
to get. All of them are backed up by promissory notes, by more or less explicit threat of 
physical violence and by the impossibility of borrowing later. This is what gives the 
niche its temporary stability, or “objectivity” (Simmel 1990), in the monetary world with 
its myriad credit institutions, credit forms and money flows. 
My understanding of the term niche thus compares to the concept of “interstice”, 
which Pignarre and Stengers (2011) use to describe viable alternative modes of living 
within the present-day capitalism. According to them “[A]n interstice is defined neither 
against nor in relation to the bloc to which it nevertheless belongs. It creates its own 
dimensions starting from concrete processes that confer on it its consistency and scope, 
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what it concerns and who it concerns” (2011: 110). They draw inspiration from the 
science of materials, that “has learned to address them [materials] as the milieu for 
interstices, for faults, or fissures” (111). I see, for instance, Guyer’s (1997) description of 
competitive proliferation of interconnected niches in Yoruba economic life, or Roitman’s 
(2005) linking of pluralisation of economic activity to creation of ever novel 
unsanctioned forms of wealth generation at Cameroon’s moving frontier of wealth 
creation, as such milieus for interstices. As Pignarre and Stengers observe, interstices 
define what materials can do (e.g. what tension can be applied and when they breaks), but 
no single interstice has in itself power to cause do anything (2011: 111).  
 
Creating The Inside 
The niche or interstice presupposes creation of its own dimensions, and Calon use varied 
forms of monetary exchange – various types of loans that come with different names and 
standards and that specify relationships between parties involved – to constantly (re-
)create “morally informed spaces of interaction” (McCallum 2003: 71). In other words, 
throughout the thesis I have shown how money – primarily through rolos, a term that 
figuratively stands for “deals” or “swaps”, but connotes a rotation or a disturbance of 
order – serves to create what Patrick Williams (2003) called (heterogeneous Calon) 
“gaps” or “disturbances” – décalage, in French – in the otherwise homogeneous world of 
the non-Gypsies. Thus predatory but risky loans to dangerous brasileiros, contrast with 
the conceptual impossibility of loans to one’s enemies (who are always Calon) and to 
unknown Ciganos. Deals, or rolos, as agonistic exchanges between men who jealously 
guard their autonomy, dominate one’s home range, within which one moves throughout 
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most of one’s life and whence one’s wife comes. “Help” accompanies emotionally 
charged relations with one’s affinal relatives as well as gifts to one’s children, while 
small subsistence loans that help households survive on a day-to-day basis characterise 
one’s settlement. At the core of this linking of the social and physical space lies the 
dowry, which establishes households that form settlements and the existence of which 
also creates an imperative for Calon men to go onto “the street” and to multiply 
transactions especially with brasileiros. Calon assimilate the exchanges “on the street” 
that is dominated by brasileiros, and through linking this capacity to “bring meat” to 
other exchanges, they continuously produce the Calon inside.  
The production of the distinction between what can be heuristically termed as the 
“inside” and “outside” seems characteristic to trader and middlemen communities, whose 
members, primarily by means of money, transgress localities and make a living through 
extending outwards. Polish Górale described by Frances Pine (1999: 45-60), for instance, 
like Bahian Calon, embrace money-making and do not consider money as anti-social. 
Nevertheless, while they stress individualism, trickery and even predation in their dealing 
with the outsiders (as traders, smugglers or bandits), they see house and village 
collectivity as the “a correct moral social order” and through disguise, subterfuge, rituals 
and so on, fend off any intrusion of the more powerful outside. Unlike the Górale, the 
Hungarian Rom who ideologically also foreground their capabilities on the market, do 
not preserve their inside through anchoring it in the past, through, for instance, farming 
familial lands in the region historically associated with them. For the Rom, who live 
dispersed among unfriendly gadze, this inside is more radically embodied. It focuses, for 
instance, on guarding proper gender and sexual relations between a trader and his wife, 
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which in turn are seen as determining one’s relation to the gadze on the marketplace (see 
also Stewart 1997;Day, Papataxiarchis, and Stewart 1999: 1-24).  
For Calon too, the management of moneylending to brasileiros is related to the 
character of households, settlements, or the impact of violence. After a man marries, he 
becomes responsible for providing for his household through making money “on the 
street” (na rua), primarily through loans to other Calon and especially to brasileiros. This 
capacity to seize and create such opportunities is sometimes glossed over as “making the 
future” (fazer futuro), the ultimate aim of which is to establish oneself (estabelecer) and 
to be respected. This is seen as one’s strength, força, which is a level of potency as well 
as a capacity to impose on all demonstrations of manhood a sign of this potency – as a 
sort of generic value. One’s força is made visible in egalitarian agonistic deals or card 
games with other Calon, in his reputation among brasileiros and in living surrounded by 
his closest family who are willing to stand up for him – after all the successful weddings 
of his children are the main proof of his efficacy. Money inscribes the space of this 
potency: small loans criss-cross settlements, deferred agonistic payments among equals 
constantly create moments through which Calon manhood can be forged, while loans to 
juróns are presented as a source of easy living reflecting one’s skill.  
“Money on the street” (dinheiro na rua), which is seen as a whole made out 
various loans repayable at different dates, creates the environment against which one’s 
acts and relationships with others become visible, since this whole, characterised by the 
quantity of quality, registers any displacement of sums (Holbraad 2005: 231-254). This 
environment is individual and people constantly assess how a man behaves, whether he is 
willing to lend to his relatives or to pay for a huge wedding, in relation to the knowledge 
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they have of the money he has “on the street”. As Piasere argued, although one’s 
clientele, one’s “capital gāğikāno”, is important, the key concern are relationships 
between the Gypsies that are reproduced with reference to this “capital” (Piasere 1985: 
143-146;see also 1986: 1-4).  
Hence, if the neoliberal moment is characterised by decoupling production from 
social reproduction, whereby the latter is threatened, Calon, whose social reproduction 
was never based on fixed local relations and sources of authority, have used these new 
alignments to recreate themselves anew as Calon. The punctuation of temporality through 
events, especially times of repayment and renegotiation, which is seen as characteristic of 
the present-day era (Guyer 2006: 409-421;Piot 2010), is used as a tool to create an event-
full present in which Gypsyness is constantly created. Bahia today, too, represents “the 
time of the Gypsies”.  
 
Beyond Identity 
Like Gypsies elsewhere, the Calon in Bahia thus creatively “react” to the situation 
“offered” (Stewart 1987: 364), a process which I described as a creation of niches or 
interstices. Here, the non-Gypsies can be seen as “nature” (Piasere 1985) or a “given” 
(Ferrari 2010) from which proper culture needs to be created and differentiated. In 
addition, because social relations in Bahia thwart any easy attempt at applying concepts 
of “ethnic identity” and “ethnic groups” (at least until recent state-led multiculturalism), 
the case of the Bahian Calon makes even more visible what other anthropologists have 
pointed out before: that the logic of the dynamics by which Gypsyness is created out of 
relation with non-Gypsies is internal to Gypsy sociality. Co-ordinately, the point of the 
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anthropology of Gypsies should be to describe how such transformations take place. For 
instance, Ferrari (2010) interprets Calon vergonha, as the structural transformation of a 
cosmology of pollution that lies at the core of claim of distinctiveness of various 
populations of the Roma (e.g. Silverman 1981: 55-70). This is not to say that the there is 
something as the bounded Gypsy “culture” or self-identical reproduction. As Williams 
(2011: 43-56) points out, there are diverse tools of “amalgamation” and “separation” 
through which Gypsy “own culture” is created out of transformation of gadze elements. 
Here, even elements of the Indian “culture” should not been seen as “heritage” or 
“remnants” of the lost “wholeness”, but as witnesses to Gypsyness as it was created at the 
moment of interacting with the non-Gypsies on the Indian subcontinent (2011: 53). Such 
processes through which Gypsy “culture” is produced through assimilating gadze 
elements are not equivalent and some transformations can give rise to novel societal 
forms.  
In some sense then the main question is not of Gypsy identity, which in any case 
seems a non-question from the Bahian point of view, but the gadze alterity, where gadze 
refers generally to the non-Gypsy “outside”. But not only are there different populations 
of Gypsies – in Brazil, for instance, known as Kalderash and Calon caatingueiros –, but 
viewed from the point of view of Gypsies, gaje, juróns, payos, gorgios and so on, with 
whom they interact and from which Gypsyness is created in each moment by a specific 
population at a given location, are also not the same. Piasere suggested as much when he 
showed that three groups of Gypsies can variously react to the same surrounding situation 
(Piasere 1992: 289;see also Zatta and Piasere 1990: 163-172;Grill 2011: 79-102). In 
Brazil, for instance, at the beginning of the twentieth century while Calon avoided state 
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authorities, the recently arrived Roma readily used them in their internal conflicts 
between in-laws (xanamika), and most interestingly in the same way as the Rom who 
migrated to the United States during the same period (Salo 1988: 25-41).  
But if taken seriously, anthropologists cannot assume that processes such as 
industrialisation, loss of capability to make money through trading, or events such as 
wars will have for Gypsies -- who are focused on situational Gypsyness – the same 
meaning as they have for the non-Gypsies, or that they will be assimilated in the same 
manner. To paraphrase Peter Gow (2001: 7-8), if Calon can take the punctuation of time 
through events and novel financial flows by which neoliberalism has inserted itself into 
people’s lives as the very stuff from which they generate moments for Gypsyness and 
Calon sociality, “then clearly this history was no longer, in any meaningful sense, our 
common history”.  
For instance, the Calon I knew were not bothered about the end of “nomadism” 
and the itinerant trade with animals despite the proclamations of some journalists or 
activists. Of course, when asked directly, they would say that lives of “before” (antes) 
differed from today. But, unlike the activists and the journalist who see history as 
transcendental and somewhat external to the everyday (cf. McCallum 2000: 375-401), the 
split between “before” and “after” does not describe a movement of a group from A to B 
over time considered as transcendent; while the non-Gypsies tend to see Ciganos as one 
group among many, Calon do not imagine themselves as a group in the first place. Nor 
does it signify a loss (of “tradition”) through acculturation, marking Ciganos in the 
present as somehow forever incomplete. For the Calon I knew, the discursive split 
between “before” and “today” served as a way to show respect to one’s dead; ultimately 
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it was also the recognition of the necessity of change. The split thus called the attention to 
creating proper Gypsyness through individual behaviours in the present and: by 
associating the anonymous dead of the “before” with travel (viagem), Calon men 
engendered a chain of questions about dangers of “still life” for their Gypsyness. The 
threat of the fixed domicile, for instance, was countered with constant physical movement 
and circulating the money “on the street”.   
To use Sahlins’ expressions (1985: viii), while the end of the demand for animals 
in the interior of Bahia or financialisation of the past two decades, might have been 
events “externally induced”, the emergence of the moneylending niche was 
“orchestrated” by Calon themselves. This “orchestration” is difficult to see, because 
unlike Captain Cook, gadze do not come in boats from outside. There is no “initial event” 
which created “the situation of contact” (Turner 1988), but, from the point of view of 
Gypsyness, gadze have always served as its “outside” (e.g. Zatta and Piasere 1990: 163-
172). Today, Calon lives are fully embedded in the monetary economy, while their way 
of making a living is produced from the system itself through “symbolic refraction” 
(Viveiros de Castro 2011: 13) following a logic of transformation internal to Calon 
(Ferrari 2010). Here moneylending to brasileiros, deferred payments to Calon and 
technologies of monetary management, such as bank accounts and promissory notes, 
although continuous with non-Gypsy practices serve as tools for (re-)creating Gypsyness. 
And in this process, through attaining certain stability over time, a recognisable social 
form – a Cigano moneylending niche – emerges.    
 
GLOSSARY 
 
Throughout the thesis Portuguese and Romani (Rom.) words are defined the first time 
they appear. Below I provide brief definitions of the most important words and 
expressions, or those that appeared several times; I focus on usage most relevant within 
the context of my ethnography.  
 
acampamento Cigano gypsy camp 
agiota  moneylender; usurer 
ajuda  help (verb: ajudar) 
antes  in the past 
aposentadoria retirement benefit 
atrapalhado confused; misleading; disturbed; complicated (verb: atrapalhar) 
barganha exchange involving small things  
bandido criminal; an outlaw 
besta  beast of burden; fig. a fool  
bolsa família conditional family cash benefit 
caden/radens (Rom.)  money  
calote unpaid debt or one acquired without any intention of repaying it (tomar 
calote – to accept a loss through an unpaid debt) 
Candomblé Afro-Brazilian religion 
chibe (Rom.) name for a form of Romani spoken by Calon 
Cigano desconhecido  unfamiliar and potentially dangerous Cigano 
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cobrador  person who collects (e.g. debt payments) 
colega  peer; comrade 
Communidade Tradicional A community or a people defined by the state as 
“traditional” 
corretor middleman 
CPF  Cadastro de Pessoa Física, personal identification number  
crediário system of sale on installments by commercial establishments; an account 
opened in such establishment 
crédito consignado  loan from an official financial institution whereby a 
payment is directly deducted from one’s bank account 
degredo decree; in the past also sentencing people to galleys or exile 
degredado person exiled on the basis of a royal degredo 
dinheiro money; cash 
direto  frank; open; honest  
esperto quick-witted and efficient person  
empréstimo loan 
enrolado complicated; bluffing (verb: enrolar) 
estabelecer to fix one’s residence, to install, to make oneself 
família one’s immediate family 
farinha starchy manioc flour, a local staple 
fazendeiro a proprietor of agricultural land; a farmer 
fazer futuro to open up and seize opportunities; to be active  
fiado  bought or sold on credit 
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financeira non-bank financial institution 
feiticeira sorceress  
feitiço  spell; a charm 
festa  party, festival or a celebration 
força  strength 
futuro  future; what is to come; destiny; luck  
garantia collateral 
homem man; masculine self 
inimigo enemy 
juro  interest 
laje (Rom.) shame  
letra  promissory note or a contract 
liso  smooth; fig. without any money (see puro) 
malandro astute and conniving individual living by his wits  
mascate itinerant trader 
moleque black young man or a boy; a punk (an insult) 
morto  dead; fig. incapable of achieving things (see mulon) 
mulon (Rom.) dead (see morto) 
negócio transaction; commerce  
nota promissória a promissory note 
o povo  the people 
original original (e.g. product) 
parado without movement; inexpressive; without vivacity  
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paraguaio counterfeit; smuggled from Paraguay; of low quality  
parente a relative 
Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) Worker’s Party 
perigoso dangerous 
pistoleiro (hired) gunman 
praça  public square; plaza 
prazo  due date 
prejuízo (financial) loss 
puro  clear; fig. without any money (see liso) 
quilombo maroon community 
quintal courtyard of a house 
Real (R$) Brazilian currency 
Recôncavo the area around the Bay of All Saints, Bahia 
respeito respect; consideration; fear 
rico  rich 
rifa  raffle 
rolo confusion; rotation; disturbance; fig. a swap or a deal (see negócio, troca, 
barganha) 
rua   street 
São João Saint John; the June festival 
sem futuro without future (see futuro, fazer futuro) 
sertão      semi arid hinterland, backlands  
sofrido somebody or something that went through hardship 
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traficante drug dealer 
trato  agreement; agreement between two families to conclude a marriage  
troca  swap; exchange of small things  
turma  cohort; group of Ciganos used to camping together over a period  
vagabundo vagrant; person who leads disreputable life 
valente valiant, brave 
vergonha shame; fig. worth, honour (see laje) 
vingança revenge, feud 
violência violence 
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